Rash Judgment According to St Thomas Aquinas

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DavidJoseph

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On the subject of rash judgment, Aquinas says, among other things, the following (concerning degrees of suspicion from which rash judgment springs):

The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor.

So what does it mean to regard one’s wickedness as certain if it’s about grave matter? Does it mean to assume the person is guilty of mortal sin? Or does it mean to assume said person has a malicious will? For that matter, how could assuming one’s wickedness as certain NOT be about some sort of grave matter?
 
For those reading this thread, the OP is referring to the Summa, IIb, Q. 60, a3.

If you back up to Article 2, he says “our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention”. It seems to me he is not saying we have to pretend evil is good, but we cannot presume to know that the person has a bad will, without sufficient reason to suppose this (e.g. if the person clearly states his malicious motives). Even then we should be careful about assuming God’s place; he alone knows the heart.
 
From slight indications… seems to me that would mean inadequate evidence.

Say someone bumps into a woman in the subway as it’s rounding a curve. Assuming the man was *deliberately *trying to feel her sexually would be wrong because you don’t have enough evidence.t
 
Aquinas may be treading carefully here. He does not mention the accuser thinking of a mortal sin in the case of the accused, only wickedness. It’s not like Aquinas to stop from going into further detail, so maybe he is letting a general statement about an accuser seeing something that looks wicked to them stand on its own for the sake of his own argument.

Interestingly enough though, he goes on to say the accuser would be committing a mortal sin if the unspoken accusation was about something serious. Aquinas seems to violate his own statement about rash judgement. Go figure.
 
… So what does it mean to regard one’s wickedness as certain if it’s about grave matter? Does it mean to assume the person is guilty of mortal sin? Or does it mean to assume said person has a malicious will?..
As I understand this passage, Aquinas is not saying any of that. Let’s go over the text a piece at a time:

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life,” …
If one merely begins to doubt (or question) another’s goodness, based on scant evidence of wrongdoing, it is venial.

The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor…
Regarding another’s wickedness as certain, without sufficient foundation, can be mortal. Why would the sin of rash judgement be mortal? Because the one making the judgement has a profound lack of charity toward the other (contempt).

Aquinas seems to say that the sin of rash judgement would be mortal if the other’s suspected offense is grave matter. Let’s assume for the moment that this is true, and see if it makes sense: If I believed, without sufficient grounds, that my neighbor was guilty of adultery, that would be a total failure of my charity. If I believed that my neighbor stole a few raspberries from my garden, would it be a lesser failure of my charity? I guess so, because the guilt I impute to him is quite small, and I may still love and respect him.

The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
Going so far as to condemn another, or to ruin his reputation, on mere suspicion, is clearly an offense against both charity and justice.
 
Aquinas’ theology and basis is based on the actuality that God exist.
 
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