Problems with the Principle of Sufficient Reason

[JDaniel]

For instance, the First Way of Aquinas (the argument from motion) assumes that nothing just moves for no reason or cause; it doesn’t just pop from potentiality to actuality, but it needs a sufficient reason, some other entity already in act moving it.

From the New Advent Encyclopedia Summa, Q 2, A 3:

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

And the problem is that the PSR, stated this way, leads to a contradiction. Imagine a world with a set of contingent facts (which could in theory be an infinite set). Now, contrary to Hume, even an infinite set is not “explained” in the sense the term is meant by the PSR, because even though every member of the set has an explanation, a world without that set but with all other features the same would not involve a logical contradiction. For any set therefore, even an infinite set, an explanation must be sought outside the set. (There are also circular sets where A explains B and B explains A, of course.) But we’re always at the same problem, if all we have are contingent facts - the set is never explained. Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

Shown to be irrelevant to Aquinas’s First Way.

I’ve seen some Catholic metaphysicians with Ph.D.s attempt to grapple with this, not very successfully I might add. I’ve read things like “explanation does not mean entailment” pray tell then what does it mean? I’ve read an attempt to deny the above argument, claiming that a contingent set is “explained” when all its members are explained. It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

(I have already asked pertinent questions concerning these assertions.) Again irrelevant due to this argument being a strawman - an argument either misunderstood by the arguer or made up in order to misdirect the opponents.

jd

 

[itinerant1]

Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

Contingent being does not contain within itself the reason for its being. Thus its existence is ultimately dependent on some necessary being. The relation of necessary being to contingent being pertains only to the ground of existence of contingent being. The ontological necessity of the causality of necessary being in the existence of contingent being cannot be legitimately extended to include the idea that this particular contingent being must exist of necessity, as if God could not have created another contingent being instead of this particular one.

Whatever beings God freely wills to create are necessarily contingent beings. God is free to choose the creation of beings A or B or C or D and so on. Whichever being he chooses to create that being will necessarily depend on God for its existence. The necessity here is ontological only insofar as contingent being depends on another for its existence. The necessity involved does not extend prior, either logically or causally to impose any necessity on God’s choice to create. The latter case would be the real logical contradiction. Hence, the alleged challenge to the PSR is a pseudo-problem.

 

[JDaniel]

Do you even know what a “strawman” is? Can you document exactly how my argument is a “strawman”. What argument am I misrepresenting?

After reading my first most recent posts, it seems that I do, and, perhaps, you don’t. No insolence intended.

www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/ENNFtalk.html

"I think either horn of the dilemma can be embraced by the defender of the PSR. First, the necessity horn. The argument against this relies on the claim that if p explains q then p entails q. But we know this is not always so. "

The ridiculous errors in that essay are too numerous to count. But here’s a doozy:

I’ve read Pruss’s arguments before. I refuse to reread the trash. It is so full of absurd assertions that they are too numerous to count. Also, sorry, I could not find the ad hominem you were referring to.

Yes, I’m suggesting that God’s creation being logically necessary is contradictory to His creating freely.

I hope you have more than pure conjecture for this assertion?

There is nothing wrong with the tone of my text. It simply laid out the argument. The fact that you might not like it and can’t refute it is not my fault.

Your tone is very acceptable in your more recent posts. You have my thanks and appreciation for that.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

And just how does positing a necessary being make “sense” of things? What do you mean by “sense”?

May I repeat my statement? I think that the answers to your questions are, at least partially, bound up in my statements. Here goes:

Originally Posted by JDaniel:

Ask yourself that question: How many contingent beings would we have to regress through before the creation of the universe made any sense whatsoever? If the “series” was infinite, it would never occur and we wouldn’t be here discussing it. (Of course, perhaps we’re not here.)

Do you “see” the answers to your questions upon the re-reading of my statement? If not, I’ll explain.

There is no ultimate explanation for the universe unless it is logically necessary.

What is your rationale for this statement?

If the universe is contingent there must be a brute fact somewhere.

Or, a necessary efficient cause - which may be God.

Lots of rhetoric, but nothing in the way of a substantive rebuttal…

You did not give me a chance. Rather uncharitable, ole’boy. Don’t you think?

It’s a cute rhetorical trick to claim your opponent “just doesn’t understand” when you can’t really refute him…

Again, why do you make such silly claims before you give me a chance. I do not jump to your finger-snap; neither does anyone else - except your bark-less dog.

But yeah, kind of like the billions of humans, if one accepts libertarian free will, they are the first movers when they move something from potency to act, their own will doesn’t have a cause.

In another thread, I have spent some time explaining the meanings of essentially subordinated and accidentally subordinated causes. That thread is going on right now. If you will look, you will find the answers you are looking for. I have too much to do and am way to tired to repeat it over and over again. Sorry, that’s not your fault. It just happens to be the case at this time in my existence. If you can’t find it, let me know and I’ll write it up again.

jd

 

[James_S_Saint]

What is your rationale for this statement?

Because you either have state A or state B, if you do not have state B (non-existence), then it has no cause (by definition). Since state B is not the actual, there was not an actual cause.

State A, on the other hand, is the actual and thus must be different than anything that had no cause. The only difference is “cause”.

Therefore, state A had to be caused.

But realize that there is a difference between temporal cause (event causation) and situational cause (logic causation).

4 being the result of 2+2 has a “situational cause” even if no one ever actually brought about the event (temporal cause).

It is due to logical situational cause that the universe could not ever, not exist.

 

[JDaniel]

Because you either have state A or state B, if you do not have state B (non-existence), then it has no cause (by definition). Since state B is not the actual, there was not an actual cause.

State A, on the other hand, is the actual and thus must be different than anything that had no cause. The only difference is “cause”.

Is this some sort of new logic. perhaps a cross between modal logic and causal-temporal logic?

Therefore, state A had to be caused.

But realize that there is a difference between temporal cause (event causation) and situational cause (logic causation).

I thought so.

4 being the result of 2+2 has a “situational cause” even if no one ever actually brought about the event (temporal cause).

I lost you around the “actually brought about the event…” words.

It is due to logical situational cause that the universe could not ever, not exist.

OK. I got ya now.

jd

 

[TheWhim]

Once again, the car example: if a car exists, humans must exist because they are the ones who make cars. But why did the humans make cars? Oh no! I don’t know! The cars are unexplained! Thus, humans don’t exist! Right? What? Wait a minute, that doesn’t make any sense. This is what your argument looks like to me. Is this a fair representation?

I think Aeropagites answers have been very concise on this point. What he says is comparable to punkforChrist’s reply, namely, that we should differentiate between a strong PSR(all facts) and the ‘normal’ PSR(all things). - Of course, if there are free agents and if there is free will the strong PSR cannot hold. God explains the universe existence in the sense that there is an omnipotent free agent (God) who brought the universe into being. If I type this wonderful sentence down now this sentence is explained in the sense that a frail human free agent (I) have brought it into being. I could have made the sentence shorter or longer, more brisk or more verbose, but so long as you will grant me still that I am a free agent and not a robot you will also grant that the sentence’s existence is sufficiently explained by my typing it down. Same reasoning holds for the God-universe question. - You see, your counter-argument only works if you hold on to the strong PSR - and if you do so, you necessarily abolish free will and embrace perfect physical determinism. And if you do so, we may well stop arguing now, shut down this thread and close the forums. Because you hold on to your agnostic position by physical necessity and I hold on to my own position by physical necessity and we shouldn’t be so bold as to hope that our brain patterns will change soon in a way that could lead us to an understanding.

I really believe there are many logical flaws inherent in the denial of free agent causation. I do not claim that the idea of free agent causation is spotless but if we do reject it(by worshipping the strong PSR respective physical determinism) we quickly run into logical dead-ends. So, in short, I believe your question, at the bottom, rather belongs to those threads covering the idea of free will and your research should be directed to those philosophers who have defended and rejected it to get a good overview of the picture.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Wow, a lot of posts and discussion. I can just respond to the more important and salient points raised.

JDaniel:

If my argument contains an erroneous premise, it would make it unsound, but doesn’t make it a straw man, because I’m presenting no one else’s argument but my own.

The premise you are contesting is that all versions of the cosmological argument rely on some version of the PSR. (Now you may cite whomever you wish, but the argument to authority is of absolutely no value in philosophy.) Let’s assume every essentially subordinated series of causes (or motion, or whatever) must have a first member (and yes, I do understand the difference between essentially and accidentally subordinated BTW, and I don’t buy the argument against an accidentally subordinated infinite regress, neither did Aquinas). It can not be proven that Aquinas’s first mover is God without the PSR, as I will show. If everything doesn’t need a reason for its existence, if things can exist without an explanation (their existence is brute fact), a bunch of first movers consisting of potency and act can exist contingently from eternity without explanation. This state of affairs does not violate the metaphysical principle that everything **brought **from potency to act had to have been moved there by something already in act, for the contingently existing first movers never were in potency in the respects they are in act. If everything does need a reason for its existence, that is the PSR.

I’ll be “charitable” and give you as much time as you like to rebut the above argument.

Punkforchrist:

Clearly the van Inwagen/Rowe objection to the strong PSR is correct.

See above why the PSR is necessary for any TCA/KCA argument. It is necessary to refute the possibility of eternally existent, yet logically contingent entities without an eternally existent, logically necessary one.

Your “standard” or “weak” version of the PSR doesn’t get you where you want to go, I think. For one thing (pun intended), define “thing”. Ontological entity? Surely God’s will is an ontological entity needing explanation. Or maybe, you would like to make this a mere “attribute” of God (assuming a necessary being can have contingent attributes). Then I’d like to ask you what a priori epistemic justification there is for accepting the weak PSR over the strong version. For, experience and “common sense” tell us that there is a reason for attributes just as there is a reason for existences, the sky is not blue for no reason, the lead block is not heavy for no reason, etc. Whatever justification you can have for the weak PSR applies to the strong one. With one exception, detailed below in my response to TheWhim.

Your own TCA consistently confuses necessarily with contingently. A potentiality can be contingently, as opposed to necessarily, impossible to actualize (e.g. it is actualized in other worlds, but it will never happen this one.) And, indeed everything is either logically contingent or logically necessary, but that doesn’t mean everything logically (or even temporally) contingent must fail to exist at one point or another in time, something can exist for eternity but only due to contingent circumstances. A simple counter-example: one thing fails to exist only by changing into another thing, and another thing only begins to exist by the corruption of something else. Follow the chain backwards, and you will never get to a time where nothing existed, even if you take the limit to infinity.

Areopagite:

If the eternal universe is contingent then it needs to be created, otherwise it would be necessary…

How is what is not created logically necessary?

But I think that since his actions are contingent (at least the actions that proceed out of Him, unlike the ones that do not, like the Trinitarian processions), they are extrinsic to His nature.

But that’s the point! A perfectly simple being **by definition **can have nothing “extrinsic to nature” - that would be an “accident”.

…but you can actually and really distinguish the actions that are not in Him, but proceed out of Him (like Creation). Thus, creation, which is an action that proceeded out of Him and not in Him…

But if they proceed out of Him, they must start from in Him.

TheWhim and others:

Indeed the only reason we recoil from this universe being logically necessary is because we wish to believe in free will, that we are really masters of our destiny in some sense. Current neuroscientific research, however, provides some evidence (if not absolutely conclusive) that our “free will” may be an illusion, that we have actually “decided” before we are even conscious of the choice.

Now, the PSR can be abandoned slightly to the extent where no complete explanation can be given for the free choices of a rational creature. That would mean adoption of libertarian free will, a whole other can of worms.

Everyone, pretty much:

I do not accept any version of “explanation” that is not entailment. In colloquial terms when we say “explanation” which is not entailment we just mean “part of the explanation”. For instance, I went to the steak restaurant because I was hungry. OK, but this doesn’t explain why I didn’t go to the fish place or the Mexican joint, or why I didn’t skip dinner despite being hungry. But we know there are other explanations for these things: the restaurant was closer, the food was better in my opinion, I had no pressing engagement necessitating my skipping dinner, etc. We’re just giving what we deem the most relevant part of the explanation because we don’t have time to give the complete one.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

TheWhim and others:

Indeed the only reason we recoil from this universe being logically necessary is because we wish to believe in free will, that we are really masters of our destiny in some sense.

actually, the universe isnt necessary because it might not have been, modalisms possible world semantics clearly show that this is not the only posible world, and therefore it might not have been, making this universe contingent, ergo not necessary. it has nothing to do with free will.

Current neuroscientific research, however, provides some evidence (if not absolutely conclusive) that our “free will” may be an illusion, that we have actually “decided” before we are even conscious of the choice.

the trillions of empirically observed tests of free will performed everyday kill this idea that we do not have free will. if the universe is arranged in such a way as to give us the impression that we have free will all those trillions of times per day, that would literally scream that the universe is designed.

so the choice is really between a universe where we actually have free will in violation of determinism, or a universe where somehow free will has come to be faked trillions of times per day, for thousands of years.* for no other reason than mere chance.*

applying occams razor, it seems obvious. we simply possess free will.

you may ask how do i explain then the neurological studies? the seat of decision making isnt the conciousmind, its the subconcious, the soul.

Now, the PSR can be abandoned slightly to the extent where no complete explanation can be given for the free choices of a rational creature. That would mean adoption of libertarian free will, a whole other can of worms.

if we hold to determinism and libertarianism, then obviously there is a G-d. as we cant seem to deny determinism, and the empirical evidence seems to show that we have lireal, actual free will, even in this deterministic universe. im not sure how else we can see the universe other than a creation of G-d. it all comes back to that. G-d.

Everyone, pretty much:

I do not accept any version of “explanation” that is not entailment. In colloquial terms when we say “explanation” which is not entailment we just mean “part of the explanation”. For instance, I went to the steak restaurant because I was hungry. OK, but this doesn’t explain why I didn’t go to the fish place or the Mexican joint, or why I didn’t skip dinner despite being hungry. But we know there are other explanations for these things: the restaurant was closer, the food was better in my opinion, I had no pressing engagement necessitating my skipping dinner, etc. We’re just giving what we deem the most relevant part of the explanation because we don’t have time to give the complete one.

i suppose that if you want a complete explanation, that really necessitates a discussion about the proofs of G-d, namely the contingency argument. surely you arent satisfied with a partial answer. let us then seek the full answer and begin a discussion about the nature of being.

you obviously have an interest or you wouldnt be here. there are 2 types of non-theists here, those who enjoty the conflict, they can never be convinced no matter how many corners they are backed into because it is about pride and aggression.

then there are those who are seeking truth. where ever it leads. which are you? are you capable of accepting a G-d if it is reasonable to believe that He must exist?

 

[James_S_Saint]

actually, the universe isnt necessary because it might not have been, modalisms possible world semantics clearly show that this is not the only posible world, and therefore it might not have been, making this universe contingent, ergo not necessary. it has nothing to do with free will.

Pure 100% fantasy. But you are right about it having nothing to do with free-will.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Pure 100% fantasy. But you are right about it having nothing to do with free-will.

ok, you arent a fan of modalism then?

 

[wussup]

so the choice is really between a universe where we actually have free will in violation of determinism, or a universe where somehow free will has come to be faked trillions of times per day, for thousands of years.* for no other reason than mere chance.*

i suppose that if you want a complete explanation, that really necessitates a discussion about the proofs of G-d, namely the contingency argument. surely you arent satisfied with a partial answer. let us then seek the full answer and begin a discussion about the nature of being.

I happen to agree with WSP on this, but to add that a discussion of PSR begins at an understanding of “Being”, with an emphasis on the role of Free Will in that “Being”. I think an argument can be made that PSR is a anti-Free Will argument (somewhat like my inference of WSP).

 

[James_S_Saint]

ok, you arent a fan of modalism then?

I am not a fan of unlimited “possible world” scenarios.

Future possible worlds are an admission of ignorance of the present actual world. Using such concepts isn’t a problem as long as you remember that it is only ignorance that defines your limits.

Past possible worlds only make any sense if they lead to the present actual world. The idea that there “could have been” a different past world that led to a different present world, is pure 100% fantasy.

 

[wussup]

I am not a fan of unlimited “possible world” scenarios.

Future possible worlds are an admission of ignorance of the present actual world. Using such concepts isn’t a problem as long as you remember that it is only ignorance that defines your limits.

Past possible worlds only make any sense if they lead to the present actual world. The idea that there “could have been” a different past world that led to a different present world, is pure 100% fantasy.

Sort of like Spock then, eh? Kind of strange, but…

I like the multiverse concept in logical arguments dealing with PSR, first cause, only cause, and the various cosmological arguments because they (the aforementioned theories) open the door on the idea, and it is only a natural flow that leads one to see most (if not all) of these arguments want it both ways, they want an all powerful- and omniscient-being while denying the logical consequences of the exercise of such power within the frame work of the argument. In a limited way, addressing past- and future-worlds must be addressed in any logical argument of a ‘maximal’ being. A failure to be able to address this (either to include the possibility that a ‘maximal’ being will expand His realm of influence to the full extent, or to logically disprove of the state of a possible ‘future’ world or address an alternate past for the current present, should be noted.

Logically, there is an argument against trying to prove a negative. Creating a general ontology of ‘Being’ or ‘Free-will’ is extremely challenging. It is far easier to show fault in another argument than it is to be creative and gutsy enough to suggest an alternative…

 

[Areopagite]

First of all, some Thomas Aquinas:

Summa Theologica, p.I, q.19, a.3

There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means.** Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely** necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition**, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

So, in summary, God only wills things in an absolute sense if it is necessary for His divine goodness. However, anything that he wills that is not necessary for His divine goodness can be said to not be willed in an absolutely necessary sense. However, he does will those things necessarily by suppositum. That is, since He wills those things, He necessarily wills them. However, those certain things are not necessary for his divine goodness, and that is why it is said He does not will them with absolute necessity.

Now, I believe that this distinction is a purely logical and virtual one, because the will of God is simple and one in every sense. Hence, the term “freedom” that we attribute to God, like all the attributes, are analogous terms when they are also applied to humans. When we say that God is “free” to do a certain action, it doesn’t mean there was a chance that He “wasn’t going to do it” but rather “He didn’t have to do it” … particularly, “He didn’t have to do it for the fulfillment of His divine goodness.”

How is what is not created logically necessary?

Because “if something exists and is not created” then it would necessarily exist. Otherwise, it would not be something that “exists and is not created.”

Maybe you need to elucidate what you mean by logical contingency and the other kind of contingency (“existential” contingency?). Give me and example where they are clearly separate. Maybe it’s too obvious that I’m missing it.

But that’s the point! A perfectly simple being **by definition **can have nothing “extrinsic to nature” - that would be an “accident”.

You might be right about this one. I’m going to change my argument because I think I was wrong. I think His act of creation is the same as all His actions … the same as His whole will. However … this problem is resolved in the explanation above by Aquinas (hopefully elucidated a bit my own explanations).

Indeed the only reason we recoil from this universe being logically necessary is because we wish to believe in free will, that we are really masters of our destiny in some sense. Current neuroscientific research, however, provides some evidence (if not absolutely conclusive) that our “free will” may be an illusion, that we have actually “decided” before we are even conscious of the choice.

The neuroscientific research thing was brought up awhile back in another thread. I had a couple cogitations about here as possible explanations about what’s going on:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5386219&postcount=2

I do not accept any version of “explanation” that is not entailment. In colloquial terms when we say “explanation” which is not entailment we just mean “part of the explanation”. For instance, I went to the steak restaurant because I was hungry. OK, but this doesn’t explain why I didn’t go to the fish place or the Mexican joint, or why I didn’t skip dinner despite being hungry. But we know there are other explanations for these things: the restaurant was closer, the food was better in my opinion, I had no pressing engagement necessitating my skipping dinner, etc. We’re just giving what we deem the most relevant part of the explanation because we don’t have time to give the complete one.

Well, then, I would say the the Cosmological Proof attempts to answer only “part of the explanation” regarding the existence of the universe. The other part of the story is in divine revelation.

 

[MindOverMatter]

It is due to logical situational cause that the universe could not ever, not exist.

What do you mean by this?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I happen to agree with WSP on this, but to add that a discussion of PSR begins at an understanding of “Being”, with an emphasis on the role of Free Will in that “Being”. I think an argument can be made that PSR is a anti-Free Will argument (somewhat like my inference of WSP).

im a metaphysical libertarian in concerns to free will. what did you infer that i am?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I am not a fan of unlimited “possible world” scenarios.

Future possible worlds are an admission of ignorance of the present actual world. Using such concepts isn’t a problem as long as you remember that it is only ignorance that defines your limits.

Past possible worlds only make any sense if they lead to the present actual world. The idea that there “could have been” a different past world that led to a different present world, is pure 100% fantasy.

ive always thought of possible worlds in terms of being concurrent.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi NowAgnostic,

Thanks for the reply. I realize you have received a lot of responses, so I appreciate your willingness to take a look at each of them.

NowAgnostic:

Clearly the van Inwagen/Rowe objection to the strong PSR is correct.

I’m not entirely convinced, but I agree that the argument is at least a fairly good one.

See above why the PSR is necessary for any TCA/KCA argument. It is necessary to refute the possibility of eternally existent, yet logically contingent entities without an eternally existent, logically necessary one.

I disagree with this. Under the TCA (I’m thinking specifically of the argument from motion now. Just letting you know so there’s no confusion), we can postulate the existence of an eternal watch. Even if the motion of each of the gears is eternal, unless there is a first member of the watch (i.e. the spring), none of the gears would be able to move. Notice that both the spring and the gears are eternal, but the motion of the gears is reducible to the cause of motion found in the spring.

Your “standard” or “weak” version of the PSR doesn’t get you where you want to go, I think. For one thing (pun intended), define “thing”. Ontological entity? Surely God’s will is an ontological entity needing explanation. Or maybe, you would like to make this a mere “attribute” of God (assuming a necessary being can have contingent attributes). Then I’d like to ask you what a priori epistemic justification there is for accepting the weak PSR over the strong version. For, experience and “common sense” tell us that there is a reason for attributes just as there is a reason for existences, the sky is not blue for no reason, the lead block is not heavy for no reason, etc. Whatever justification you can have for the weak PSR applies to the strong one. With one exception, detailed below in my response to TheWhim.

This isn’t the weak version of the PSR (W-PSR). The W-PSR states that either every thing or fact possibly has an explanation. The PSR I’m talking about is weaker than the S-PSR, but stronger than the W-PSR.

God’s having a will certainly is a thing that is necessarily part of God’s nature, but there is a difference between God’s having a will and what God chooses to actualize. The latter entails a fact, and not an ontological thing. Epistemic justification for the PSR could take an entire book to just scratch the surface. I think, though, that while there are plausibly defeaters for the S-PSR (the Rowe/van Inwagen objection), there are no available defeaters for the PSR. Imagine you and I are walking to a coffee shop and we see an elephant standing in the middle of the road. You ask, “what’s the explanation for that elephant?” and I answer, “there is no explanation. It’s just there.” You would either look at me like I’m crazy, or merely jesting.

A sound reason to accept the PSR, then, is that without it, scientific and observational knowledge would be impossible.

Your own TCA consistently confuses necessarily with contingently. A potentiality can be contingently, as opposed to necessarily, impossible to actualize (e.g. it is actualized in other worlds, but it will never happen this one.) And, indeed everything is either logically contingent or logically necessary, but that doesn’t mean everything logically (or even temporally) contingent must fail to exist at one point or another in time, something can exist for eternity but only due to contingent circumstances.

The TCA doesn’t confuse “necessity” and “contingency”. It just uses them in the metaphysical, and not necessarily logical, sense. Even granting that corruptible entities can exist in the actual world eternally, they must still be grounded in something temporally necessary.

A simple counter-example: one thing fails to exist only by changing into another thing, and another thing only begins to exist by the corruption of something else. Follow the chain backwards, and you will never get to a time where nothing existed, even if you take the limit to infinity.

I don’t see how that exhausts every possible potentiality. We can certainly envisage the transformation of one thing into another, and thence the corruption of one and the generation of another simultaneously. However, every moment of the past has been actualized. No moment of the past is merely potential. This means that we can form a one-to-one correspondence with the set of corruptible/generative beings with the set of all corruptible beings. So, let’s suppose that your own analogy (corruptible/generative beings) exhausts the set of odd numbers - {1, 3, 5, . . . n}. Now, if the past only exhausts the set of odd numbers, then the analogy suffices to show that no temporally necessary being must exist. However, if the past exhausts the set of all numbers, including the potentiality of all corruptible beings’ collectively failing to exist, then given the existence of something at the present, something temporally necessary must exist.

The reader will be persuaded by the Third Way if the latter is accepted. I realize you may not accept that, however. In either case, the First Way, I believe, remains a sound argument.

Robert Maydole has recently modalized the Third Way. bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliMayd.htm

Even if there is no past time in which every corruptible being collectively fails to exist, we can postulate without contradiction some possible world in which this is the case. So, it is possible that no corruptible being existed at some time in the past, but it is not possible for nothing to have existed in the past. Hence, a temporally necessary being exists.

The only weakness of this argument is that it doesn’t demonstrate the existence of a temporally necessary being in every possible world (hence, it doesn’t rely on the PSR). The null world, for example, contains neither necessary nor corruptible beings. Nevertheless, the TCA doesn’t purport to demonstrate the existence of a logically necessary being, so that point is rather moot.

I apologize for the length of this post. I just have a great interest in cosmological and modal arguments.

 

[wussup]

ive always thought of possible worlds in terms of being concurrent.

Gosh, I’ve never met a Catholic who was a Libertarian. So do you reject the TCA etc? I understand there is some debate over this concept, but my understanding of a Libertarian was that it was essentially a response to the idea that causality logically leads to the idea that Free Will is a myth. While in a general way, I would agree with this, there is baggage in the argument I don’t agree with.

My understanding of Boehm’s multiverse is that he also felt all possible universes (you could say he was something of a libertarian in his philosophy).

Here is my problem with a PSR.

For the sake of this argument Assume:

1. God is the Maximal Being with attributes:
   a. Omniscient (all knowing)
   b. Omnipresent (either all-when or every-where, choose your poison)
   c. Is Maximally Good
2. Follow up to 1c, God can do no evil (evil meaning to ‘choose’ to do other than the ‘maximal good’)
3. God is the First Cause per the PSR and Leibniz/Craig/Kalam/T Cosmological Arguments

This then leads to:
1’) God, following 1c and 2, must choose between creation of the Universe, or not to create the Universe.
2’) Because 1a, God knows the ‘Maximal Good’
3’) From 1a, 2’, and 3; God knows the ‘Maximal Good’ is to Create the Universe.
4’) From 3’, God has only one choice, to Create. This gives God another necessary trait that He has no Freedom to create or not to create.
5’) From 4’, God can not express Free Will, as he cannot not create the Universe