Resources on the "argument from motion"

[Luke_S]

I think that modern arguments from “intelligent design” are relatively shallow.

What about Aquinas’ argument through intelligent design?:

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

obtained from newadvent.org, “The Summa Theologiae,” Thomas Aquinas

I would hardly say it is either modern or shallow. Perhaps this is what jimmy85 was referring to.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Luke,
Luke S:

Hi pfc, I am unfamiliar with any proofs that demonstrate that God is personal. I know Aquinas demonstrates that God exists, is one, contains all perfections, etc, but I was not aware that he nor anyone else thought that this characteristic is knowable by reason. Do you have a reference for this?

Thanks, Luke

For Aquinas, God can only be known (qua reason) through remotion. In other words, one cannot come to a positive conclusion about what the nature of God is, except by demonstrating what He is not. An example of this that is relevant to your question is that since God cannot lack intelligence, He must be intelligent. One reference for this can be found in chapters 45 and the following of the Summa Contra Gentiles. I actually prefer this work to the Summa Theologiae, but of the latter, Question XIV (14) addresses this question.

I am not aware of something as specific in Aquinas’ work as “a proof that God is personal”, but rather I am saying that intelligence is exclusively a characteristic of persons, such that if God were impersonal, He would have no knowledge.

I may have misinterpreted your question, though. Were you asking if I have a reference for “a proof that God can be known by us in a personal way”? If so, then I think that is a case of something being above, but not contrary to, reason.

Blessings

 

[Contarini]

What about Aquinas’ argument through intelligent design?:

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

obtained from newadvent.org, “The Summa Theologiae,” Thomas Aquinas

I would hardly say it is either modern or shallow. Perhaps this is what jimmy85 was referring to.

Yes, perhaps it was. I hastily assumed that he was referring to the scientific (or quasi-scientific?) theory of “intelligent design,” which is quite different from the above.

Edwin

 

[RobNY]

Perhaps it would be helpful, at this point, to distinguish between an argument from design and an argument from telos.

It would seem that an argument from design is based first on complexity. The classic example of the argument from design is the watchmaker.

Watches require a maker.
The world is like a watch.
Therefore the world requires a maker.

The argument from design sees complexity as the proof of design (intelligence in design). It proceeds by means of an analogy to reach its conclusion.

The teleological argument assumes that the universe is ordered. Certain unintelligent things are ordered towards an end. Because they always act towards this end it isn’t haphazardly but designedly that they act towards the end. But, only intelligence can order things towards an end. As the scholastics might say, therefore etc.

The argument from ends is much different. Complexity, at least in-itself, is not a factor. There is nothing about complexity which illuminates St. Thomas’s example of the arrow, only directedness, which is like the orderedness of creation. Note that this analogy is illuminative, not argumentative. Thus this argument is deductive, not probable.

For this reason alone the teleological argument is much stronger, as even valid inductive arguments with true premises can be false, unlike deductive arguments.

As a further critique, I would say that the argument from design risks making a God of the gaps, as can be seen in many contemporary renditions of the argument from design (for instance, in intelligent design theory in regards to evolution). If only natural things which are unexplained are put forth as evidence of design, then surely as things become explained our proof of God will dwindle.

Thomas’s argument has always been far more sophisticated than the design arguments, which seem to have rested on a mechanistic deistic universe anyway. However, there are problems with Thomas’s argument: namely that modern and contemporary philosophy eschew formal and final causes. How I attempt to solve that problem, well, I have to learn some more before I comment on that.

-Rob

 

[john_doran]

Hi pfc, I am unfamiliar with any proofs that demonstrate that God is personal. I know Aquinas demonstrates that God exists, is one, contains all perfections, etc, but I was not aware that he nor anyone else thought that this characteristic is knowable by reason. Do you have a reference for this?

Thanks, Luke

try aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles; in it he goes through the arguments for god’s existnce much more exhaustively and painstakingly than he does in the Summa. good stuff.

that god is personal follows more clearly from the kalam cosmological argument: if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the universe have themselves existed for all eternity, then so would the universe; but the universe began to exist at a point in the finite past; therefore the eternally existent First Cause must have chosen to cause the universe to come into being; but free choice is a characteristic of rational beings, and rational beings are “personal”; therefore the First Cause must be a personal being.

 

[jimmy85]

Hi Jimmy,

The argument from motion is most accurately described as “the argument from change”, since it involves not just the movement from one location to another, but all change. For example, we all know what a chicken egg looks like, but if I held one up and exclaimed, “chicken!”, I would be corrected and told that it is only in potentiality a chicken. In order to become a chicken, it has to undergo a complex series of changes brought about by different causes. What the argument from motion claims is that this series of causes (i.e. “movers”) cannot proceed to infinity, because otherwise the present state of motion would have never arrived.

Blessings

oh ok, someone told me that gravity could refute that argument but I coudlnt reply to him, because I didnt know about it. thanks for the answer.

 

[Luke_S]

since God cannot lack intelligence, He must be intelligent. One reference for this can be found in chapters 45 and the following of the Summa Contra Gentiles. I actually prefer this work to the Summa Theologiae, but of the latter, Question XIV (14) addresses this question.

I looked at the articles in the Summa Theologiae under question 14, they address the self- understanding and comprehension of God and the fact that God is a knowing being, among other things regarding God’s knowledge. It seems like these three divine characteristics are what you would be referring to as proof to his personhood. The problem is that personhood thus finds no distinction from knowledge:

1. God is a knowing thing
2. to be a knowing thing is to be a person
3. Thus God is a person

I think this presents a problem.

If God’s personhood is not distinct from his knowledge, then God would necessarily have to be only one person, since God is one being and omniscience is a singular characteristic. However, God is not one person, but three.

I am not aware of something as specific in Aquinas’ work as “a proof that God is personal”, but rather I am saying that intelligence is exclusively a characteristic of persons, such that if God were impersonal, He would have no knowledge.

I think the only things that are intelligent (in the sense of reasoning, or ability to know forms) are God, angels and man; two of which we believe through faith have personhood (God and angels); the other (man) demonstratably so, since matter individuates form. However, I don’t see how knowing a being exists and is intelligent forces us to accept that it has personhood, if we are going to rely solely on reason, unless personhood is not distinct from intelligence, or knowledge ability (which again runs into the problem I mentioned above).

I may have misinterpreted your question, though.

No, you hit it dead on. I hope I don’t come across as too argumentative. I have been reading the thread and it seems like you and other posters have a lot of good insights and understanding of Aquinas/Aristotle that exceed my own amateur interests. I truly want to be convinced that the personhood of God can be established by reason, but it still doesn’t seem to me that we can come to this simply through knowing God’s omniscience and intelligence. If I am missing something, I welcome anyone’s constructive criticisms. Thanks for your response pfc, if you don’t find the time, know that I have still enjoyed endeavoring the subject this far.

 

[cpayne]

I looked at the articles in the Summa Theologiae under question 14, they address the self- understanding and comprehension of God and the fact that God is a knowing being, among other things regarding God’s knowledge. It seems like these three divine characteristics are what you would be referring to as proof to his personhood. The problem is that personhood thus finds no distinction from knowledge:

1. God is a knowing thing
2. to be a knowing thing is to be a person
3. Thus God is a person

I think this presents a problem.

If God’s personhood is not distinct from his knowledge, then God would necessarily have to be only one person, since God is one being and omniscience is a singular characteristic. However, God is not one person, but three.

I think the only things that are intelligent (in the sense of reasoning, or ability to know forms) are God, angels and man; two of which we believe through faith have personhood (God and angels); the other (man) demonstratably so, since matter individuates form. However, I don’t see how knowing a being exists and is intelligent forces us to accept that it has personhood, if we are going to rely solely on reason, unless personhood is not distinct from intelligence, or knowledge ability (which again runs into the problem I mentioned above).

Hi, Luke S. Aquinas accepts the definition of “person” given by Boethius: “An individual substance of rational nature” (Summa theologica III.2.2). Since God is an individual substance and of rational nature, that makes God a person.

Also, I don’t think God necessarily then has to be only one person—just one individual substance. “One substance in three Persons,” as it is said. Hope this helps. Best, cpayne

 

[john_doran]

I looked at the articles in the Summa Theologiae under question 14, they address the self- understanding and comprehension of God and the fact that God is a knowing being, among other things regarding God’s knowledge. It seems like these three divine characteristics are what you would be referring to as proof to his personhood. The problem is that personhood thus finds no distinction from knowledge:

1. God is a knowing thing
2. to be a knowing thing is to be a person
3. Thus God is a person

I think this presents a problem.

If God’s personhood is not distinct from his knowledge, then God would necessarily have to be only one person, since God is one being and omniscience is a singular characteristic. However, God is not one person, but three.

i’m not sure why you’re concluding that god’s personality and his knowledge are identical…

the argument you give above assumes that to be a knowing thing is a sufficient condition for the existence of something else: personality; being a sufficient condition for something is to not to be identical with the thing for which it is the condition. for example, my act of pulling the trigger is, arguendo, the sufficient condition for the can of soup exploding on the rock where i shot it, but the event that is “my pulling the trigger” isn’t identical with the event “the can of soup exploding”. god’s choosing to create the universe is the sufficient condition for the universe coming into being; but the universe and god’s creative choice aren’t identical.

so. god has knowledge and he has personhood; but the two aren’t identical (at least not logically - if god has the property of simplicity, then all of his properties are identical; but that’s a different story).
Luke S:

I think the only things that are intelligent (in the sense of reasoning, or ability to know forms) are God, angels and man; two of which we believe through faith have personhood (God and angels); the other (man) demonstratably so, since matter individuates form. However, I don’t see how knowing a being exists and is intelligent forces us to accept that it has personhood, if we are going to rely solely on reason, unless personhood is not distinct from intelligence, or knowledge ability (which again runs into the problem I mentioned above).

well, what do you think constitutes personhood? can there be a person that is not an intelligent knower? throw “having freedom of choice” into the mix, and it seems to me that anything that intelligently knows and makes free choices must necessarily be a personal being.

if this isn’t enough, you’re going to have to explain what you think is lacking.

 

[Luke_S]

the argument you give above assumes that to be a knowing thing is a sufficient condition for the existence of something else: personality.

Thanks for the (name removed by moderator)ut JD. The reason I equated personhood with knowledge is that pfc seemed to be using God’s knowledge to prove his personhood, which I was pointing out presented a problem (unless there is something I am misunderstanding). I agree whole-heartedly that knowledge is not the sufficient condition of personhood, that is the very problem I am addressing; if it was, it seems that there could only be one person in God, but we know there is not, there are three persons.

 

[Luke_S]

Aquinas accepts the definition of “person” given by Boethius: “An individual substance of rational nature” (Summa theologica III.2.2). Since God is an individual substance and of rational nature, that makes God a person.

Also, I don’t think God necessarily then has to be only one person—just one individual substance. “One substance in three Persons,” as it is said. Hope this helps. Best, cpayne

Interesting… Thanks cpayne, this definition helps a lot. If it can be proven that God is an individual substance, and has a rational nature, then it can be proven that he has personhood. I agree that it likewise seems that three persons in one substance is not harmed with this definition of substance.

Is there a definition of “rational nature” and likewise an argument to show that God has a rational nature? Human beings are said to be rational, in the sense that they can know forms through sensory experience, thus is rationality equated with the Thomistic/Aristotelian notion of abstraction? If so, would we be speaking properly to say of God that he is “rational,” since God does not know forms by abstraction, but he knows them in and of themselves?

This is a great discussion, thanks to those who are participating, it’s a priveledge for me to get information from others who know a lot about Aquinas/Aristotle.

 

[john_doran]

Thanks for the (name removed by moderator)ut JD. The reason I equated personhood with knowledge is that pfc seemed to be using God’s knowledge to prove his personhood, which I was pointing out presented a problem (unless there is something I am misunderstanding). I agree whole-heartedly that knowledge is not the sufficient condition of personhood, that is the very problem I am addressing; if it was, it seems that there could only be one person in God, but we know there is not, there are three persons.

i think you misunderstood me…

i was pointing out that your claimed identity - between knowledge and personhood - is false: while being a knower entails that one is also a person, one’s personhood is not thereby identical with his knowledge.

i in fgact do believe that being a knower is a sufficient condition for being a person.

that having been said, i don’t understand your alleged problem: even if knowledge and personhood are identical, all you’d need for a multiplicity of persons in one being would be to have a multitude of different sets of knowledge; to have person A, B, and C in the one being G would require only that the sets of propositions known by A, B, and C are not identical.

of course, this may prove to be inconsistent with divine omniscience - if god is omniscient, and if father, son, and holy spirit are each equally god, then each should also be equally omniscient…

still, that’s a different problem (if it’s a problem at all) than the one you originally raised.

 

[john_doran]

Interesting… Thanks cpayne, this definition helps a lot. If it can be proven that God is an individual substance, and has a rational nature, then it can be proven that he has personhood. I agree that it likewise seems that three persons in one substance is not harmed with this definition of substance.

Is there a definition of “rational nature” and likewise an argument to show that God has a rational nature? Human beings are said to be rational, in the sense that they can know forms through sensory experience, thus is rationality equated with the Thomistic/Aristotelian notion of abstraction? If so, would we be speaking properly to say of God that he is “rational,” since God does not know forms by abstraction, but he knows them in and of themselves?

i don’t believe that aquinas equates “rationality” with the act of abstracting form from matter; rather, rationality is the knowing of the form - the adequation of the intellect with the thing known, to use the technical definition.

which means god can be rational in virtue of being able to know forms, however it is that he acquires that knowledge.

which also means that showing that god is a “knower” is to show that he is rational, is to show that he is a person…

and keep in mind, aquinas stresses that all speech about god is necessarily analogous, which means that calling god “rational” is only meant to be a gesture in the direction of the kind of intellect possessed by an infinite, eternal, purely actual being whose existence is identical with his essence…

in other words, we will usually only be able to speak of god with a certain kind of imprecision.

 

[Luke_S]

i think you misunderstood me…

It seems that I have JD, I owe you an apology. I’m sorry.

I reread your post and I see what you are saying now- knowledge is a sufficient condition for personhood and this in no way makes it identical. Is that representative of your position?

The problem still remains however, that if we are going to say that Question 14 proves God’s personhood because knowledge is not identical with personhood but sufficient for it, then how is it that knowledge is sufficient for personhood? I’ll admit that for material living substances (like human beings, animals, plants, etc) that this seems to be true, however how is it translated to immaterial substances (like angels and God) as well? Perhaps one could argue that angels and God, not being material, are likewise not persons, but they are still knowing things. This doesn’t seem to be a contradiction, thus I don’t think God’s personhood is established solely on his knowledge, as was my original problem.

that having been said, i don’t understand your alleged problem: even if knowledge and personhood are identical, all you’d need for a multiplicity of persons in one being would be to have a multitude of different sets of knowledge; to have person A, B, and C in the one being G would require only that the sets of propositions known by A, B, and C are not identical.

of course, this may prove to be inconsistent with divine omniscience - if god is omniscient, and if father, son, and holy spirit are each equally god, then each should also be equally omniscient…

Well, as you point out, as Catholics we don’t want to say that each person of the Trinity has seperate and distinct knowledge, all persons of the Trinity have omniscience in the same way. It is to God that omniscience is predicated, and if God be three persons and one substance, then all three persons must likewise all be omniscience, since all persons are the divine substance that is omniscient, in and of themselves.

1. personhood is identical with knowledge (assumed premise)
2. there is no distinction of knowledge in F, S and HS, since each person has omniscience, which isn’t distinct from omniscience.
3. Therefore, F, S and HS are all one person

For the record, we both seem to be rejecting premise 1. I just wanted to illustrate the consequences of this.

still, that’s a different problem (if it’s a problem at all) than the one you originally raised

Actually, this is the problem I addressed (with the assumption that we all believe in Catholic teaching; that each person of the Trinity all are omniscient in and of themselves, since they are all God, in and of themselves):
Luke S.:

If God’s personhood is not distinct from his knowledge, then God would necessarily have to be only one person, since God is one being and omniscience is a singular characteristic. However, God is not one person, but three.

Thanks for your post JD, I hope I understood you better in this one.

 

[Luke_S]

i don’t believe that aquinas equates “rationality” with the act of abstracting form from matter; rather, rationality is the knowing of the form - the adequation of the intellect with the thing known, to use the technical definition.

Hi JD. Is there a reference for this definition that you know of?

 

[diarmait]

i don’t believe that aquinas equates “rationality” with the act of abstracting form from matter; rather, rationality is the knowing of the form - the adequation of the intellect with the thing known, to use the technical definition.

which means god can be rational in virtue of being able to know forms, however it is that he acquires that knowledge.

which also means that showing that god is a “knower” is to show that he is rational, is to show that he is a person…

and keep in mind, aquinas stresses that all speech about god is necessarily analogous, which means that calling god “rational” is only meant to be a gesture in the direction of the kind of intellect possessed by an infinite, eternal, purely actual being whose existence is identical with his essence…

in other words, we will usually only be able to speak of god with a certain kind of imprecision.

Here’s St. Thomas on whether “Person” should be said of God:

newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm#3

 

[diarmait]

Hi JD. Is there a reference for this definition that you know of?

In his reply to obj. 4 from the link above, St. Thomas says:

“It may be said that God has a rational “nature,” if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature.”

 

[Luke_S]

Luke S:

I think the only things that are intelligent (in the sense of reasoning, or ability to know forms) are God, angels and man; two of which we believe through faith have personhood (God and angels); the other (man) demonstratably so, since matter individuates form. However, I don’t see how knowing a being exists and is intelligent forces us to accept that it has personhood, if we are going to rely solely on reason, unless personhood is not distinct from intelligence, or knowledge ability (which again runs into the problem I mentioned above).

well, what do you think constitutes personhood? can there be a person that is not an intelligent knower? throw “having freedom of choice” into the mix, and it seems to me that anything that intelligently knows and makes free choices must necessarily be a personal being.

Yes, there can be a person who is not an intelligent knower. Human beings rely on the body to know, thus if we are unable to have sensory experience from which to abstract forms, then we cannot know. There are brain dead people who are unable to abstract, yet they are still persons; this is why euthenasia is unacceptable for a Catholic. Likewise, the unborn child is considered a person, even when he/she lacks the ability to know. This is why abortion and abortive contraception is unacceptable for the Catholic.

Likewise, neither of the above cited cases would have freedom of choice, but this again would do no harm to their personhood.

I don’t know what constitutes personhood exactly, but I would love to find out. It would be even better to be able to prove that God is personal. I believe what the Catholic church teaches in all respects of personhood and God, but I believe from faith about these things, not from reason. God’s existence we can believe from reason alone, but I’m not convinced the same goes for his personhood, which hasn’t seemed to be established here, nor have I read anything of Aquinas’ that seems to even claim to establish this reasonably.

 

[john_doran]

It seems that I have JD, I owe you an apology. I’m sorry.

none needed. really…
Luke S:

I reread your post and I see what you are saying now- knowledge is a sufficient condition for personhood and this in no way makes it identical. Is that representative of your position?

Yup.
Luke S:

The problem still remains however, that if we are going to say that Question 14 proves God’s personhood because knowledge is not identical with personhood but sufficient for it, then how is it that knowledge is sufficient for personhood? I’ll admit that for material living substances (like human beings, animals, plants, etc) that this seems to be true, however how is it translated to immaterial substances (like angels and God) as well? Perhaps one could argue that angels and God, not being material, are likewise not persons, but they are still knowing things. This doesn’t seem to be a contradiction, thus I don’t think God’s personhood is established solely on his knowledge, as was my original problem.

philosophical details aside, i think you may be trying to get the concept of “person” to do more work than is needed…

proving god is “personal” is not so much a matter of demonstrating that he can accurately be placed in some forensically precise phiosophical category - “person” - so much as it is a matter of being able simply to distinguish the First Cause/Prime Mover/Pure Act of natural theology from a mindless, deistic force…

look, i’m not fussed if you want to say that we can’t know that god is a person via the light of natural reason; what we do know is that god has (propositional) knowledge and is so far forth in some sense rational, and he has free choice. whether or not we call the thing that possesses those properties, a “person” is secondary. don’t you think?

what matters is that we can know that god is a thinker and a chooser.

 

[Luke_S]

Here’s St. Thomas on whether “Person” should be said of God:

newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm#3

Thank you so much for the reference D. It seems that my ignorance of TA has made for a rather lengthy derail of the thread, so I apologize. This seems to be sufficient in proving that God is personal, I don’t remember ever seeing this before.

TA’s definition:

Person= a subsistent individual of a rational nature.

Thus, in the objection to JD I just raised, the brain dead person and the unborn baby would both qualify as having a rational nature, even though their powers of reasoning have in the first case been unnaturally inhibited, and in the second case not fully developed yet.

Also, the fact that a person needs to also be a subsistent individual in addition to having a rational nature, seems to be more in line with common sense. Indeed, these two characteristics seem to be sufficient and necessary for personhood; a very good definition. I’ll have to look at the argument more closely when I have more time. Thanks again.