E
ethereality
Guest
Karlo Broussard fails to defend the argument from contingency here:
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Asserting that reality is causally like a a train is simply and demonstrably false: The train is, as he says, “interlinked”: It is one event. Reality, in contrast, is a series of separate events. Regarding Karlo’s tree, we see that it grows from a sapling, from a seed receiving sun, rain, and soil nutrients. The seed may have been planted by a human, or it may have fallen from another tree, and we do not have to see the human planting the seed to know that the tree grew from the seed. Hence these are separate events. It is logically false to equate it to a train whereby an engine pushes everything in front of it. The tree is explained by the seed. If you want to know what explains the seed, you identify its cause, e.g. the human or the previous tree. And so on, you ask one question and it is answered by the previous moment in time. For each event you want an answer to, you look at the preceding moment in time. You do not identify “the first” moment before declaring that your question has been answered. To do so is patently ridiculous: “Why did I fail this test at school?” “Because God created the universe!” Clearly we do not think this way. Rather, for each event we want a causal explanation, we look at what caused that particular event.But, what if the cause of the tree’s act of being—call it Cause 1—doesn’t have its existence by nature? Well, then it too would need an existential cause to remain in existence (let’s call that Cause 2).
Notice that in this series the tree’s act of being is dependent not only on the existential causal activity of Cause 1 but also on the existential causal activity of Cause 2, since Cause 1 could not cause the tree to exist without the simultaneous existential influence of Cause 2. Cause 1 would be an instrument of Cause 2, and without Cause 2, Cause 1 would not exist—and consequently the tree would not exist.[2]
Could this type of series of causes of the tree’s act of being regress infinitely? In other words, is it possible for the tree’s act of being to be caused here and now by a series of causes where every cause derives its existence from something else?
This is no more possible than a caboose receiving motion from an infinite number of interlinked train cars without an engine car. In an ordinary series of interlinked train cars, the engine car is the real cause (primary cause) of the caboose’s motion, with the interlinked cars being merely instruments of the engine car.
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