We can only speculate on whether this is true or not. As far as we know God can allow an evil only if it will result in a greater good or prevent a greater evil from coming about.
This is only one possible explanation, and indeed it is frequently brought up.
However, it quickly breaks down when one considers the pain and suffering of animals and little children - which ends in death. They will not experience any greater good from their suffering here in this existence. Two possible answers to that: 1) the gretaer good will happen to others, and the animals and children are the
tools to bring this good forth; and 2) the children will be amply rewarded in heaven (though the animals will not).
Problems here: 1) to allow the suffering of “A” to bring forth greater good to “B” is morally unjustifyable; and 2) if the reward is not a logical corollary of the suffering then the suffering was gratuitous (it is not necessary in the logical sense).
And this is the point when the greater good defense is abandoned. At this point the “unintended consequence” type of argument is brougt up: “God gave us free will, and the unavoidable (but unintended) consequence is the existence of evil”. The problem with this is that only the
possibility of evil is the logical corollary of free will, but not its
actuality. A secondary problem is the existence of the so-called “natural evil”, which cannot be blamed on free will.
Which brings us to your next paragraph.
This
might mean 2 things for Thomists (this is my personal opinion)
- It is impossible to create a world in which everyone would love God
- This may have been God’s purpose in creating the evil person and predestining who he predestines. He cannot predestine everyone to good for some reason, maybe because if this was done no one would reach the greatest good they could.
For the Molinist it means 2 things (again, opinion)
- Again, it is impossible to create a world in which everyone will love God
- There is no possible world which God could create in which a person, lets say Hitler, would not become an evil dictator, but God could affect surrounding conditions to bring a greater good out of this. Thus, God could do 2 things. Not create Hitler, or create him and use his evil to bring more people to good than there would have been if he had not existed. In the second case God will naturally try to convince Hitler to choose good as much as he could. Hitler would refuse, but this would not be God’s doing. Note that God cannot make Hitler choose Him, only convince him (due to free will).
Not just your opinion, it is used all over the place. No wonder, since it
sounds convincing, though it is erroneous. However, it is possible to create a world where everyone freely chooses God. The proof is mathematical. In a nutshell it goes like this.
- Suppose there is only one moral agent, and he is confronted with one moral decision. There are two possible worlds, one, in which the agent will choose morally (W1), and the other one in which he will not (W2). Due to God’s omniscience, he knows what the choice will be. God can instantiate either W1 or W2 - since neither of them contains a logical contradiction. Therefore God can instantiate W1 - where “everyone” (the only moral agent) will (always) choose the moral outcome. Consider: if either world would “somehow” lead to a logical contradiction, and thus would be impossible to instantiate, then the decision would not be “free”.
- Now let’s add another moral decison to this world. Either the agent is confronted by two decisions, or there are two agents, each confronted by one decision. There are 4 possible worlds here: 1) both decisions are made morally (W1); 2) both decisions are made immorally (W2); 3) the first decison is made morally, but the second one is not (W3); and 4) the first decison is made immorally, but second one is not (W4). Since God knows all these 4 outcomes, and since none of them contains a logical contradiction, he can instantiate either one. And W1 is the world where everyone always makes only moral decisons.
- You can continue from here. It is always possible to add one more decision, and select from the 2^n possible worlds the one where all agents will always choose morally. The only possible argument against this that “maybe” W1 (all moral decisons) somehow contains or leads to a logical contradiction. Of course, “maybe” is not an argument.
But it goes deeper than that. Let’s look at the second problem, the world with 2 decisons. If its W1 would lead to a logical contradiction, then the two decisions would not be “free”. One of them would determine of the other. Since we already know that it is possible to create a one-agent-one-decison setup, we have a starting point. God creates the one with the moral decison, and tries to add another free decison. If he cannot, it means that the second decision is contingent upon the outcome of the first one, and so it cannot be free.
Q.E.D. It is always possible to create a world with an unlimited number of morals agents with an unlimited number of moral decisons, where every one will always freely choose the moral outcome. The nature of these decisions is not specified. You can say that the decision is to “love or reject God”.