Questions about the Cosmological Argument

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To Shike and JDaniel

I am not going to respond to each separate item. I think there really is only one question to answer here.

Can God distinguish between a state of affairs at which only He exists and another state of affairs at which both He and the universe exist?

If yes, then there is a change in God and Aquinas is wrong and there is a temporal sequence, which means Craig is wrong.

If no, then the universe has no beginning and the KCA is wrong.

I think these are the only two possible answers, but if you can offer a third one, I am all ears.
 
Can God distinguish between a state of affairs at which only He exists and another state of affairs at which both He and the universe exist?
To even ask that question is to treat God as a being possibly subject to time.

It’s not that He could distinguish or could not distinguish… but categorically it does not apply.
 
To even ask that question is to treat God as a being possibly subject to time.

It’s not that He could distinguish or could not distinguish… but categorically it does not apply.
OK, that answers my question. God is not possibly subject to time, hence the KCA is false.

Thanks for the discussion.
 
OK, that answers my question. God is not possibly subject to time, hence the KCA is false.

Thanks for the discussion.
You are welcome. But not so fast… your dilemma needs work.

There exist at least two possibilities where someone could say “no” and still reject your associated conclusion. The first is saying no, God cannot exercise the ability to distinguish between one state where He exists and another state where He and something created exist. Granted, such a “God” would not be all-powerful and would be subject to change, and hence, subject to time. From this it would not follow that the universe did not begin to exist as you say, though it would follow that Aquinas was wrong (what you posit as the conclusion of saying “yes”).

Big deal, I already see the gears turning and you reformulating your dilemma into a trilemma.

The other possibility where someone could say “no” and still reject your conclusion is when God is categorically not subject to time. There is no logical contradiction with God not being subject to time and creating something that is subject to time. Sure, from God’s perspective all is eternally present so-to-speak, but that in no way inhibits a contingent creation from experiencing time.

Check your use of the word “eternity” and you will find a misguided conception… that God merely exists infinitely in the past. This is wrong and is tripping you up when bringing an eternal creation into the mix. Basically, such a conception is giving you the impression that creation is static and that it has already happened and is over with instead of continually happening.

It may perhaps be the difference between using the word “eternity” univocally and analogically that is tripping you up.

Good luck.
 
Can God distinguish between a state of affairs at which only He exists and another state of affairs at which both He and the universe exist?
Yes. All you require here is that God be able to distinguish between the two. That is a question of knowledge, not a question experience. Even human beings, who are not omniscient, can distinguish intellectually the difference between the two.
If yes, then there is a change in God and Aquinas is wrong and there is a temporal sequence, which means Craig is wrong.
That conclusion doesn’t follow. Because God can intellectually distinguish between a timeless state and a temporal state does not entail there is change in God. This is the case even if the universe had a beginning.
If no, then the universe has no beginning and the KCA is wrong.
This is also incorrect. Even if the answer is “no” (I do not believe it is) all it would mean is that God is not omniscient. It does not require that the universe has no beginning. It would at most prove that God cannot distinguish between the state of his own timelessness without the universe and the state of his own timelessness with the universe.
I think these are the only two possible answers, but if you can offer a third one, I am all ears.
The third answer is that an eternal timeless cause can create a temporal effect - the universe.
 
Yes. All you require here is that God be able to distinguish between the two. That is a question of knowledge, not a question experience. Even human beings, who are not omniscient, can distinguish intellectually the difference between the two.
I like your answer. I see it fitting in with my answer, though I think we interpreted the meaning of his question a bit different.
 
So I finally checked out the Kalaam again, and here’s what I think.

I think the argument from lines 1 - 3 is logically valid. I also think the premises are true…
however, I don’t buy Craig’s a priori argument for premise 2. He screws with the terminology of actual infinities and would require equivocation for his argument to work. In all, I think at most we have a rather probabilistic evidence from science that 2 is true… which is not the same kind of grounding that Aquinas gives for his empirical premises.
  1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
It’s not a demonstration in the scholastic sense, but I agree with these three lines.
 
To Shike and JDaniel

I am not going to respond to each separate item. I think there really is only one question to answer here.

Can God distinguish between a state of affairs at which only He exists and another state of affairs at which both He and the universe exist?
Belorg:

I have to say, at this point, that I am very impressed with your genteel manner and hospitable interaction in recent days. Wow. (I’m not being condescending, just honest.)

God, in my view, always Creates. That means He has always been creating. If it wasn’t this universe, it was something else, such as the angels, or another universe, or other creatures. Only an Infinite Being can know His own infinite being. So, God cannot know such a state of affairs as you have described. What you have described is a state of affairs that requires the concurrence of Time. That is an anthropomorphism.
If yes, then there is a change in God and Aquinas is wrong and there is a temporal sequence, which means Craig is wrong.
I wrote my answer sequentially, before I read this codicil. I trust the reasoning of St. Thomas.
If no, then the universe has no beginning and the KCA is wrong.
Once again, I must ask you: from what, or where, do you derive this conclusion? I have already told you why God can create creatures successively - from all eternity. An Infinite Being must know Himself as Infinite Being perfectly, otherwise, He is not what we call God. If God is not, then we (and all of this) are not here. Naked infinity does not stop at some point along its way, to start an universe - or, anything else. A naked infinity has no finite points, nor does it have any finite segments. A naked infinity is an everlasting continuum in either direction. It cannot actualize in a finite structure, so, it cannot stop to allow for finite creation (or causation) within its infinite structure… Only an infinitely knowing Infinite Being can do that. Only an infinitely knowing Infinite Being can create along the way.
I think these are the only two possible answers, but if you can offer a third one, I am all ears.
Well, I hope not. I’d like to think that we’ve I’ve been talking to a human! 😉

God bless, Belorg
jd
 
To even ask that question is to treat God as a being possibly subject to time.

It’s not that He could distinguish or could not distinguish… but categorically it does not apply.
Precisely.

God bless,
jd
 
You are welcome. But not so fast… your dilemma needs work.

There exist at least two possibilities where someone could say “no” and still reject your associated conclusion. The first is saying no, God cannot exercise the ability to distinguish between one state where He exists and another state where He and something created exist. Granted, such a “God” would not be all-powerful and would be subject to change, and hence, subject to time. From this it would not follow that the universe did not begin to exist as you say, though it would follow that Aquinas was wrong (what you posit as the conclusion of saying “yes”).
Yes, Aquinas can also be wrong if the answer is no.
Big deal, I already see the gears turning and you reformulating your dilemma into a trilemma.
The main point is that saying no in this way means your concept of God is wrong.
So, I won’t bother.
The other possibility where someone could say “no” and still reject your conclusion is when God is categorically not subject to time. There is no logical contradiction with God not being subject to time and creating something that is subject to time. Sure, from God’s perspective all is eternally present so-to-speak, but that in no way inhibits a contingent creation from experiencing time.
I have never claimed that if God is categorically timeless it is impossible for His creatures to experinece time, or even to experience in some way a beginning of time. But the first premise of the KCA does NOT say ‘everything that experiences a beginning must have a cause’, so this kind of defense really does not work.
Check your use of the word “eternity” and you will find a misguided conception… that God merely exists infinitely in the past.
That is definitely NOT my conception. If that were the case, God could create a beginning universe at any time He chose. (because He would have time to do so)

T
his is wrong and is tripping you up when bringing an eternal creation into the mix.
No
Basically, such a conception is giving you the impression that creation is static and that it has already happened and is over with instead of continually happening.
It’s not giving me any impression, Shike.
It may perhaps be the difference between using the word “eternity” univocally and analogically that is tripping you up.
I use the word ‘eternity’ to mean ‘without beginning’. That’s all. If someone claims a personal being can be without beginning and timeless, I accept that FTSOTA and draw the logical conclusions from this.
Good luck.
Thank you. But I think you will need more luck than I
 
Yes. All you require here is that God be able to distinguish between the two. That is a question of knowledge, not a question experience. Even human beings, who are not omniscient, can distinguish intellectually the difference between the two.
I am not talking about dreaming up some distinction, , I could rephrase my question as : is there , from God’s POV, a real disctintion between Him existing ‘alone’ (sans the universe) and Him existing with the universe.
This is also incorrect. Even if the answer is “no” (I do not believe it is) all it would mean is that God is not omniscient. It does not require that the universe has no beginning. It would at most prove that God cannot distinguish between the state of his own timelessness without the universe and the state of his own timelessness with the universe.
Yes, I should have also included the possibility of some kind of inferior God, but I really don’t feel like refuting each and every of the thousands of God concepts, so, in this thread I concentrate on Craig’s God (and to a lesser extent Aquinas’ God)
The third answer is that an eternal timeless cause can create a temporal effect - the universe.
That’s actually a ‘yes’ answer. Which means God is not timeless nor changeless.
 
Belorg:

I have to say, at this point, that I am very impressed with your genteel manner and hospitable interaction in recent days. Wow. (I’m not being condescending, just honest.)
I have always interacted in that way, if the ‘other side’ does not start insulting me, that is.
I don’t think there is any reason to start calling names just because there is a disagreement.
God, in my view, always Creates. That means He has always been creating. If it wasn’t this universe, it was something else, such as the angels, or another universe, or other creatures.
That is, IMO, the only logical conclusion from a timeless, beginningless creator.
Only an Infinite Being can know His own infinite being. So, God cannot know such a state of affairs as you have described. What you have described is a state of affairs that requires the concurrence of Time. That is an anthropomorphism.
Of course this state of affairs requires the concurrence of time. And because your definition of God makes this impossible, your God (and Craig’s and Aqionas’) is incompatible with a beginning universe.
Once again, I must ask you: from what, or where, do you derive this conclusion? I have already told you why God can create creatures successively - from all eternity.
That’s exactly what I am claiming: that God crates from all eternity.
You seem to suggest that the universe can have a beginning if God created a chain of causes from eternity that resulted in the universe. But that runs into very serious problems and moreover, depends on your definition of ‘universe’
An Infinite Being must know Himself as Infinite Being perfectly, otherwise, He is not what we call God. If God is not, then we (and all of this) are not here. Naked infinity does not stop at some point along its way, to start an universe - or, anything else. A naked infinity has no finite points, nor does it have any finite segments. A naked infinity is an everlasting continuum in either direction. It cannot actualize in a finite structure, so, it cannot stop to allow for finite creation (or causation) within its infinite structure… Only an infinitely knowing Infinite Being can do that. Only an infinitely knowing Infinite Being can create along the way.
That’s a nice assertion, but I do not see any argument for that, especially since you seem to presuppose a ‘way’ along which God can create. A ‘way’ in this sense is temporal. So a a-tempral being cannot have a ‘way’ along which to create.
Well, I hope not. I’d like to think that we’ve I’ve been talking to a human! 😉
God bless, Belorg
jd
Well, since you haven’t really offered a third answer, I can remain human for the time being.
 
I have never claimed that if God is categorically timeless it is impossible for His creatures to experinece time, or even to experience in some way a beginning of time. But the first premise of the KCA does NOT say ‘everything that experiences a beginning must have a cause’, so this kind of defense really does not work.
Oh, I’m not trying to defend the KCA - my previous post says as much.

But why not trust the experience of a beginning as the fact of a beginning? If our senses are not generally reliable we are in epistemological deep doo-doo.

I will however change my wording from “experience” to “has”, as I still do not see a logical contradiction… I am trying.
I use the word ‘eternity’ to mean ‘without beginning’. That’s all. If someone claims a personal being can be without beginning and timeless, I accept that FTSOTA and draw the logical conclusions from this.
Fair enough. But you do realize that such a definition is still ambiguous between the two different concepts of eternity… one that applies to God and one that doesn’t? One can have a series without a first member or one can have no series at all.
… is there , from God’s POV, a real disctintion between Him existing ‘alone’ (sans the universe) and Him existing with the universe.
And to ask such a question is to presuppose that God is in time.
That’s exactly what I am claiming: that God crates from all eternity.
You seem to suggest that the universe can have a beginning if God created a chain of causes from eternity that resulted in the universe. But that runs into very serious problems and moreover, depends on your definition of ‘universe’
The definition of “universe” is important. Some put all existence whatsoever under the term while others place God’s creation. The latter is favored by its etymology. If one were to pick the former then there would be all sorts of absurdities. But I don’t think you are falling into this.

Their is no logical contradiction with God creating a chain of causes from eternity (the definition that I still don’t think you use) that has a temporal first member. Only if one has some overarching non-relative notion of time does the trouble begin.

belorg, what is time?
 
This simple argument for God’s existence, sometimes called the Kalam argument, goes something like:
  1. Anything that has a beginning has a cause.
  2. The universe has a beginning
  3. Therefore the universe has a cause.
    …various arguments…
    X. This cause is God.
Here go my questions:
  1. Do you find this argument convincing?
  2. If not, why not?
  3. If you do find this argument convincing, how do you answer the objection that things may be self-caused?
  4. What about the objection that something that has a beginning may not be caused?
  5. Finally, what arguments do you use to go from (3) to (X), and how do you eliminate alternative causes, such as some eternal pre-universe, etc?
I reject the Kalam Cosmological because it’s invalid. We don’t know that the universe had a beginning.

Theists require for time and causation to not be married, or else God could not have created time. The cosmological evidence to support a finite past only supports a finite temporal past. Therefore, the cosmological evidence is really irrelevant, Craig throws it in to make his argument sound more compelling but it doesn’t have any effect on the truth of the conclusion.

What the argument boils down to is the philosophical reasons to reject an infinite causal past. Craig in his debates doesn’t even give arguments for a finite causal past, but thought experiments to pump up the audiences intuitions to agree with him. The times he does give arguments they’re really weak and easily refuted by just showing that he doesn’t understand the concepts he speaks of. Any argument I’ve come across so far trying to prove that the universe had to have had a finite past was just very confused.
 
Oh, I’m not trying to defend the KCA - my previous post says as much.
Then we don’t have any real issue (at least as far as this thread is concerned)
But why not trust the experience of a beginning as the fact of a beginning? If our senses are not generally reliable we are in epistemological deep doo-doo.
I don’t trust the experience of a beginning mainly because you claim the One who knows everything better than we do knows it is not a beginning.
I will however change my wording from “experience” to “has”, as I still do not see a logical contradiction… I am trying.
If you chnage 'experineceing a beginning to ‘have’ a beginning, you are contradicting God’s eternal will and God eternal act of creation.
Fair enough. But you do realize that such a definition is still ambiguous between the two different concepts of eternity… one that applies to God and one that doesn’t? One can have a series without a first member or one can have no series at all.
Yes, but that’s irrelevant to what I am claiming.
And to ask such a question is to presuppose that God is in time.
No, Shike, to ask such a question is to wonder if people who claim God is timeless actually realize the consequences of what they are claiming.
The definition of “universe” is important. Some put all existence whatsoever under the term while others place God’s creation. The latter is favored by its etymology. If one were to pick the former then there would be all sorts of absurdities. But I don’t think you are falling into this.
Owh, buit ’ God’s creation’ will do FTSOTA.
Their is no logical contradiction with God creating a chain of causes from eternity (the definition that I still don’t think you use) that has a temporal first member.
There is a logical contradiction in that in this case, God’s eternal will is somehow not a sufficient condition for ‘God’s creation’ to occur. That’s the only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur.
Only if one has some overarching non-relative notion of time does the trouble begin.
No, Sike, the trouble begins if one wants someone not begionning to create a beginning.
belorg, what is time?
Time is a measurement of change. On a Thomistic notion of God, the mere existence of time is already a contradiction. But that’s not relevant to this thread.
 
So I guess I’m just not seeing it.
Could you spell out the contradiction in a single sentence in the form A & not-A?
I don’t trust the experience of a beginning mainly because you claim the One who knows everything better than we do knows it is not a beginning.
Oh, no… God sure does know it is a beginning for us… but He doesn’t experience a beginning because He doesn’t change.
If you chnage 'experineceing a beginning to ‘have’ a beginning, you are contradicting God’s eternal will and God eternal act of creation.
So you keep saying… but why is it a contradiction? It seems to me that the only way it could be a problem is if you select the wrong definition of the two possible definitions of eternity that your definition ambiguously includes.

When I keep running the conditional through my head, namely, that ‘if God is eternal and does not change then He cannot create something that isn’t and does’, I do find a contradiction… but upon further inspection I find that I am sneaking change into God through the back door and subjecting Him to time.

I’m not saying I can perfectly conceive of a categorically timeless being creating something subject to time… all I am saying is that there is no contradiction. If there appears to be then I am only losing sight of one of the premises.
Yes, but that’s irrelevant to what I am claiming.
It’s becoming more apparent to me that it is indeed not irrelevant.
There is a logical contradiction in that in this case, God’s eternal will is somehow not a sufficient condition for ‘God’s creation’ to occur. That’s the only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur.
So the only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur is if God is the sufficient condition. And I agree that He is… what I don’t agree is that a being categorically not subject to time is found to be in contradiction with something that is.

It’s like saying something which couldn’t fly by nature is in opposition to something which can. The analogy you are hoping for is something that could fly by nature but happens to not be able to versus something which can fly–but that doesn’t fly here in this case.
Time is a measurement of change. On a Thomistic notion of God, the mere existence of time is already a contradiction. But that’s not relevant to this thread
Could God create anything if He could not change? Beware of what your answer will commit you to…

Meh, if anything I think you are helping show that there is something wrong with Craig’s conception of God. And for that I thank you.
 
I reject the Kalam Cosmological because it’s invalid. We don’t know that the universe had a beginning.
I’m not much of a fan either. But the term “invalid” has a very precise meaning and I don’t think you are using it correctly. If you wish to reject the truth of premise 2, then do so… but that only means his argument is not sound. Validity is a structural term and if you wish to use it correctly you need to point out a structural flaw, not just that you reject the truth of one of the premises.

I do agree however that there is some fishy stuff going on when he starts talking about potential and actual infinities. My problem is that in the case of time he seems to call an actual infinity what an aristotelian would call a potential infinity.
 
I’m not much of a fan either. But the term “invalid” has a very precise meaning and I don’t think you are using it correctly. If you wish to reject the truth of premise 2, then do so… but that only means his argument is not sound. Validity is a structural term and if you wish to use it correctly you need to point out a structural flaw, not just that you reject the truth of one of the premises.

I do agree however that there is some fishy stuff going on when he starts talking about potential and actual infinities. My problem is that in the case of time he seems to call an actual infinity what an aristotelian would call a potential infinity.
Sorry you’re right, I had meant to say unsound. And yes, infinity is very well defined in set theory. Craigs conceptions of potential and actual infinite’s are confused, and do not address the modern conception one might have of an infinite past which may be expressed with set theory.
 
I reject the Kalam Cosmological because-] it’s invalid/-] (I reject premise 2). -]We/-] ( others and I ) don’t know that the universe had a beginning.

-]Theists/-] (The Kalam argument) require for time and causation to not be married, or else God could not have created time(what does that mean?). The cosmological evidence to support a finite past only supports a finite temporal past. Therefore, the cosmological evidence is really irrelevant ( if the universe is eternal), Craig throws it in to make his argument sound more compelling but it doesn’t have any effect on the truth of the conclusion (if the universe did not have a beggining).

What the argument boils down to is the philosophical reasons to reject an infinite causal past. Craig in his debates -]doesn’t even/-] gives arguments for a finite causal past, -]but thought experiments to pump up the audiences intuitions to agree with him./-] The times he does give arguments (contradiction, does he give arguments or does he not?) they’re really weak and easily refuted by just showing that he doesn’t understand the concepts he speaks of. Any argument I’ve come across so far trying to prove that the universe had to have had a finite past was just very confused.
What are these weak and easily refuted arguments? Are you saying that anyone that says the universe had a beginning, including scientists, is using “very confused arguments?”

1-if the universe had a beginning the argument constitutes a persuasive argument for a necessary being.
2- The argument is not the strongest version of the cosmological argument as there arguments that are compatible with an eternal universe.
 
I’ve never seen Craig give an argument in a debate, though I’ve heard of arguments that he’s given in books.
What are these weak and easily refuted arguments? Are you saying that anyone that says the universe had a beginning, including scientists, is using “very confused arguments?”
(1) There is an infinite collection A of discrete objects
(2) Three objects are removed from A
(3) A contains infinity - 3 many members
(4) A contains infinity many members
(5) Contradiction between (3) and (4), therefore reject (1)

I’m not sure where he gives this argument, I’ve only heard it given by people who agree with him and claim this is an argument of his.

I’m claiming that Craig’s arguments that it’s necessarily true that the universe had a beginning are confused. Others who have made similar attempts such as “if the past is infinite, how could the present exist?” were also quite confused. I’ve never heard of a scientist give any such argument, though.
1-if the universe had a beginning the argument constitutes a persuasive argument for a necessary being.
2- The argument is not the strongest version of the cosmological argument as there arguments that are compatible with an eternal universe.
(1) No it does not. P being true does not imply that P is a tautology.
Also like I said, even if it’s true that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past it does not support a finite causal past. The theist is committed to accepting that our temporal past and our causal past are not identical, so the fact that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past is irrelevant.

(2) I know.
 
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