Returning to an old argument

[R_Daneel]

Every time the “problem of evil” is considered, someone will come up with the “free will defense”. They say that “free will” makes “love” meaningful, and love is the highest good. They say that “free will” is so valuable that God “must” compromise, because the existence of “free will” leads logically and inevitably to the existence of some form of “moral evil”. Of course they are wrong. The existence of free will only leads to the possibility of moral evil, but does not lead to the actuality of it. I leave the nature of “morally evil” unspecified. You can use whatever definition you like. Free will is simply the concept that the agent is in charge, that the locus of decision is with the agent itself, and that the agent has the freedom to make a different decision if he/she so chooses (principle of alternate possibilities).

There are several ways to refute this defense. I could point out that “love” is used ambiguously, and that agape is not the same as eros (or philia or storge) and there is no need for volition when one considers agape. But I am not concerned about this line of argument in this thread. Let’s leave it alone.

The argument I am going to present will prove that it is possible to have a world with unbridled free will and no instance of moral evil.

Let’s contemplate a simple world. There is one moral agent in this world, and there is one morally significant decision to be made. Therefore, there are only two possible worlds that can be created by God:

1. world-A, in which the agent makes the morally right decision, and
2. world-B, in which the agent makes the morally incorrect decision. Before God commits to make the act of creation, he can “preview” these two possible worlds, and make a decision, which one to instantiate - if any. God’s foreknowledge has absolutely no impact on the freedom of the decision. God’s action of creation has no bearing on the freedom of the decision either. The agent does, what he does - and he freely chooses to make either the morally right decision (world-A) or the morally incorrect decision (world-B). It could be said, that God does not actually “create” the final outcome, that the agent is a “co-creator”. That distinction has no relevance - though it is certainly a strange way of viewing things. Such a view makes God’s creative act almost irrelevant, makes God a spectator of the events, instead of an actual creator. If God would “foresee” that the agent does not make the morally right decision, he can simply stop and refrain from making the creation at all.

Therefore, it is possible for God to make a hypothetical world, in which there is free will, and no morally wrong decisons. Therefore it is proven, that free will does not lead to the actuality of “moral evil”, though the potentiality is there.

This is it, folks. You cannot “hide” behind the “free will defense” any more.

Now, I am sure, that some of you will say that this world is very different from ours. Some of you might say that “maybe” God could create such a simple world without moral evil, but “maybe” God could not create a sufficiently complicated world, with billions of moral agents and innumerable morally charged decisions - and still ensure that all the decisions will be the “right” ones. I will return to this question later, and will prove that God can always instantiate the “right” world.

But the first point of this thread is the scenario presented. Can you bring up any argument against the proposed scenario?

 

[tonyrey]

1. If we are genuinely free we have the power to frustrate God’s Will.
2. Free will implies that we share God’s power.
3. It is presumptuous to claim to understand the nature of God’s power.
4. There is no reason to believe free will is predictable.
5. If free will were predictable all God’s activity would be predictable!

 

[JohnDamian]

Therefore, it is possible for God to make a hypothetical world, in which there is free will, and no morally wrong decisons. Therefore it is proven, that free will does not lead to the actuality of “moral evil”, though the potentiality is there.

This is it, folks. You cannot “hide” behind the “free will defense” any more.

If a potential cannot be actualised by its agent; through some compulsion or force; the potential is impinged; and illusiory. Ie-ergo; that removes free will.

 

[R_Daneel]

If a potential cannot be actualised by its agent; through some compulsion or force; the potential is impinged; and illusiory. Ie-ergo; that removes free will.

In my opinion, you are right. But there is a view that one can have free will without the ability to choose “otherwise”. See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_counterexamples . I don’t accept that argument, for reasons which are not important, since we agree that the PAP is relevant.

However, that does not apply to this case. If the agent wanted to, he could choose “otherwise”. There is no force or compulsion to prevent it. The only difference is that God would not actualize the world in that case. Don’t forget, up until the choice is made, there is one world, which God can actualize if he wants to. God can foresee how the agent will choose. It is stipulated that this “foreknowledge” has no impact on the freedom of agent. Therefore the choice is free, in every sense of the word. If the agent would choose morally, there is no problem. If the would choose immorally, God simply does not “set the ball rolling”.

So I would like to hear your assessment of this proposition: “God can create a world, with one free agent, who faces one moral dilemma, where the agent will freely choose the moral option”. That is the problem at hand.

 

[JohnDamian]

So I would like to hear your assessment of this proposition: “God can create a world, with one free agent, who faces one moral dilemma, where the agent will freely choose the moral option”. That is the problem at hand.

In that case; God would be deliberatly bringing about an event that will end in a particular way; by purposefully choosing to not make certain world actual; he in effect forces the will.

The important element of this is the specific choice to actualise this world; and not to actualise the others; by deliberating in this fashion; God brings about a world that is specifically predetermined to his end; wheras when he actualised the real world; the end is accidental to God’s end; for else a contradiction would be entertained (as contrary acts occur).

 

[R_Daneel]

In that case; God would be deliberatly bringing about an event that will end in a particular way; by purposefully choosing to not make certain world actual; he in effect forces the will.

I disagree with your conclusion (he in effect forces the will), and I agree with the prior part. Where is the “force” you speak of? The agent is free, he has the Locus of Decision. The agent could choose otherwise (PAP). There is absolutely no force here.

And a few more things. Your way of viewing “creation” cannot be reconciled with the idea that God is a purposeful being. If you deny God’s ability to create a specific world, and leave only God’s ability to create a generic world, then where is God’s omniscience and omnipotence? You deny that God can bring forth a world which he likes, you render God to an impotent “creator”, who definitely does not deserve the title of “creator”. Finally, you deny God’s free will. You deny the PAP for God, since you say that he cannot do “otherwise”.

 

[JohnDamian]

It is certainly no easy question to answer.

I disagree with your conclusion (he in effect forces the will), and I agree with the prior part. Where is the “force” you speak of? The agent is free, he has the Locus of Decision. The agent could choose otherwise (PAP). There is absolutely no force here.

Eliminating the possibility for other action is in essence; compelling it. The awareness of this compulsion to the agent is irrelevant; the agent might feel free;- but if God specifically only allows one act; and annihilates all other potentials; then the freedom is illusory. Note; that it is specifically the case that the annihilation of alternatives in effect is what constitutes an illusiory volition; and not the fact that the future would be determined;- it is possible that a future be determined and the will also freely chooses that future; but it is only contrary to sense that this is the case in the singular; if we allow a multiplicity of alternates; which are specifically and purposefully denied; we are left with only an illusion.

The distinction between God’s foreknowlege and will; and God’s foreknowlege and active selection and will is quite subtle; but clearly present.

And a few more things. Your way of viewing “creation” cannot be reconciled with the idea that God is a purposeful being. If you deny God’s ability to create a specific world, and leave only God’s ability to create a generic world, then where is God’s omniscience and omnipotence?

Well; God’s purpose is not contrary to God creating a world where agents act freely; without any active selection or determination on God’s behalf; at least in terms of an exersis of omnipotence;- as Job’s wife says; we are all free to “curse God and die”.

God’s purpose is that we freely emerge from the generic; and not that we only freely emerge from the generic; as this consequent is a product of a diminishment of volition to that specific; compelled by the potency of God electing only that which is conformative.

God’s omnipotence does not mean he can be evil; and activelly dispelling the possibility to turn away from God denies the whole premise of our freedom; God cannot commit an evil act – the best defence of this is in “De divina omnipotentia” by St. Peter Damian.

Finally, you deny God’s free will. You deny the PAP for God, since you say that he cannot do “otherwise”.

God does have free will; but he is also unable to do evil. And before you or others bring up biblical examples of “evil” it is clear that the agency of an infinite being is modally distinct for the persons who predicate univocally; and formally distinct for those who predicate analagorically, and really distinct for those who predicate plurivocally.

 

[danserr]

Every time the “problem of evil” is considered, someone will come up with the “free will defense”. They say that “free will” makes “love” meaningful, and love is the highest good. They say that “free will” is so valuable that God “must” compromise, because the existence of “free will” leads logically and inevitably to the existence of some form of “moral evil”. Of course they are wrong. The existence of free will only leads to the possibility of moral evil, but does not lead to the actuality of it. I leave the nature of “morally evil” unspecified. You can use whatever definition you like. Free will is simply the concept that the agent is in charge, that the locus of decision is with the agent itself, and that the agent has the freedom to make a different decision if he/she so chooses (principle of alternate possibilities).

There are several ways to refute this defense. I could point out that “love” is used ambiguously, and that agape is not the same as eros (or philia or storge) and there is no need for volition when one considers agape. But I am not concerned about this line of argument in this thread. Let’s leave it alone.

The argument I am going to present will prove that it is possible to have a world with unbridled free will and no instance of moral evil.

Let’s contemplate a simple world. There is one moral agent in this world, and there is one morally significant decision to be made. Therefore, there are only two possible worlds that can be created by God:

1. world-A, in which the agent makes the morally right decision, and
2. world-B, in which the agent makes the morally incorrect decision. Before God commits to make the act of creation, he can “preview” these two possible worlds, and make a decision, which one to instantiate - if any. God’s foreknowledge has absolutely no impact on the freedom of the decision. God’s action of creation has no bearing on the freedom of the decision either. The agent does, what he does - and he freely chooses to make either the morally right decision (world-A) or the morally incorrect decision (world-B). It could be said, that God does not actually “create” the final outcome, that the agent is a “co-creator”. That distinction has no relevance - though it is certainly a strange way of viewing things. Such a view makes God’s creative act almost irrelevant, makes God a spectator of the events, instead of an actual creator. If God would “foresee” that the agent does not make the morally right decision, he can simply stop and refrain from making the creation at all.

Therefore, it is possible for God to make a hypothetical world, in which there is free will, and no morally wrong decisons. Therefore it is proven, that free will does not lead to the actuality of “moral evil”, though the potentiality is there.

This is it, folks. You cannot “hide” behind the “free will defense” any more.

Now, I am sure, that some of you will say that this world is very different from ours. Some of you might say that “maybe” God could create such a simple world without moral evil, but “maybe” God could not create a sufficiently complicated world, with billions of moral agents and innumerable morally charged decisions - and still ensure that all the decisions will be the “right” ones. I will return to this question later, and will prove that God can always instantiate the “right” world.

But the first point of this thread is the scenario presented. Can you bring up any argument against the proposed scenario?

I hope you don’t mind a brief response, there may be several possible answers to this, but I will suggest one that I have heard. Such a world that you propose (a world where everyone always freely chooses the correct decision) may (or may not) be a “logically possible” world, but it may not be a “feasible” world. For instance such a world may have serious drawbacks, like having only a very small number of people, and so It might be preferable to create a world with a larger number of people though it their free will will allow for evil. The larger number of saved souls in the end might more than compensate for the existence of evil.

 

[R_Daneel]

Eliminating the possibility for other action is in essence; compelling it.

Again, I agree, but this is what does not happen in the scenario I presented. Let’s take it one step at a time.

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
4. God foresees the agent making the decision.
5. God actualizes the world.
6. The agent makes the decision.

Now, where is the freedom curtailed in this scenario? Nowhere. The agent cannot make both the right and the wrong decision. So one of them will go unactualized. That fact cannot take away the freedom. Which decision is made by the agent is not important. So God can actualize this state of affairs, regardless of the decision made by the agent - specifically, if the agent makes the right decision is just as possible as if the agent makes the wrong decision. Therefore God actualizing the world with the right decision is just as “possible” as God actualizing the world where the agent makes the wrong decision.

God does have free will; but he is also unable to do evil.

Evil does not even come into the picture. You say that God is “unable” to instantiate one specific world, and that means eliminating the freedom of God.

 

[R_Daneel]

I hope you don’t mind a brief response, there may be several possible answers to this, but I will suggest one that I have heard. Such a world that you propose (a world where everyone always freely chooses the correct decision) may (or may not) be a “logically possible” world, but it may not be a “feasible” world. For instance such a world may have serious drawbacks, like having only a very small number of people, and so It might be preferable to create a world with a larger number of people though it their free will will allow for evil. The larger number of saved souls in the end might more than compensate for the existence of evil.

Of course I don’t mind a brief response. But your objection is a bit premature. I started with a very simple scenario, but I do not plan to stop there. I simply do not want to “dump” too much information too soon. Most people are unequipped (mathematically) to handle the final argument without taking “baby steps”.

And, of course, to have a small number of “salvable” souls cannot be said to be “inferior” to a greater number of “salvable” souls. This is not a “number’s game”.

For the time being I am only concerned with the scenario presented. Is there any valid argument against the state of affairs, where God instantiates a simple world where there is only one free moral agent, facing one moral dilemma and where the agent makes the morally right decision?

 

[JohnDamian]

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
   4) God foresees the agent making the decision.
4. God actualizes the world.
5. The agent makes the decision.

If 4) causes 5) specifically as an efficient cause; then it would mean God was evil; God cannot allow the creation of someone to be contingent upon their future actions.

If God is to create someone; God must create (or not create) that person irrespective of that persons actions. To do otherwise is evil.

Evil does not even come into the picture. You say that God is “unable” to instantiate one specific world, and that means eliminating the freedom of God.

Well; God is able to instantiate more than one world were he to wish it; but he is not able to instantiate a world where which he has instantiated specifically because of the future actions of humanity; per se it is not the act itself; but the reasons behind it which make it impossible for God to do it.

Were God to instantiate a perfect world; it would be despite his will; not through it - because through creating a perfect world; his will would necessarily have to act contrary to his essence; which is impossible; if (and only if) this creation was through his will.

 

[JDaniel]

Again, I agree, but this is what does not happen in the scenario I presented. Let’s take it one step at a time.

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
4. God foresees the agent making the decision.
5. God actualizes the world.
6. The agent makes the decision.

RD: I cannot understand why some insist on calling it “god’s foreknowledge,” when in fact, such knowledge, for God, is primarily due to the correlative instantiation of the world simultaneously. All things are created during the same Eternal Now, for God. So, God sees the effects of the creation of man upon giving him Free Will immediately. In a Being that is infinite, what happens in God’s outer extremities, so to speak, happens at the same moment as what happens at His very core. (A bad analogy, but, you get the point.) Although, I understand your argument.

Now, where is the freedom curtailed in this scenario? Nowhere. The agent cannot make both the right and the wrong decision. So one of them will go unactualized. That fact cannot take away the freedom. Which decision is made by the agent is not important. So God can actualize this state of affairs, regardless of the decision made by the agent - specifically, if the agent makes the right decision is just as possible as if the agent makes the wrong decision. Therefore God actualizing the world with the right decision is just as “possible” as God actualizing the world where the agent makes the wrong decision.

And this is precisely what happened. Adam and eve made the right decisions as the Earth was instantiated. Then, subsequently (Adam’s “time”) the pair made bad decisions. Now, I cannot tell what is possible and what is not. Obviously, God’s Omnipotence sort of precludes God not being able to instantiate what ever world He wishes. But, we can’t know what considerations were at play there. As I said, our imperfections I’m sure played a part in what we got.

Evil does not even come into the picture. You say that God is “unable” to instantiate one specific world, and that means eliminating the freedom of God.

Like all predicates, there is a hierarchy for each which each belongs to and which causes the lower ones. IMHO, man’s imperfection, in this case, put the greatest evil at the top. It became the evil that defined all other evils. But, at that time, Adam and Eve did not understand that severity.

God bless,
jd

 

[danserr]

Of course I don’t mind a brief response. But your objection is a bit premature. I started with a very simple scenario, but I do not plan to stop there. I simply do not want to “dump” too much information too soon. Most people are unequipped (mathematically) to handle the final argument without taking “baby steps”.

And, of course, to have a small number of “salvable” souls cannot be said to be “inferior” to a greater number of “salvable” souls. This is not a “number’s game”.

For the time being I am only concerned with the scenario presented. Is there any valid argument against the state of affairs, where God instantiates a simple world where there is only one free moral agent, facing one moral dilemma and where the agent makes the morally right decision?

I disagree with your statement “of course, to have a small number… number’s game.” For your argument to be a compelling one, you would have to be able to show that your scenario is preferable to a world with more people but with evil. But you wanted to leave that alone for the moment, so we can think about that later.

In terms of if there is a problem with your scenario, I don’t endorse this, but here is a possibility. Your scenario rests on the view that God sees the future and possible futures. Open theists deny this to be the case. They say God does not know the future. (They reason the future does not exist, so obviously God can’t know it-he remains perfect). If God does not know the future, then your objection does not work. He simply knows that free will may allow the existence of evil.

I don’t endorse that view since I’m not an open theist, my objection to your problem is that the world you propose may be possible, but may not be feasible, but since you are asking if there is any logical problem with the scenario you propose, I mention this. If open theism were true, I think your scenario would not work.

 

[tonyrey]

I disagree with your statement “of course, to have a small number… number’s game.” For your argument to be a compelling one, you would have to be able to show that your scenario is preferable to a world with more people but with evil. But you wanted to leave that alone for the moment, so we can think about that later.

In terms of if there is a problem with your scenario, I don’t endorse this, but here is a possibility. Your scenario rests on the view that God sees the future and possible futures. Open theists deny this to be the case. They say God does not know the future. (They reason the future does not exist, so obviously God can’t know it-he remains perfect). If God does not know the future, then your objection does not work. He simply knows that free will may allow the existence of evil.

I don’t endorse that view since I’m not an open theist, my objection to your problem is that the world you propose may be possible, but may not be feasible, but since you are asking if there is any logical problem with the scenario you propose, I mention this. If open theism were true, I think your scenario would not work.

Thank you for confirming the implications of my argument in post #2. A formidable objection to the theory that free choices are predictable is that all God’s activity would be predictable in principle!
This seems an absurd constraint on divine creativity and originality…

 

[Luke_K]

Again, I agree, but this is what does not happen in the scenario I presented. Let’s take it one step at a time.

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
4. God foresees the agent making the decision.
5. God actualizes the world.
6. The agent makes the decision.

There is no potential for any action, good or bad, if the agent does not exist. What is there to foresee of a non-thing?

 

[Luke_K]

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
4. God foresees the agent making the decision.
5. God actualizes the world.
6. The agent makes the decision.

Only the agent can actualize the decision. If the agent does not exist, then there is nothing to foresee. God can’t foresee a future actuality that won’t be actual. It’s a contradiction.

Let me put it this way:

1. Free decisions are actualized by the agent.
2. The agent must exist in order to have the potential to actualize the decision.
3. Without existence, the agent has no potential to actualize the decision, and thus there is no potential for an evil decision.
4. Without the potential for an evil decision, there is no evil to foresee.

This seems like a “Why can’t God make a boulder so heavy he can’t lift it?” question.

 

[The_Exodus]

There are many things to say here. I will list them as succinctly as possible.

1. It may indeed be possible for God to create a world in which all creatures freely choose good over evil every choice; yet such a world may not be the best of all possible worlds because a) there are greater goods which can be had from a world with free evil, such as the courage of martyrs, and b) such a world would not display the divine nature most perfectly, since there would be no place for the infinite justice of God.
2. It is manifestly impossible for God to have created this world in which all its creatures always freely choose good. Such a world could possibly exist, but obviously none of us humans would exist in it, since we have all freely done evil. You may object and say that God could have created us free from sin in the first place, removed every inclination for evil, etc. Yet, such creatures would not be us. The law of identity shows that a thing is what it is so long as it has all its properties and none other. Yet these other “us-es” would have properties completely different from ourselves, and thus, in a strictly logical way of speaking, they could not actually *be *us.
3. Foreknowledge does not imply foreordination, unless God’s foreknowledge is based on his divine decree to create a given possible world, and this is the view Molinists take. Their view is that since God is omniscient, he knows, by his nature before any free choice on his part, all possible things. This includes all the choices any possible free agent could make in any given scenario. By the depth of his intellect, he has true knowledge of counter-factuals. If this happened, then free creature x would freely elicit act y. Such a type of knowledge, Molinists say, is “supercomprehensive.” That is, it is actually true of an actually free agent that it will do x. Because God’s nature infinitely surpasses any created nature, this knowledge is 100% without error, and yet the freedom of the creature is not impinged. How can God have this sort of knowledge? Molina himself says that since God is complete act, he knows, in knowing himself, everything that he is not - this includes any sort of conceivable potentiality. He knows an infinite amount of possible created things which he is not. In other words, God has a knowledge of an infinite number of things which may not ever come to be, though which, if he so willed them to come to be, would certainly exist just as he knew them. The important point stressed here by Molinists is that this knowledge is not based on a pre-determining decree of God’s which makes a given scenario the way it is. Hence Peter’s acceptance of Christ, while it could never happen without God’s grace, is not due to the fact that God decreed it. Rather, God decreed to bring such a world into existence in which he knew first that Peter would freely accept Christ. What follows from this is that in God’s mind there are an infinite amount of possible worlds. Many of them may contain entire creations existing and all of them freely free from sin. Many may contain entire creations freely rejecting God and deserving of eternal punishment. Yet this particular world, Molinists would say, is only different from all others in that it actually exists. It has not been however determined to be how it is. It simply is one possible world, which, in itself, could never be otherwise, or else it would be a different world. God then merely brings it about that this particular idea in his mind comes into being.
4. All this to say, I lean more toward traditional Thomism, which says that God’s foreknowledge is indeed based off his divine will to determine all things whatsoever, including the free assent of creatures to his grace, and allowing certain creatures to fall away, due to an impediment in themselves.

 

[R_Daneel]

If 4) causes 5) specifically as an efficient cause; then it would mean God was evil; God cannot allow the creation of someone to be contingent upon their future actions.

I did not say that 4) causes 5).

Were God to instantiate a perfect world; it would be despite his will; not through it - because through creating a perfect world; his will would necessarily have to act contrary to his essence; which is impossible; if (and only if) this creation was through his will.

How do you know that having a “perfect world” would be contrary to God’s will? After all the world was “supposed to be” perfect until the fall.

Previously you argued that an unrealized potential takes away the freedom to act otherwise. This is simply incorrect. Freedom logically and inevitably leads to the potential of either good or evil acts. But freedom does not lead logically and inevitably to the actuality of either good or evil acts. This is the basis of my argument. Do you agree with this?

 

[awatkins69]

Hi R_Daneel. I’d like to note that it seems, if I’m understanding correctly, that this argument is going to largely revolve around compatibilism vs. incompatibilism. This debate has been going on for a long time and there is certainly no conclusive agreement amongst philosophers. If that’s the case, I don’t think you’re going to prove anything conclusive at all.

Of course, I may be misunderstanding you.

 

[R_Daneel]

RD: I cannot understand why some insist on calling it “god’s foreknowledge,” when in fact, such knowledge, for God, is primarily due to the correlative instantiation of the world simultaneously. All things are created during the same Eternal Now, for God. So, God sees the effects of the creation of man upon giving him Free Will immediately. In a Being that is infinite, what happens in God’s outer extremities, so to speak, happens at the same moment as what happens at His very core. (A bad analogy, but, you get the point.) Although, I understand your argument.

That is fine. I do not argue for temporal precedence, only causative precedence. It is impossible to do away from temporal wording. The language does not have the possibility to express ourselves a-temporarily. We can just use temporal wording, and pretend that we did not.

And this is precisely what happened. Adam and eve made the right decisions as the Earth was instantiated. Then, subsequently (Adam’s “time”) the pair made bad decisions. Now, I cannot tell what is possible and what is not. Obviously, God’s Omnipotence sort of precludes God not being able to instantiate what ever world He wishes. But, we can’t know what considerations were at play there. As I said, our imperfections I’m sure played a part in what we got.

This is not the point I am trying to make. Omnipotence - as a word is problematic, most people prefer to use maxipotence. But whatever word we use, omnipotence is not supposed to be able to create logical impossibilities - on that we can agree. But logically possibility is a different matter.

If omnipotence (or maxipotence) is unable to create a logically possible state of affairs then it is next to meaningless. The point is that the proposed scenario: “one free moral agent confronted by one moral dilemma” is very simple. There is no logical impossibility involved. There is the agent, there is his dilemma, and he chooses one way or the other. If God can “foresee” (for lack of a better word) how the agent will choose, then he can “set the ball rolling”, or he can “stay his hand” (so to speak). Where is the problem here?