G
gilliam
Guest
From Tigerhawk
The Mesopotamian explains why our resolve is the most important weapon in our arsenal (see article). Indeed. As I have written before (in a much longer post that praises some forms of anti-war dissent):
A civil insurgency such as the one raging in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq cannot defeat the United States, in the sense of vanquishing its armed forces. It is perfectly within the capacity of our country to spend $80 billion a year on this war and suffer perhaps 1000 fatalities a year ad infinitum. The insurgency can therefore have only two victory conditions. First, to shape the political circumstances of post-war Iraq. Second, to induce the United States and the rest of the coalition to withdraw from Iraq (some insurgents would probably be happy to see this result under any circumstances, but al Qaeda wants humiliation to accompany the withdrawal). It is therefore manifestly the case that to the extent that anti-war dissent achieves those of its objectives that require an American withdrawal, the domestic opponents of the war have helped the enemy achieve at least the second of these victory conditions. And, since American withdrawal would probably (although not necessarily) increase the political leverage of the insurgency, it might also help the enemy achieve its first victory condition. How can it be otherwise?Of the various reasons to withdraw from Iraq, there are none more contemptible than those that cite the costs of this war, which are trivial as against the size of the United States and the wars of our history. The only question is whether the counterinsurgency in Iraq remains productive geopolitically. Regular reasons know that I think that it is.tigerhawk.blogspot.com/2005/10/resolve-is-only-weapon-that-matters.html
The Mesopotamian explains why our resolve is the most important weapon in our arsenal (see article). Indeed. As I have written before (in a much longer post that praises some forms of anti-war dissent):
A civil insurgency such as the one raging in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq cannot defeat the United States, in the sense of vanquishing its armed forces. It is perfectly within the capacity of our country to spend $80 billion a year on this war and suffer perhaps 1000 fatalities a year ad infinitum. The insurgency can therefore have only two victory conditions. First, to shape the political circumstances of post-war Iraq. Second, to induce the United States and the rest of the coalition to withdraw from Iraq (some insurgents would probably be happy to see this result under any circumstances, but al Qaeda wants humiliation to accompany the withdrawal). It is therefore manifestly the case that to the extent that anti-war dissent achieves those of its objectives that require an American withdrawal, the domestic opponents of the war have helped the enemy achieve at least the second of these victory conditions. And, since American withdrawal would probably (although not necessarily) increase the political leverage of the insurgency, it might also help the enemy achieve its first victory condition. How can it be otherwise?Of the various reasons to withdraw from Iraq, there are none more contemptible than those that cite the costs of this war, which are trivial as against the size of the United States and the wars of our history. The only question is whether the counterinsurgency in Iraq remains productive geopolitically. Regular reasons know that I think that it is.tigerhawk.blogspot.com/2005/10/resolve-is-only-weapon-that-matters.html
