Wow! This answer with due respect sounds clintonian, lol
With all due respect, you think this because you have not thought deeply enough about this issue.
I suggest you seriously re-consider these things. Instead of trying to split hairs and plays games with words. like: "Not free will, but God’s will. "
I suggest that you read some of the classic discussions of this issue, perhaps beginning with Augustine’s City of God.
“Cause” and “will” do need to be defined carefully. When we are talking about how God chooses and acts (which as jprejean recently pointed out on his blog can never be literal language, since God is timeless and unchanging), precision and nuance are necessary and not at all “Clintonian.”
I would say that God permitted Adam’s sin.
Try this thought experiment, if you really don’t see how complex this issue is.
God could have annihilated Adam after he sinned and created a new Adam, identical to the old one in every way, right?
If Adam really had free will (as we all believe), then this new Adam might not have sinned, right? (That as I take it is the definition of libertarian free will–that two people identical in every respect and placed in identical circumstances might choose different things.) If the new Adam did sin, God could have annihilated him too and created yet another, and so on ad infinitum. Eventually, God would have gotten to an “Adam” who didn’t sin (to say otherwise is, as I see it, to deny that Adam sinned freely).
Now, since God knows all our choices beforehand, He could obviously skip this whole tiresome process and *only *create the “Adam” whom He had foreknown would not sin.
Therefore, we must conclude that in some sense God creates people along with their foreknown choices. On the supposition of human free will, He could have created otherwise identical people who would make different choices. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that free will
demands rather than excluding divine predestination. Given the supposition of divine foreknowledge and omnipotence, the only alternative to the view that God creates humans-who-will-choose-x rather than otherwise-identical-humans-who-will-choose-y (and in that sense “causes” us to choose x) is to say that humans with certain dispositions in certain circumstances will necessarily choose x. This, and not the supposition of divine “causation” I’ve described, denies free will.
In Christ,
Edwin