Please help me understand free will

[Sair]

They are indeed the same, but not in the way that you’re thinking.

You’ve hit on something very important here when you say “in our own experience”. The analogy you describe reflects only our limitations of understanding, not a limitation on God’s part. God can have a plan without violating our free will, as bizarre as that sounds. We’re just not able to understand it because we’re finite creatures and He is infinite.

That’s accurate. Nothing ever surprises God.

You’re almost there. To our limited way of understanding, it would be useless to hope or plan for salvation, but not for God.

Consider this: God knows (from all eternity) that certain people will end up in Hell. But He doesn’t want anyone to go to Hell…how can this seeming contradiction be true??

I think the answer is that God also designs each person’s life (again from outside time) so that we’re all given every possible opportunity to make the right choices, but we’re never given so much grace that it would violate our free will. God knows exactly how far he can “encourage” or “nudge” each of us without ever forcing us. It’s always our fault if we end up in Hell, and just because God has the ability to see (from all eternity) that we will make the wrong choice, doesn’t mean that He didn’t do everything short of violating our free will to help us make the right choice.

Hope that is helpful.

I’m afraid it’s not so much helpful as sounding like a get-out-of-jail-free clause for God - special pleading, I guess, is the more philosophically formal term. As much as it might seem reasonable to say, “Well, we just can’t understand the way God sees time” or “We can’t comprehend the way God knows”, that doesn’t actually tell us anything useful, or counteract the problem that if the future is actually able to be known, in any concrete sense, rather than just guessed or predicted, then in some way it already exists and could not be other than what it is known to be.

If God already knows we will make certain choices, it seems like rather a waste of time trying to change what is already fixed, certain and inevitable by offering the occasional ‘nudge’.

 

[Sair]

Divine knowledge does **not **entail a fixed and unchangeable future because God transcends time and space! To think otherwise is to put the Creator in the same category as that which He has created - which is clearly absurd.

Special pleading!

What does it actually mean for God to be ‘outside time’ anyway? That he can see the beginning and the end and everything in between? That doesn’t make the future, from our point of view, any less fixed just because God is supposedly looking in from the outside. If it’s known to be, it can’t be otherwise.

 

[Sair]

There is two senses of “future” that are expressed in different contexts. There is what might happen, and there is also what will happen. When we talk about what might happen, this simply represents a limit in our knowledge. Its an epistemological limitation relative to our physical states. But there is also that which will happen, and this is simply everything that will occur regardless of our knowledge.

If it is in fact true that i will decide to go to the shop tomorrow, then it is simply true that this is what will happen tomorrow. That does not mean that i am not the one who freely chose to go to the shops. If i am going to be hit by lightning tomorrow then it is true that tomorrow i am going to be hit by lightning, but that does not mean that i am not the one who freely went to the place where lightning just happens to strike. It just means that it is true that it will happen. Some event in the future will have some kind of effect on me; this general metaphysical statement is true, and yet has no effect on my freewill in terms of actions. Things will happen in the future so long as there is a future.

God having knowledge of what will happen, doesn’t change the fact that i am the one that made it happen. It just means that God knows what is true. It is also true that God cannot know me as doing something different to what he already knows, because it is not true that i did something different. My actions have determined what will happen, not Gods knowledge. Truth doesn’t have to be linear. What will be true is true, and God knows that truth, from his perspective insofar as he is timeless and non-physical and is the act of reality. There is nothing about God knowing all truth that conflicts with our free actions unless you choose to limit God to the confines of physical laws.

The future is fixed in the sense that it will happen, but in order for there to be a future things have to happen in the here and now. The future is not an independent entity.

Therefore i don’t see a contradiction. A Contradiction arises for you, becuase you are treating future-states as if it is not something caused by or actualized by that which is in the here and now

This is pretty much the same argument that one might use for physical determinism entailing a lack of free will. The main difference is that with physical determinism, there is no foreknowledge, therefore the things that happen in the here and now are, indeed, what bring about the future and we have no way of actually knowing what it will be until we get there.

On the other hand, if the existence of divine foreknowledge is taken as given, all it would take - I say, for the sake of argument - would be a conversation with God, and we would have the ability not merely to predict probabilities, but to know exactly how the future will be. Where would freedom of choice, free will, be then?

I am certainly not treating future states as not being caused or actualised by the present - that I leave to those who imagine this entity that has foreknowledge of the future, implying that on some level, the future already exists to be known.

I still don’t see how the divine foreknowledge argument can be considered to allow free will, especially as it is adopted by those who already reject physical determinism for the very reason that it seems to disallow the possibility of free will. It would seem that under either system, the future is equally inevitable. A foreknowing God seems surplus to requirements at that point.

 

[InJesusItrust]

God is not a temporal being that knows the future. God is a transcendent being to whom the future already is. He can already see the sum of your choices at all times, but they remain your own choices. The problem is that people think of God being bound by time. If He isn’t our paradoxical understanding is idiotic.

 

[fred_conty]

This is pretty much the same argument that one might use for physical determinism entailing a lack of free will. The main difference is that with physical determinism, there is no foreknowledge, therefore the things that happen in the here and now are, indeed, what bring about the future and we have no way of actually knowing what it will be until we get there.

On the other hand, if the existence of divine foreknowledge is taken as given, all it would take - I say, for the sake of argument - would be a conversation with God, and we would have the ability not merely to predict probabilities, but to know exactly how the future will be. Where would freedom of choice, free will, be then?

I am certainly not treating future states as not being caused or actualised by the present - that I leave to those who imagine this entity that has foreknowledge of the future, implying that on some level, the future already exists to be known.

I still don’t see how the divine foreknowledge argument can be considered to allow free will, especially as it is adopted by those who already reject physical determinism for the very reason that it seems to disallow the possibility of free will. It would seem that under either system, the future is equally inevitable. A foreknowing God seems surplus to requirements at that point.

In discussing free will, God’s foreknowledge, and other ideas relating to these, the first thing we do know is that there is no precision certainty how these all work together without interfering with each other or taking over one another. We do the best we can when we are looking into the mind of the creator and attempting to understand difficult concepts.

One thing we know is that we are free and not forced, and yet this does not interfere with God’s complete control or his complete foreknowledge.

But freedom by one and complete control by another seems contradictory. I would agree, it does. But we know that it is never the less true. And how to explain it is quite a problem.

However, we can experience the truth of our freedom everyday. But God’s complete control is another matter which we rarely experience. But the clue to this is that God is exorcising complete control when we exorcise his gift of freedom, or it is built into his decision to make us free. And there are other times when he leads us in a special way or ways again exorcising his complete control without seeming to be doing it in a natural process.

His foreknowledge too does not interfere with what we decide to do. For a man on a high place can forsee two cars about to collide but he is not responsible for making them collide.

Can a 6 year old child talk about Einstein’s theory? We may know somethings, but we are at the bottom rung of the ladder for a lot more.

Just a thought.

 

[lemondiesel]

It’s an analogy. God knows h because he is God. God allows us totally free choice. There’s no contradiction, is the point.

If you already have your mind made up, why did you ask for help understanding? Believe whatever you want. Won’t change the fact: without freewill life is meaningless.

I just don’t find purpose in believing when he already knew whether or not we were going to.What if being a non believer is what makes me a ‘better’ person?

 

[lemondiesel]

To think otherwise is to put the Creator in the same category as that which He has created - which is clearly absurd.

Jesus?

 

[ReapReason]

This is pretty much the same argument that one might use for physical determinism entailing a lack of free will.

This is pretty much putting words in my mouth without explaining why my argument and the argument for physical determinism is the same. If everything is essentially physical, then yes there is no freewill; there are just physical actions and reactions. But that has nothing to do with my argument. You have failed to understand what i was saying.

On the other hand, if the existence of divine foreknowledge is taken as given, all it would take - I say, for the sake of argument - would be a conversation with God, and we would have the ability not merely to predict probabilities, but to know exactly how the future will be. Where would freedom of choice, free will, be then?

This is a different argument from what you have originally stated. You are now asking can God tell you what you are going to do and yet leave you with the freedom to not do it. But that is besides the point, since even if that were impossible it does not tell us that it is impossible for God to know our future and grant us freewill at the same time. It would only tell us that it is impossible for God to tell us our future and at the same time grant us freewill.

In general, the question of “God” knowing our future free choices is not an insurmountable problem once you take Gods nature into consideration; such as the fact that he is non-physical and therefore not confined to any particular event in time. God does not know things before they happen in a linear sense. He simply knows all physical truth because of his non-physical perspective of physical reality.

If the future is made up of our free choices, then you cannot say that knowledge of that future destroys our freedom to choose. Gods knowledge of the future is fixed, but that does not mean that God does not have knowledge of our free choices.

 

[Sair]

God is not a temporal being that knows the future. God is a transcendent being to whom the future already is. He can already see the sum of your choices at all times, but they remain your own choices. The problem is that people think of God being bound by time. If He isn’t our paradoxical understanding is idiotic.

For the thrust of the argument, I don’t think it matters whether God is in any measure a temporal being or not. If the future - that is, what is ‘future’ to us, from our temporal perspective - already is in any sense, then it is as determined (by the fact of already existing, no less) as if the argument from physical determinism against free will were actually the case. Yes, it’s still us making the choices in both cases (who else could it be, really?) but our choices, as such, could not be other than what they are determined to be (by prior circumstances) or are already (in the sense of being known from a nontemporal perspective). The concept of libertarian free will appears doomed in either case.

 

[Sair]

This is pretty much putting words in my mouth without explaining why my argument and the argument for physical determinism is the same. If everything is essentially physical, then yes there is no freewill; there are just physical actions and reactions. But that has nothing to do with my argument. You have failed to understand what i was saying.

This is a different argument from what you have originally stated. You are now asking can God tell you what you are going to do and yet leave you with the freedom to not do it. But that is besides the point, since even if that were impossible it does not tell us that it is impossible for God to know our future and grant us freewill at the same time. It would only tell us that it is impossible for God to tell us our future and at the same time grant us freewill.

Apologies if I did not fully grasp your argument, but I think the above actually does demonstrate the underlying similarity between arguments against free will, either from divine foreknowledge or from physical determinism. You appear to be saying that it is only our own knowledge of our future behaviour or future circumstances that negates the freedom to choose something other than what we know will happen. That claim negates both arguments against free will, since under physical determinism, we know no more of our own future circumstances than we do if God simply refuses to share his knowledge with us.

That being the case, my real question is - how can those who reject physical determinism on the grounds that it cancels out free will then actually accept the concept of divine foreknowledge? It seems indubitable to me that this also cancels out any genuine possibility of libertarian free will.

I am not saying this as someone who believes in libertarian free will - I don’t, at this point, think it’s a workable concept. My real query is, as I said, why be an opponent of physical determinism whilst at the same time championing the concept of divine foreknowledge?

 

[ReapReason]

Apologies if I did not fully grasp your argument, but I think the above actually does demonstrate the underlying similarity between arguments against free will, either from divine foreknowledge or from physical determinism. You appear to be saying that it is only our own knowledge of our future behaviour or future circumstances that negates the freedom to choose something other than what we know will happen. That claim negates both arguments against free will, since under physical determinism, we know no more of our own future circumstances than we do if God simply refuses to share his knowledge with us.

That being the case, my real question is - how can those who reject physical determinism on the grounds that it cancels out free will then actually accept the concept of divine foreknowledge? It seems indubitable to me that this also cancels out any genuine possibility of libertarian free will.

I am not saying this as someone who believes in libertarian free will - I don’t, at this point, think it’s a workable concept. My real query is, as I said, why be an opponent of physical determinism whilst at the same time championing the concept of divine foreknowledge?

You have not addressed what i have said: in fact it seems like you are ignoring what i have said.

My argument is simply that if God is not an intrinsic part of the physical space-time continuum, if he transcends space-time, then it follows that God knows all space-time events, since his essential nature or knowledge is not limited by or contained within in any particular physical reference point. Relative to your physical state, the future has not happened yet; it is not actual. But once you stand outside the space time continuum it becomes meaningless to speak of the future, since all physical states that would ever come to be are relatively actual; given your perspective from outside the space-time continuum.

Thus Gods knowledge of your actions is simply knowledge of all actual states from a timeless perspective. Its already happened for God; while from our relative physical perspective it has not happened. The general theory of relativity provides a good analogy for this.

Given these factors, i see no intrinsic contradiction between freewill, and God knowing your future, since from Gods timeless perspective, God simply knows what you did, rather than what you are going to do.

 

[Sair]

You have not addressed what i have said: in fact it seems like you are ignoring what i have said.

My argument is simply that if God is not an intrinsic part of the physical space-time continuum, if he transcends space-time, then it follows that God knows all space-time events, since his essential nature or knowledge is not limited by or contained within in any particular physical reference point. Relative to your physical state, the future has not happened yet; it is not actual. But once you stand outside the space time continuum it becomes meaningless to speak of the future, since all physical states that would ever come to be are relatively actual; given your perspective from outside the space-time continuum.

Thus Gods knowledge of your actions is simply knowledge of all actual states from a timeless perspective. Its already happened for God; while from our relative physical perspective it has not happened. The general theory of relativity provides a good analogy for this.

Given these factors, i see no intrinsic contradiction between freewill, and God knowing your future, since from Gods timeless perspective, God simply knows what you did, rather than what you are going to do.

It seems to me that you are also ignoring what I have argued - if what is the ‘future’ from our perspective already exists such that it can be known, then it already exists, whether we know it or not. God might as well be irrelevant except as a being that can know what already is.

Free will is cancelled out if our actions are in any way fixed - if they are knowable, even to a being outside of time, then they are fixed, inevitable, certain - knowledge implies no less. No freedom, on our part, exists, except from our temporal perspective of not knowing the future - and this is the same situation that obtains if physical determinism is the case (assuming, of course, that physical determinism entails inevitability, which has not actually been established).

 

[Bradski]

Thus Gods knowledge of your actions is simply knowledge of all actual states from a timeless perspective. Its already happened for God; while from our relative physical perspective it has not happened.

If we all had free will then there would be an infinite number of choices we could make and therefore there would be an infinite number of future states.

But…God apparently knows (from ‘outside’ time if you will), which one of the infinite states will occur. Each choice I make will result in that particular future. In fact, from a perspective outside time, it has already happened and I have already made those choices.

If I have already made a choice, I cannot ‘unmake’ it. There was only one option available. If there is only one option available to me, then I cannot be said to have free will.

 

[ReapReason]

If we all had free will then there would be an infinite number of choices we could make and therefore there would be an infinite number of future states.

Firstly, freewill does not require that one be able to make an infinite number of choices. Secondly, why should a potentially infinite amount of possibilities mean that there must be an actually infinite number of physical states in the future?

 

[ReapReason]

If we all had free will then there would be an infinite number of choices we could make and therefore there would be an infinite number of future states.

But…God apparently knows (from ‘outside’ time if you will), which one of the infinite states will occur. Each choice I make will result in that particular future. In fact, from a perspective outside time, it has already happened and I have already made those choices.

If I have already made a choice, I cannot ‘unmake’ it.

Relatively speaking you have made that choice; relative to Gods timeless perspective. From your perspective as a physical object, the future is not actual yet. Its irrelevant that you cannot unmake what you are freely going to do in the future. You still made that choice freely.

 

[nuntym]

+JMJ+

Free Will is a theoretical concept; for all practical purposes there is no such thing.

God gives you a “free will” and for the most part you can do whatever you want. But if you don’t do it “His way” there are dire consequences.

So what choice do you really have?

Free will is all about limitations and consequences. If I go to church, I renounce the right to go now to the mall, or to the golf course, or to watch TV, or anything else.

Free will is also all about manning up to the responsibilities of the choices you’ve made. Hell is just as a product of free will as heaven is.

Stupid people are those who think free will is all about keeping one’s choices open.

 

[Bradski]

Firstly, freewill does not require that one be able to make an infinite number of choices. Secondly, why should a potentially infinite amount of possibilities mean that there must be an actually infinite number of physical states in the future?

Apologies, I meant a ‘potential’ number of future states. If I have two choices, then there are two potential future states. I have literally unlimited choices each day, as does everyone else, so there are unlimited potential future states.

However, according to you, there is only one. God, existing outside of time, already knows what the future state will be tomorrow. He is after all omniescent. Therefore, if I have the choice of going to church or playing golf, he knows that I will play golf. The two options are apparently available to me and I appear to make the choice with free will, but I cannot change my future. It is pre-ordained.

Free will is the ability to change one potential future to another. If there is only one future available, then I cannot change it and by definition, there is no free will.

 

[ReapReason]

Apologies, I meant a ‘potential’ number of future states. If I have two choices, then there are two potential future states. I have literally unlimited choices each day, as does everyone else, so there are unlimited potential future states.

However, according to you, there is only one. God, existing outside of time, already knows what the future state will be tomorrow.

Not true. You do have a number of choices that you can freely make. God, relative to his non-physical timeless nature, simply knows what choice you made. God only knows it because it happened.

 

[Bradski]

Not true. You do have a number of choices that you can freely make. God, relative to his non-physical timeless nature, simply knows what choice you made. God only knows it because it happened.

So there’s a number of choices I could make. Let’s say A, B and C. It appears that I have three from which to choose, but God knows I have already picked B.

It appears to me as if I have free choice because I can choose any one, but in fact I cannot make any choice other than B. It is the illusion of free choice.

 

[tonyrey]

So there’s a number of choices I could make. Let’s say A, B and C. It appears that I have three from which to choose, but God knows I have already picked B.

It appears to me as if I have free choice because I can choose any one, but in fact I cannot make any choice other than B. It is the illusion of free choice.

Your concept of God is defective because even we can predict with a very high degree of probability what people will choose - unless they are insane…