Well, I’ve simply interpreted ST probabilistically. As we can see, all sorts of absurdities fall out from this, so I wanted to use the most absurd ones I could find (I’ve got a big pool to draw from
Sure, you can create any absurdity you want. This does not mean it is true. In fact, it does not prove anything. I still do not believe that you can interpret philosophy in a probabilistic fashion.
(P1) In order to get probabilities, you need statistics.
(P2) In order to get statistics, you need testable circumstances.
(P3) You cannot create testable circumstances for philosophy
(C1) You cannot get statistics for philosophy if there are no testable circumstances
(C2) You cannot get probabilities for philosophy if there are no statistics.
QED: Taking a Bayesian approach will do you no good.
I’ve never suggested that you have no reason to suspect someone didn’t die because God exists. I’m also not saying we need to know the reasons something happened to know that something did happen. These (and other) comments suggest to me you’re unfamiliar with what conditional probabilities are, and how we work with them.
Yes you are. You said explicitly,
ST informs us that we can’t be sure of whether God would or wouldn’t permit it, it follows that on ST, we can’t be sure of whether any given E will occur in your OP.
This is directly saying: If ST is true (God exists but we do not know his reasoning), then we cannot know for sure if someone died.
This is directly saying: For us to know if an event occurred, we need to know the reason behind it.
QED: You are unfamiliar with the implications of your own argument.
With conditional probabilities we’re trying to figure out whether B implies A, and we do this by assuming that B is true (whether we know or believe it is or not), and seeing if whether this supposition leads us to expect A.
Right. And you have made no credible argument that suggests that if ST is true, then we cannot know if an event occurred. In fact, you have slyly suggested, by saying
using Bayes’ theorem, we could prove that ST’s probability is near 0.0 (i.e., irrational); but, I don’t want to kill dialogue with technicalities., that that statement is true and moved on. You did offer some numbers, but you offered no justification for the chosen numbers.
Like I said in my previous reply to you, we remove A from our background knowledge when we do this. So, even if A is something that has obviously occurred (like Washington’s death), when it’s removed from our background knowledge we’re pretending it didn’t occur and seeing if B implies that A would occur.
False! You are not pretending that the event did not occur, you are pretending to remove
knowledge of the event. Our background knowledge is that we
know that people do die, we are pretending to remove the
knowledge of that fact.
Does removing the knowledge of the fact that people die mean that a person will not die? No, it does not. Nor does it mean that a person will not die. Thus, your claim of ~ST cannot be proven from your circumstance.
This clearly has not been my claim. I’ll formalize this to clarify:
- If skeptical theism is true, we can’t be sure that God has no morally overriding reason(s) to prevent some event E. (because we’re not privy to any of God’s moral justifications)
- If we can’t be sure that God has no morally overriding reason(s) to prevent some event E, then we can’t be sure that God wouldn’t prevent E.
- If we can’t be sure that God wouldn’t prevent E, then we can’t be sure that E would occur. (because on theism, no event occurs unless God permits it)
- Therefore, if skeptical theism is true, we can’t be sure that E would occur.
Step 3 is fallacious. We can be sure events occur because we can witness them. If ST is true, then the only thing we would not know is what the
reason behind it is. Why do people die? I do not know. Do people die? I do know. Very different questions that you are aligning in Step 3.
Since Step 3 is false, then Step 4 is very wrong.
I’d recommend reading Colin’s Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. I’m not using Bayesianism in any peculiar way, this is how philosophers and scientists use it.
See my first response in this post.
The numbers are numerical representations of our degrees of confidence. 1.0 = our highest, 0.5 = indifference, 0.0 = the least.
I get the 0–>1 scale of it, but you have no valid reason to assert any numeric value to any probability in untestable circumstances.
I’ve clarified what I mean by theism and it certainly isn’t Deism. Look, I’m not saying anything interesting here, this is common knowledge in philosophy of religion. It seems odd to me that it’s this aspect of what I said that you question.
It seems to me that you are directly conflicting your definition of ST. You defined it in your first post and I previously copied what you wrote nearly verbatim. Now you are here stating that it is not what you wrote? By your own definition, a ST is one who accepts God exists, but does not accept revelation of His knowledge/reason. If God does not reveal Himself, he is impersonal by definition. If God is an impersonal God, then He is no different than the Deist interpretation of God.