Refuting the Matrix Argument (Or: Why Stoned College Kids Make Bad Philosophers)

[AntiTheist]

It’s something that happens every single day: a stoned college kid watches The Matrix for the first time and, after his jaw unslackens, mumbles his profoundest thought. “Whoa, man…maybe the real world is, like, totally unreal.”

And it is indeed understandable why a stoned college kid – like anyone else who is relatively unsatisfied with the real world – would find this idea immensely appealing. Perhaps if there is some other “real world,” he correctly reasons, there may be a “real world” in which he’s not such a pathetic, powerless loser. Or alternatively, if he’s the type of fellow who feels that an “injustice” has been done to him, he takes some comfort in imagining another “real world” where perfect justice will exist.

And you know what? As far as wild speculation after smoking a bowl with some friends goes, I’m fine with people having thoughts like this. I’ve always encouraged people to have a strong imagination and fantasy life. The problem arises when one of these specimens shows up in public discussions where adults are talking about the real world.

Take the following scenario: a bunch of adults are having a serious conversation about a claim – say, for example, that a god of some kind exists. One individual is correctly pointing out that there is no good evidence that any gods exist, something that others in the discussion are having a hard time coming to terms with. Then, our friendly neighborhood Matrix fan comes to the rescue of his fellows, spewing out the following bit of nonsense, the pot smoke just barely detectable through the computer screen:

“What evidence do you have that there’s a real world outside of your mind?”

Now, anyone who is even halfway paying attention should be able to observe that our young stoner is confused about terminology. When people talk about the world and make claims about the world, they’re not making metaphysical declarations: they’re discussing the consistent world revealed by our senses. In other words, “the real world” is the label that people put on the consistent world revealed by our senses.

Whether that world is “really real” or not is completely and totally irrelevant to discussions about claims made about that world.

For example, let’s pretend that the world that our senses reveal to us is actually a complex computer simulation being fed into my brain – which is in a vat, of course – by a mad scientist in some other “real world.” All of that wouldn’t change the fact that we know that in the world revealed by our senses, evidence tells us that objects fall at the rate of 32 feet per second per second (on this planet, anyway). All of that wouldn’t change the fact that we know that in the world revealed by our senses, there is insufficient evidence to accept the claim that Bigfoot exists. And all of that wouldn’t change the fact that we know that in the world revealed by our senses, there is insufficient evidence to accept the claim that gods exist.

Now, I’m perfectly willing to discuss the last point, but if someone just wants to confuse terminology for the sake of confusing it, that person is accomplishing nothing except revealing his own ignorance and impeding the conversation for the grown-ups in the room.
Worse is when these buffoons equivocate on the meaning of the word “faith”: “But you have faith that the world is real!” they whine. “Why, then, do you criticize religious people for having faith in god?”

The answer, agfain, is obvious to anyone who is halfway paying attention. Faith – by definition – is accepting claims without sufficient evidence. No one is arguing that “the world is really real and not the Matrix.” In the context of evaluating claims about the consistent world revealed by our senses, it makes no difference whether that world is the Matrix or not. It’s not a matter of “faith” at all, not in the sense that religious believers use the word “faith.”

 

[AntiTheist]

Sometimes, you run into one of these Matrix-mongers who rolls out an amusing comment like this, presumably thinking that he’s outdone himself in the cleverness department:

“What evidence do you have that all claims need evidence?”

After you’re finished pointing at him and laughing, you might, if you were so inclined, point out the vast amounts of evidence that evidence-based inquiry is the best – in fact, the only – reliable source of knowledge. You could point out all of the advancements and developments that have resulted from evidence-based inquiry; you could point out all conclusions drawn by people not operating on the basis of sufficient evidence and note how these conclusions are much, much more likely to be false.

The fact is, when we talk about whether a claim is true or not, we’re talking about whether or not that claim corresponds to the world revealed by our senses – if something is “true” and doesn’t correspond to the world revealed by our senses, then you have no basis at all for saying that it’s true. And the only way to determine if a claim corresponds to the world revealed by our senses is to measure it against data from the world revealed by our senses. If you’ve got a better way to arrive at knowledge, I’d like to hear it – and I’d like to know how you know it’s a better way.

Sometimes, these Matrix-mongers are so lost in the “reality” they’ve invented for themselves that they go so far as to say something as asinine like “To use science, you have to have faith that it works! All systems of knowledge have faith at their root!”

Obviously, that statement is false – as I’ve demonstrated above, there is quite a lot of evidence that evidence-based inquiry (of which science is a subset) works. What’s more interesting than that obvious observation is this: such a foolish statement implies that the believers themselves have absolutely no basis for choosing to have faith in the things that they do. If they did have a basis, they wouldn’t have to appeal to faith – they’d just explain their reasons and the evidentiary basis of those reasons.

But they don’t – they wander around in a fog, mumbling trash about everything being a matter of faith. So if that’s really the case, what they’re saying is that their beliefs are completely random and arbitrary and no more likely to be correct than the “faith” that jungle tribes have in the bush that they worship; they’re saying that there’s no good reason to accept, say, the results revealed by an application of science over the results revealed by a tarot card reading.

It’s all “faith” to these Matrix-mongers, which means they live in a completely irrational world, which is ironically what so many people accuse atheists of doing.

It’s a good thing for the human race that not everyone is so absolutely in love with ignorance as these people are.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Intelligent ramblings.

However…

Sometimes, you run into one of these Matrix-mongers who rolls out an amusing comment like this, presumably thinking that he’s outdone himself in the cleverness department:

“What evidence do you have that all claims need evidence?”

After you’re finished pointing at him and laughing, you might, if you were so inclined, point out the vast amounts of evidence that evidence-based inquiry is the best – in fact, the only – reliable source of knowledge. You could point out all of the advancements and developments that have resulted from evidence-based inquiry; you could point out all conclusions drawn by people not operating on the basis of sufficient evidence and note how these conclusions are much, much more likely to be false.

Your claim is this: (A1) all claims about the world need sufficient evidence to believe. I think this makes some sense, although I am hardly convinced of it. I’m also not sure I could ever be convinced.

Here’s the problem: this is a UNIVERSAL claim. In order to defend a universal claim, you must either a) list all possible claims, and show that A1 is true of each, or b) consider all possible types of claims, and give an argument that each type conforms to A1.

You have mentioned scientific claims, and given me reason to believe that they conform to A1. Very good. But what about metaphysical claims? (For example, “determinism is compatible with knowledge” or “human beings have a common nature”). As I see it, you have two options: 1) Give an argument of how metaphysical claims conform to A1, or 2) Give an argument that metaphysical claims are not claims about the world.

Option #2 collapses on itself, since the sentence “metaphysical claims are not claims about the world” is a metaphysical claim.

Good luck choosing option #1!

Of course, nothing I’ve said refutes A1. But it does **severely **undermine your ability to argue for A1. Thus, I propose that A1 is not a strictly rational claim, but rather the result of an epistemic choice that you’ve made. And the denial of A1 is not irrational, but extrarational.

Sorry to burst your bubble.

 

[Kaninchen]

“metaphysical claims are not claims about the world” is a metaphysical claim.

I’d have thought that it was a definition (since it applies to the physical world).

 

[R_Daneel]

“Whoa, man…maybe the real world is, like, totally unreal.”

Thank you so much for this. My tears are still running from laughter!

It reminds me of a cartoon of “Non Sequitur”. There were two teenagers standing in front of a newspaper stand, holding an open paper. One of them says: “No way, dude! You mean that they downloaded all that information, and printed it out for our use?! Way cool, man!!!”

 

[R_Daneel]

Your claim is this: (A1) all claims about the world need sufficient evidence to believe.

I wonder, why is this a problematic priniciple. What else is there? Intuition? It is a fine starting point. We make some observation and intuit a hypothesis. But to stop there is not sufficient, is it? Different people make different intuitive claims, and how does one decide which is the good one (if any of them)? Pure speculation just does not cut it.

By the way, there is the much touted PSR, “principle of sufficient reason”. It is argued that the materialistic point of view is incorrect, because it cannot “explain” the world as it is. Yet, this principle is a UNIVERSAL claim. Can it be defended? Of course not. Is there a way to apply the PSR to PSR? What sufficient reason is there to accept PSR?

But what about metaphysical claims? (For example, “determinism is compatible with knowledge” or “human beings have a common nature”). As I see it, you have two options: 1) Give an argument of how metaphysical claims conform to A1, or 2) Give an argument that metaphysical claims are not claims about the world.

Metaphysical claims are mostly empty musings. The only part of philosophy worth considering is epistemology. How do we obtain knowledge?

Of course, nothing I’ve said refutes A1. But it does **severely **undermine your ability to argue for A1. Thus, I propose that A1 is not a strictly rational claim, but rather the result of an epistemic choice that you’ve made. And the denial of A1 is not irrational, but extrarational.

“Extrarational” is “irrational”. Just like “supernatural” is “unnatural”.

 

[Sarpedon]

Now, anyone who is even halfway paying attention should be able to observe that our young stoner is confused about terminology. When people talk about the world and make claims about the world, they’re not making metaphysical declarations: they’re discussing the consistent world revealed by our senses. In other words, “the real world” is the label that people put on the consistent world revealed by our senses.

Whether that world is “really real” or not is completely and totally irrelevant to discussions about claims made about that world.

Catholicism is fundamentally realist, so I’m not sure how you think that Catholic faith is somehow tied to idealism.

The real issue is this- not everyone is content with just cataloging facts. When I speak of my “home” I suppose I could speak of the individual contents of my home. I could describe what type of bed I have, where my computer is, and what type of cereal I have in my pantry. I’m sure your average intelligent, clear-headed college kid would be bored to death by this. Some people are willing to think beyond aggregates of facts and ask the big questions- what does my house mean, what is the relevance of my house for the whole spectrum of reality? That’s a bit more appealing than rambling on about the individual things in your house.

Science does a good job of cataloging facts about sensory experience and explaining those facts in light of other empirical facts. That’s what science is used for. However, when people talk about “life” they don’t always mean life as a collection of things in your house- they refer to a much broader spectrum involving relationships, love, virtue, beauty, art, travel, wonder, and all those things that don’t make it into a physics textbook. Philosophy in the broadest sense is concerned with that wider spectrum. This doesn’t mean engaging in idealistic philosophy. It just means looking at life through the lens of the big picture, and not getting obsessed about cataloging facts. People who are overly obsessed about cataloging things in their house tend to be considered a little weird.

 

[Spencerian]

“The Matrix” series was special in that it caused many ordinary movie watchers to actually ponder and analyze what they were seeing to understand and appreciate the storyline. (That reason was also why the 2nd and 3rd movies didn’t do as well; these latter films were going deeper in the philosophy, and many people weren’t trying to engage their brains at a movie in so much as disengage it.)

The Matrix (and the people in the real world) were in a state of samsara, the eternal cycle of death, life and suffering and rebirth. It was Neo (both Christological and Buddhism-inspired) to break the cycle of samsara, not just for Zion, but for all inside the Matrix (including the machines).

If you are inferring that merely watching these movies doesn’t turn you into Aristotle or Plato, I agree. I would also posit that posting about such observations (especially by making stereotypes of college students to deemphazize their importance) doesn’t make one particularly gifted, either.

What is precisely your point, AntiTheist?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I’d have thought that it was a definition (since it applies to the physical world).

Well, if you reduce “world” to “physical world”, then “metaphysical claims are not claims about the world” may become a definition. But you can’t define your way out of metaphysics!

You may, of course, say that you prefer to ignore any truths appertaining to the non-physical world, and any second-level truths about the physical world. But this is simply a “picture preference”; there is nothing rationally compelling us to such a preference.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I wonder, why is this a problematic priniciple.

Because it is highly relative, for one. It depends on what sorts of things we decide to call evidence. You might say that objects falling is evidence that a force makes objects fall, but Hume makes mincemeat of the claim that this is a logical entailment. So what kind of entailment is it? When Kant points out that we *contribute *at least as much to our “observations” as we observe, I am not sure how the evidentialist can respond. What clear, distinct and reasonable criteria tells us which things count as evidence, and which do not?

I suspect there is none.

What else is there?

What guarantee do we have that there ARE rationally entailed beliefs? I am afraid that any ground for rationality – such as belief in God, or logical positivism – is not rationally entailed, itself.

I might suggest “logic”, which after all the major limitation on metaphysical speculations (at least until Hegel mucked it up). But how do we ground our belief in logic? We can’t, although we can realize – and I think this is similar to AntiTheist’s suggestion – that we must simply assume logic is reliable.

Intuition? It is a fine starting point. We make some observation and intuit a hypothesis. But to stop there is not sufficient, is it? Different people make different intuitive claims, and how does one decide which is the good one (if any of them)? Pure speculation just does not cut it.

Neither does experimentation. Experimentation, when available, is useful for limiting our options. But there are an infinite number of unconsidered hypotheses, for every considered hypothesis. Why should we expect that our starting points are ever spot on?

By the way, there is the much touted PSR, “principle of sufficient reason”. It is argued that the materialistic point of view is incorrect, because it cannot “explain” the world as it is. Yet, this principle is a UNIVERSAL claim. Can it be defended? Of course not. Is there a way to apply the PSR to PSR? What sufficient reason is there to accept PSR?

I agree that the PSR is not entailed by logic or rationality. It is very hard to find a counterexample to it, however.

Metaphysical claims are mostly empty musings. The only part of philosophy worth considering is epistemology. How do we obtain knowledge?

Good question. And, certainly, epistemology must be prior to metaphysics; otherwise, we make problematic “free-wheeling” arguments like the ontological argument for the existence of God. Two metaphysicians who have different epistemic commitments are talking different languages.

“Extrarational” is “irrational”. Just like “supernatural” is “unnatural”.

“Not entailed by rationality” is not identical to “unreasonable”. Surely, you comprehend the difference quite well, whether or not you will admit it.

As for “supernatural”, it depends on how you define “nature”. If nature = “all there is”, then supernatural is just unnatural, i.e. false. But if nature = “one aspect of all there is”, then supernature is simply another aspect – as if you were to look at a mirror from another angle.

 

[catholicwriter2]

Were you “stoned” when you wrote this Anti Theist? Because I really do not see any kind of point to this entire rambling paragraph you took the time to write.

 

[Kaninchen]

Well, if you reduce “world” to “physical world”, then “metaphysical claims are not claims about the world” may become a definition. But you can’t define your way out of metaphysics!

Nor into it.

You may, of course, say that you prefer to ignore any truths appertaining to the non-physical world, and any second-level truths about the physical world. But this is simply a “picture preference”; there is nothing rationally compelling us to such a preference.

Well, libraries have been filled on such conjectures.

 

[Kaninchen]

Because it is highly relative, for one. It depends on what sorts of things we decide to call evidence. You might say that objects falling is evidence that a force makes objects fall, but Hume makes mincemeat of the claim that this is a logical entailment. So what kind of entailment is it? When Kant points out that we *contribute *at least as much to our “observations” as we observe, I am not sure how the evidentialist can respond. What clear, distinct and reasonable criteria tells us which things count as evidence, and which do not?

I suspect there is none.

Well, evidence exists ‘in theory’, in a very real way. If you don’t ‘know’ what you’re looking for, you won’t find it or notice that not having found it is a result.

What guarantee do we have that there ARE rationally entailed beliefs? I am afraid that any ground for rationality – such as belief in God, or logical positivism – is not rationally entailed, itself.

It’s not the search for certainty that keeps us honest, it’s the guessing and testing that keeps us honest.

 

[Prophesy]

The answer, again[sic], is obvious to anyone who is halfway paying attention. Faith – by definition – is accepting claims without sufficient evidence. No one is arguing that “the world is really real and not the Matrix.” In the context of evaluating claims about the consistent world revealed by our senses, it makes no difference whether that world is the Matrix or not. It’s not a matter of “faith” at all, not in the sense that religious believers use the word “faith.”

I take issue with the presented definition of faith in that it is worded in an emotive way. Perhaps a better (though close) definition is – trust in something that is not certain.

Though this will be largely tangential to the discussion, I’ll try my best to wrap it in.

When discussing a similar issue with a friend of mine, I like to point out that there are 3 different types of trust (in the sense we are using here).

1). Certainty – This refers to things such as logic, mathematics, philosophical and ontological truths (a triangle by definition has three sides, it is certain that a triangle has three sides; Aquinas has argued that the existence of God also belongs in here, but I’ll not assert that because this isn’t the place to do so).

2). Phenomenal Faith – This is trusting on things empirical. Primarily in things we have discerned through routine but cannot be absolutely sure of. Now a ludicrous example. Let’s suppose you are about to sit in a chair, you cannot be certain that the chair will support your weight and not collapse underneath you. You could inspect the joints and put a mass on the chair that is equal to your weight, but after that you cannot be sure that your testing hasn’t produced a new flaw in the chair. But you know one thing, you’ve sat in the chair before. You can have faith in the chair that it will hold you based on previous experiences with chairs.

3). Non-phenomenal Faith – This refers to things based off that are not non-empirical, but I believe this group to be much smaller than the second. Philosophical systems (utilitarians v. deontologism) for example, though not necessarily religious groups. Religious belief can be grounded within the second grouping (cosmological arguments for the existence of God would be drawn from the 2nd grouping, as would evidence of historical events).

Now belief that the world is not as it seems (Kant’s noumenon v. phenomenon or the Matrix idea) is grounded in the 3rd type of faith entirely. It isn’t ontologically true, nor can it be grounded in empirical evidence (primarily because empirical evidence doesn’t have any say about another existence). While it cannot be dismissed for merely existing in the 3rd group, it can be dismissed by recognizing 'even if true, it is seemingly impossible to interact with this other existence unless through extraordinary means (Neo being discovered). Given this, even if a 2nd existence exists, it is almost completely inconsequential.

-Prophecy

 

[Marc_Anthony]

AntiTheist, I want to thank you for posting this.

Right now on another sight I have started a thread similar to the “Well, why?” thread over here. Since the sight isn’t as popular as CAF, no atheists, so I have adopted the skeptics position.

Somebody just came at me with the gem, “How do you know you’re not a brain in a vat?”.

Now I have a response to use.

I’d also like to point out I copied and used almost word for word your argument from ghost stories refutation. I hope you’re not insulted.

 

[KostyaJMJ]

Logical Positivism is so last century, man.

Pass the bong over, will you?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Logical Positivism is so last century, man.

Pass the bong over, will you?

Dude. :clapping:

 

[Betterave]

RD: Metaphysical claims are mostly empty musings. The only part of philosophy worth considering is epistemology. How do we obtain knowledge?

PS: Good question. And, certainly, epistemology must be prior to metaphysics; otherwise, we make problematic “free-wheeling” arguments like the ontological argument for the existence of God. Two metaphysicians who have different epistemic commitments are talking different languages.

A radically naive claim followed by a slighly less radically naive claim (in response to a radically naive OP). (At least that’s my opinion. ) No epistemology is possible without metaphysical commitment. The case of Kant makes this perfectly clear. The fact that you can ignore the metaphysical commitments presupposed by your epistemological doctrines doesn’t mean they don’t exist or that they are not operative in shaping your epistemological system.

 

[AntiTheist]

Your claim is this: (A1) all claims about the world need sufficient evidence to believe. I think this makes some sense, although I am hardly convinced of it. I’m also not sure I could ever be convinced.

So then explain a method of coming to conclusions that works better than evidence-based inquiry. Also explain how you know that it’s a better method.

See, I don’t really care what you’re convinced of or what that magical “real reality” you’ve dreamed up for yourself is like. It’s plain as day that evidence-based inquiry is the only method we have ever come up with that actually leads to knowledge and that no other method has ever been demonstrated to work better.

Here’s the problem: this is a UNIVERSAL claim. In order to defend a universal claim, you must

No, I mustn’t. Here’s a universal claim: all objects dropped on this planet will fall down. Even if we didn’t have a pretty strong grasp of how gravity works and the associated math that almost demonstrates to a certainty that this is true, we could still use inductive reasoning applied to the evidence of our observations to determine that that universal claim is true.

You don’t need to exhaustively demonstrate every case – you just need to wake up and pay attention.

Now, seriously. Give me another way of knowing things that works better than evidence-based inquiry and tell me how you know that it works better.

Spencerian:

What is precisely your point, AntiTheist?

I’ll take “Facepalm” for 100, Alex.

catholicwriter2:

I really do not see any kind of point to this entire rambling paragraph you took the time to write.

Well, perhaps your confusion arises because my post consists of quite a few paragraphs, not one “paragraph” as you say above. All of those many paragraphs, together, advance an overall argument, which may be summed up by the title of the piece (which is one of the functions that titles serve): “Refuting the Matrix Argument.”

It’s a refutation of a particularly stupid argument that I see advanced often by believers. Perhaps you should read it again with this in mind.

Marc Anthony:

AntiTheist, I want to thank you for posting this.

You’re welcome. I’m glad you enjoyed it.

Right now on another sight I have started a thread similar to the “Well, why?” thread over here. Since the sight isn’t as popular as CAF, no atheists, so I have adopted the skeptics position.

Somebody just came at me with the gem, “How do you know you’re not a brain in a vat?”.

Now I have a response to use.

Heh. Yeah, as soon as you start pressing them for evidence, they automatically start suggesting that evidence isn’t necessary.

I wonder if they use the same logic when their cars stop working. “How do I know a warlock hasn’t bewitched my automobile? Maybe I better go to the local palm reader shop instead of the mechanic…”

When a person’s actions don’t match up with a person’s “philosophy,” it’s a dead giveaway that the “philosophy” is pure fantasy.

I’d also like to point out I copied and used almost word for word your argument from ghost stories refutation. I hope you’re not insulted.

I’m not insulted at all. However, I’d really prefer that you either rephrased the idea in your own words or, at the very least, gave some credit to the source of the original words.

 

[R_Daneel]

Because it is highly relative, for one. It depends on what sorts of things we decide to call evidence. You might say that objects falling is evidence that a force makes objects fall, but Hume makes mincemeat of the claim that this is a logical entailment. So what kind of entailment is it? When Kant points out that we *contribute *at least as much to our “observations” as we observe, I am not sure how the evidentialist can respond. What clear, distinct and reasonable criteria tells us which things count as evidence, and which do not?

I suspect there is none.

This is what epistemology deals with. There are a few subsets here.

1. Claims about the physical world.
2. Claims within an axiomatic system.
3. Claims about history.
4. Claims about art.
5. Claims about “supernatural”.
6. Claims about anything else - whatever they may be.
   The evidence or proof is different depending on the type of the claim. Very few would disagree that the claims about the physical world can be only decided by experimentation. Claims within an axiomatic system can be decided by deductive menthod - those claims can be proven, not just substantiated. Claims about the past (historical claims) can only be approximated. Claims about art are subjective, whatever may be “beautiful” for someone might be boring to others. Claims about supernatural are problematic - even the concept of “supernatural” is dubious.

Neither does experimentation. Experimentation, when available, is useful for limiting our options. But there are an infinite number of unconsidered hypotheses, for every considered hypothesis. Why should we expect that our starting points are ever spot on?

The proof of the pudding. An explanation does not have to be “perfect”, it is enough if it allows predictions, which can be verified.

I agree that the PSR is not entailed by logic or rationality. It is very hard to find a counterexample to it, however.

It is useful, but not universal. Which means that there are basic principles and axioms which cannot be reduced any further, so they need no explanation.

As for “supernatural”, it depends on how you define “nature”. If nature = “all there is”, then supernatural is just unnatural, i.e. false. But if nature = “one aspect of all there is”, then supernature is simply another aspect – as if you were to look at a mirror from another angle.

I will use your mirror analogy. There are two ways to look at a mirros, from the front, and from the back.