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STT
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Yes. We have evidence for it.
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STT
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How Aquinas resolve the problem of recreation?
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Vico
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GEddie
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Didn’t even Aquinas hold that memory was physical and must therefore die with the body?Please… do share.
Be careful to ensure that your evidence doesn’t merely demonstrate that memory may be represented physically, but that it must be stored physically.
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Vico
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae > First Part > Question 79
Question 79. The intellectual powers
Article 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.
newadvent.org/summa/1079.htm#article6
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STT
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Yes, I agree that human soul persist to exist once created. I am however interested to know about recreation of memory and personality upon resurrection.
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STT
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We know that we lose memory with deformation of some part of our brain. Moreover, memory is nothing more than stored information and information is nothing more than formation of a substance.Please… do share.
Be careful to ensure that your evidence doesn’t merely demonstrate that memory may be represented physically, but that it must be stored physically.
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Vico
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St. Thomas Aquinas identified two memory capacities: one dependent of senses and phantasia and another dependent on the intellect. At the resurrection memory restoration would depend upon what God reconstructs, if any.
He answers on the soul capabilty in
Summa Theologiae > First Part > Question 89
Question 89. The knowledge of the separated soul
Article 1. Whether the separated soul can understand anything?
Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.
newadvent.org/summa/1089.htm
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STT
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So our memory and personality is reconstructed. That was not a big surprise since we change our personality and forget memory in our life too.
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Gorgias
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No, that’s not what Aquinas is saying here.
In the Summa (I.89.1), he responds that the soul (separated from the body) does understand things. He goes into the particular way that the soul understands, both with the body and without. However, here he is not talking about “reconstructed” memory or personality. He’s just answering the question of whether the soul depends on the body for understanding (and his answer is “no, it doesn’t, although it understands in a different way when it’s separated from the body”).
I’m not sure that’s what Aquinas would answer. (Perhaps you have a citation for us?)
I don’t usually quote from the supplement to the ST, but q. 80, article 5 seems to address this general question. Here, what’s under consideration is “whether whatever was materially in a man’s members will all rise again.” The answer given is that it would be silly to suggest that all the matter that was ever associated with your body will rise again (e.g., baby teeth, skin cells that you sloughed off throughout your life, etc). However, he discusses the distinction between material that “belongs to the truth of human nature” and this matter that merely had some association with the body at some time during life.
We’ve been talking about the physical operations through which a soul understands. If we recognize this to mean that there are physical effects to body-soul understanding (that is, I think STT would tell us that this understanding ‘resides’ in the brain), then this understanding is clearly something that “belongs to the truth of human nature.” Therefore, it’s not a question of “what God reconstructs”, but rather, it follows directly from the resurrection: our memories will continue to be part of us. To quote from the answer in the ST: “the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of parts.”
So, if we believe that memory is physical, it will rise again.
However, it would seem that this is not what Aquinas states. In I.89.5, he asks, “whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul.” That seems to be what’s in play in our discussion here. Aquinas answers:
Therefore, according to Aquinas, it’s not the case, as STT (and Vico?) claim here, that memory is wholly “reconstructed”.
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Gorgias
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That’s not necessarily the case. It may be the case that* the ability to access memory* is what is lost.
Not true. If that were the case, then witnesses would be 100% reliable. Moreover, witnesses’ memories would be unchanging over time. Neither of these is true. ‘Memory’, it seems, has an integral relationship with the person.
No. You keep making this mistake. Information may be stored in physical substances, but it exists independently of the manner or method of storage. Does a[sup]2[/sup] + b[sup]2[/sup] = c[sup]2[/sup] cease to exist, as information, if all the geometry books in the world are destroyed? Does it cease to exist, as information, if all human life ceases to exist? Of course not. Information is not physical, even though it is real.
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STT
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You might need to google “memory+brain” and “memory+soul” to see that how much literature exist in each category.
If information was stored in soul then witness would be 100% reliable. It is always some part of information missing.
a[sup]2[/sup] + b[sup]2[/sup] = c[sup]2[/sup] is a prior knowledge.
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Vico
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The soul has the faculties of will and intelligence which when separated from the body by death, remain in it and still exercises. But the soul is virtually vegetal and sentient so when separated from the body has no need or even ability to actually exercise the vegetal and sensitive operations of life.
Since the physical brain dies but no the soul only the physical is resurrected, reunited with the soul.
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Vico
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What is retained in the separated soul.
Memory reconstituted especially at the Resurrection.
Summa Theologiae > First Part >
Question 89. The knowledge of the separated soul
Article 5. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?
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Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (I:79:2 ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible “intentions,” above all as regards simple intelligence of “what a thing is.” But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, “forgetfulness” on the part of the memorative power, and “deception” on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.
newadvent.org/summa/1089.htm#article5
St. Thomas things that more will be recalled at the resurrection that the normal memory we have now.
Summa Theologiae > Supplement > Question 87
Question 87. The knowledge which, after rising again, men will have at the judgment concerning merits and demerits
Article 1. Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has committed?
Reply to Objection 1. Although many merits and demerits will have escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this.
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Reply to Objection 4. The wicked will know all the good they have done, and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which reason Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that “the greatest misfortune is to have been happy.”
newadvent.org/summa/5087.htm
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Gorgias
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As I’m sure you’ve already noticed, I already cited this article.
This answers a different question than the one we’re considering. We’re talking about memory. In this question, Aquinas’ friend has created an answer to the question “will we acquire more knowledge after the resurrection than we had previously?” … and that’s a completely different issue than the one we’re discussing here.
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Vico
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I already posted it before and you commented on it – I think that is what you mean.As I’m sure you’ve already noticed, I already cited this article.
This answers a different question than the one we’re considering. We’re talking about memory. In this question, Aquinas’ friend has created an answer to the question “will we acquire more knowledge after the resurrection than we had previously?” … and that’s a completely different issue than the one we’re discussing here.
The second is about our memory of our lives restored, but normally we forget things. Here he is expressing that we will have what was forgotten restored. “Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds.”
More knowledge would be in addition to what we knew before.
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Gorgias
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Actually, you quoted article 1. But hey… whatever makes you happy.
Psst… keep reading. The following articles in q. 87 talk about learning about everyone’s sins. That’s certainly “more knowledge”, not “memory”, wouldn’t you say?
(In any case, your take on it doesn’t really hold up: in the reply to objection 1, he discusses those things which “have escaped our memory”, but which are present in the resurrection. That means that, not being part of our memories, they are items which are made present anew. In other words: “more knowledge” that wasn’t part of our memory prior to the resurrection.)
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