Refuting the Matrix Argument (Or: Why Stoned College Kids Make Bad Philosophers)

[Areopagite]

No need to apologize. RL (real life) always comes first. Curiosity: what classes do you teach? I used to be a math prof at the beginning of my adult life.

I teach history (ancient, medieval, early modern) and philosophy (Pre-Socratic, Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic, Scholastic, and Early Modern) to 9th, 10th, and 11th graders. It’s … a lot of work. But it’s pretty awesome.

 

[AntiTheist]

AntiTheist,

What Betterave is saying (and correct me if I am wrong here, Betterave) is that your examples about building reliable computers, driving a car safely etc and the like are non sequiturs, especially in the context of a Matrix argument refutation. All that is required for success in these types of activities is consistency, not necessarily truth. People in the Matrix could make exactly the same argument you are making, yet not have knowledge (where knowledge is here loosely defined as justified true belief).

You seem to be saying that it doesn’t really matter if we are in the Matrix, as long as we can consistently do things like build reliable computers and the like. Yet, you keep trying to say that a method which searches for consistency also mostly arrives at knowledge, that is, justified true belief. But clearly, if you were able to use evidential type methods of knowledge discovery in the Matrix, you would not be arriving at justified true belief (which is what knowledge is commonly defined as), rather only justified belief (beliefs which are consistent but not true).

Anyway, as a lurker, that is my 2 cents. Hope it makes sense.

Well, Andy, thank you very much for posting a cogent and clear summary of what Betterave is (probably?) trying to say. I hope you’re taking notes, Betterave, because here is a person who has said in one short post what you’ve (probably) been clumsily trying to articulate for pages now.

Let me respond to Andy’s claims by zeroing in on this sentence: “All that is required for success in these types of activities [such as building computers or driving cars] is consistency, not necessarily truth.”

My response to that – and it’s surprising that people have missed this point, since I think I make it pretty clearly in the OP – when I talk about “truth” I’m talking about consistency with the world that we apparently experience, apparently can make mistakes about, and apparently share with others.

If you have some other definition of truth – let’s call it “transcendent truth,” which can probably be defined as something along the lines of “metaphysical hogwash that we can never, ever demonstrate and never, ever know that we actually have” – then that definition is perfectly and completely useless, and it should be discarded.

If you claim that there’s a transcendent truth, how do you know that there’s a transcendent truth? If you have some kind of evidence, then you’re admitting that you have to use evidence-based inquiry to evaluate claims. If there’s no evidence, how can you be sure that you’re right?

Sure, you can just declare yourself to be right, but that makes you no better than the guy on the streetcorner who declares himself correct about being Napoleon and being pursued by aliens who want to eat his brains.

 

[AntiTheist]

Areopagite,

While I appreciate your…er, zeal…to continue our conversation line-by-line, I have neither the time nor the energy nor the desire to respond line-by-line.

Can you pick one point that you’re really, really interested in and present a really strong argument for?

I’ll start by picking this particular point of yours:

Evidence-based inquiry relies on the mind’s ability to interpret the senses correctly. However, you have cited examples where the mind fails to do this.

Yes. It’s not totally and completely infallibale. It’s consistently reliable, and we know this from observing its operation and its results.

And incidentally, the way we learn that we’ve made a mistake about reality is to use evidence – we have no other way of learning that we’ve been wrong, so I really don’t know where you’re going with this. You are affirming evidence-based inquiry as the only tool we have to get this job done.

You first need faith in your mind’s ability to interpret reality before you can accept evidence-based inquiry. This is pretty obvious if you think about it.

What you’re describing isn’t “faith” – you are describing what is sometimes called a “necessary assumption,” but I personally don’t even think that it rises to the level of assumption.

For me, this whole business is definitional.

Let’s get our terms straight. Your experience of the world is obviously subjective, and reality – in terms of your experience – is whatever happens to be presenting itself to you at any given time. If I see a sandwhich, I am experiencing the sight of a sandwhich. Even if the sandwhich turns out to be an illusion, it’s a real illusion (if it wasn’t a real illusion, I wouldn’t be experiencing it).

There’s no “faith” required. What you experience is real, even if it’s a real illusion.

There’s another meaning of the word reality: “Existing independently of any one person’s thoughts about it.” Within my perfectly subjective experience, I am more than capable of drawing a distinction between things that seem to exist just for me and things that seem to exist independently of me.

When I forget to turn off a light and leave it on all day and find it still on when I come home; when I throw a match onto a grill, walk away, and then come back later to find it still burning; when I start cooking something, get distracted, and a fire starts when I’m out of the room – all these experiences and many more testify to the fact that things apparently happen when I’m not around and that there’s stuff that isn’t dependent on my thoughts – this stuff is what I label as “reality” under this second definition.

I’m not attributing any metaphysical significance to anything. I’m experiencing stuff and attaching labels to those experiences so that I can discuss it with others (who are apparently separate from me).

I can experience a ghost – that is, have a hallucination or dream of a ghost that is real in the first sense – that is not real in the second sense. It isn’t a matter of “faith” at all – for any experience I have, I can soberly analyze the evidence for and against thinking that what I have experienced [which is real in the first sense] is (likely) real in the second sense or not.

In day to day life, this is trivially easy. I don’t have a problem distinguishing between the imaginary dragon in my mind and the sight of the computer screen in front of me. They are entirely different kinds of experiences, and anyone who hasn’t learned how to distinguish them has a lot of catching up to do.

Now the mind doesn’t just simply go around perceiving stuff, that’s true. The senses take in too much data for the mind to process, so the mind forms a representation or model of the world based on sensory data. It’s easy for that model to get a little screwed up because all of us naturally pay more attention to the model than we do to our actual senses. That’s why it’s so common to miss proofreading errors or miss minor changes in a room we pass through all the time – our mind filters out anything deemed not necessary for the model.

But so what? We can be wrong about little details, but our models agree to an incredible extent, especially when we start paying attention to our senses (instead of the models). We might miss a typo on the page, but we have a lot of good reasons to think that it’s a page and not a hamburger. For example, not only does it not have any of the properties of a hamburge – as far as anyone can detect – no one comes up to us when we’re reading in a crowded place and says, “Hey buddy, why are you staring at that hamburger?”

Frankly, I don’t see where “faith” enters the picture one tiny bit. If I were to believe that the thing that looks like a page and has all the qualities of a page is really a hamburger – when no one else at all seems to think it is a hamburger – that would take an act of faith.

 

[Areopagite]

Can you pick one point that you’re really, really interested in and present a really strong argument for?

Here’s an important question: how do you know you’re not dreaming? If you’re dreaming, then your senses are not operative. And everything you’ve said falls to the ground. Would you say that a person is experiencing reality if they’re dreaming? If so, then you have to revise your definitions.

And incidentally, the way we learn that we’ve made a mistake about reality is to use evidence – we have no other way of learning that we’ve been wrong, so I really don’t know where you’re going with this. You are affirming evidence-based inquiry as the only tool we have to get this job done.

One thing I’ve been saying is that faith is necessary for the acceptance of evidence-based inquiry. This is because evidence-based inquiry cannot prove itself. And yet we accept it. Thus, it is accepted on faith, because the definition of faith is that which is accepted without demonstration. I don’t see how you can disagree with that.

Also, I’m still not quite sure what you mean by evidence. I don’t understand why you would dismiss the possibility that one can receive supernatural knowledge. Such knowledge may not be evidence for one who does not have that knowledge. But it certainly can be knowledge for those who do have it. And the person who does not have it has no argument that such knowledge can’t exist.

What you’re describing isn’t “faith” – you are describing what is sometimes called a “necessary assumption,” but I personally don’t even think that it rises to the level of assumption.

Faith is that which is accepted without demonstration. Hence, the acceptance of the idea that the mind can reliable grasp reality is one of faith, since you cannot prove the mind can do that (because any attempt to do so would be fallacious, circular reasoning).

For me, this whole business is definitional.

Let’s get our terms straight. Your experience of the world is obviously subjective, and reality – in terms of your experience – is whatever happens to be presenting itself to you at any given time. If I see a sandwhich, I am experiencing the sight of a sandwhich. Even if the sandwhich turns out to be an illusion, it’s a real illusion (if it wasn’t a real illusion, I wouldn’t be experiencing it).

There’s no “faith” required. What you experience is real, even if it’s a real illusion.

So dreams are just as real as conscious sense experience? Yeah, I don’t think so.

There’s another meaning of the word reality: “Existing independently of any one person’s thoughts about it.” Within my perfectly subjective experience, I am more than capable of drawing a distinction between things that seem to exist just for me and things that seem to exist independently of me.

When I forget to turn off a light and leave it on all day and find it still on when I come home; when I throw a match onto a grill, walk away, and then come back later to find it still burning; when I start cooking something, get distracted, and a fire starts when I’m out of the room – all these experiences and many more testify to the fact that things apparently happen when I’m not around and that there’s stuff that isn’t dependent on my thoughts – this stuff is what I label as “reality” under this second definition.

These could conceivably be illusions too, as such things could happen in dreams. Hence, it is no proof that you are drawing the distinction between things that exist just for you and things that exist independently of you.

However, you do use the word “seem to exist” as a kind of criteria for accepting things … and yet you categorically deny that Catholic faith even if it “seems to exist” for others. I don’t see any consistency in your epistemological claims.

 

[Areopagite]

I’m not attributing any metaphysical significance to anything. I’m experiencing stuff and attaching labels to those experiences so that I can discuss it with others (who are apparently separate from me).

Why can’t Catholics attach labels to their religious experiences and discuss it with other Catholics? If their faith “seems to exist” isn’t that good enough, according to your views?

I can experience a ghost – that is, have a hallucination or dream of a ghost that is real in the first sense – that is not real in the second sense.

Are you saying that ghosts are necessarily not real in the second sense?

It isn’t a matter of “faith” at all – for any experience I have, I can soberly analyze the evidence for and against thinking that what I have experienced [which is real in the first sense] is (likely) real in the second sense or not.

I don’t know what you’re talking about. You lose me at this step. If everything is illusory (which is possible, as you seem to say), then how can you conclude that some things are real (in the second sense), when all you have is potential illusions to work with? It doesn’t work. This is circular reasoning.

In day to day life, this is trivially easy. I don’t have a problem distinguishing between the imaginary dragon in my mind and the sight of the computer screen in front of me. They are entirely different kinds of experiences, and anyone who hasn’t learned how to distinguish them has a lot of catching up to do.

You have not clearly demonstrated how to distinguish the two. It seems perhaps that one must rely on one’s intuition to distinguish the two. And if you think you’re intuition is reliable, then you have faith (i.e. that your intuition is reliable).

Frankly, I don’t see where “faith” enters the picture one tiny bit. If I were to believe that the thing that looks like a page and has all the qualities of a page is really a hamburger – when no one else at all seems to think it is a hamburger – that would take an act of faith.

I’ll explain again why faith enters the picture: faith, by definition, is the acceptance of something without demonstration. You cannot prove that your mind’s ability to grasp reality is reliable (because an attempt to do so results in circular reasoning … I hope you see that). Hence, one accepts on faith that the mind IS reliable enough to grasp reality. That is how, therefore, faith enters the picture. Do you see it now?

 

[R_Daneel]

I’ll explain again why faith enters the picture: faith, by definition, is the acceptance of something without demonstration. You cannot prove that your mind’s ability to grasp reality is reliable (because an attempt to do so results in circular reasoning … I hope you see that).

That is an unacceptable definition. Especially, because you argued before that the acceptance of the “demonstration” is also based on faith (you said something like: “how do you know that the demonstration supported your prior assumption?”). So you need faith to accept everything - presumably even need faith to accept that faith is a reliable epistemological tool. That is what makes your definition of “faith” unacceptable - you are really in a circular nightmare.

Now, I do not need “faith” to know that I exist. This is where Descartes started - cogito, ergo sum. I can experience myself directly. If you would deny that, you would have to deny everything - which is universal skepticism. From here onwards, we can make two assumptions: 1) everything which I “seem” to experience (outside myself) is the figment of my imagination - which is just solipsism; or 2) whatever I experience outside myself is “really” there. The only sensible choice is option number 2. There is no faith involved here.

Whatever I experience, I experience via my senses. Can one reasonably doubt one’s senses? Of course not. What method would one use to verify the reporting of one’s senses? Not a sensory method, obviously. So what else is there? To be blunt, to doubt one’s senses can be expressed as: “I cannot see because I have eyes, I cannot hear because I have ears, I cannot touch because I have fingertips, etc…”. This is completely absurd. The reliability of the senses is not based upon “faith”, it is accepted, because there is nothing else.

Now the proper definition of “faith” is very different from what you propose. Faith is the acceptance of some proposition, for which the evidence is insufficient. That is faith. Depending upon the availablity and/or lack of evidence it can vary. At an extreme one may accept a proposition, for which there is no evidence at all. Even worse, some people can accept something which is denied by the available evidence. These two are properly called “blind” faith. So, all this is a fruitless conversation, because we cannot agree on the basic definition of “faith”.

 

[Monte_RCMS]

The problem with the Matrix (and Harry Potter) is that the message is so … persuasive. Slickly presented.

People start to actually BELIEVE that there is some substance to the message.

The may wish or pine for the simple ideas of what makes good and evil tick.

So I ask, if people don’t have much of a rigorous religious education background [maybe they made banners in religious education classes], then how much of the following can they pick up on their own, stoned or unstoned, from the Matrix or from Harry Potter.

Read this over.

Every hear of any of these ideas before:

Apostles’ Creed

1. I believe in God the Father, Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth:
2. And in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord:
3. Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary:
4. Suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, died and buried: He descended into hell:
5. On the third day he rose again from the dead:
6. He ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God the Father Almighty:
7. From thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead:
8. I believe in the Holy Ghost:
9. I believe in the Holy Catholic Church: the communion of saints:
10. The forgiveness of sins:

1l. The resurrection of the body:

1. And the life everlasting. Amen.

The attractions of the Matrix and Harry Potter distract from the above.

And offer substitutions that pull people away from Christianity.

 

[tjkozinski]

Antitheist:

Don’t forget my most recent post!

Thaddeus

 

[Monte_RCMS]

A critique of the Harry Potter message … and by extension to the Matrix:

studiobrien.com/writings_on_fantasy/michael-d-obrien-book-on-harry-potter.html

 

[Areopagite]

The problem with the Matrix (and Harry Potter) is that the message is so … persuasive. Slickly presented.

People start to actually BELIEVE that there is some substance to the message.

The may wish or pine for the simple ideas of what makes good and evil tick.

So I ask, if people don’t have much of a rigorous religious education background [maybe they made banners in religious education classes], then how much of the following can they pick up on their own, stoned or unstoned, from the Matrix or from Harry Potter.

Read this over.

Every hear of any of these ideas before:

Apostles’ Creed

1. I believe in God the Father, Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth:
2. And in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord:
3. Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary:
4. Suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, died and buried: He descended into hell:
5. On the third day he rose again from the dead:
6. He ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God the Father Almighty:
7. From thence he shall come to judge the living and the dead:
8. I believe in the Holy Ghost:
9. I believe in the Holy Catholic Church: the communion of saints:
10. The forgiveness of sins:

1l. The resurrection of the body:

1. And the life everlasting. Amen.

The attractions of the Matrix and Harry Potter distract from the above.

And offer substitutions that pull people away from Christianity.

A critique of the Harry Potter message … and by extension to the Matrix:

studiobrien.com/writings_on_fantasy/michael-d-obrien-book-on-harry-potter.html

I’m not quite sure what your point is.

I do admit there are some Gnostic elements to the Matrix. But I think there are a lot of praiseworthy elements in it (though mainly in the first movie … the sequels kind of fall off the deep end and cease making sense).

But Harry Potter is another issue (and I’m not sure why you’re bringing this up … can you explain?). Personally, I think Harry Potter is the savior of the Christian imagination. Michael O’Brien is a moron. I’ve read articles by him critiquing Harry Potter, and it’s clear he has no idea what he’s talking about. He’s an embarrassment to Catholic apologetics, and a man too heavily influenced by Puritanical Protestantism.

But you might want to start another thread on this. I am a bit confused why you chose to bring this up. Has Harry Potter anything to do with what we’re talking about here? I don’t think so. If so, show me. Please, I would really like to know. Thanks.

 

[Areopagite]

That is an unacceptable definition. Especially, because you argued before that the acceptance of the “demonstration” is also based on faith (you said something like: “how do you know that the demonstration supported your prior assumption?”). So you need faith to accept everything - presumably even need faith to accept that faith is a reliable epistemological tool. That is what makes your definition of “faith” unacceptable - you are really in a circular nightmare.

No, this is not circular reasoning because faith is not a demonstration. Only demonstrations can fall victim to circular reasoning. Faith, as I’ve made clear, is the acceptance of something without demonstration. Thus it cannot be circular.

Now, the principle of non-contradiction is not a demonstrable truth and yet must be accepted for anything to be thought. It is accepted on faith because it is accepted without demonstration. But the acceptance of it does not result in circular reasoning. So, what you said was false (i.e. it was false to say that the acceptance of something without demonstration is circular). Hence, the proposed definition of faith is not fallacious.

Now, I do not need “faith” to know that I exist. This is where Descartes started - cogito, ergo sum. I can experience myself directly. If you would deny that, you would have to deny everything - which is universal skepticism. From here onwards, we can make two assumptions: 1) everything which I “seem” to experience (outside myself) is the figment of my imagination - which is just solipsism; or 2) whatever I experience outside myself is “really” there. The only sensible choice is option number 2. There is no faith involved here.

I do not deny that the Cogito is valid. But I do believe that the acceptance of it requires presuppositions that are based on faith and not demonstration. For one, you must accept the mind’s ability to think rationally, and the Cogito relies on that. You cannot prove the mind is reliable but rather accept it on faith (i.e. without demonstration). Hence, the Cogito presupposes faith.

Whatever I experience, I experience via my senses. Can one reasonably doubt one’s senses? Of course not.

Well, that’s interesting because you invoked Descartes a moment ago, and yet Descartes’ first philosophy hinges upon the doubting of the senses (though he eventually trusts them … but if you read the Meditations, anyone can see that his reason for trusting them is ridiculous).

What method would one use to verify the reporting of one’s senses? Not a sensory method, obviously. So what else is there? To be blunt, to doubt one’s senses can be expressed as: “I cannot see because I have eyes, I cannot hear because I have ears, I cannot touch because I have fingertips, etc…”. This is completely absurd. The reliability of the senses is not based upon “faith”, it is accepted, because there is nothing else.

I’m really not quite sure what you just said. I don’t see why one can’t think that the sensory information they are receiving are actually mental pictures of a dream. Such a thing is possible, so I don’t see why you say there is “nothing else.”

Now the proper definition of “faith” is very different from what you propose. Faith is the acceptance of some proposition, for which the evidence is insufficient. That is faith. Depending upon the availablity and/or lack of evidence it can vary. At an extreme one may accept a proposition, for which there is no evidence at all. Even worse, some people can accept something which is denied by the available evidence. These two are properly called “blind” faith. So, all this is a fruitless conversation, because we cannot agree on the basic definition of “faith”.

I think this definition of faith that you propose contradicts what you said about having faith in scientific claims. Are you saying that having faith that the astronomers are right about the earth being 93 million miles away from the sun is accepting something without sufficient evidence? You seemed to say otherwise. If you are answering yes to that question, it seems that most people’s knowledge of science is based upon the acceptance of claims that have insufficient evidence. Is this what you’re saying?

 

[AntiTheist]

So dreams are just as real as conscious sense experience?

Under the first definition I gave, yes: dreams are experienced in exactly the same way that our conscious life is experienced. When I have a dream, it’s a real dream – if it wasn’t a real dream, then I wouldn’t be having it.

A dream is not real under the second definition of the word “real” that I gave. How do we determine that? We use evidence: while we can indeed sometimes determine that we are dreaming during a dream on the basis of evidence within the dream, such as inconsistencies in the dream world, more frequently we realize that we’re dreaming when we gain the new evidence of waking up in our beds.

Until we acquire such evidence, we cannot determine that it’s a dream. You continue to affirm evidence-based inquiry as the necessary and only tool we have to accomplish this kind of task.

However, you do use the word “seem to exist” as a kind of criteria for accepting things … and yet you categorically deny that Catholic faith even if it “seems to exist” for others. I don’t see any consistency in your epistemological claims.

When I talk about the world that “seems to exist,” I’m talking about the world we interact with in our day to day lives.

Within that world, there’s no such thing as something that really exists – in the second sense of the word “real” – for you and not for me.

I am not going to respond point-by-point to you. If you want to disagree with me, you can start with definitions. Take the two definitions that I have offered for “real” and tell me if you agree with them and how you are using the word. Offer examples.

 

[AntiTheist]

You tend to jump to conclusions too quickly

It only seems that way because I have come to my own conclusions after a very long time examining the evidence.

Frankly, some of the arguments going on here are just plain boring because the people advancing them don’t grasp how horribly flawed they are.

For example, just because I said that there is some evidence that makes it credible to believe in the resurrection does not mean I am saying that I believe in the resurrection solely on credible evidence, or that the evidence proves the event. …] Nevertheless, one can know with absolute certainty that the resurrection occurred.

You’re all over the place here. You believe in something although you don’t believe it on the basis of credible evidence; you cannot prove that an event happened, but you are “absolutely certain” that it happened. And anyone who points out to you how woefully contradictory and backwards you have it is someone who’s “closed minded,” who doesn’t want to have his “neat categories” of existence shattered…oh, those rational sticks-in-the-mud and their clear headed understanding of everything…how exasperating!

If I were you, I would take your own advice: take a step back and ask yourself how you go about knowing anything at all and on what basis. There’s really nothing more I can do for you.

 

[Areopagite]

Under the first definition I gave, yes: dreams are experienced in exactly the same way that our conscious life is experienced. When I have a dream, it’s a real dream – if it wasn’t a real dream, then I wouldn’t be having it.

The question is not whether the dream is taking place but whether the content of the dream can be categorized under “reality.”

A dream is not real under the second definition of the word “real” that I gave. How do we determine that? We use evidence: while we can indeed sometimes determine that we are dreaming during a dream on the basis of evidence within the dream, such as inconsistencies in the dream world, more frequently we realize that we’re dreaming when we gain the new evidence of waking up in our beds.

But I’ve had very consistent dreams that fooled me into thinking it was reality (in the second sense). I’ve even had dreams of waking up from a dream and yet was still in a dream. There is certainly no logical necessity that dreams are necessarily inconsistent. I think it is fair to say that there is insufficient evidence to prove that you are not dreaming. Hence, you must have faith that you are not dreaming … even if things are consistent enough to suggest you aren’t.

I can’t fathom how you still can be arguing against this. Surely, this must be clear.

Until we acquire such evidence, we cannot determine that it’s a dream. You continue to affirm evidence-based inquiry as the necessary and only tool we have to accomplish this kind of task.

“This kind of task”? What kind of task are you talking about? The task of coming to the truth? If that’s what you mean, then no, I do not think evidence-based inquiry is the only tool to accomplish this kind of task. I believe that intuition is more necessary and fundamental than evidence-based inquiry, because evidence-based inquiry relies on fundamental principles that cannot be demonstrated (and hence cannot be subjected to evidence-based inquiry). These fundamental principles thus must obviously be accepted on faith.

When I talk about the world that “seems to exist,” I’m talking about the world we interact with in our day to day lives.

Devout Catholics do something with their faith in their day to day lives. So not only does the things of their faith seem to exist, but it can very much seem to exist everyday. So, once again, if you think it’s a valid thing to accept the existence of things that “seem to exist”, then I don’t see why it’s irrational for a Catholic to accept their religious faith on the grounds that their faith comprises things that “seem to exist.”

Also, I go to post office quite rarely. Does this mean the post office must be brought into question since I do not interact with it in my day to day life?

Once again, your epistemology is half-baked, and your categorical rejection of Catholicism is hypocritical.

Within that world, there’s no such thing as something that really exists – in the second sense of the word “real” – for you and not for me.

Within what world? I’m not sure what you’re referring to.

I am not going to respond point-by-point to you. If you want to disagree with me, you can start with definitions. Take the two definitions that I have offered for “real” and tell me if you agree with them and how you are using the word. Offer examples.

I think your definition of reality “in the first sense” is still unclear. At one time it seems you defined it as “that which appears to your senses” but then also said it applies to dreams wherein the senses are not operative. So, I’m not clear what your definition of it is exactly. If it means “that which seems to be” then I would definitely not consider it “reality” at all. I think few would. Reality has to do with what is and not what merely seems but may not be. If you dream of a unicorn prancing across your living room, that doesn’t mean that unicorn is really prancing across your living room. I don’t understand why you could call that “reality.” Anything could thus be called reality under that definition.

I think your definition of reality “in the second sense” is also problematic. First of all you reject metaphysics, so right there you reject reality, and what most people consider reality to be. Your define reality in the second sense as “that which appears to be separate from oneself” … which is just a fancier kind of your reality in the first sense. If you dream the unicorn is prancing across your living room into the kitchen, and then go to the kitchen and you see the unicorn then prance into the basement, and then you go to the basement and you see it prance into the bathroom, etc … you can argue there is a consistency there, even though, unbeknownst to you, you are dreaming. But just because there is consistency, doesn’t mean you’re not dreaming, and hence doesn’t mean that you are necessarily experiencing reality in the second sense. Nonetheless you are likely to have faith you are not dreaming, and that is all you can do.

So, I think both your definitions of reality do not work … or at least don’t work without the presupposition of faith (i.e. accepting certain things without demonstration). Your definitions certainly don’t succeed in refuting the legitimacy of the Catholic faith.

 

[Areopagite]

As an appendix:

I just realized that you said there is no way to figure out whether we’re in the Matrix … and yet you said we can figure out whether we’re dreaming. That’s kind of contradictory, isn’t it? Right? Just a thought.

 

[AntiTheist]

I’ve had very consistent dreams that fooled me into thinking it was reality (in the second sense). I’ve even had dreams of waking up from a dream and yet was still in a dream.

Sure, me too. But the only way I have ever discovered that it was a dream was through evidence.

I think it is fair to say that there is insufficient evidence to prove that you are not dreaming. Hence, you must have faith that you are not dreaming … even if things are consistent enough to suggest you aren’t.

You have a fundamental misunderstanding of how evidence-based inquiry works.

You can never demonstrate a universal negative. I can’t prove that I’m not dreaming right now any more than I can’t prove that Zippy the leprechaun is not creating reality as illusion or any more than I can’t prove that sock-stealing leprechauns are not responsible when my socks go missing.

But I don’t go around believing in sock-stealing leprechauns, nor do I go around believing that things are an illusion created by Zippy the leprechaun or that things are all a dream. There’s no good evidence for any of those claims.

We believe things because there is evidence for them, not because there is no evidence against them.

Honestly, if you’re this confused about things, nothing I say is really going to help. Ask a psychic to explain it to you through telepathy or something…hey, you never know…we can’t prove telepathy doesn’t exist, can we?

 

[Areopagite]

Sure, me too. But the only way I have ever discovered that it was a dream was through evidence.

The only way I found out was waking up. And yet, I had to have faith that I wasn’t dreaming then.

Likewise, a Catholic has faith in the truths of Christianity, but he will only one day see the truths with complete clarity when he “wakes up” (i.e. goes to heaven).

You can never demonstrate a universal negative.

This statement, of course, is a universal negative. Can you prove it?

Also, I’m afraid to say that you can prove plenty of universal negatives. Anyone who has taken logic will know this. It is a myth that hopefully will go out of style really soon.

Examples of universal negatives that can be proven:

• No squares circles exist.
• No pink unicorns are visible to me right now.
• No words spelt “asdkojbnasdokhasbgouhbvsad” appear in my dictionary.
• No atheists believe in God.
• No romance novels have ever been written by me.
• No movie was ever produced by a movie director named Joe who never existed.

And so on. Yeah, plenty of universal negatives can be proven.

I can’t prove that I’m not dreaming right now any more than I can’t prove that Zippy the leprechaun is not creating reality as illusion or any more than I can’t prove that sock-stealing leprechauns are not responsible when my socks go missing.

That’s true. You can’t prove those things. I bet you have, on the basis of faith, rejected that those things are the case. I share that faith as well.

But I don’t go around believing in sock-stealing leprechauns, nor do I go around believing that things are an illusion created by Zippy the leprechaun or that things are all a dream. There’s no good evidence for any of those claims.

We believe things because there is evidence for them, not because there is no evidence against them.

And, once again, we come to the question: “What do you mean by evidence?” Never have I gotten an answer to this question from an atheist on this forum. Why does evidence necessarily exclude supernaturally revealed truth as exemplified by the Catholic faith?

Honestly, if you’re this confused about things, nothing I say is really going to help. Ask a psychic to explain it to you through telepathy or something…hey, you never know…we can’t prove telepathy doesn’t exist, can we?

Just like you can’t prove God doesn’t exist. So here’s my advice: stop trying.

 

[Betterave]

Antitheist:

I think, if you are indeed a truth seeker above all else, you need to take a step back from your own present opinions and convictions. You tend to jump to conclusions too quickly, as it seems to me, and you jump in ways that are not derived from what others are actually saying, but from your own categories and habits of discourse which you impose on others words and judgments.

…]I wonder if you really are open to new information–you come off as a staunch conservative in this respect, and not very philosophical or Socratic. Saying that you only accept things that are empirically verifiable is, as I said in my first post, not a empirically verifiable epistemological first principle, so you need some other defense against truths that make you uncomfortable.

…]

You might consider that your own way of thinking might be the one that is fundamentalist, anti-rational, reactionary, dogmatic, superstitious, out-of-date, and psychologically motivated. Perhaps some “religious” people have these characteristics too, but perhaps thou does protest too much against them.

…]

I think this is right on the money. That’s why Anti gets belligerent and dogmatic instead of just answering when someone asks him questions, or he gets the same way when he doesn’t understand what someone is saying and he ought to be the one asking some questions of his own so he might at least give himself a chance of understanding. That’s why most of what he writes is fallacious and he doesn’t seem to notice or care.

 

[Betterave]

Well, Andy, thank you very much for posting a cogent and clear summary of what Betterave is (probably?) trying to say. I hope you’re taking notes, Betterave, because here is a person who has said in one short post what you’ve (probably) been clumsily trying to articulate for pages now.

continued from last post:
For example, here Anti should have obviously just said, “Thank you, Andy. I found that to be cogent and clear. Does that capture the position you’ve been arguing for, Betterave?” That would have been the response of an intelligent, serious truth-seeker. Instead we got the usual simplistic jumping to conclusions mixed with groundless abuse.

 

[R_Daneel]

No, this is not circular reasoning because faith is not a demonstration. Only demonstrations can fall victim to circular reasoning. Faith, as I’ve made clear, is the acceptance of something without demonstration. Thus it cannot be circular.

According to what you said before even the demonstration must be accepted of faith. What do you actually call a “demonstration”?

By the way the “cogito” does not rely on any reasoning. We directly experience ourselves. You said before that hitting one’s thumb with a hammer and experiencing pain requires “faith”. That is preposterous. When you have a headache, you cannot think: “well maybe I do have a headache, or maybe I feel perfectly fine, I am just imagining this excruciating pain”.

But that is exactly what your proposition boils down to. You say that even the “cogito…” must be accepted on faith. And obviously the proposition that “faith is necessary to accept faith” is clearly circular.

I think this definition of faith that you propose contradicts what you said about having faith in scientific claims. Are you saying that having faith that the astronomers are right about the earth being 93 million miles away from the sun is accepting something without sufficient evidence? You seemed to say otherwise. If you are answering yes to that question, it seems that most people’s knowledge of science is based upon the acceptance of claims that have insufficient evidence. Is this what you’re saying?

It does not. Everything hinges on the terms “evidence” and “sufficient” or “insufficient”. But there is no reason to get into that. You definition of faith is irrational and unacceptable.