Problem of Evil (again): Logic [intro]

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God values human free will to the point of allowIng the evil that results from the abuse of that freedom to prevail, but only for awhile, temporarily, for His reasons or purposes. Ultimately evil will be destroyed, no longer allowed., Meanwhile He wants us to decide, He wants us to come to use that freedom rightly. He wants us to participate in opposing and destroying evil.
 
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Very bad example. The responsibility for stopping evil is commensurate to the knowledge and the power of the agent . Obviously if the agent does not know about the “evil”, or powerless to stop it, there is no responsibility to do so. But, of course you assert that God is “all-knowing” and “all-powerful”, so these excuses are invalid.
Isn’t it interesting how not a single objection you listed actually applies to that example? 🙂

After all, in that example the President obviously has sufficient knowledge and power.
The action must be commensurate to the deed. A nuclear strike is excessive.
Then there is no unlimited duty to prevent evil whenever that is possible.
But all God has to do is, is to “will” that the evil would stop.
And all the President has to do is to press the button. 🙂

Ease of preventing that evil is not relevant here.
Ah, the usual “free will” defense.
When the very first sentence I wrote in that post is “Not just free will.”… 🤦‍♂️
Imagine the difficulty of trying to create two arguments with 5 and 5 premises, respectively or an argument with 10 premises (as your assumptions are also really premises).

Much, much, much, much more difficult than it looks.
Well, not trivial, but still pretty easy. As you can see, I did pretty much that in rewriting that argument properly. And the hard part was staying within the post character limit (so, for example, I did not construct conjunction step by step). 🙂

And that for an argument which I considered to be bad, with a false conclusion. So, no “heroic” effort could be expected. 🙂

The harder thing is constructing a valid proof with obviously true premises and unobvious true conclusion.
Are insults now permitted?
You seem to expect a much higher level of respect than you are entitled to, given that you are just an anonymous user of Internet, like the rest of us.

None of us can be just presumed to be smart, competent, honest and unbiased. Any such claim needs proof. So, present the proof or learn to make arguments that do not rely on your own trustworthiness.

For a “warm up”, you could explain why you think you are not closed minded here. In such case you could present “private” evidence we cannot check.
 
God values human free will to the point of allowIng the evil that results from the abuse of that freedom to prevail, but only for awhile, temporarily, for His reasons or purposes. Ultimately evil will be destroyed, no longer allowed., Meanwhile He wants us to decide, He wants us to come to use that freedom rightly. He wants us to participate in opposing and destroying evil.
Yes. I would add that for those who choose the good path, God grants inner peace even in the midst of suffering, while the evil ones even in the midst of luxury and pleasure, enjoy life only with difficulty, being mostly paranoid and anxious with no peace.
 
Isn’t it interesting how not a single objection you listed actually applies to that example?
But it is the crux of the matter.
Then there is no unlimited duty to prevent evil whenever that is possible.
Yes, there is - especially as long as it does not “cost” them anything. Only psychopaths and sociopaths have a different opinion. And they also change their opinion, as soon as they get on the receiving end of some some electrodes affixed to their private parts.
You seem to expect a much higher level of respect than you are entitled to, given that you are just an anonymous user of Internet, like the rest of us.
According to the forum rules, everyone MUST be treated with respect.
 
I have 4 to 5 posts of content here. The forums have a three-consecutive-post limit. I’m going to need an assist/bump halfway through.
So how would you, in context, explain the fact that literally uncounted numbers of non-humans have suffered painful lives and agonising deaths over hundreds of millions of years each with no hope whatsoever of any sort of countervailing eternal life and eternal bliss? I see the ‘problem of pain’ as discussed by most CAFers as ignoring the obvious insurmountable problem for Christians: the pain experienced by animals.
The treatment I’d like to give this would require at least an essay, so I’ve opted to responding with “a few” sentences.

Those who put forth the Problem of Evil as an objection to an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God assume that evil is a real phenomenon in the world, at least for the sake of argument. Many atheists I speak to are, in reality, ethical relativist or nihilists and don’t believe in any objective standard for goodness or badness at all, but they have a point that Christians do claim there is an objective standard. It’s important, at least, that the atheist not (for the sake of argument) waffle between relativism when objecting to a defense of the problem of evil and objectivity when claiming the problem of evil is a real problem. The theory has to be approached in good faith. Even if it’s not necessarily agreement, it would be something if the atheist could at least acknowledge whether a consistent theist theory of goodness has been presented and whether it addresses the problem of evil, even if they don’t fully buy into the system.

I’ve written previously that any response to the problem of evil has to first answer the questions “what is goodness?” and “what is evil?” I’d like to review the standard scholastic theory of goodness developed by Thomas Aquinas, who to a large extent agreed with the basic account of good and evil expounded upon by Augustine of Hippo. Before I do, I should acknowledge two other commonly cited theories of goodness. The first would be Divine Command Theory, that what is good is merely an arbitrary decision of divine fiat. What God commands is good. I don’t think it’s impossible to defend a “DCT” of goodness against the problem of evil, but I do not believe DCT is correct, and it comes with a host of other problems. The other is a sort of Platonist goodness. That what is good is something like an eternally existing Platonist Form, which God loves. I’ve had the impression that when some atheists speak to theists on the Problem of Evil and what an objective idea of goodness must be, they default to treating goodness in a Platonist way. The Platonist conception of goodness is generally seen by theists as incompatible with theism, though, as it proposes that there is some thing that is not God that exists uncreated by God, and the standard cosmological arguments employed by theists rule out such a possibility.
 
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As we move to the scholastic theory of goodness, I must mention that this theory is not an independent system. It is an outgrowth of, or part of, the general Thomist philosophy of being, and works from distinctions between essence and act of existence, substance and accident, act and potency, etc, none of which are the subject of this response.

All that acknowledged, the scholastic response is that a thing is good insofar as it is obedient to its nature, or fulfillment of appetite (a thing’s natural tendencies), the actualization of potencies that belong to a nature. This is a top to bottom theory which applies to all things, including the inorganic, from the small electron instantiating its nature to create a negative charge to a large stone simply keeping its molecular bonds, falling into gravity wells, and so on. This is what Augustine and Thomas Aquinas mean when they say that insofar as a thing is, it is good. Simply insofar as how it is fulfills the tendencies of its nature, it is good. Any judgment of goodness we make is really in regards to whether the nature of the thing we’re looking at is instantiated, whether we’re talking about a contrived game such as golf or an organic substance like a tree. We judge whether a child’s drawing of a triangle is good insofar as the nature of triangularity is instantiated or actualized. We judge whether a golfer is good on whether her potential skills at the game of golf are actualized. We judge whether a tree is good (in itself, not necessarily whether it is “good for” something else) based on whether it has an effective root system, is able to obtain the nutrients it needs, etc…

I have moved onto organic examples, because in the inorganic world there really isn’t a way for things to be that don’t instantiate their nature. But insofar as they do “obey their nature” by virtue of being what they are, they are good. In the organic world we encounter the notion of “being good for” something, and the idea of health and flourishing, of innate systems that can fail to fulfill their purpose.

The goodness of a plant includes the same type of essential tendencies we find in inorganic physical bodies. Molecular bonds, matter doing what matter does, etc… But we also find that the plant has tendencies or appetites towards maintaining itself, for nutrition, for reproduction. Insofar as it fulfills these appetites it is good, insofar as the potencies proper to its nature are not actualized or fulfilled, it is bad, there is an evil (and the Thomist isn’t importing any malicious or immoral connotation when they apply the word evil in these cases). More on evil shortly.
 
The goodness of an animal includes the same type of tendencies of inorganic physical bodies and plants (the latter including nutrition and reproduction), but also additional appetites/operations regarding sentience and locomotion. Now, I will stop here and make a brief comment on comparing different species of plants with plants and animals with animals. Is an animal with a shorter lifespan but which produces hundreds of offspring better than an animal with a longer lifespan but which produces few offspring? The intent behind the question is understandable, but the response is that there is no direct comparison between species. The goodness of an organism has to be evaluated against the nature it shares with its kind. What it is to be a good rabbit is not the same as what it is to be a good chimpanzee, or praying mantis. Insofar as each type fulfills the nature proper to it, it is good. Living longer or continuing to flourish for a longer period of time instead of a short period of time, when comparing between natures is not relevant.

The above examples, and what follow, truly deserve much longer treatments and considerations, a look at different examples and common objections. I do not deny any of that, but I’m writing an internet post and not a book. If we want to discuss particular examples in more detail later, we can.

Humans are rational animals capable of grasping the goodness as a concept, both intuitively and by discursive reasoning. They can be good in all of the ways discussed above, but there is an added dimension: choices made deliberately and with knowledge. This is the area of morality/ethics. While this is a power unique to humans, what is good is evaluated in the same way, insofar as the rational, sensitive (see: animals), nutritive (see plants), and even inorganic body appetites are fulfilled, and whether the person has fulfilled the ends/tendencies that are proper to their nature.

So far I have not really discussed evil. Evil or badness is the absence of some fulfillment of appetite/tendency that should be there according to that being’s nature, whether a physical evil or a moral evil. If a person loses an arm, or is undergoing starvation, they are experiencing a physical evil. Same goes with animals and plants. Inorganic bodies don’t fail to fulfill their natures so can’t undergo evil as such. Moral evil represents a privation/defect in the choices a person knowledgeably makes and how they deviate from the person’s nature/natural ends.

Post limit reached. Can someone give this thread a bump?
 
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Interesting and informative as usual @Wesrock. Looking forward to the next two posts.
 
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Despite the length of this post, this is all a very brief look at the scholastic theory of goodness. What of the goodness of God? If the Thomist cosmological arguments for God are true, and it’s not the subject of this post to prove them, what must be what we call God is itself Pure Act and Subsistent Being (that which just is its own existence). It has no potencies that are or could be actualized by anything else. Insofar as there is no defect or possible defect in its act of being, it is therefore perfectly good by definition on this account of being and goodness. Furthermore, the arguments establish that there is nothing God could do or not do that would further fulfill his being or which would deviate from his being. The logical fall out is that there is no difference to God’s perfect goodness whether he creates a world without suffering or a world with suffering, whether he creates a world of one planet or a world of trillions of trillions of planets, or no world at all. Therefore there is no contradiction between God as understood to be perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent and evil in creation under this conception of goodness.

Is that all we can say? No, it’s not. Once we’ve stripped away the anthropomorphic conceptions and reached the foundation underneath them, we can then build up a little more on this foundation. I already feel pressed for time, but I did say I was writing only a “few sentences” and not an essay. So I may break down the rest into shorter bullet points.
  • Insofar as God wills the existence of things, he wills the good. This really follows from the above. He wills things to be as they are, to have their natures, and to operate according to their natures. And insofar as those natures are fulfilled they are good. Furthermore, insofar as a being is actualized, or in being, it is good. Goodness is a property convertible with being. As far as act, goes, God only positively creates the being in things. The badness in things isn’t caused into actual being at all.
  • God does not benefit at all from his willing the good or creation of other beings. In this way, God wills the good of other things in a manner that is absolutely self-less and not reciprocal, something which transcends any human ability.
  • There are no passable feelings in the divine nature, so God does not “feel” love in any sensitive way. Rather, we must view love as doing and willing the good of another, and insofar as God acts and freely and selflessly gives being to other things he is willing the good. His eternal action is itself willing his own being and that of creatures. In this way God’s act of love transcends any ability of ours.
  • Outside of anything that can be deduced by natural philosophy, Christians profess that God has made numerous covenants with man, established a relationship with them, has glorified their nature in the Incarnation, and calls them into an eternal sharing of his eternal bliss and goodness. In a non-philosophical or absolute terminology way, Christians profess that this is a call of love, and kind of needs to be understood in context with pre-Christian views of deities/God.
 
I will make one last point, and this is where gnostics and manichaeans and many pessimists today differ from Christians. Christians do not view reality as gratuitously evil, nor can it follow under this conception of goodness that the world is gratuitously evil, nor is it possible for God’s by his nature to will a reality that is gratuitously evil. All being, insofar as it has being and instantiates its kind of being, is good.

I am not asking for total agreement, but hopefully this can be at least chewed over as a theory/model. I could recommend books that give fuller treatments of everything discussed above and a more thorough review of examples and alleged counter examples, though having some background in Thomist philosophy of being helps.

Fin

Many words, hasty treatment…
 
Actually, I think I need one more post to add to all that. As a reminder to myself: diversity of being.

Edit:

I’ve realized I forgot something I wished to comment on. The above discussed how evil in the world is not in contradiction with God’s perfect goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence. It also discussed in what way God’s own act towards creation is good and loving. However, it did not present reasons (in addition to and not separate from) why God would create a world in which there is evil. The only reason we can say God would create, given that creation does not add to him of his goodness or beatitudes, is simply that he wills to manifest his goodness in creation and to share it with creatures. One consideration is that the diversity of being in creatures, and the diversity in degree of perceptions allows the goodness of God, his pure actuality, to be better manifested in creation. No one creature can represent the fullness of God. But a diversity of creatures does so. The same goes for the diversity of perfections in creatures. In addition, the diversity of perfections, which means that there is “badness” in creation, allows for certain goods to exist which would not exist if there was no badness. Things such as virtues of charity and courage, though I’m not being exhaustive.

Again, to be redundant, these reasons aren’t intended to stand alone to resolve the alleged contradiction. That accusation was already treated separately regardless of these reasons. These considerations only discuss reasons why a world with badness in it may be superior, under specific considerations of what goodness is and why God created, than a world without such diversity.
 
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Wesrock:
Despite the length of this post, this is all a very brief look at the scholastic theory of goodness.
How about the real, secular theory of goodness?
It is a secular analysis aside from one aside comment which isn’t necessary to the reasoning.
 
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According to the forum rules, everyone MUST be treated with respect.
And so, no swear words have been used.

Nor has anyone criticised you personally without a provocation.

As for the higher level of respect, there seems to be no good reason to show it to you.

For example, do you show such respect to others? No, definitely not.

For example:
Only psychopaths and sociopaths have a different opinion. And they also change their opinion, as soon as they get on the receiving end of some some electrodes affixed to their private parts.
So, we see that you have called everyone who would disagree with you “psychopaths and sociopaths”. And gave no justification, leaving it just an insult (perhaps “preemptive”).

So, you demand respect you do not give others. Well, do you demonstrate uncommon competence, impartiality, attentiveness (or something) that would deserve extra respect? Doesn’t look like that. Feel free to point that out in case I have missed it.

Finally, on a related note, have you made arguments in a way that keeps your competence, impartiality etc. irrelevant? Let’s compare:
Isn’t it interesting how not a single objection you listed actually applies to that example? 🙂

After all, in that example the President obviously has sufficient knowledge and power.
But it is the crux of the matter.
See, I have pointed out why, in my opinion, your objections fail. And you only claimed my “counter objection” fails. You gave no justification for this claim.

And if there is no justification, the claim has to “borrow” support from your reputation, from things we know about your competence and honesty. And then it becomes perfectly fine to point out that you have no actual reputation for such a “loan”.

So, if you do not want others to point out that you are not known to be impartial, show respect to others and do your best to make good arguments. Or admit that you can’t do that.

For that matter, this “affair” illustrates one more reason why there is no unlimited duty to prevent all evil and suffering. Sometimes that suffering is well deserved. Then it should not be prevented, perhaps it should even be inflicted. And that is not merely an opinion of “only psychopaths and sociopaths”.

To cite Aristotle (https://isidore.co/aquinas/Ethics4.htm): “Any virtuous man of this type will refuse to give pleasure and will choose to cause pain over what is dishonorable and harmful to himself or to the person doing an injury or a great wrong. Although his opposition brings not a little offense, he will disregard it.”. And, coincidentally, concerning levels of respect: “He converses differently with persons in high places and with others, with friends, and with acquaintances. Likewise, according to other differences he attributes what is becoming to each.”.
 
One of the fundamental difficulties of discussing the problem of evil with atheists is they reject the afterlife, so the suffering of this world is all they see.

So, as a Christian who believes in the afterlife, I’m operating on a whole bunch of assumptions that are different from my atheist debate partner.

Suffering on this earth doesn’t really disprove God.
This prompts a couple of things. First the suggestion that suffering can be discounted because there’s an afterlife. And second, anyone who agrees with that assumes they are going to end up in heaven. Would the word ‘presumptious’ be applicable?
 
First of all I’d like to discuss whether anyone has any objections to this logic, and then move on to discuss the proposed theodicies one at a time, each in their own thread.

Thoughts?
I think that @Abrosz brought it up earlier and it’s the crux of the problem as I see it. And blazingly simple as well. In short…

Antelopes eat grass. Lions eat antelopes. They are both perfectly suited for both. Antelopes have a physiology that is best suited to eating grasses and the lion for tearing and eating flesh.

Now there are two options. Either they evolved as such and we accept the result as simply the way the natural world works, or we claim that they were designed thus. I go with option 1. If someone goes with option 2 then they have to come to terms with that fact.

We can then skip all the moral implications of free will and personal responsibility and how we define evil and what constitutes goodness. Just explain option 2.
 
And second, anyone who agrees with that assumes they are going to end up in heaven
That would be an Evangelical idea— once saved always saved.

Catholics see the spiritual life as one that has the potential for twists and turns—a person could lose faith or gain faith.

So I don’t assume my salvation, but my Evangelical friends assume theirs.
 
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Freddy:
And second, anyone who agrees with that assumes they are going to end up in heaven
That would be an Evangelical idea— once saved always saved.

Catholics see the spiritual life as one that has the potential for twists and turns—a person could lose faith or gain faith.

So I don’t assume my salvation, but my Evangelical friends assume theirs.
So if one doesn’t assume an eternal happiness then suffering in this world and the next is something of a problem. Notwithstanding the problem of design as per my last post.
 
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0Scarlett_nidiyilii:
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Freddy:
And second, anyone who agrees with that assumes they are going to end up in heaven
That would be an Evangelical idea— once saved always saved.

Catholics see the spiritual life as one that has the potential for twists and turns—a person could lose faith or gain faith.

So I don’t assume my salvation, but my Evangelical friends assume theirs.
So if one doesn’t assume an eternal happiness then suffering in this world and the next is something of a problem. Notwithstanding the problem of design as per my last post.
I gave a completely different argument above, but this misses the point. Any suffering in the next life would be due and deserved, whereas those who suffered in this life but are innocent would receive infinite reward.
 
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