Relativism actually don't contradict morality?

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I’d be happy to hear your different conclusion so that we can dialogue about it.

Well, I “excised” it because there was so much else to talk about and because it seemed like a waste of time getting into it until you were sure of what I was arguing.

I’m confused by what you say about it. I asked you to name one method – other than via reason and rational discourse – by which we can determine whether claims are likely to be true or not.

Perhaps this is just a difference of language between us, but I understand “empiricism” to mean the reliance on empirical evidence, evidence derived from what we can sense, measure, detect, etc. For me, using evidence is a part of rational discourse (one of the most important parts) – you can’t rationally come to accurate conclusions if you don’t start from true, verifiable premises.

We all know that you can start from false premises and reason your way to a false – but thoroughly logical and consistent – position. For this reason, I advocate the use of what I call “evidence-based inquiry”…rational inquiry that starts from evidence and true, verifiable premises.

For me, reason applied to evidence is the only method of determining whether or not a claim is likely to be true.
I can offer one other method for determining the likely truth of something: Trust.

If a statement is made by someone you trust, how aften do you accept it without further discussion?
 
I can offer one other method for determining the likely truth of something: Trust.

If a statement is made by someone you trust, how aften do you accept it without further discussion?
I don’t consider trust a reliable method of determining truth – I consider trust a necessary shortcut that we employ for practical reasons.

Rationally speaking, all claims require sufficient evidence (and reasoning to explain the sufficiency of the evidence) before a person accepts them, but it’s just not practical to do this for every claim you hear.

So we develop a heuristic for shortcutting the process of evaluating claims. When we come across claims that strike us as ordinary, we generally accept them when others tell them to us (sometimes depending on the level of reliability the person has, based on the evidence of our experience with that person). But when someone tells us an extraordinary claim, we don’t generally accept that without investigating it. Even if the source is very trustworthy, we insist on evidence because we know that our trust isn’t sufficient by itself to justify a claim.

As an example, if I trust my friend a great deal and he tells me he bought a new car last week, I’ll typically take his word for it. After all, this is an extremely ordinary claim, and even if he’s lying or mistaken, we can still have a good conversation about cars, and that’s all that’s important to me in that situation. So in that situation, I would waive the requirement to see evidence before I accept his claim, just because it’s more practically useful to do so.

My trust in him can’t confirm the claim – it only provides me a shortcut in accepting it.

However, if that same friend told me that he bought a space ship from the aliens who abducted him last week, it wouldn’t matter how trustworthy he was. I would doubt him, and I would not believe him until some pretty compelling evidence convinced me.
 
I don’t consider trust a reliable method of determining truth – I consider trust a necessary shortcut that we employ for practical reasons.
If the one you trust, never lies, trust is a highly reliable method.
Rationally speaking, all claims require sufficient evidence (and reasoning to explain the sufficiency of the evidence) before a person accepts them, but it’s just not practical to do this for every claim you hear.

So we develop a heuristic for shortcutting the process of evaluating claims. When we come across claims that strike us as ordinary, we generally accept them when others tell them to us (sometimes depending on the level of reliability the person has, based on the evidence of our experience with that person). But when someone tells us an extraordinary claim, we don’t generally accept that without investigating it. Even if the source is very trustworthy, we insist on evidence because we know that our trust isn’t sufficient by itself to justify a claim.

As an example, if I trust my friend a great deal and he tells me he bought a new car last week, I’ll typically take his word for it. After all, this is an extremely ordinary claim, and even if he’s lying or mistaken, we can still have a good conversation about cars, and that’s all that’s important to me in that situation. So in that situation, I would waive the requirement to see evidence before I accept his claim, just because it’s more practically useful to do so.

My trust in him can’t confirm the claim – it only provides me a shortcut in accepting it.

However, if that same friend told me that he bought a space ship from the aliens who abducted him last week, it wouldn’t matter how trustworthy he was. I would doubt him, and I would not believe him until some pretty compelling evidence convinced me.
Your anecdote shows me that you didn’t have trust. You did not depend on the messenger in either case. You depended on your personal assessment of what was believable without regard to the trustworthiness of the messenger.
 
I’d be happy to hear your different conclusion so that we can dialogue about it.

Well, I “excised” it because there was so much else to talk about and because it seemed like a waste of time getting into it until you were sure of what I was arguing.

I’m confused by what you say about it. I asked you to name one method – other than via reason and rational discourse – by which we can determine whether claims are likely to be true or not.

Perhaps this is just a difference of language between us, but I understand “empiricism” to mean the reliance on empirical evidence, evidence derived from what we can sense, measure, detect, etc. For me, using evidence is a part of rational discourse (one of the most important parts) – you can’t rationally come to accurate conclusions if you don’t start from true, verifiable premises.

We all know that you can start from false premises and reason your way to a false – but thoroughly logical and consistent – position. For this reason, I advocate the use of what I call “evidence-based inquiry”…rational inquiry that starts from evidence and true, verifiable premises.

For me, reason applied to evidence is the only method of determining whether or not a claim is likely to be true.
I’ll begin with some discussion of terms and concepts. Among the terms and concepts I will present are: reason, empiricism, subjectivism, values, and trust, all discussed already but not necessarily in a useful or clear way.

Let me also note that you have taken what appears, at first glance, to be a enlightenment view of reason. You declare reason to be reliable when properly applied, which is to say it is reliable except when it’s not (given that there is no non-reason method of testing the correctness of application). You lump empiricism into reason, though conceding that it involves observation, while excluding moral reasoning. In short, it is a rather peculiar taxonomy.

The word “reason” has many meanings but there is more at work here than a mere semantic dispute.

I’ll also note, as I implied previously, that morality is a hard subject. My impression is that many who grasp at moral relativism are simply giving up on the application of reason to morality.

Finally, I’ll extend that last point by showing that morality is not uniquely difficult. In fact, human knowledge can be ordered by the ease of verification. Math is, in this respect, the easiest. The “hard” sciences come next, and then the “soft” sciences.

History is an interesting case because it involves claims about the past that are not directly available to verification. We can only understand the past indirectly through writings, archeology, etc. Most of what we know of history depends on trusting dead people.

Which brings us to David’s argument for trust (or faith as it is often called). While I appreciate your distinction between trusting out of convenience, as you can see from history, we sometimes have no choice but to trust others’. This line of argument, of course, leads to the domain of religion and God as a source of moral knowledge. It is an interesting discussion whether we can have any confidence in moral questions absent God’s revelation.
 
Let me also note that you have taken what appears, at first glance, to be a enlightenment view of reason. You declare reason to be reliable when properly applied, which is to say it is reliable except when it’s not (given that there is no non-reason method of testing the correctness of application).
Reason is consistently reliable when it is applied to true premises and when its operations are performed without fallacy.

I wouldn’t expect anyone to have any serious objections with such a claim, but if you have a serious objection, now’s the time to air it.
You lump empiricism into reason, though conceding that it involves observation
I say that reason is consistently reliable when applied to true premises. We determine whether premises are true by comparing them to evidence, which has to be detectable in some manner.

Again, I wouldn’t expect anyone to have a serious problem with this, but if you do, let’s hear it.
while excluding moral reasoning.
To be clear, I don’t “exclude moral reasoning.” Morality is a subject to which evidence-based inquiry can be applied, and I would argue – as I do on this thread – that there is no good reason to accept that “morality” – understood to be a normative framework and set of rules by which we can consistently judge actions, a framework and set of rules that exist outside of human minds and are binding on all humans – exists.

In order to discuss that question, we need to employ reason, and we need to evaluate evidence (what evidence is there for this kind of morality? Is the evidence sufficient? etc.)

Before we can have that discussion, we have to agree on the basics, so I’m going to stop here. Raise your objections, and we’ll settle them before I move on to your next point about “trust.”
 
Reason is consistently reliable when it is applied to true premises and when its operations are performed without fallacy. I wouldn’t expect anyone to have any serious objections with such a claim, but if you have a serious objection, now’s the time to air it.
The wider we expand the definition of “reason”, the more problem you will have with that simplistic claim. That claim is probably safe in the domain of math, for example. Either a proof is correct or it’s not. But as soon as you cross into science, even the hard sciences, you will encounter problems.
I say that reason is consistently reliable when applied to true premises. We determine whether premises are true by comparing them to evidence, which has to be detectable in some manner. Again, I wouldn’t expect anyone to have a serious problem with this, but if you do, let’s hear it.
You are reducing reason, here, to deduction which is not consistent with your expansive meaning previously where you included empiricism. There are all manner of problems that come into the picture when observation and experimentation is considered.
To be clear, I don’t “exclude moral reasoning.” Morality is a subject to which evidence-based inquiry can be applied,…
I’m guessing from the above that you are using “evidence-based inquiry” as some sort of definition of reason. That is not consistent with a deductive definition.
…and I would argue – as I do on this thread – that there is no good reason to accept that “morality” – understood to be a normative framework and set of rules by which we can consistently judge actions, a framework and set of rules that exist outside of human minds and are binding on all humans – exists.
Morality is a complex subject and your definition above may or may not be appropriate. Morality can be more simply understood as choosing the right thing to do or even more simply pursuing the good.

Interestingly, you yourself supplied the best argument for “accepting” morality: it is as essential as what you term “reason” (by whatever meaning). Humans are moral reasoning beings at their core.
In order to discuss that question, we need to employ reason, and we need to evaluate evidence (what evidence is there for this kind of morality? Is the evidence sufficient? etc.)
Reason will be part of the process but, as noted above, not the only element.
Before we can have that discussion, we have to agree on the basics, so I’m going to stop here. Raise your objections, and we’ll settle them before I move on to your next point about “trust.”
See above.
 
The wider we expand the definition of “reason”, the more problem you will have with that simplistic claim. That claim is probably safe in the domain of math, for example. Either a proof is correct or it’s not. But as soon as you cross into science, even the hard sciences, you will encounter problems.
Such as what? If I advance a claim in the scientific community, I have to produce evidence to support my claim: the only way that we can verify that my claim is true is through the use of evidence-based inquiry, rationally discussing what evidence there is and whether the evidence is sufficient to support my claim. If it is not sufficient, then no one has any reason to accept the claim.

Let’s forget about “reason” since that term seems to be giving you so many problems. I’m calling the process of supporting claims with evidence and explanations of how that evidence supports a claim “evidence-based inquiry.”

I’m saying that the only way we can determine whether claims are true and accurate is by evidence-based inquiry.

I want to hear specifically what problems you have with this idea. Specifically. Give two or three examples that demonstrate the problem you have with it, and I’ll try to address it.

Also, provide a different method of determining whether claims are true and accurate if you disagree with the use of evidence-based inquiry.
 
Such as what? If I advance a claim in the scientific community, I have to produce evidence to support my claim: the only way that we can verify that my claim is true is through the use of evidence-based inquiry, rationally discussing what evidence there is and whether the evidence is sufficient to support my claim. If it is not sufficient, then no one has any reason to accept the claim. Let’s forget about “reason” since that term seems to be giving you so many problems. I’m calling the process of supporting claims with evidence and explanations of how that evidence supports a claim “evidence-based inquiry.”
First of all, it’s important not to gloss over the difference between math and science. In math you don’t provide evidence, you provide proof. The sciences lower the standards of evidence because you can’t prove anything in science. But even then what constitutes evidence varies from field to field. In physics you expect a reproducible experiment. Not so in sociology or economics. And throughout the sciences you have a reliance on induction which is so problematic that the evidentiary standard is to go with a theory until disconfirming evidence is found. Science, then, is a perpetual search for disconfirming evidence and theories that are not yet disconfirmed.
Also, provide a different method of determining whether claims are true and accurate if you disagree with the use of evidence-based inquiry.
The essential question is what constitutes satisfactory evidence.

I have evidence that murder is absolutely wrong: God said so.
 
I have evidence that murder is absolutely wrong: God said so.
And where did you obtain your evidence?

You could only have come across this evidence from two potential sources: 1) You heard it from this “god” character yourself, or 2) You heard it second-hand (or, rather, third-hand, fourth-hand, a thousandth-hand) from another person or, more likely, a tradition rooted in ancient texts, the authors of which have been lost to time and of which no original copies exist.

So why don’t you tell me exactly where you got this evidence from and why you believe your source on this point.
 
Go back and address the other points first.
Well, to simplify things, I’m going to drop the word “reason” altogether, which – as you noted – can mean a lot of different things. It’s just confusing our conversation with word games. So I’m going to talk about “evidence-based inquiry,” which I’m going to say is how we evaluate all claims.

Now, when I talk about “evidence-based inquiry,” I’m talking about using evidence to support a claim and explaining how the evidence supports that claim. In no way does evidence-based inquiry have to absolutely “prove” a claim: it is merely used to demonstrate that a claim is likely to be true.

Case in point: I know that when I turn the key to start my car it will start. I know this because of evidence based inquiry – because of the evidence of my experiences doing it, which I have induced to form a general principle, and because of further evidence (my knowledge that my car has gas in the tank and has recently been tuned up) applied against the general principle to deduce a conclusion.

My use of evidence-based inquiry in no way absolutely “proves” that my car will start when I turn the key, but that’s irrelevant because I don’t live my life on absolute certainty. My use of evidence-based inquiry tells me that it’s very, very likely that the car will start when I turn the key.

Evidence-based inquiry is used in every field of inquiry and study, and of course, as you note, the types of evidence that we accept are going to change depending on exactly what the claim is and what the subject is that we’re studying.

In strict science, of course scientists often propose theories that they attempt to falsify, but often theories are accepted because of predictive power that they have (which supplies evidence that confirms the theory). If a scientist accepts a theory – say, for example, the theory of evolution by descent from common ancestors – he can very often provide evidence that convinces him that the claim is true (and in the case of evolution, we have the confirming evidence of the fossil record, DNA, comparative anatomy, vaccinations, etc.).

I’m not really sure what you find “sloppy” about anything I’ve said or precisely what issue you have with it, so if you’d like, please present your model of how we use evidence to support claims.

I mean, you went to the trouble of providing “evidence” for you claim about morality, so I assumed you wanted to discuss it: where you got this evidence from, why you think your source is reliable, etc.

So please, by all means, give me as detailed an explanation as you like of your model for the use of evidence, but make it relevant to how you go about gathering evidence to support your claim about morality and why you think that evidence is good evidence to support the claim and why you think your source for the evidence is a good source.
 
Well, to simplify things, I’m going to drop the word “reason” altogether, which – as you noted – can mean a lot of different things. It’s just confusing our conversation with word games. So I’m going to talk about “evidence-based inquiry,” which I’m going to say is how we evaluate all claims.
I’m fine with that.
Now, when I talk about “evidence-based inquiry,” I’m talking about using evidence to support a claim and explaining how the evidence supports that claim. In no way does evidence-based inquiry have to absolutely “prove” a claim: it is merely used to demonstrate that a claim is likely to be true.
It’s worth pausing to consider why. A mathematician looks at scientists as having a lower standard of evidence. Mathematicians prove their claims. In math, but really only in math, your earlier claim about reason being reliable when used correctly is literally true.

Once we step out of math and into the real world that goes out the window. We lower the standard of evidence precisely when we move from pure thinking to thinking about the world outside us, from making claims about creations of the intellect to claims about physical reality. (That’s an interesting observation, I think, in view of your earlier dismissal of the reliability of moral reasoning as a mere creation of the mind.)

We could, I suppose, insist on proof of every claim. But we don’t for very practical reasons.

And every now and then scientific theory gets tossed out the window due to new observations. What was widely accepted, upon evidence-based inquiry to be true is found to be false. We have an interesting example of this with the recent observation of neutrinos exceeding the speed of light. Although it’s probably too early to judge, the physics world is atwitter at the possibility that Einstein’s relativity is flat wrong. But at least in physics they can replicate the experiments. Not so in economics.

Part of the problem flows also from the very nature of theory itself. Science could limit itself to making disconnected observations, as predominates history. But theory has practical, predictive value.

In other words, subjective human values drive our standard of evidence-based inquiry even in the hard sciences.
Evidence-based inquiry is used in every field of inquiry and study, and of course, as you note, the types of evidence that we accept are going to change depending on exactly what the claim is and what the subject is that we’re studying.
Again, it’s worth pausing to consider why. Why do we insist on repeatable experiments in physics and chemistry but only historical analysis in economics and sociology? Why are we willing to rely on people’s reports in history?
I mean, you went to the trouble of providing “evidence” for you claim about morality, so I assumed you wanted to discuss it: where you got this evidence from, why you think your source is reliable, etc.
So please, by all means, give me as detailed an explanation as you like of your model for the use of evidence, but make it relevant to how you go about gathering evidence to support your claim about morality and why you think that evidence is good evidence to support the claim and why you think your source for the evidence is a good source.
I will do so in due course but I think we need to spend a little time on the nature of evidence-based inquiry first. I meant only to introduce the notion that morality claims are not without evidence and so to make the connection to the discussion at hand.
 
It’s worth pausing to consider why. A mathematician looks at scientists as having a lower standard of evidence. Mathematicians prove their claims. In math, but really only in math, your earlier claim about reason being reliable when used correctly is literally true.
The difference here is that in math, one works through a rigorously logical process from postulates that are defined and accepted by all participants. Under such circumstances, the conclusions aren’t just reliable – they are proven in a sense much more absolute than we can prove things when we talk about the real world.

If you start from given premises – and you apply logic correctly – you will absolutely get a logical conclusion.

In the real world, and in evaluating claims about the real world – which includes claims about whether beings or rules exist outside of human minds or not – the process of evidence-based inquiry can’t begin from postulates or definitions because (since we’re talking about the real world), one has to first confirm that one is beginning from premises that are true, that one’s ideas actually reflect reality. In order to confirm whether one’s premises are true, one must start from observations, from evidence.

One then tries to determine which claim is best supported by the evidence and whether the evidence is sufficient to support that claim, but obviously this process can’t “prove” anything absolutely because – as you noted – we could always stumble across new evidence that changes everything.

So the conclusions of evidence-based inquiry are always tentative, always “the best possible answer we have now based on evidence.”

Now, the more evidence we have, the more likely a claim is to be true. Claims that are insufficiently supported by evidence can be dismissed until there is sufficient evidence for them.
Why do we insist on repeatable experiments in physics and chemistry but only historical analysis in economics and sociology? Why are we willing to rely on people’s reports in history?
Because – obviously – you can’t repeatably test something that already happened and only happened once.

For this reason, our conclusions about history are based on the best possible answers that we can come up with based on evidence…and this, by the way, doesn’t always mean blindly trusting historical reports. There are all kinds of things in “reports” of history that we don’t take at face value…for example, the history of the Roman emperors and generals contain all sorts of stories of magic and divination and other things widely thought today to not have happened. Suetonius’ account of Caesar crossing the Rubicon on the advice of a gigantic spirit is one example: it’s generally accepted that Caesar crossed the Rubicon – mostly because tons and tons of other evidence suggests that it happened – but it’s generally not accepted that spooky giant spirits talked him into it, for the reason that it’s a fantastical, supernatural account that comes from only one guy (and perhaps has its source in contemporary folklore).

But luckily for us, our discussion about morality isn’t a historical inquiry: we’re looking at whether or not we can justify the existence of a normative framework and set of rules outside of human minds. This is a claim about the world as it exists right now, for which we can gather evidence right now, so whatever the practices of historians are, they need not directly concern us for the purposes of this question.

So I still don’t know what problem you’re having exactly. Different subjects have different kinds of evidence, obviously. We can’t absolutely, positively, 100% prove the things we say about reality, which is self-evidently the case and irrelevant because we don’t need to be absolutely certain about our claims for those claims to be useful.

So what’s the problem, exactly?
 
The difference here is that in math, one works through a rigorously logical process from postulates that are defined and accepted by all participants. Under such circumstances, the conclusions aren’t just reliable – they are proven in a sense much more absolute than we can prove things when we talk about the real world. If you start from given premises – and you apply logic correctly – you will absolutely get a logical conclusion.
Of course, mathematicians make mistakes too but we can set that aside for the moment as correcting such mistakes is far easier than in science.
In the real world, and in evaluating claims about the real world – which includes claims about whether beings or rules exist outside of human minds or not – the process of evidence-based inquiry can’t begin from postulates or definitions because (since we’re talking about the real world), one has to first confirm that one is beginning from premises that are true, that one’s ideas actually reflect reality. In order to confirm whether one’s premises are true, one must start from observations, from evidence.
One then tries to determine which claim is best supported by the evidence and whether the evidence is sufficient to support that claim, but obviously this process can’t “prove” anything absolutely because – as you noted – we could always stumble across new evidence that changes everything. So the conclusions of evidence-based inquiry are always tentative, always “the best possible answer we have now based on evidence.” Now, the more evidence we have, the more likely a claim is to be true. Claims that are insufficiently supported by evidence can be dismissed until there is sufficient evidence for them.
This is commonly known as the problem of induction.
Because – obviously – you can’t repeatably test something that already happened and only happened once.
Note that in the case of economics and sociology you could, at least in theory, conduct experiments. They would simply be immensely and prohibitively expensive. In history it’s not even possible to conceive of such an approach.
For this reason, our conclusions about history are based on the best possible answers that we can come up with based on evidence…and this, by the way, doesn’t always mean blindly trusting historical reports. There are all kinds of things in “reports” of history that we don’t take at face value…for example, the history of the Roman emperors and generals contain all sorts of stories of magic and divination and other things widely thought today to not have happened. Suetonius’ account of Caesar crossing the Rubicon on the advice of a gigantic spirit is one example: it’s generally accepted that Caesar crossed the Rubicon – mostly because tons and tons of other evidence suggests that it happened – but it’s generally not accepted that spooky giant spirits talked him into it, for the reason that it’s a fantastical, supernatural account that comes from only one guy (and perhaps has its source in contemporary folklore).
We could, though, fold our arms and declare that there is no objective truth in economics, sociology, or history lacking repeatable experimental just as we might have folded our arms at science and insisted on mathematical proof.

Again, in each field we establish standards of evidence on the basis of human values. We value the tentative results of science and the cloudy view of history and, so, we lower our standards of evidence accordingly in order to have some notion of an objective reality.
But luckily for us, our discussion about morality isn’t a historical inquiry: we’re looking at whether or not we can justify the existence of a normative framework and set of rules outside of human minds. This is a claim about the world as it exists right now, for which we can gather evidence right now, so whatever the practices of historians are, they need not directly concern us for the purposes of this question.
In fact, though, moral reasoning much more resembles economics, sociology, and history than it does physics and chemistry. It relies on these and then adds the additional distinction of being about what ought to be as opposed to what is (or was).
So I still don’t know what problem you’re having exactly. Different subjects have different kinds of evidence, obviously. We can’t absolutely, positively, 100% prove the things we say about reality, which is self-evidently the case and irrelevant because we don’t need to be absolutely certain about our claims for those claims to be useful. So what’s the problem, exactly?
So what have we learned so far?

That there is no uniform standard of evidence. That evidence-based inquiry is full of potential error beyond what we would find in the construction of mathematical proofs. That the standards of evidence are a function of human values. That in most cases we are entirely content to tentatively accept claims based on the best evidence available at the time.

All of this points to a different conclusion about morality: The fact that morality is a difficult and slippery subject is no reason to abandon the pursuit of objective theories. Just as we might grasp at the best available evidence in any area of human inquiry, so do we in the field of morality.

You may think that the standard of evidence is pathetic next to more reliable sciences but that is a meaningless comparison, like comparing science and mathematics or history and science.
 
evidence-based inquiry is full of potential error …] in most cases we are entirely content to tentatively accept claims based on the best evidence available at the time.
Agreed.

So what’s your evidence for the existence of an objective morality, and why do you think your evidence is sufficient to support your claim?
 
So what have we learned so far?

That there is no uniform standard of evidence. That evidence-based inquiry is full of potential error beyond what we would find in the construction of mathematical proofs. That the standards of evidence are a function of human values. That in most cases we are entirely content to tentatively accept claims based on the best evidence available at the time.

All of this points to a different conclusion about morality: The fact that morality is a difficult and slippery subject is no reason to abandon the pursuit of objective theories. Just as we might grasp at the best available evidence in any area of human inquiry, so do we in the field of morality.

You may think that the standard of evidence is pathetic next to more reliable sciences but that is a meaningless comparison, like comparing science and mathematics or history and science.
Although much of what you said is correct, the last conclusion is wrong. The comparsion is meaningful, when the probability of something being true is relevant.

Take for example the situation, that you want to put a man on the moon. You have the money, you are allowed to spend the money for that goal. Next you get some scientist or engineers and ask them for a design, production and so on.

Take for exmaple the situation, that you want to stop the recession in a country and bring it back on a path of economic growth. You have the money, you are allowed to spend the money for that goal. Next you get some economists and ask them how to spend the money.

There are 2 fundamental differences in those cases:
  • in the first the answers given, what to do regarding the technical issue, will not differ from one expert to another much. Regarding fundamental details (e.g. momentum conservation, so something has to be accelerated in the opposite drection fo your verhicle) they will not differ a hair. In the second you are lucky if you find 2 experts who actually agree to a large extent what to do
  • more importantly in the first case you are very likely to end up with plans that work without doubt at least partially (e.g. the rocket lifts, then malfunctions and explodes → at least initially it was going in the right direction) and with repeated try and error the job will be done or at least an assesment why it was not possible is avaible. In the second case you have no idea whether what you did was harmful or helpful towards the goal (as the experts cannot agree)
And these two difference both stem from the unavoidable lack of experiments. So when an expert of a science branch that can rely heavily of experiments states something it is far more reliable thatn when an expert of a branch without experiments states something. Unfortunately the public always misses this point.

(BTW, this distinction does in part also go through some sciences, e.g. clima science is a branch of geology or physics depending on definition, but it has no experiments at hand. So its statements are not as reliable as for example building engeneering.)
 
Agreed.

So what’s your evidence for the existence of an objective morality, and why do you think your evidence is sufficient to support your claim?
So at this point I’m going to start to offer more opinion. I think we can both recognize that there are, and have been, many theories of morality throughout human history. I have gravitated toward one that I think you will find is not too far different from your own position.

Just to offer two possible answers to your question: consider the claims of Ayn Rand’s objectivism which is an objective theory of morality based on “reason” alone (she was a flaming atheist). And consider, alternatively, natural law which was perhaps best exemplified by Thomas Aquinas on the basis of observation and “reason”. I won’t defend their views, I just want to point to them as examples.

So let me begin with a few points.

In general, what I mean by “objective” is simply the negation relative or subjective, namely claims about what one ought to do that transcend the individual.

The term “objective” doesn’t mean like in physics where phenomenon can be observed and validated by experimentation.

Also, it’s helpful to fix on simpler moral concepts before taking on the more difficult question. So, for example, we can consider the moral question: what ought I do when I get up in the morning? Maybe get dressed and eat breakfast? Maybe run out nude into the street and chase cars? Each choice has consequences and we can “reason” about those consequences in relation to our values, objectives, etc.

Finally, just to be clear we are on the same page, I want to emphasize that moral questions are central to our existence. We need to answer the question what should I do this morning? Thus, as with the transition from math to science we are perfectly willing to take the best answer we can get. Agnosticism, sitting in bed without a decision, is unacceptable.
 
Although much of what you said is correct, the last conclusion is wrong. The comparsion is meaningful, when the probability of something being true is relevant.

Take for example the situation, that you want to put a man on the moon. You have the money, you are allowed to spend the money for that goal. Next you get some scientist or engineers and ask them for a design, production and so on.

Take for exmaple the situation, that you want to stop the recession in a country and bring it back on a path of economic growth. You have the money, you are allowed to spend the money for that goal. Next you get some economists and ask them how to spend the money.

There are 2 fundamental differences in those cases:
  • in the first the answers given, what to do regarding the technical issue, will not differ from one expert to another much. Regarding fundamental details (e.g. momentum conservation, so something has to be accelerated in the opposite drection fo your verhicle) they will not differ a hair. In the second you are lucky if you find 2 experts who actually agree to a large extent what to do
  • more importantly in the first case you are very likely to end up with plans that work without doubt at least partially (e.g. the rocket lifts, then malfunctions and explodes → at least initially it was going in the right direction) and with repeated try and error the job will be done or at least an assesment why it was not possible is avaible. In the second case you have no idea whether what you did was harmful or helpful towards the goal (as the experts cannot agree)
And these two difference both stem from the unavoidable lack of experiments. So when an expert of a science branch that can rely heavily of experiments states something it is far more reliable thatn when an expert of a branch without experiments states something. Unfortunately the public always misses this point.

(BTW, this distinction does in part also go through some sciences, e.g. clima science is a branch of geology or physics depending on definition, but it has no experiments at hand. So its statements are not as reliable as for example building engeneering.)
The problem with your argument, and the reason I stand by what you have argued against, is that the ability to to go the moon is of no use in solving economic problems. Go to the moon or not, the economic problems remain. While it is clear that getting to the moon is more reliable exercise, with more consistent expert opinion, etc., going to the moon won’t fix the economy and experts and expertise on moon travel are of no use to us when addressing the economy.

We have to leave the domain of moon travel and enter the domain of economics, in all it’s uncertainty, in order to make any progress on economic problems. A person who points out the inaccuracy of economic expertise relative to moon travel contributes nothing to the discussion.
 
The problem with your argument, and the reason I stand by what you have argued against, is that the ability to to go the moon is of no use in solving economic problems. Go to the moon or not, the economic problems remain. While it is clear that getting to the moon is more reliable exercise, with more consistent expert opinion, etc., going to the moon won’t fix the economy and experts and expertise on moon travel are of no use to us when addressing the economy.

We have to leave the domain of moon travel and enter the domain of economics, in all it’s uncertainty, in order to make any progress on economic problems. A person who points out the inaccuracy of economic expertise relative to moon travel contributes nothing to the discussion.
The contribution is, that the (name removed by moderator)ut on economics from the economic experts should be taken with more doubt than the (name removed by moderator)ut on space travel from the space travel experts.

In discussions often people try to end the discussion by referring to an expert opinion. That is often fine regarding space travel, because the probability of the experts being completely in error is slim.
In economics and lot of other social sciences while it is not irrelvant what some experts have to say, it cannot be the end of the discussion, because the probability for an expert error is a lot higher.

Just think about pschology, you will find dozens of university professors who would claim that child whether a child is raised by same sex partners, by different sex but non-married partners and by married couples has no relevant effect upon his psyche. Even if i knew no experts with differing opinions, i know that these claims are not as reliable as what some engineer tells about constructing a rocket, because the issue of psychology is so complex and is not open to much deductive resoning that those expert with some probability misinterpret the known observational data.

With the engineer the only worry is, whether he knows his trade, otherwise the foundation is solid, because it can be deduced from known fundamental laws and can be extensively tested.

This one has to keep in mind, when one reads something from expert, the expert opinion can only be as good as the means to derive that opinion are regarding the subject. And repeatable experiments are the best means, if they are applicable.
 
The contribution is, that the (name removed by moderator)ut on economics from the economic experts should be taken with more doubt than the (name removed by moderator)ut on space travel from the space travel experts.
You are speaking in circles here.

Yes, it is literally true that economics experts are less certain than aeronautics experts. So what?!

The certainty of aeronautics contributes nothing to solving economics problems.
In discussions often people try to end the discussion by referring to an expert opinion. That is often fine regarding space travel, because the probability of the experts being completely in error is slim. In economics and lot of other social sciences while it is not irrelvant what some experts have to say, it cannot be the end of the discussion, because the probability for an expert error is a lot higher.
Just think about pschology, you will find dozens of university professors who would claim that child whether a child is raised by same sex partners, by different sex but non-married partners and by married couples has no relevant effect upon his psyche. Even if i knew no experts with differing opinions, i know that these claims are not as reliable as what some engineer tells about constructing a rocket, because the issue of psychology is so complex and is not open to much deductive resoning that those expert with some probability misinterpret the known observational data.
With the engineer the only worry is, whether he knows his trade, otherwise the foundation is solid, because it can be deduced from known fundamental laws and can be extensively tested.
This one has to keep in mind, when one reads something from expert, the expert opinion can only be as good as the means to derive that opinion are regarding the subject. And repeatable experiments are the best means, if they are applicable.
You are simply repeating yourself in asserting that one field is more certain than another. We know that.

The question is what does the certainty of one field contribute to another? What good does it do economics experts, or those of us seeking solutions to economics problems, to know that aeronautics is a more reliable field?

(Now if you could reduce economics to aeronautics, then the reliability of aeronautics would become relevant. But it cannot and so it is not.)

Imagine it this way: you have a room full of economics experts at a meeting at the white house who are debating solutions to economics problems. Next door is a NASA meeting discussing the return to the moon. A few of the aeronautics scientists grow bored and wander into the economics meeting. What do they say that is of use to the meeting? “We can get to the moon but you can’t figure out how to reduce unemployment?”
 
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