POLL on understanding of economic Procession

[Aramis]

Dear brother Aramis,

I can see the statement could be interpreted in various ways. I think you took it to mean: “I’m not sure and I need guidance on it.”

When I included that option, my thinking was:

“SInce the Church has not dogmatized it, I haven’t really thought about it. So I’m not sure.”

I think the latter aligns somewhat to what you are saying?

It can be taken in both senses, for the practical purposes of the poll.

Blessings,
Marduk

Nowhere near. It’s an unhealthy pursuit, one best left to simply accepting that we are better off NOT thinking about it.

 

[jeannetherese]

LOL!
I came to this thread, thinking we were going to discuss economics: a bit of capitalist theory versus a marxist interpretation of the election and the global situation…
Now I need to see if i can find a Catholic definition of economic procession in my Catechism:thumbsup:.
From here on out, I’m lurking on this thread.

 

[Phillip_Rolfes]

I voted for number one with some slight reservations and a desire for some clarification. My reservation is due in large part to my own ignorance. Trinitarian theology, whether it be the Trinity in its essence or the Trinity in its economic workings, has never been a strong point for me. A priest I know used to always say that one couldn’t talk about the Trinity for more than five minutes without falling into some heresy.

I believe part of the problem that Constantine might be having is that in Byzantine theology, unless I’ve misunderstood everything (a very real possibility), traditionally one does not speak of the economic workings of the Trinity without relating it to the essential/eternal/inner workings of the Trinity itself since the economic workings of the Trinity are a manifestation of the inner workings of the Trinity in time and space. To my mind this would imply that the Father communicates the fullness of the Spirit to us through the Son, but, as you mentioned, we as creatures can only experience this fullness through the divine Energies.

I’ll admit here that my own understanding is more than a little fuzzy. I’ll also admit that the fuzziness is increased since I’ve just recently woken up due to my daughter being sick and I haven’t yet finished my morning coffee. Trinitarian theology, again, has never been my strong point. I’ve preferred to simply immerse myself in the mystery rather than try and understand it intellectually… but I admit that I do need to put the effort into a bit better intellectual understanding.

 

[mardukm]

Nowhere near. It’s an unhealthy pursuit, one best left to simply accepting that we are better off NOT thinking about it.

I actually agree with that. In fact, I suggested that in the other thread on filioque, but the EO member with whom I was having the dialogue did not agree, and continued to discuss the matter. That’s part of the reason I started this thread. From my end, I am assuming our discussion on this matter is purely academic, and does not affect my personal Faith one way or the other, nor, especially, does the matter affect the unity of our Churches in the Faith.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

The first can be interpreted in two ways. Do we receive the essence of God without experiencing it, or do we not receive the essence of God? In other words, is our inability to experience the essence of God real or is it merely conceptual?

I was equating “receiving” with “experiencing.” I’m confident most Easterns and Orientals (Catholic or Orthodox) would have interpreted it that way.

And so with any operation like sanctification which is shared by all three, when we are said to be sanctified by the Holy Spirit, does this mean that we are sanctified by the Holy Spirit alone, or by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit acting as one principle.

As the Fathers indicate, no one action of any Person in the Economy is devoid of the participation of another.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[mardukm]

Dear brother Philip,

I agree with everything you say.

On another level, we can distinguish between the Economic workings and the internal/eternal workings of the Godhead in one way - namely, while it is a sure theological fact that in the Economy, the action of one Person is not devoid of the participation of any other Person in that action, as far as the internal/eternal workings of the Godhead, the Father does not participate in the Son’s Hypostatic Property of Sonship (and all that it uniquely entails) or the Holy Spirit’s Hypostatic Property as the one Who Proceeds (and all that it uniquely entails), the Son does not participate in Fatherhood (and all that it uniquely entails) or the Holy Spirit’s Hypostatic Property as the one Who Proceeds (and all that it uniquely entails), and the Holy Spirit does not participate in Fatherhood (and all that it uniquely entails) or Sonship (and all that it uniquely entails).

Is that something we can all agree on?

Blessings,
Marduk

I voted for number one with some slight reservations and a desire for some clarification. My reservation is due in large part to my own ignorance. Trinitarian theology, whether it be the Trinity in its essence or the Trinity in its economic workings, has never been a strong point for me. A priest I know used to always say that one couldn’t talk about the Trinity for more than five minutes without falling into some heresy.

I believe part of the problem that Constantine might be having is that in Byzantine theology, unless I’ve misunderstood everything (a very real possibility), traditionally one does not speak of the economic workings of the Trinity without relating it to the essential/eternal/inner workings of the Trinity itself since the economic workings of the Trinity are a manifestation of the inner workings of the Trinity in time and space. To my mind this would imply that the Father communicates the fullness of the Spirit to us through the Son, but, as you mentioned, we as creatures can only experience this fullness through the divine Energies.

I’ll admit here that my own understanding is more than a little fuzzy. I’ll also admit that the fuzziness is increased since I’ve just recently woken up due to my daughter being sick and I haven’t yet finished my morning coffee. Trinitarian theology, again, has never been my strong point. I’ve preferred to simply immerse myself in the mystery rather than try and understand it intellectually… but I admit that I do need to put the effort into a bit better intellectual understanding.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I was equating “receiving” with “experiencing.” I’m confident most Easterns and Orientals (Catholic or Orthodox) would have interpreted it that way.

So was the world created according to nature or according to energy? If essence and energy are indistinguishable in reality, then it stands to reason that we were made according to both, does it not?

As the Fathers indicate, no one action of any Person in the Economy is devoid of the participation of another.

What eternal energy is devoid of the participation of the others? Is the divine will or the divine foreknowledge worked only by one or two in eternity or by all three?

 

[mardukm]

So was the world created according to nature or according to energy? If essence and energy are indistinguishable in reality, then it stands to reason that we were made according to both, does it not?

I wouldn’t say that the Essence and Energy are indistinguishable, but inseparable (i,.e., not ontologically distinct). Since Energy is of the Essence inseparably, yes I would say that creation was done according to Essence and Energy. But from the creature’s perspective, it is only Energy that can be experienced/received. In the words of the Fathers, we receive/experience of God only according to what our nature can receive/experience – created nature can only receive/experience the Energy. But just because we can only receive/experience Energy due to the fact that this is all our nature is capable of receiving/experiencing, that does not mean that such a restriction or condition exists in God Himself. Thus, in God, Essence/Energy are never separated.

What eternal energy is devoid of the participation of the others?

None

Is the divine will or the divine foreknowledge worked only by one or two in eternity or by all three?

All three.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

I wouldn’t say that the Essence and Energy are indistinguishable, but inseparable (i,.e., not ontologically distinct). Since Energy is of the Essence inseparably, yes I would say that creation was done according to Essence and Energy. But from the creature’s perspective, it is only Energy that can be experienced/received.

But this contradicts both St. Cyril and St. Athanasius, both of whom taught that the Son is begotten according to nature, and the world was created according to energy, and that this is what distinguishes the Only-Begotten Son from creatures. If essence and energy are ‘inseparable’ in the sense Duns Scotus uses the term (that one cannot exist without the other), then I would agree, but if one argues like it has been argued here, that essence and energy are inseparable, such that the world was created according to both, then I must disagree.

In the words of the Fathers, we receive/experience of God only according to what our nature can receive/experience – created nature can only receive/experience the Energy. But just because we can only receive/experience Energy due to the fact that this is all our nature is capable of receiving/experiencing, that does not mean that such a restriction or condition exists in God Himself. Thus, in God, Essence/Energy are never separated.

So then if essence and energy are inseparable, it follows that the very Word was begotten according to the will of God, the providence of God, and the creative power of God, such that Christ God would not be God at all, but rather a creature, as the Arians believed.

None

All three.

Why then is it necessary to qualify the statement that no action of one person is devoid of the participation of the others, with “in the economy”, when this is also true in eternity? The only reason why I could think of is if one were to account begetting and procession as ‘actions’, but even then, the distinction should not be between economy and eternity but between what is common and what is unique to only one hypostasis.

 

[mardukm]

But this contradicts both St. Cyril and St. Athanasius, both of whom taught that the Son is begotten according to nature, and the world was created according to energy, and that this is what distinguishes the Only-Begotten Son from creatures.

How does this contradict what I stated? I stated that Creation is created according to Essence and Energy in the sense that Energy is OF the Essence, not that Energy IS Essence.

If essence and energy are ‘inseparable’ in the sense Duns Scotus uses the term (that one cannot exist without the other), then I would agree, but if one argues like it has been argued here, that essence and energy are inseparable, such that the world was created according to both, then I must disagree.

If that is what Duns Scotus means, I am using it in that sense. To be perfectly conscise, Essence and Energy are inseparable (i.e., one depends on the other) by virtue of sheer necessity because Energy is of the Essence. In distinction, the Persons are inseparable (i.e., one depends on another) not out of necessity but by virtue of natural, Divine Will (recall that this is the difference I pointed out in the other thread), as St.Basil explicitly teaches.

So then if essence and energy are inseparable, it follows that the very Word was begotten according to the will of God, the providence of God, and the creative power of God, such that Christ God would not be God at all, but rather a creature, as the Arians believed.

I don’t see how that follows. Can you this claim. However, I do affirm that the relationship between the Persons is borne of natural, Divine Will.

Why then is it necessary to qualify the statement that no action of one person is devoid of the participation of the others, with “in the economy”, when this is also true in eternity?

I explained it to brother Philip in post#45.

The only reason why I could think of is if one were to account begetting and procession as ‘actions’

Yes, the begetting and procession can be accounted as natural operations within the Godhead that no creature can comprehend in the least.

but even then, the distinction should not be between economy and eternity but between what is common and what is unique to only one hypostasis.

If it is something unfathomable to creatures, then the distinction can be made.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

How does this contradict what I stated? I stated that Creation is created according to Essence and Energy in the sense that Energy is OF the Essence, not that Energy IS Essence.

Either the world is created according to nature or it is not. I for one prefer to stay in the company of the Fathers who taught that it is not.

If that is what Duns Scotus means, I am using it in that sense. To be perfectly conscise, Essence and Energy are inseparable (i.e., one depends on the other) by virtue of sheer necessity because Energy is of the Essence.

This alone is not enough, however, to establish that two things are inseparable. Things are separable if and only if one of them is capable of existing without the other. In this case, it has been established that energy cannot exist without essence, but the opposite has not been established. Essence and energy have a two way dependency, one could argue, which makes them inseparable. This inseparability does not, however, mean that the world was created according to nature.

In distinction, the Persons are inseparable (i.e., one depends on another) not out of necessity but by virtue of natural, Divine Will (recall that this is the difference I pointed out in the other thread), as St.Basil explicitly teaches.

Where does St. Basil teach this?

I don’t see how that follows. Can you this claim. However, I do affirm that the relationship between the Persons is borne of natural, Divine Will.

The Arian Son is begotten according to the divine will. The Son, whom we worship as our God, however, was begotten according to nature, not will.

Yes, the begetting and procession can be accounted as natural operations within the Godhead that no creature can comprehend in the least.

If it is something unfathomable to creatures, then the distinction can be made.

Yet the divine will, divine justice, divine knowledge, etc. are all incomprehensible. It is still better to affirm that something is either proper to one or to all three.

 

[GaryTaylor]

The energies are contingent to the essense. One would not exist without the other. My postion is not that Essense “is” Energy but its action/work, The being of God resides in both. In other words there is no seperation.

If we for example have a power source for power as the grid of Texas. All are supplied energy from the power source in Texas. The energy distributed to a home, is not equal to the power supplied by its source, but it is energy directly contingent to the Source and and extension of it. Now when you or I flick the light switch which is your cooperation with the energy, we see the energy transmitted, thus acknowledge its presence=energy. You flick the switch in “faith” that light will come on. Or there is a break in continuity and the energy is not transmitted.

Now when we say essense, though in my example we can see this, with essence/energy, we cannot and understand “essense”. here resides the difference in understanding.

Or I don’t get it and missed the entire concept.

Nature above threw me off. yet we can only view the from East/West understanding with the hypostitic union. human/Divine nature. Here we see predestination and cooperation with free-will, and the contingent that free-will plays on Grace or Energy which resides in Communion with God, or a yes to God.

Did I hit heresy yet?

 

[mardukm]

Either the world is created according to nature or it is not. I for one prefer to stay in the company of the Fathers who taught that it is not.

I believe what the Fathers meant when they say that the world is not created “according to nature” is that creation does not share in the Essence of God, not that it is not God (Essence and Energy entire) who creates. I believe it is very dangerous and improper to conceive of a God who is Essence, and a God who is Energy, and only the God who is Energy is the one creating.

This alone is not enough, however, to establish that two things are inseparable. Things are separable if and only if one of them is capable of existing without the other. In this case, it has been established that energy cannot exist without essence, but the opposite has not been established. Essence and energy have a two way dependency, one could argue, which makes them inseparable. This inseparability does not, however, mean that the world was created according to nature.

Agreed, if by “according to nature” is meant only that creation does not share in or experience the Essence of God.

Where does St. Basil teach this?

I think in Against Eunomius(?). I’m not sure. But the gist of his statement was an argument against those who claimed that the Son and the Spirit were subordinated by nature to the Father because they have different roles in creation. He stated that there was no subordination despite the different roles because the roles existed by the Divine Will, not by any sort of necessity (i.e., the Son;s role was by His Divine Will, identical to the Father and Holy Spirit’s. the Holy Spirit’s role was by His Divine Will, identical to the Father and the Son’s, etc.)

The Arian Son is begotten according to the divine will. The Son, whom we worship as our God, however, was begotten according to nature, not will.

I haven’t read Pope St. Athanasius’ treatise in a while, but I am positive that his objection to the Arian claim that the Son was begotten according to the Divine Will was because the Arians conceived of the Divine Will as subject to change. The orthodox teaching is that the Divine Will never changes, but is eternal. The eternal, never-changing Divine WIll is “part of” the eternal, never-changing Nature of God.

Yet the divine will, divine justice, divine knowledge, etc. are all incomprehensible. It is still better to affirm that something is either proper to one or to all three.

I’m not sure what you are getting at here. When you say that “it is proper to one,” are you saying that only one of the Persons has Divine Will? When you say “it is proper to all three,” are you saying that there are three distinct Wills that just happen to agree with each other, or one will shared by three distinct Persons?

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

I believe what the Fathers meant when they say that the world is not created “according to nature” is that creation does not share in the Essence of God, not that it is not God (Essence and Energy entire) who creates. I believe it is very dangerous and improper to conceive of a God who is Essence, and a God who is Energy, and only the God who is Energy is the one creating.

Where did I ever say that there is a God who is energy and a different God who is essence? This goes beyond the twisting of word and into the realm of pure fantasy.

Agreed, if by “according to nature” is meant only that creation does not share in or experience the Essence of God.

I cannot agree, because if the world were created according to nature, then it would be necessary that God create the world from all eternity, something which contradicts the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

I think in Against Eunomius(?). I’m not sure. But the gist of his statement was an argument against those who claimed that the Son and the Spirit were subordinated by nature to the Father because they have different roles in creation. He stated that there was no subordination despite the different roles because the roles existed by the Divine Will, not by any sort of necessity (i.e., the Son;s role was by His Divine Will, identical to the Father and Holy Spirit’s. the Holy Spirit’s role was by His Divine Will, identical to the Father and the Son’s, etc.)

If St. Basil wrote this (and it seems like a perfectly Orthodox proposition to make, so I am willing to grant that he did), it is still not equivalent to the argument you were making earlier. Earlier, you argued:In distinction, the Persons are inseparable (i.e., one depends on another) not out of necessity but by virtue of natural, Divine Will (recall that this is the difference I pointed out in the other thread), as St.Basil explicitly teaches.

The argument that St. Basil (allegedly) makes is that the differing roles of the persons in economy does not subordinate them, because their differing roles in economy are so by the divine will, and not by necessity. This is not at all the same as arguing that the trinitarian Persons are inseparable by the Divine Will. If that were true, then there would be three Gods united by one common will, somewhat like Nestorius’ prosopically united Christ (which has two separate beings united by a common moral purpose). The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are inseparable by virtue of their ontological (natural) oneness caused by the Father (the so-called monarchy of the Father), and not by virtue of the divine will, which is something that is consequent to nature. Even in the innermost (natural) life of the Trinity, we affirm that God is truly one and united, not by will, which is consequent to nature, but by nature. Indeed, to say that the persons are not inseparable by nature but by will would be to fall into Tritheism.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I haven’t read Pope St. Athanasius’ treatise in a while, but I am positive that his objection to the Arian claim that the Son was begotten according to the Divine Will was because the Arians conceived of the Divine Will as subject to change. The orthodox teaching is that the Divine Will never changes, but is eternal. The eternal, never-changing Divine WIll is “part of” the eternal, never-changing Nature of God.

The Orthodox teaching is that the will is immutable, but consequent to the nature of God. On this, both St. Athanasius and the Arians seemed to agree. The Arians objected to the Son being begotten according to nature, according to St. Athanasius himself in his Discourse Against the Arians III, 30., because, “they [The Arians] assert that He is a creature, putting forward ‘will,’ and saying, ‘Unless He has by will come to be, therefore God had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure.’” This argument Athanasius (in the same chapter) rather cleverly refutes, writing, “For let them tell us themselves—that God is good and merciful, does this attach to Him by will or not? If by will, we must consider that He began to be good, and that His not being good is possible; for to counsel and choose implies an inclination two ways, and is incidental to a rational nature. But if it be too unseemly that He should be called good and merciful upon will, then what they have said themselves must be retorted on them—‘therefore by necessity and not at His pleasure He is good;’ and, ‘who is it that imposes this necessity on Him?’”

That being said, Athanasius strictly denies that the Son was begotten by will throughout this entire treatise, and accepts rather unquestioningly the logic that if the Son were begotten by will, he would be a creature. In fact, one of his arguments is that since the Word is referred to in places as the Father’s will, or counsel, or good pleasure, if the Word were a creature, created by will, then there would have to be some other Word through which the Word was created. This argument would make no sense, if St. Athanasius denied that things begotten by will were not necessarily creatures.

I’m not sure what you are getting at here. When you say that “it is proper to one,” are you saying that only one of the Persons has Divine Will? When you say “it is proper to all three,” are you saying that there are three distinct Wills that just happen to agree with each other, or one will shared by three distinct Persons?

Things are either proper to one person, or to all three. Begetting is proper only to the Father, while being Begotten is proper to the Son. The divine nature is proper to all three, as are the divine energies. My original objection was that you wrote: As the Fathers indicate, no one action of any Person in the Economy is devoid of the participation of another.The problem with this statement is that it could give the impression that this rule does not hold in eternity as well, which for most uncreated energies is not the case. Thus, it is better to distinguish between hypostatic characteristics (those proper to one) and natural characteristics (those proper to all three), than to draw the line between economy and eternity, because the former clears up all confusion, while the latter does not.

 

[mardukm]

Dear Cavaradossi,

Thanks for the responses, I love debating with you because our conversations are theologically deep.

Where did I ever say that there is a God who is energy and a different God who is essence? This goes beyond the twisting of word and into the realm of pure fantasy.

Sorry to be unclear. I wasn’t accusing YOU of claiming that there are separate Gods, but only implying that your statement might mislead someone into believing that. I used to believe this about the EO theology on Essence and Energy when I was in the Oriental Orthodox communion, but I stated long ago I divested myself of that opinion when I became Catholic.

I cannot agree, because if the world were created according to nature, then it would be necessary that God create the world from all eternity, something which contradicts the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

That’s a non-sequitur. The Energy is also eternal, so I don’t know how you can draw that conclusion by my statement. Are you claiming that Energy is not also eternal? Are you claiming that God’s Essence is somehow absent “where” His energy is? I don’t pretend to know HOW God created, and I don’t pretend to know exactly what “creating according to Energy” fully means, but I know at the very least that it means that creation is not in touch with the Essence when God created. What I affirm is that God “whole and entire” (in quotes to indicate that the opposite cannot be assumed even for an instant - that God is composed of parts) is at work in creation, but creation is simply incapable by its nature to be in touch with the Essence of God. Energy cannot exist by itself. It is naturally of the Essence and the two cannot logically be separated in anything that God as God does.

If St. Basil wrote this (and it seems like a perfectly Orthodox proposition to make, so I am willing to grant that he did), it is still not equivalent to the argument you were making earlier. Earlier, you argued:In distinction, the Persons are inseparable (i.e., one depends on another) not out of necessity but by virtue of natural, Divine Will (recall that this is the difference I pointed out in the other thread), as St.Basil explicitly teaches.

The argument that St. Basil (allegedly) makes is that the differing roles of the persons in economy does not subordinate them…Even in the innermost (natural) life of the Trinity, we affirm that God is truly one and united, not by will, which is consequent to nature, but by nature. Indeed, to say that the persons are not inseparable by nature but by will would be to fall into Tritheism.

I don’t believe the divine will is consequent to nature (at least not in the way you seem to be implying) because Essence and Energy are eternal. The Divine WIll comes with the Nature always. I affirm wholeheartedly that the Divine Will is natural to the innermost life of the Trinity. You speak as if the Essence is some sort of personal being. It is the Father (not the Essence) by His natural Divine Will Who is the cause of the unity of the Godhead. I sense you might agree with the foregoing staement, and that we are just defining our terms differently.

The Orthodox teaching is that the will is immutable, but consequent to the nature of God. On this, both St. Athanasius and the Arians seemed to agree. The Arians objected to the Son being begotten according to nature, according to St. Athanasius himself in his Discourse Against the Arians III, 30., because, “they [The Arians] assert that He is a creature, putting forward ‘will,’ and saying, ‘Unless He has by will come to be, therefore God had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure.’”

As stated, I dont’ agree that the DIvine WIll is consequent to the Divine Nature, but is exactly co-eternal with it, and I don’t agree that St. Athanasius believed the Divine Will is consequent to the Divine Nature. The Arians believed the only solution against the belief that the Father generated the Son by necessity was by will. St. Athanasius agreed that the Generation was not by necessity. But St. Athanasius’ solution was very different from the Arians’. There were two problems with the Arian argument: (1) Due to their premise that the Son was a creature, they could not conceive of the possibility that another solution to the problem of Generation by necessity was Generation by Nature; (2) due to the same premise that the Son was a creature, the Arians misunderstood that the Divine Will was PRECEDENT to the Generation, as opposed to the orthodox understanding that the Divine Will is co-eternal with the Generation (more on this below).

CONT’d

 

[mardukm]

CONT’d

That being said, Athanasius strictly denies that the Son was begotten by will throughout this entire treatise, and accepts rather unquestioningly the logic that if the Son were begotten by will, he would be a creature.

No, it is not unquestioning. In fact, he introduces that portion of his argument thus: “Now if any of those who believe aright were to say this in simplicity, there would be no cause to be suspicious of the expression, the right intention prevailing over that somewhat simple use of words.”
It is obvious that St. Athanasius knew that the use of that expression can have a thoroughly orthodox sense. In fact, several Fathers before him used that expression (Sts. Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, to name just two off the top of my head). The fact is that St. Athanasius’ argument was not a deductive argument, but an inference. He did not set out to prove that the statement was heterodox, but he already presumed a heterodox understanding of it (“…But since the phrase is from the heretics and the words of heretics are suspicious…come let us examine this phrase also”). He premises his entire argument with the statement “where, I ask, did they find will or pleasure 'precedent ’ to the Word of God unless forsooth, leaving the Scriptures, they simulate the perverseness of Valentinus?.” Where do the Arians get the idea that the Divine Will is precedent to the Generation of the Son? That’s his whole focus - he is not arguing against the idea of an eternal Generation by Divine Will, but of conceiving of the Divine Will as being precedent to the eternal Generation (before you respond to this portion, read the rest of my response below). Basically, St. Athanasius’ whole argument in the section is an argumentum ad absurdum, demonstrating from the very premises that the Arians accepted that their beliefs were inconsistent.

In fact, one of his arguments is that since the Word is referred to in places as the Father’s will, or counsel, or good pleasure, if the Word were a creature, created by will, then there would have to be some other Word through which the Word was created. This argument would make no sense, if St. Athanasius denied that things begotten by will were not necessarily creatures.

This actually demonstrates exactly what I stated - that St. Athanasius was trying to refute the Arians by evincing inconsistency in their OWN views (he argued from Scripture precisely because the Arians adhered - or pretended to adhere - to Scripture). In many places, he makes a point of complaining against the Arian idea of a “precedent will.” Do you think for an instant that St. Athanasius himself believed that the Divine Will PRECEDES the generation of the Son in any way? Understand the implications of St. Athanasius argument - IF the Word were a creature (i.e., the heterodox premise of the Arians), then there would have to be some other Word through which the Word was created. This implies the truth of the opposite sense - i.e., if the Word was NOT a creature, but co-eternal with the Father (i.e., the orthodox premise), then the Divine Will would NOT be precedent to the Generation, and the Word would not be a created. Indeed, St. Athanasius affirms exactly what I just stated - “But if, in whom He makes, in Him also is the will, and in Christ is the pleasure of the Father, how can He, as others, come into being by will and pleasure?” I read a commentary on this a while back, where the theologian stated that the origination of Persons is not totally devoid of Divine Will in the sense that the eternal Divine WIll is CONCOMITANT to the eternal origination of Persons (as opposed to PRECEDING it).

The foregoing statement is the sense I use the phrase “by Divine Will” (as noted before, St. Athanasius admitted that there was a certain sense in which the expression could be understood in an orthodox way) – IF that was what I was arguing. Having said all that in the last two sections, I must remind you that I never claimed that eternal origination came about by Divine Will. That was something you imposed on my statements yourself. Our exchange regarding divine will and eternal origination is purely academic and theoretical, as far as I’m concerned - i.e., not a cause for division.

Things are either proper to one person, or to all three. Begetting is proper only to the Father, while being Begotten is proper to the Son. The divine nature is proper to all three, as are the divine energies. My original objection was that you wrote: As the Fathers indicate, no one action of any Person in the Economy is devoid of the participation of another.The problem with this statement is that it could give the impression that this rule does not hold in eternity as well, which for most uncreated energies is not the case. Thus, it is better to distinguish between hypostatic characteristics (those proper to one) and natural characteristics (those proper to all three), than to draw the line between economy and eternity, because the former clears up all confusion, while the latter does not.

Sounds good. Not that I ever intended the impression that you assumed from my statement. Your statement is exactly like my claim that “creation according to Energy” can create the impression that there is a God Who is Energy and a God Who is Essence, and only the God Who is Energy creates. It’s not “fantasy,” but is a natural (mis)interpretation that can occur. As I stated in another thread, human language is often inadequate to properly describe a Mystery. That’s why we have inter-Church theological commissions - to make sure we understand what the other is really saying because human language is indeed oftentimes inadequate to express Mystery.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

Thanks for the responses, I love debating with you because our conversations are theologically deep.

Thank you. Likewise to you.

That’s a non-sequitur. The Energy is also eternal, so I don’t know how you can draw that conclusion by my statement. Are you claiming that Energy is not also eternal? Are you claiming that God’s Essence is somehow absent “where” His energy is?

The difference is not between eternity and non-eternity or being subject to change and being immutable. Both the essence and the divine will are immutable, and eternal. They differ in that essence signifies what God is in himself, the aseity of God, so to speak, while energy signifies what God reveals himself to be. For God to create according to nature would mean that God necessarily had to create from all eternity as part of his very self-subsistence and self-existence (that is, God’s existence would be contingent upon his act of creation), and not only that, but it would signify that the World as created by God must have been created as it is (to suggest otherwise would be to suggest that God could have been some other way), leading to a form of hard determinism. Because the will (and energy in general) deals not with God’s aseity (His supersubstantial being), but rather His freedom to be as He reveals Himself, creation according to will does not come with the same problem. God’s being is not contingent upon that which is done by will.

I don’t pretend to know HOW God created, and I don’t pretend to know exactly what “creating according to Energy” fully means, but I know at the very least that it means that creation is not in touch with the Essence when God created. What I affirm is that God “whole and entire” (in quotes to indicate that the opposite cannot be assumed even for an instant - that God is composed of parts) is at work in creation, but creation is simply incapable by its nature to be in touch with the Essence of God. Energy cannot exist by itself. It is naturally of the Essence and the two cannot logically be separated in anything that God as God does.

But this sort of thinking runs into problems. How does one preserve this particular notion of simplicity in the face of the fact that the Trinitarian hypostases have differing roles in the economy of our salvation? The same argument from simplicity, for example, could be turned against the teaching that the Son alone became incarnate. It is true, yes, that the Father and the Holy Spirit participate in the Son’s incarnation, but the Son participates in a unique way, which shows clearly the difference between the Son and the Father. It also seems that the logic offered for preserving this notion of divine simplicity in the face of creation ex nihilo, when applied to events concerning the earthly life of the Son is also rather wanting. Arguing, for example—that God “whole and entire” was baptized in the Jordan, while God “whole and entire” spoke, and God “whole and entire” in the form of a dove descended upon God “whole and entire”, but that the human nature could not be assumed by the Father or the Holy Spirit, and that the atmosphere could not be moved by the Holy Spirit or the Son, and that the form of the dove could not be taken on by the Father and the Son, and therefore while God is simple, it is possible, because of the nature of creation, that the Son was baptized, while the Father spoke, and the Holy Spirit descended upon the Son in the form of a dove—would be rather absurd, if not suspiciously close to sabellianism. I don’t see, therefore, how this argument simplicity can be applicable in the case of creation either. It is clear that God is simple, yes, but the definition of simple must be made to be compatible with the truth of Scriptural revelation, and not the other way around.

I don’t believe the divine will is consequent to nature (at least not in the way you seem to be implying) because Essence and Energy are eternal. The Divine WIll comes with the Nature always.

I do not mean that the divine will is consequential to the divine nature in a temporal sense, any more than admitting that the Father is the cause of the Son is to admit that there was a time when the Father was without His Son. It is consequential in that God has the divine will by nature. It must be consequential because otherwise God could not have willed or created otherwise—that is to say, neither God nor creature would truly have freedom were it not.

I affirm wholeheartedly that the Divine Will is natural to the innermost life of the Trinity.

I cannot agree, for the reasons stated above.

You speak as if the Essence is some sort of personal being.

Not at all. In fact, if one were to go back to read the entire paragraph I wrote, instead of just that excerpt there, he would see that I wrote, “The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are inseparable by virtue of their ontological (natural) oneness caused by the Father (the so-called monarchy of the Father).” I always have acknowledged the Father to be the cause of the unity of the three.

It is the Father (not the Essence) by His natural Divine Will Who is the cause of the unity of the Godhead.

This cannot be. If the Father is cause of the unity of the Godhead by His natural will, then it holds that the Son and the Holy Spirit too are co-causes, because they share in the same will by nature. The natural unity of God must for this reason precede the will. The Father as hypostasis is cause of the unity by nature of the three hypostases.

 

[Cavaradossi]

As stated, I dont’ agree that the DIvine WIll is consequent to the Divine Nature, but is exactly co-eternal with it, and I don’t agree that St. Athanasius believed the Divine Will is consequent to the Divine Nature. The Arians believed the only solution against the belief that the Father generated the Son by necessity was by will. St. Athanasius agreed that the Generation was not by necessity.

I don’t really think that is how St. Athanasius conceived of it. His argument against the Arians who brought up the issue of necessity, as one can see in* Discourse Against the Arians* chapter 30, was not to deny that the Son being begotten by nature would make the begetting of the Son necessary, but instead his tactic was to use the example of goodness. If one confesses goodness to be of the will, as St. Athanasius argued, then God began to be good, and could also not be good. If one confesses that God is by nature good (as St. Athanasius expected the Arians would argue), then God is by necessity Good, which shows that the Arian argument from necessity was unsound, because they too would be willing to admit that God is by necessity good.

But St. Athanasius’ solution was very different from the Arians’. There were two problems with the Arian argument: (1) Due to their premise that the Son was a creature, they could not conceive of the possibility that another solution to the problem of Generation by necessity was Generation by Nature;

I am not convinced of this.

(2) due to the same premise that the Son was a creature, the Arians misunderstood that the Divine Will was PRECEDENT to the Generation, as opposed to the orthodox understanding that the Divine Will is co-eternal with the Generation (more on this below).

I am not so convinced of this either. It seems that both ran under the assumption that the will is something consequential to the nature of God (but again, not in a temporal sense).

No, it is not unquestioning. In fact, he introduces that portion of his argument thus: “Now if any of those who believe aright were to say this in simplicity, there would be no cause to be suspicious of the expression, the right intention prevailing over that somewhat simple use of words.” It is obvious that St. Athanasius knew that the use of that expression can have a thoroughly orthodox sense. In fact, several Fathers before him used that expression (Sts. Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, to name just two off the top of my head).

I think you have misinterpreted St. Athanasius’ use of the term simple. He means it here in a pejorative sense (as in English, the Greek word for simple possesses multiple meanings, including a pejorative meaning which in Greek was used in the same sense that people who were a bit “slow” were in the past called “simpletons” in English). He does not admit that the phrase has an orthodox interpretation, only that the right intention (τῆς ὀρθοδόξου διανοίας, literally “the orthodox intention”) prevails over the “simple [in a pejorative sense] use of words.” This is why he writes, “These crafty ones have endeavoured to convey their meaning in another way, putting forth the word ‘will,’ as cuttlefish their blackness, thereby to blind the simple, and to keep in mind their peculiar heresy.” See again how he uses the term simple in a pejorative sense, implying that the simple, in their simplicity of mind, might be deceived by the Arians’ use of the term will.

It is true that the Pre-Nicene fathers spoke of the Son being begotten according to energy, but this is because they were not aware of the subordinationist conclusions which could logically be drawn from such teachings. There is a reason why after the Arian controversy all of the Fathers wrote of the Son being begotten according to nature and abandoned the language of the Son being begotten according to energy, because the Arian controversy opened the can of worms so to speak, and showed what the logical conclusion of that formulation is.

The fact is that St. Athanasius’ argument was not a deductive argument, but an inference. He did not set out to prove that the statement was heterodox, but he already presumed a heterodox understanding of it (“…But since the phrase is from the heretics and the words of heretics are suspicious…come let us examine this phrase also”). He premises his entire argument with the statement “where, I ask, did they find will or pleasure 'precedent ’ to the Word of God unless forsooth, leaving the Scriptures, they simulate the perverseness of Valentinus?.” Where do the Arians get the idea that the Divine Will is precedent to the Generation of the Son? That’s his whole focus - he is not arguing against the idea of an eternal Generation by Divine Will, but of conceiving of the Divine Will as being precedent to the eternal Generation (before you respond to this portion, read the rest of my response below). Basically, St. Athanasius’ whole argument in the section is an argumentum ad absurdum, demonstrating from the very premises that the Arians accepted that their beliefs were inconsistent.

I cannot agree. If St. Athanasius disagreed with the premise of the Arians that being generated according to will was the mark of a temporal creature, then he would have devoted some section either to refuting this premise or at the very least objecting to it. But I have yet to come across such a passage.

 

[Cavaradossi]

This actually demonstrates exactly what I stated - that St. Athanasius was trying to refute the Arians by evincing inconsistency in their OWN views (he argued from Scripture precisely because the Arians adhered - or pretended to adhere - to Scripture). In many places, he makes a point of complaining against the Arian idea of a “precedent will.” Do you think for an instant that St. Athanasius himself believed that the Divine Will PRECEDES the generation of the Son in any way? Understand the implications of St. Athanasius argument - IF the Word were a creature (i.e., the heterodox premise of the Arians), then there would have to be some other Word through which the Word was created.

Yes, I understand the implication of that argument quite well, and nobody here is saying that St. Athanasius accepted the Arian argument that the divine will precedes the generation of the Son. My objection right now is that you assert that St. Athanasius leaves room for an eternal generation of the Son according to the divine will, and rejects the Arian premise that things generated according to will are necessarily creatures, but I have seen no passages either where he makes this allowance or where he rejects this premise.

This implies the truth of the opposite sense - i.e., if the Word was NOT a creature, but co-eternal with the Father (i.e., the orthodox premise), then the Divine Will would NOT be precedent to the Generation, and the Word would not be a created. Indeed, St. Athanasius affirms exactly what I just stated - “But if, in whom He makes, in Him also is the will, and in Christ is the pleasure of the Father, how can He, as others, come into being by will and pleasure?” I read a commentary on this a while back, where the theologian stated that the origination of Persons is not totally devoid of Divine Will in the sense that the eternal Divine WIll is CONCOMITANT to the eternal origination of Persons (as opposed to PRECEDING it).

But again, just because the divine will is coeternal with the trinitarian persons (or concomitant), that does not mean therefore that St. Athanasius taught that the persons originate eternally according to the divine will. Indeed, if the will is concomitant to the eternal origination of the persons, that would imply that the origination of the persons cannot be according to the will, because that which is concomitant to something else may be subordinate and posterior to it, or equal to it, but never superior or prior to it.

The foregoing statement is the sense I use the phrase “by Divine Will” (as noted before, St. Athanasius admitted that there was a certain sense in which the expression could be understood in an orthodox way) – IF that was what I was arguing. Having said all that in the last two sections, I must remind you that I never claimed that eternal origination came about by Divine Will. That was something you imposed on my statements yourself. Our exchange regarding divine will and eternal origination is purely academic and theoretical, as far as I’m concerned - i.e., not a cause for division.

I suppose we could drop the matter, then, and stick to discussing some other topic that was raised in this thread.

Merry Christmas. :christmastree1: