Resurrection, recreation and hylomorphic dualism

[STT]

Hylomorphic dualism is an attempt to resolve the mind (soul) body problem. Hylomorphism is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives being as a compound of matter and form. Later Thomas Aquinas develop his own theory assuming that form is soul in human case. We however know that attributes like personality, identity, etc are subject of destruction due to disease or death. This means that soul cannot own these attributes. This means that the person should be recreated upon resurrection in order to have former attributes, namely personality, identity, etc. This however sounds odd and not acceptable as a right theory since a right theory must at least guarantee the passage of identity upon death.

 

[Bradski]

We are not the same person we were years ago. We are not really the same person we were yesterday.

Let’s say that my father went to heaven when he died at the age of 40 (and I was 16). I am now older than he was when he died. If I go to heaven, how does that relationship work?

If you have a child that dies as a toddler, is your son still three years old in heaven?

If you are a grumply old sod when you die, are you a different person when you get to heaven?

Would you still have a relationship with your wife? What if you were married twice?

How do you respond to the fact that someone who murdered your child has repented and is now in heaven? How does your child respond?

 

[Gorgias]

We however know that attributes like personality, identity, etc are subject of destruction due to disease or death.

We do?

Tell me, please: how do you know what happens to a person after death? How do you know that their ‘personality’ and ‘identity’ die?

 

[STT]

We are not the same person we were years ago. We are not really the same person we were yesterday.

Of course we are gradually dying and changing.

Let’s say that my father went to heaven when he died at the age of 40 (and I was 16). I am now older than he was when he died. If I go to heaven, how does that relationship work?

Relationship? Of course about how people wishes. How people could be happy forever otherwise?

If you have a child that dies as a toddler, is your son still three years old in heaven?

Why we should care about age in Heaven?

If you are a grumply old sod when you die, are you a different person when you get to heaven?

I strongly believe in spirituality (I have spiritual experiences) and I believe that we are material. To be honest I cannot resolve the problem of life after death.

Would you still have a relationship with your wife? What if you were married twice?

I think having relationships with two woman is allowed if you are honest in the relationships.

How do you respond to the fact that someone who murdered your child has repented and is now in heaven? How does your child respond?

I forgive him. Why should bother about temporal separation if we really have strong faith.

 

[STT]

We do?

Tell me, please: how do you know what happens to a person after death? How do you know that their ‘personality’ and ‘identity’ die?

Yes, case of Alzheimer shows the gradual lose of long memory, ability to reason, personality, identity and eventually death. Death is the worst part therefore we cannot own the above mentioned properties.

 

[dmar198]

Hylomorphic dualism is an attempt to resolve the mind (soul) body problem. Hylomorphism is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives being as a compound of matter and form. Later Thomas Aquinas develop his own theory assuming that form is soul in human case. We however know that attributes like personality, identity, etc are subject of destruction due to disease or death. This means that soul cannot own these attributes. This means that the person should be recreated upon resurrection in order to have former attributes, namely personality, identity, etc. This however sounds odd and not acceptable as a right theory since a right theory must at least guarantee the passage of identity upon death.

It seems your argument can be summarized in the following way (but correct me if I got something wrong):

Premise 1. Personal attributes like personality and identity can be destroyed by physical changes.
Premise 2. The soul, in the hylomorphic theory, cannot be destroyed by physical changes.
Conclusion. Therefore, personality and identity are not attributes of the soul.

Then you further go on to argue that, if we will have the attributes of identity and personality in our resurrected bodies, these attributes will have to be recreated, which essentially involves creating a new person. And this is problematic.

Does that seem like an accurate summary of your argument?

If so, then it seems that there are three possible responses: we can deny the validity of the argument (if it contains a logical fallacy), we can deny the second premise (denying the hylomorphic theory), or we can deny the first premise.

Denying the first premise seems safest to me. I don’t think physical changes can destroy your personality or identity. Perhaps we are using “personality” and “identity” in different ways? I think our personality, identity, and rational nature make use of our bodies in a similar way to how a musician makes use of his instrument. If you damage the instrument, you don’t change the musician, but you do change the musician’s product, i.e. you change the music. Similarly, if you damage the brain, you don’t change the soul, but you do change the soul’s product, i.e. you change the person’s behavior. Does that make sense?

It might be possible to put it this way: our personality, identity, and rational nature are filtered through our bodies. If you change the filter (i.e. the body), you can Seem to change the personality, identity, and rational nature, but you’re actually just changing the way they appear to us on this side of the grave. After death, any problems created by damaging the body will be undone, and our true personality/identity/rational nature will be there in a pure form. In this life, other people get an imperfect view of your personality/identity/rational nature. These imperfections are a result of bodily limitations and original sin. Damaging the brain adds additional imperfections, impeding other people even further from getting a true view of your unadulterated personality/identity/rational nature. Take away the damage, and you’ll be more perfectly revealed to others. Not a new person, the same “you” will be there in the resurrection, just without the imperfections. Does that make sense?

 

[STT]

It seems your argument can be summarized in the following way (but correct me if I got something wrong):

Premise 1. Personal attributes like personality and identity can be destroyed by physical changes.
Premise 2. The soul, in the hylomorphic theory, cannot be destroyed by physical changes.
Conclusion. Therefore, personality and identity are not attributes of the soul.

Then you further go on to argue that, if we will have the attributes of identity and personality in our resurrected bodies, these attributes will have to be recreated, which essentially involves creating a new person. And this is problematic.

Does that seem like an accurate summary of your argument?

Yes.

If so, then it seems that there are three possible responses: we can deny the validity of the argument (if it contains a logical fallacy), we can deny the second premise (denying the hylomorphic theory), or we can deny the first premise.

Ok lets discuss the cases separately.

Denying the first premise seems safest to me. What evidence do you have that diseases or death can change your personality or identity?

Please read post #5.

 

[dmar198]

Please read post #5.

I did, and then I edited my response to take account of that. Please see my latest edit.

 

[STT]

I did, and then I edited my response to take account of that. Please see my latest edit.

Sure.

 

[STT]

It seems your argument can be summarized in the following way (but correct me if I got something wrong):

Premise 1. Personal attributes like personality and identity can be destroyed by physical changes.
Premise 2. The soul, in the hylomorphic theory, cannot be destroyed by physical changes.
Conclusion. Therefore, personality and identity are not attributes of the soul.

Then you further go on to argue that, if we will have the attributes of identity and personality in our resurrected bodies, these attributes will have to be recreated, which essentially involves creating a new person. And this is problematic.

Does that seem like an accurate summary of your argument?

If so, then it seems that there are three possible responses: we can deny the validity of the argument (if it contains a logical fallacy), we can deny the second premise (denying the hylomorphic theory), or we can deny the first premise.

Denying the first premise seems safest to me. I don’t think physical changes can destroy your personality or identity. Perhaps we are using “personality” and “identity” in different ways? I think our personality, identity, and rational nature make use of our bodies in a similar way to how a musician makes use of his instrument. If you damage the instrument, you don’t change the musician, but you do change the musician’s product, i.e. you change the music. Similarly, if you damage the brain, you don’t change the soul, but you do change the soul’s product, i.e. you change the person’s behavior. Does that make sense?

It might be possible to put it this way: our personality, identity, and rational nature are filtered through our bodies. If you change the filter (i.e. the body), you can Seem to change the personality, identity, and rational nature, but you’re actually just changing the way they appear to us on this side of the grave. After death, any problems created by damaging the body will be undone, and our true personality/identity/rational nature will be there in a pure form. In this life, other people get an imperfect view of your personality/identity/rational nature. These imperfections are a result of bodily limitations and original sin. Damaging the brain adds additional imperfections, impeding other people even further from getting a true view of your unadulterated personality/identity/rational nature. Take away the damage, and you’ll be more perfectly revealed to others. Not a new person, the same “you” will be there in the resurrection, just without the imperfections. Does that make sense?

Quoted from here:

… thanks to the available medicine in the marketplace, I am able to live a somewhat “normal” life; although you must understand that the definition of “normal” changes every day. I’m definitely not the same person I once was. (Kris’s Story, from alz.org)

This and this are also interesting links.

I just google it.

 

[GEddie]

Personality is IMINWHO overrated. It is no more nor less than the part of our mind that others see; and it changes from day to day, never mind over years, or trans-death.

There will certainly be a personality in the resurrectional body (pneumatikon soma) but there is no way that it is not deeply affected by the hideous trauma that is human death.

ICXC NIKA

 

[dmar198]

Quoted from here:

This and this are also interesting links.

I just google it.

All of these articles speak of the identity changing, as well as the personality and memory. These reports are consistent with the view I spoke of earlier. Your identity and your memory are attributes of your soul which, in one way, are known to you and God alone. Nobody knows you like you know you…except God. He knows you even better. This true identity, the real you, is represented to others through our behaviors, and is represented imperfectly but (typically) quite well.

Sickness or death can impede your ability to represent yourself to others. Your identity, as others see it, can be obscured, but not your identity as God sees it. The articles you cited all Say that people’s identities have changed, but they are only basing that statement on observable changes in people’s behavior. Behavior is only a representation of your identity, not the real thing. Their claim is completely explainable without concluding that anybody’s identity has actually changed. Our identity is not part of our behavior. It is “represented” in our behavior. Sickness can change our behavior and therefore make it Seem like our identity has changed, but in reality it has not.

 

[STT]

All of these articles speak of the identity changing, as well as the personality and memory. These reports are consistent with the view I spoke of earlier. Your identity and your memory are attributes of your soul which, in one way, are known to you and God alone.

You wouldn’t lose your memory if it was part of your soul.

Nobody knows you like you know you…except God. He knows you even better. This true identity, the real you, is represented to others through our behaviors, and is represented imperfectly but (typically) quite well.

There is nothing fixed in us. Everything is subject to change including our memories and personality. The only thing which I doubt that is subject to change is the sense of Iness or identity.

Sickness or death can impede your ability to represent yourself to others. Your identity, as others see it, can be obscured, but not your identity as God sees it.

So you are saying that there is something deep inside me that even I cannot see but God can. Where is it? It cannot be inside the soul since soul is not subject to change. Material however is subject to change and destruction therefore there is nothing like memory that can exist in it once it is destroyed.

The articles you cited all Say that people’s identities have changed, but they are only basing that statement on observable changes in people’s behavior. Behavior is only a representation of your identity, not the real thing. Their claim is completely explainable without concluding that anybody’s identity has actually changed. Our identity is not part of our behavior. It is “represented” in our behavior. Sickness can change our behavior and therefore make it Seem like our identity has changed, but in reality it has not.

Personality and memory is subject destruction even if we accept that identity is not subject of change.

 

[Gorgias]

Yes, case of Alzheimer shows the gradual lose of long memory, ability to reason, personality, identity

Alternately, I could describe these symptoms as the loss of ability to express memory, ability to reason, personality and identity.

Death is the worst part therefore we cannot own the above mentioned properties.

You haven’t addressed my question, though. I asked how you know the effects of death on the above criteria. You’ve merely asserted that “death is the worst part”. That doesn’t prove the assertion, vis-a-vis the soul.

 

[STT]

Alternately, I could describe these symptoms as the loss of ability to express memory, ability to reason, personality and identity.

Do you believe that soul has shape? If not how it could hold memory and personality?

You haven’t addressed my question, though. I asked how you know the effects of death on the above criteria. You’ve merely asserted that “death is the worst part”. That doesn’t prove the assertion, vis-a-vis the soul.

I think that was a good answer to your question.

 

[Gorgias]

Do you believe that soul has shape? If not how it could hold memory and personality?

Do you believe memory and personality have shape? If not, why would the soul need those properties?

I think that was a good answer to your question.

It didn’t address the request for substantiation; it merely re-stated the assertion. If ‘good’, it was nevertheless non-responsive.

 

[STT]

Do you believe memory and personality have shape? If not, why would the soul need those properties?

You need shape to store memory.

 

[lmelahn]

Hylomorphic dualism is an attempt to resolve the mind (soul) body problem. Hylomorphism is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives being as a compound of matter and form. Later Thomas Aquinas develop his own theory assuming that form is soul in human case. We however know that attributes like personality, identity, etc are subject of destruction due to disease or death. This means that soul cannot own these attributes. This means that the person should be recreated upon resurrection in order to have former attributes, namely personality, identity, etc. This however sounds odd and not acceptable as a right theory since a right theory must at least guarantee the passage of identity upon death.

This is a difficulty in the hylomorphic model as Aristotle formulated it. If (prime) matter and (substantial) form were the most fundamental metaphysical principles, when we would expect there to be no differences among people after their death. (I specify “prime” and “substantial” because Aristotle talks about a “secondary matter” and “accidental form” that constitute a different composition.)

St. Thomas Aquinas actually came up with an improvement to this theory: a further composition (shared by all creatures, even purely spiritual creatures like angles) between a creature’s act of being and its essence. In the case of human beings, that essence is, in turn, composed of prime matter and substantial form.

This composition allows even purely spiritual creatures (i.e., angels) to be diverse from one another. Thus, each human being—whether he is still embodied in this life, or whether he is awaiting his resurrected body after death—maintains is identity. After my death, I will still be myself, and when my body is reconstituted, it will still be my body—indeed, the very same body, numerically, that I had before (albeit glorified).

 

[Gorgias]

You need shape to store memory.

Is memory physical?

 

[STT]

This is a difficulty in the hylomorphic model as Aristotle formulated it. If (prime) matter and (substantial) form were the most fundamental metaphysical principles, when we would expect there to be no differences among people after their death. (I specify “prime” and “substantial” because Aristotle talks about a “secondary matter” and “accidental form” that constitute a different composition.)

Yes. This is my problem. All creatures look similar after their death.

St. Thomas Aquinas actually came up with an improvement to this theory: a further composition (shared by all creatures, even purely spiritual creatures like angles) between a creature’s act of being and its essence. In the case of human beings, that essence is, in turn, composed of prime matter and substantial form.

This composition allows even purely spiritual creatures (i.e., angels) to be diverse from one another. Thus, each human being—whether he is still embodied in this life, or whether he is awaiting his resurrected body after death—maintains is identity. After my death, I will still be myself, and when my body is reconstituted, it will still be my body—indeed, the very same body, numerically, that I had before (albeit glorified).

This is the part that I don’t understand well. How the difference between two models remove the problem in hylomorphic? Thomas added act of being to Aristotle’s model. His model becomes dual. First I cannot comprehend how he overcome the main problem in dualism. Second how the act of being which is a unphysical thing can hold memory, personality, etc. after death.