Question about the Most Holy Trinity

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

We are not imagining a situation in which God exists and the persons don’t. Neither am I saying that God “makes” the relations come into existence. This is who God is eternally and essentially.

So there are persons and the persons have relations to each other? Relations make persons or persons make relation? It is Confusing.

I don’t think “make” is the operative word here. If there are persons they must be related to each other in some way, and if there are subsisting relations in this way there must be persons.

The Son proceeds from the Father, and this is true, but this can be misleading also because its natural for our minds to imagine this as one being or one part proceeding from another being or part. What is “going on” is that the Divine Nature has intrinsic, processional activity. That is the procession begins in the Divine Nature and ends in the Divine Nature. This procession is a real activity. The Divine Nature therefore stands in relation to itself by both paternity and filiation. The Divine Nature as Son proceeds from the Divine Nature as Father. What is proceeding from and what is being proceeded to is the “same thing.” The “who” is different, because the procession necessitates opposing relations. And I think beginning to understand that there are “whos” is actually rooted in understanding God as being Simple. This processional activity isn’t just something done by a part of God. It is his whole self through his whole self to his whole self. Whereas when you or I know or will something it involves distinct parts and is not done through your whole essence as one act.

God revealed that he experiences himself as a Trinity of persons. Would we have known this as a way to put his experience without him revealing it? No, but theology sheds some understanding on the subject.

 

[pohandes]

Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek ousia, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called “hypostasis” and “person.” Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.

No. I don’t say that.

Please answer my question.

The Son proceeds from the Father, and this is true, but this can be misleading also because its natural for our minds to imagine this as one being or one part proceeding from another being or part

The problem is: “Could the Son exist, if there was no Father to proceed him?” Of course not. So the Son can’t be God, Because God is self-exist.

That is the procession begins in the Divine Nature and ends in the Divine Nature.

Well, we must imagine, again! There must be God the Father and not be God the Son & Holy Spirit; then God the Father begets the Son and He proceeds Holy Spirit, and then The son and Holy Spirit exist.

This procession is a real activity . The Divine Nature therefore stands in relation to itself by both paternity and filiation.

It seems to be better to talk about actions instead of relations.

What is proceeding from and what is being proceeded to is the “same thing.” The “who” is different, because the procession necessitates opposing relations.

But it will not be a “REAL” distinction and then we will not have a real Trinity.

God revealed that he experiences himself as a Trinity of persons. Would we have known this as a way to put his experience without him revealing it? No, but theology sheds some understanding on the subject.

Those experiences are not essentially, but they are out of God’s Essnece, so they can’t point to the Most Holy Trinity.

 

[Vico]

…
Please answer my question.
…

You asked: “What are the persons to essence?”

Is is answered by St. Thomas Aquinas. Did you read it? Note that a person is a hypostasis endowed with reason, also an individual, complete substance existing entirely in itself – an incommunicable substance.

Aquinas:

Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity.

In the link (divine simplicity) is:

Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

The Son proceeds from the Father, and this is true, but this can be misleading also because its natural for our minds to imagine this as one being or one part proceeding from another being or part

The problem is: “Could the Son exist, if there was no Father to proceed him?” Of course not. So the Son can’t be God, Because God is self-exist.

You cannot have the Father without the Son either. These are subsisting, not accidental, relations, not separate beings. You cannot have God without the three persons. The essence, in which three persons subsist, self-exists.

That is the procession begins in the Divine Nature and ends in the Divine Nature.

Well, we must imagine, again! There must be God the Father and not be God the Son & Holy Spirit; then God the Father begets the Son and He proceeds Holy Spirit, and then The son and Holy Spirit exist.

You cannot have one without the other. There is no “God the Father and not God the Son & Holy Spirit”.

This procession is a real activity . The Divine Nature therefore stands in relation to itself by both paternity and filiation.

It seems to be better to talk about actions instead of relations.

Why?

What is proceeding from and what is being proceeded to is the “same thing.” The “who” is different, because the procession necessitates opposing relations.

But it will not be a “REAL” distinction and then we will not have a real Trinity.

The relational distinction is real because the procession is real.

God revealed that he experiences himself as a Trinity of persons. Would we have known this as a way to put his experience without him revealing it? No, but theology sheds some understanding on the subject.

Those experiences are not essentially, but they are out of God’s Essnece, so they can’t point to the Most Holy Trinity.

Why do you say God’s mode of being and knowing himself is not part of his nature?

 

[pohandes]

You asked: “What are the persons to essence?”

Is is answered by St. Thomas Aquinas. Did you read it? Note that a person is a hypostasis endowed with reason, also an individual, complete substance existing entirely in itself – an incommunicable substance.

Aquinas:

Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity.

Ok. God is simple. Are persons equal his essence or they are somethings out of the essence?

 

[pohandes]

You cannot have the Father without the Son either. These are subsisting, not accidental, relations, not separate beings. You cannot have God without the three persons. The essence, in which three persons subsist, self-exists.

If the father is self-exist, then we have it without any condition.

Why?

Because in fact, self-knowing is a action.

Why do you say God’s mode of being and knowing himself is not part of his nature?

Because God’s nature is simple.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

You asked: “What are the persons to essence?”

Is is answered by St. Thomas Aquinas. Did you read it? Note that a person is a hypostasis endowed with reason, also an individual, complete substance existing entirely in itself – an incommunicable substance.

Aquinas:

Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity.

Ok. God is simple. Are persons equal his essence or they are somethings out of the essence?

And again Aquinas answers in the S.T. Part I, Q39, Article 1. Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The persons in relation to the essence (Prima Pars, Q. 39)

Objection 1. It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or “suppositum,” there can be only one “suppositum” of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (I:28:3; I:30:2). Therefore essence is not the same as person.

Reply to Objection 1. There cannot be a distinction of “suppositum” in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the “supposita”; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Objection 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.

Reply to Objection 2. As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

 

[pohandes]

And again Aquinas answers in the S.T. Part I, Q39, Article 1. Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The persons in relation to the essence (Prima Pars, Q. 39)

Objection 2 . Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.

Reply to Objection 2 . As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

Dear Vico, I have read the Summa. Thomas Aquinas does not answering to what I’m saying.

I say:

The Son is God.

The Father is God.

God is one and simple.

So How it is possible to the Son to not be the Father?

 

[Vico]

Vico:

And again Aquinas answers in the S.T. Part I, Q39, Article 1. Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The persons in relation to the essence (Prima Pars, Q. 39)

Objection 2 . Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.

Reply to Objection 2 . As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

Dear Vico, I have read the Summa. Thomas Aquinas does not answering to what I’m saying.

I say:

The Son is God.

The Father is God.

God is one and simple.

So How it is possible to the Son to not be the Father?

He does. See S.T. Part I, Q42, Article 5. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1042.htm#article5

Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.

 

[pohandes]

He does. See S.T. Part I, Q42, Article 5. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Equality and likeness among the divine persons (Prima Pars, Q. 42)

Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.

If I accept this, I must accept that each person is compound! I mean The Son and The Father, has two parts:

1.God’ essnece

2.Side of the relation

Unless you say the relation is not real, and then the Trinity will not be real.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

He does. See S.T. Part I, Q42, Article 5. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Equality and likeness among the divine persons (Prima Pars, Q. 42)

Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.

If I accept this, I must accept that each person is compound! I mean The Son and The Father, has two parts:

1.God’ essnece

2.Side of the relation

Unless you say the relation is not real, and then the Trinity will not be real.

Note that relations do not import composition. Aristotle Metaphysics, used by St. Thomas Aquinas in the S.T…

Eastern view St. Gregory of Nyssa wrote:

“Though we hold that the nature is not different, we do not deny the difference arising in regard of the source and that which proceeds from the source; but in this alone do we admit that one Person differs from another.”

Joyce, G. (1912). The Blessed Trinity. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15047a.htm

 

[pohandes]

Note that relations do not import composition. Aristotle Metaphysics, used by St. Thomas Aquinas in the S.T…

If the relations are real and they make real distinction, they must have two sides, and if the sides are the essence of God, then Trinity is not real.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

Note that relations do not import composition. Aristotle Metaphysics, used by St. Thomas Aquinas in the S.T…

If the relations are real and they make real distinction, they must have two sides, and if the sides are the essence of God, then Trinity is not real.

The persons are the relations of opposition and are real and distinct, all in the essence, for there is no matter and form in God.

The dogma of faith is that they are real distinctions in one simple Holy Trinity. Now you ask for a logical explanation. There could be more than one logical explanation, or none, but the Church does not declare based upon logic, but revelation and the guidance of the Holy Spirit given to the Church that protects it from error in faith and morals.

 

[Vico]

Jesus as True God and True Man

Luke 1

34 And Mary said to the angel: How shall this be done, because I know not man?
35 And the angel answering, said to her: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.

I don’t think it helps.

The human soul is everlasting from the time of its creation.

I point to the Divine nature and Human nauture.

A second post on this question.

A divine person never dies. The Son of God eats, drinks, etc,. through the human soul and body of Jesus Christ.

So there must be 2 persons, not 1.

That is part of the heresy called Nestorianism that proposed that the two natures of Christ were joined by will rather than personhood. It was condemned at the Councils of Ephesus 431 and Chalcedon 451.

There is human nature in Jesus Christ but the person is the Son of God with the divine nature. The Son of God assumed human nature.

 

[pohandes]

The persons are the relations of opposition and are real and distinct, all in the essence, for there is no matter and form in God.

In fact, I can’t imagine three distinct persons, all in a unique and simple essence.

The dogma of faith is that they are real distinctions in one simple Holy Trinity. Now you ask for a logical explanation. There could be more than one logical explanation, or none, but the Church does not declare based upon logic, but revelation and the guidance of the Holy Spirit given to the Church that protects it from error in faith and morals.

You are right. I hope there be logical explanations.

 

[Vico]

…
In fact, I can’t imagine three distinct persons, all in a unique and simple essence.
…
You are right. I hope there be logical explanations.

You may be able to understand St. Thomas Aquinas. One cannot think of the Holy Trinity as one does of creatures for there is not matter and form in the divine, the divine is form only (He is the first efficient cause). Key phrase below is: “relation as subsisting in the divine nature”.

S.T. I, Q39, A1:

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): “When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father.”

I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (I:3:3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (I:28:2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (I:29:4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The persons in relation to the essence (Prima Pars, Q. 39) (Question 39 The persons in relation to the essence)
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The simplicity of God (Prima Pars, Q. 3) (Question 3 The simplicity of God)
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The divine relations (Prima Pars, Q. 28) (Question 28 The divine relations)
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The divine persons (Prima Pars, Q. 29) (Question 29 The divine persons)

 

[pohandes]

You may be able to understand St. Thomas Aquinas. One cannot think of the Holy Trinity as one does of creatures for there is no matter and form in the divine.

I did not mean thinking about trinity. I meant that my mind can’t accept it. God is simple and alone, and Father and Son are in his essence but they are two distinct persons. I meant it seems impossible.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

You may be able to understand St. Thomas Aquinas. One cannot think of the Holy Trinity as one does of creatures for there is no matter and form in the divine.

I did not mean thinking about trinity. I meant that my mind can’t accept it. God is simple and alone, and Father and Son are in his essence but they are two distinct persons. I meant it seems impossible.

Isaiah 55

8 For my thoughts are not your thoughts: nor your ways my ways, saith the Lord.
9 For as the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts.

 

[pohandes]

Isaiah 55

8 For my thoughts are not your thoughts: nor your ways my ways, saith the Lord.
9 For as the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts.

Do you mean we must ignore the a Contrary to reason, because God’s thoughts are not our thoughts: nor our ways his ways? But wrong theologies can claim like this, even atheists can claim that “World without God” is a secret that we can’t understand it.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

Isaiah 55

8 For my thoughts are not your thoughts: nor your ways my ways, saith the Lord.
9 For as the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts.

Do you mean we must ignore the a Contrary to reason, because God’s thoughts are not our thoughts: nor our ways his ways? But wrong theologies can claim like this, even atheists can claim that “World without God” is a secret that we can’t understand it.

When the Church defines something as a matter of faith or morals, then the Catholic is bound to assent to it, even though not understanding it intellectually. Matters of faith and morals are protected by the Holy Spirit to be true.

Are atheists interested in the Catholic dogmas of faith?

Also, I am wondering why you think the St. Thomas Aquinas is wrong?