V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
TOME, and others,
The issue that I am bringing up is that it seems to me that there is often an appeal to “self-defense” (or defense of another) to justify the death penalty. The difficulty is that classically killing in self-defense is justified under the principle of double effect – but the imposition of the death penalty seems to violate the principle of double effect.
The solution? The death penalty is not self-defense (strictly construed). The death penalty is justified, rather, on the basis of natural law and the rights and duties of a lawful authority to punish grave offenses.
Aquinas seems to be making the distinction:
For instance see II-II, 64, 3 "Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?
In the second instance Thomas speaks about, on the other hand, actual self-defense. This is justified under a principle of double effect. Thomas explicitly states that the private individual cannot intend to kill, that only public authorities can whether it be in self-defense (and referring the act to the common good) or in the imposition of the death penalty, or in war.
Thoughts?
VC
The issue that I am bringing up is that it seems to me that there is often an appeal to “self-defense” (or defense of another) to justify the death penalty. The difficulty is that classically killing in self-defense is justified under the principle of double effect – but the imposition of the death penalty seems to violate the principle of double effect.
The solution? The death penalty is not self-defense (strictly construed). The death penalty is justified, rather, on the basis of natural law and the rights and duties of a lawful authority to punish grave offenses.
Aquinas seems to be making the distinction:
For instance see II-II, 64, 3 "Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?
Contrasted with II-II, 64, 7 “Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?”it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s welfare. . .Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.
The first instance (death penalty) Thomas speaks about the lawfulness of directly killing an evildoer – that only those who have proper authority can do so. This doesn’t seem to be an appeal to double effect or to self-defense.Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental. . . .Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. . . . But as it is unlawful to take a man’s life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
In the second instance Thomas speaks about, on the other hand, actual self-defense. This is justified under a principle of double effect. Thomas explicitly states that the private individual cannot intend to kill, that only public authorities can whether it be in self-defense (and referring the act to the common good) or in the imposition of the death penalty, or in war.
Thoughts?
VC