D
DavidJoseph
Guest
On the subject of rash judgment, Aquinas says, among other things, the following (concerning degrees of suspicion from which rash judgment springs):
The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor.
So what does it mean to regard one’s wickedness as certain if it’s about grave matter? Does it mean to assume the person is guilty of mortal sin? Or does it mean to assume said person has a malicious will? For that matter, how could assuming one’s wickedness as certain NOT be about some sort of grave matter?
The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor.
So what does it mean to regard one’s wickedness as certain if it’s about grave matter? Does it mean to assume the person is guilty of mortal sin? Or does it mean to assume said person has a malicious will? For that matter, how could assuming one’s wickedness as certain NOT be about some sort of grave matter?