Resurrection, recreation and hylomorphic dualism

[Vico]

Actually, you quoted article 1. But hey… whatever makes you happy.

Psst… keep reading. The following articles in q. 87 talk about learning about everyone’s sins. That’s certainly “more knowledge”, not “memory”, wouldn’t you say?

(In any case, your take on it doesn’t really hold up: in the reply to objection 1, he discusses those things which “have escaped our memory”, but which are present in the resurrection. That means that, not being part of our memories, they are items which are made present anew. In other words: “more knowledge” that wasn’t part of our memory prior to the resurrection.)

You miss the point. Memory that is restored, once existed during the lifetime – it is not new knowledge that was never known, therefore what “escaped” as he put it, was once known and is now restored.

 

[Gorgias]

You miss the point. Memory that is restored, once existed during the lifetime – it is not new knowledge that was never known, therefore what “escaped” as he put it, was once known and is now restored.

It’s “new” in that it wasn’t in memory at the time of death. We’re saying the same thing, but calling it by different names.

Moreover, there will be distinctly new information that we’ll have: we’ll know each others sins, too.

 

[Vico]

It’s “new” in that it wasn’t in memory at the time of death. We’re saying the same thing, but calling it by different names.

Moreover, there will be distinctly new information that we’ll have: we’ll know each others sins, too.

Really this is in regard to post #32 where you wrote: “Therefore, it’s not a question of “what God reconstructs”, but rather, it follows directly from the resurrection: our memories will continue to be part of us.”

 

[Gorgias]

Really this is in regard to post #32 where you wrote: “Therefore, it’s not a question of “what God reconstructs”, but rather, it follows directly from the resurrection: our memories will continue to be part of us.”

Actually, it’s in response to your post #37, where you assert (in the context of “memory”) that the notion in the Supplement that ‘forgotten knowledge’ that will be given back to the ‘conscience’ constitutes memory.

But hey, I think we’ve already beaten this one to death… and, as well, STT seems to have bored of this thread.

Have a wonderful day, Vico…

 

[STT]

Actually, it’s in response to your post #37, where you assert (in the context of “memory”) that the notion in the Supplement that ‘forgotten knowledge’ that will be given back to the ‘conscience’ constitutes memory.

But hey, I think we’ve already beaten this one to death… and, as well, STT seems to have bored of this thread.

Have a wonderful day, Vico…

Yes, I am bored. I have evidence (memory is subject of destruction upon brain damage) plus proof (memory is sort of information and information is form of a substance, form of matter inside brain). You, including Aquinas, just have one assertion: Soul must have a memory and personality otherwise they all look similar.

 

[Gorgias]

Yes, I am bored. I have evidence (memory is subject of destruction upon brain damage)

That’s only evidence that the brain cannot access the memory any longer.

(Think of a computer: imagine a CPU, a hard drive, and data stored “in the cloud”. When you access this memory “in the cloud”, it’s also stored in files in the hard drive. Now, suppose the CPU is damaged, such that it cannot access the hard drive any longer. Is this evidence that the encoding of the data on the hard drive has been destroyed? Moreover, is this evidence that the data in the cloud has been destroyed? Or, isn’t it really just the case that all you can say for sure is that the CPU is no longer able to access the data?)

plus proof (memory is sort of information and information is form of a substance, form of matter inside brain).

Yeah, we keep going around and around on this one. Data is not physical; the encoding of data is physical. But hey… if you think you’ve proven this one, more power to ya!

You, including Aquinas, just have one assertion: Soul must have a memory and personality otherwise they all look similar.

There’s no empirical way to prove or disprove the assertion as stated.

 

[STT]

That’s only evidence that the brain cannot access the memory any longer.

(Think of a computer: imagine a CPU, a hard drive, and data stored “in the cloud”. When you access this memory “in the cloud”, it’s also stored in files in the hard drive. Now, suppose the CPU is damaged, such that it cannot access the hard drive any longer. Is this evidence that the encoding of the data on the hard drive has been destroyed? Moreover, is this evidence that the data in the cloud has been destroyed? Or, isn’t it really just the case that all you can say for sure is that the CPU is no longer able to access the data?)

Why soul should depend on matter on retrieving memory or personality if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

Yeah, we keep going around and around on this one. Data is not physical; the encoding of data is physical. But hey… if you think you’ve proven this one, more power to ya!

Information is physical. We experience it (that is what is unphysical). There is nothing such as duaslitic picture of information.

There’s no empirical way to prove or disprove the assertion as stated.

Yes, there are (the above comments).

 

[Vico]

Actually, it’s in response to your post #37, where you assert (in the context of “memory”) that the notion in the Supplement that ‘forgotten knowledge’ that will be given back to the ‘conscience’ constitutes memory.

But hey, I think we’ve already beaten this one to death… and, as well, STT seems to have bored of this thread.

Have a wonderful day, Vico…

I just meant that my response was to your comment in post #32.

 

[Gorgias]

Why soul should depend on matter on retrieving memory or personality if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

The soul doesn’t depend on it. The human person – a body/soul composite – does, at times, depend on the state of the body and its capabilities.

Information is physical. We experience it (that is what is unphysical). There is nothing such as duaslitic picture of information.

Of course there is.

There is data that is immaterial. This data gets encoded in a variety of ways – including physical encodings. Humans experience the encoding – not the data! – and decode it; thus, the mind encounters the data itself. (And, of course, the mind itself encodes sensory (name removed by moderator)uts, creating representations of data.)

 

[STT]

The soul doesn’t depend on it. The human person – a body/soul composite – does, at times, depend on the state of the body and its capabilities.

Could soul function without body considering the fact that it owns memory and has personality? No. Therefore soul depends on body to function properly. Now back to the question: Why should soul depend on matter on retrieving memory or personality if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

Of course there is.

There is data that is immaterial. This data gets encoded in a variety of ways – including physical encodings. Humans experience the encoding – not the data! – and decode it; thus, the mind encounters the data itself. (And, of course, the mind itself encodes sensory (name removed by moderator)uts, creating representations of data.)

So you are talking about data and experiencing it?

 

[Vico]

Could soul function without body considering the fact that it owns memory and has personality? No. Therefore soul depends on body to function properly. Now back to the question: Why should soul depend on matter on retrieving memory or personality if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

So you are talking about data and experiencing it?

… if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

The person is a composite of the body and eternal soul such that it can be stated that the person does not exist without both, and that the intellect (soul) knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. There are three things in the soul (per Aquinas) which are proper to the mind: memory, understanding, and will. memory concerns the intention of an object whereas imagination concerns the form apprehended by the senses. To be an image of something signifies and intention related to the form. Animals have memory but humans also have recollecting. Aquinas calls the rational place of the soul the place of forms but does not define this type of retention memory.

 

[STT]

… if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

The person is a composite of the body and eternal soul such that it can be stated that the person does not exist without both, and that the intellect (soul) knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. There are three things in the soul (per Aquinas) which are proper to the mind: memory, understanding, and will. memory concerns the intention of an object whereas imagination concerns the form apprehended by the senses. To be an image of something signifies and intention related to the form. Animals have memory but humans also have recollecting. Aquinas calls the rational place of the soul the place of forms but does not define this type of retention memory.

I don’t understand how your post is related to what is discussed. We have two cases: (1) Memory belongs to soul and body and (2) Memory belongs to soul. The recreation of memory is needed in first case. The second case cannot be true since memory belong to soul and soul should have access to it independent of status of body which we know that is not the case.

 

[Vico]

I don’t understand how your post is related to what is discussed. We have two cases: (1) Memory belongs to soul and body and (2) Memory belongs to soul. The recreation of memory is needed in first case. The second case cannot be true since memory belong to soul and soul should have access to it independent of status of body which we know that is not the case.

The soul only receives from the body through phantasms so bodily (name removed by moderator)ut is not present when the body is not existing. The soul faculties are then available to the soul but no longer the (name removed by moderator)ut from the physical memory.

 

[Gorgias]

Could soul function without body considering the fact that it owns memory and has personality? No.

That’s the thing, though: Catholics say that the soul does function in the absence of the body! Not in the same way, of course, since it does not have a body in order to receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut or to ratiocinate, but the soul is still alive and functional!

Therefore soul depends on body to function properly.

If by “properly”, you mean “in the way that a body/soul composite functions”, I’d agree. If you mean “in any way”, I’d have to disagree.

Now back to the question: Why should soul depend on matter on retrieving memory or personality if memory belongs to soul and personality is a property of soul?

Since your objection doesn’t hold up to reason, I’m sticking to my answer.

So you are talking about data and experiencing it?

No – you’re talking about “information” (that is, ‘data’), and claiming that it’s inherently physical. I disagree. Data is formless; encodings of data have form.

 

[STT]

That’s the thing, though: Catholics say that the soul does function in the absence of the body! Not in the same way, of course, since it does not have a body in order to receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut or to ratiocinate, but the soul is still alive and functional!

So here there are two ambiguities: (1) How differently a soul acts without a body? (2) Why should soul depends on body in retrieving the memory (body just plays the role of sensory system, memory belongs to soul, isn’t it?)

If by “properly”, you mean “in the way that a body/soul composite functions”, I’d agree. If you mean “in any way”, I’d have to disagree.

I should have said if soul could function without body at all. How do you know? Do you have any evidence? Is soul minimally conscious without body? How do you comment on the cases of deep sleep or anesthesia?

Since your objection doesn’t hold up to reason, I’m sticking to my answer.

How about now?

No – you’re talking about “information” (that is, ‘data’), and claiming that it’s inherently physical. I disagree. Data is formless; encodings of data have form.

I think we are using different words for an entity.

 

[Gorgias]

So here there are two ambiguities: (1) How differently a soul acts without a body?

A soul without a body has no sense organs and no brain; it does not receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and it does not ratiocinate. It is still in existence, however, and therefore, is ‘alive’.

(2) Why should soul depends on body in retrieving the memory (body just plays the role of sensory system, memory belongs to soul, isn’t it?)

Let me answer your question with a question that I hope illuminates the issue for you:

Why should a soul depend on a body in order to receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut?

(Because that is the role of the body; it performs certain functions which are suited to its nature. Among these are “sensory perception”.)

Aquinas gives a somewhat nuanced answer to this question, vis-a-vis memory. He looks at the “nobility” of soul and of body, based on the ‘ends’ these have, and distinguishing between these, he answers that what is appropriate to soul, belongs to soul (while, similarly, what is appropriate to body, belongs to body). So, those things which pertain to higher realities belong to ‘soul’, while things which do not, belong to ‘body’. Those which belong to ‘body’ are restored in the recreated body at the end of time (since bodies are recreated at the eschaton), while those which belong to ‘soul’ continue on in uninterrupted existence. (Moreover, in the supplement to the ST, there is the claim that new ‘memories’ are added in the recreated body – these are memories that once existed but were lost, as well as others that never existed previously in the person.)

So, now we get to the heart of the matter: does ‘memory’ belong solely to ‘body’, as you claim? No. There is memory that is proper to the soul, and is retained by the soul. (However, there is memory that proper to the body, and it is restored in the eschaton.)

I should have said if soul could function without body at all.

Fair enough.

How do you know? Do you have any evidence?

Physical, empirical evidence? That’s an unreasonable request: the soul is immaterial; by definition, there is no physical evidence of the soul.

This argument is philosophical and theological in nature. Therefore, it’s truth isn’t found by measurement of length, width, depth, or temporal extension. It stands or falls on logic.

Is soul minimally conscious without body?

Are you talking about the soul of a person who has died? We would hold that it continues to exist, uninterrupted, from the death of the body until the end of time.

Are you talking, on the other hand, about the soul of a person who is unconscious or physically impaired in some way? We would assert that the soul is not impaired, although the ability of the person (i.e., the body/soul composite) to act in ways that an unimpaired body acts reflects the physical impairment of the body.

How do you comment on the cases of deep sleep or anesthesia?

Actions of the body/soul composite depend on both the body and the soul. The actions of the composite will reflect the impairment of its members.

How about now?

Still good with my responses, thank you.

I think we are using different words for an entity.

Perhaps. Would you care to refine the terms you’re using, and the implications of the usage you’re utilizing?

 

[STT]

A soul without a body has no sense organs and no brain; it does not receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and it does not ratiocinate. It is still in existence, however, and therefore, is ‘alive’.

Can you experience yourself without a body? How about thinking?

Let me answer your question with a question that I hope illuminates the issue for you:

Why should a soul depend on a body in order to receive sensory (name removed by moderator)ut?

(Because that is the role of the body; it performs certain functions which are suited to its nature. Among these are “sensory perception”.)

Aquinas gives a somewhat nuanced answer to this question, vis-a-vis memory. He looks at the “nobility” of soul and of body, based on the ‘ends’ these have, and distinguishing between these, he answers that what is appropriate to soul, belongs to soul (while, similarly, what is appropriate to body, belongs to body). So, those things which pertain to higher realities belong to ‘soul’, while things which do not, belong to ‘body’. Those which belong to ‘body’ are restored in the recreated body at the end of time (since bodies are recreated at the eschaton), while those which belong to ‘soul’ continue on in uninterrupted existence. (Moreover, in the supplement to the ST, there is the claim that new ‘memories’ are added in the recreated body – these are memories that once existed but were lost, as well as others that never existed previously in the person.)

So, now we get to the heart of the matter: does ‘memory’ belong solely to ‘body’, as you claim? No. There is memory that is proper to the soul, and is retained by the soul. (However, there is memory that proper to the body, and it is restored in the eschaton.)

Then why we forget that part of memory which is related to the soul either?

Fair enough.

So? What is your answer?

Physical, empirical evidence? That’s an unreasonable request: the soul is immaterial; by definition, there is no physical evidence of the soul.

This argument is philosophical and theological in nature. Therefore, it’s truth isn’t found by measurement of length, width, depth, or temporal extension. It stands or falls on logic.

So you are talking about an entity, soul, which can affect reality, cause something yet undetectable. We know that matter follows laws of nature so we can estimate how it moves. Soul has extra effect, it cause something, therefore it existence could be measured from the difference between what matter cause and how matter moves based on total case (cause of matter plus cause of soul).

Are you talking about the soul of a person who has died? We would hold that it continues to exist, uninterrupted, from the death of the body until the end of time.

Are you talking, on the other hand, about the soul of a person who is unconscious or physically impaired in some way? We would assert that the soul is not impaired, although the ability of the person (i.e., the body/soul composite) to act in ways that an unimpaired body acts reflects the physical impairment of the body.

Both. How can one be unconscious if body just play the role of sensory system?

Actions of the body/soul composite depend on both the body and the soul. The actions of the composite will reflect the impairment of its members.

Yes, but that might be because that soul is really play the passive role, namely experiencer.

Still good with my responses, thank you.

Ok.

Perhaps. Would you care to refine the terms you’re using, and the implications of the usage you’re utilizing?

Data=encoded information and experience=information.