Returning to an old argument

[R_Daneel]

The problem is that you can’t even conceive of a way to torture a rock. Everything you do to a rock isn’t torture, even if you put the rock in the same situation you put a human being.

Right. And the reaon is: the rock has no nervous system. You cannot torture a rock or even a plant, even though the plant is alive. Now can we get to the point?

Not at all… masturbation doesn’t affect only the person that practices it, it affects all of humankind because that man/woman is part of humankind… that’s why it is immoral. A human doesn’t exist without the rest… and even more, a single human couldn’t exist at all. Humanity is expressed in 2 genders, male and female.

Nonsense, even by Catholic standards. When Adam was alone (according to the Catholic mythology) he was already a human.

But, more to the point: I was not speaking of “humans”. I was speaking about moral agents. Can we now dispense with the nonsense?

 

[R_Daneel]

Well, I guess I just fail to see the impact of proving such a point. Of course, free will does not logically and inevitably lead to the existence of evil, but it does lead logically and inevitably to it’s possibility.

At last! That is my point. The concept I am “attacking” is the Plantinga-type “defense”, which says that free will is the most important “thing” (since it leads to love), and that free will logically leads to the actuality (not just the potentiality) of evil. Since we seem to agree, I am glad.

God then must have chose to make a world in which evil existed from creature’s free will. What is the significance here?

Well, maybe we don’t agree. What do you mean: “must”? If free will does not lead logically to the actuality of evil, then there is a possible world, in which free will exists, but evil does not.

 

[Luke_K]

Fine. Now how can you say that someone who is not born YET, already exists? That is beyond me. But for the sake of this thread, I accept it.

Now, please apply this to the problem as delineated in the OP.

Your scenario is:
There is one moral agent in this world, and there is one morally significant decision to be made. Therefore, there are only two possible worlds that can be created by God:

1) world-A, in which the agent makes the morally right decision, and
2) world-B, in which the agent makes the morally incorrect decision.

Before God commits to make the act of creation, he can “preview” these two possible worlds, and make a decision, which one to instantiate - if any…If God would “foresee” that the agent does not make the morally right decision, he can simply stop and refrain from making the creation at all.

My rebuttal is that there is no decision to preview since there is no existent agent to make the decision possible in the first place. It all hinges on the idea that the decision is actualized by the agent, and no one else.

“How can you say that someone who is not born YET, already exists?”
I don’t understand what you mean here. I say that the agent’s life- past, present, future- is all immediately present to God, but only if God creates him. That is to say, only if he exists.

 

[The_Exodus]

At last! That is my point. The concept I am “attacking” is the Plantinga-type “defense”, which says that free will is the most important “thing” (since it leads to love), and that free will logically leads to the actuality (not just the potentiality) of evil. Since we seem to agree, I am glad.

I think Plantinga is far off in much of his views. His particular point here has never been espoused by traditional Thomists in the Catholic Church.

daneel:

Well, maybe we don’t agree. What do you mean: “must”? If free will does not lead logically to the actuality of evil, then there is a possible world, in which free will exists, but evil does not.

That was my initial point in my first post. Indeed, in heaven, there exists free will and no evil. Evil is not a necessary consequence of created beings; it is only a necessary possibility. But God chose to create a world in which evil occurs. How is he unjust in doing this? He is not the cause of evil, and, by allowing evil, he can bring forth a greater good; i.e. the crown of martyrs would be impossible if evil men did not persecute them. I addressed this more at length in my initial reponse. You are simply saying that, since God is able to create a world in which free beings never choose evil, he is therefore bound to. But why? You need to justify this claim. On the other hand, Thomism shows perfectly how God is just in allowing - not causing - evil to exist by saying a) he is not morally bound to prevent creatures from exercising their own evil choices; and b) by allowing evil to happen, he can draw forth greater good; and c) a universe in which evil exists shows forth more perfectly his divine character, since his justice shines forth as well as his mercy.

 

[R_Daneel]

My rebuttal is that there is no decision to preview since there is no existent agent to make the decision possible in the first place. It all hinges on the idea that the decision is actualized by the agent, and no one else.

I don’t think this is a traditional view, though I could be mistaken. We seem to agree that it would be nonsensical to say that God can “know” the contents of a book which was never written, since the author was never born. By the same token, it would be nonsensical to say that God can “know” the contents of a book, which will never be written, since the author will never be born. Now how can God “know” the contents of a book, which will be written if the author will be born? Sounds like the Molinist “middle knowledge” to me, and if I remember correctly, you do not subscribe to the Molinist view? Or am I mistaken here?

I don’t understand what you mean here. I say that the agent’s life- past, present, future- is all immediately present to God, but only if God creates him. That is to say, only if he exists.

That is a very problematic. To say that for one observer (us) the agent has not been born YET, but he already exists from the viewpoint of God (if he will actualize the agent) sounds like utter nonsense to me. To two different observers the same fact may look different, for sure. But to say that the fact is real for one (God), but not real for the other one (us) is a logically contradictory assertion, just like a “square circle” which “IS” a square from one observer’s point (God), but which “IS” circular from another observer’s point (us). For this reason I reject the so called “eternal now”.

And there is another reason, too. If God “created” the Universe, this was an “act” (maybe an act of will). But an act without a “before” and an “after” is an oxymoron. Therefore God cannot be completely “atemporal”. It is obvious that God is not restrained by the same kind of “time” that we experience. But God must reside in some realm, where there is a “God’s time”, and within that “God’s time”, there is a “God’s past”, a “God’s present” and a “God’s future”. Otherwise the whole concept os “creation” becomes a meaningless propostion, a complete oxymoron. And that oxymoron cannot be resolved by stipulating another meaningless proposition like “God eternally willed”…

 

[R_Daneel]

I think Plantinga is far off in much of his views. His particular point here has never been espoused by traditional Thomists in the Catholic Church.

Cool hand, Luke.

That was my initial point in my first post. Indeed, in heaven, there exists free will and no evil. Evil is not a necessary consequence of created beings; it is only a necessary possibility.

On this we agree. Most gratifying.

But God chose to create a world in which evil occurs. How is he unjust in doing this? He is not the cause of evil, and, by allowing evil, he can bring forth a greater good; i.e. the crown of martyrs would be impossible if evil men did not persecute them. I addressed this more at length in my initial reponse. You are simply saying that, since God is able to create a world in which free beings never choose evil, he is therefore bound to. But why? You need to justify this claim. On the other hand, Thomism shows perfectly how God is just in allowing - not causing - evil to exist by saying a) he is not morally bound to prevent creatures from exercising their own evil choices; and b) by allowing evil to happen, he can draw forth greater good; and c) a universe in which evil exists shows forth more perfectly his divine character, since his justice shines forth as well as his mercy.

This is a completely different discussion. If you are so inclined we can go there and analyze it. Maybe in a different thread, since I dedicated this one to problem where have an agreement. And I think it would not be a good idea to discuss this question here. The reason is that many people would jump in, and this thread would be hopelessly derailed. What say you?

 

[Luke_K]

I don’t think this is a traditional view, though I could be mistaken. We seem to agree that it would be nonsensical to say that God can “know” the contents of a book which was never written, since the author was never born. By the same token, it would be nonsensical to say that God can “know” the contents of a book, which will never be written, since the author will never be born. Now how can God “know” the contents of a book, which will be written if the author will be born? Sounds like the Molinist “middle knowledge” to me, and if I remember correctly, you do not subscribe to the Molinist view? Or am I mistaken here?

Well I had to read up about what Molinism is on Wikipedia and apparently I’m against it. I’m not focused so much on what God can and can’t know/conceive, since he must be able to conceive anything beyond our minds. What I’m concerned with is that God could not base his decisive non-creation of a world on the action of an agent that would require the world to exist in the first place.

As for the eternal action issue, I would say that we must view God more as the principle for the universe’s existence than a temporal cause. Without God, the universe cannot exist. Without the universe, God can exist. I’ll think about your second paragraph for a bit longer before I reply to it.

 

[Alindawyl]

There is no logical or theological problem with the statement that the existence of free will necessitates the potential of evil but does not necessitate the act of evil. As The Exodus already said, the beings in heaven possess free will and yet never exercise it to act in an evil manner.

The problem is going to come about when you attempt to apply that conclusion to a reality without evil acts, which only exists in the mind as pure potency, and claim that the fact that this reality of pure potency doesn’t have being (instead of the reality which actually does have being) somehow proves that there is no God or no free will.

Clearly you reject or at least give little regard to metaphysics. Clearly you also have a different concept of God than what the Church teaches. If you’re going to craft a logical statement with God in it to try and show that the teaching of the Church is incorrect, you should be talking about God in the same terms as the Church (omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, first cause, etc). Talking about God as existing in some sort of realm or experiencing time means that even if your argument is valid, it’s not sound because it is based on a premise of God which is different from what the Church teaches.

 

[JDaniel]

Every time the “problem of evil” is considered, someone will come up with the “free will defense”. They say that “free will” makes “love” meaningful, and love is the highest good. They say that “free will” is so valuable that God “must” compromise, because the existence of “free will” leads logically and inevitably to the existence of some form of “moral evil”. Of course they are wrong.

RD:

They’re not completely wrong. We believe God is Love. So you can see the dilemma.

God actually Loves us. We should respectfully return that divine act. IOW, we are to Love God in return. We are to Love god in return . . . not as mindless robots. But, as human beings with the full and absolute capability of telling Him, “No!”

Unless . . . unless God is a fool. I wouldn’t put up with us without that potentiality! But that’s just me.

The existence of free will only leads to the possibility of moral evil, but does not lead to the actuality of it.

As an exigency, that which is “truly possible” must be truly real. Unless, God is toying with us.

I leave the nature of “morally evil” unspecified. You can use whatever definition you like.

“Morally evil,” is self-definitional.

Free will is simply the concept that the agent is in charge, that the locus of decision is with the agent itself, and that the agent has the freedom to make a different decision if he/she so chooses (principle of alternate possibilities).

Correct.

There are several ways to refute this defense. I could point out that “love” is used ambiguously, and that agape is not the same as eros (or philia or storge) and there is no need for volition when one considers agape.

Except that Love, as used throughout the Scriptures is anything but ambiguous. It is also interesting that the Scriptures tell us that god Loves the sinner the most.

But I am not concerned about this line of argument in this thread. Let’s leave it alone.

Well, OK, then!

The argument I am going to present will prove that it is possible to have a world with unbridled free will and no instance of moral evil.

Let’s contemplate a simple world. There is one moral agent in this world, and there is one morally significant decision to be made. Therefore, there are only two possible worlds that can be created by God:

1. world-A, in which the agent makes the morally right decision, and
2. world-B, in which the agent makes the morally incorrect decision. Before God commits to make the act of creation, he can “preview” these two possible worlds, and make a decision, which one to instantiate - if any. God’s foreknowledge has absolutely no impact on the freedom of the decision. God’s action of creation has no bearing on the freedom of the decision either. The agent does, what he does - and he freely chooses to make either the morally right decision (world-A) or the morally incorrect decision (world-B). It could be said, that God does not actually “create” the final outcome, that the agent is a “co-creator”. That distinction has no relevance - though it is certainly a strange way of viewing things. Such a view makes God’s creative act almost irrelevant, makes God a spectator of the events, instead of an actual creator. If God would “foresee” that the agent does not make the morally right decision, he can simply stop and refrain from making the creation at all.

That is true. But, the Creation is God’s outpouring of the Love that He is.

Therefore, it is possible for God to make a hypothetical world, in which there is free will, and no morally wrong decisons.

Which was the way it was supposed to be. Except Adam and Eve erred.

Therefore it is proven, that free will does not lead to the actuality of “moral evil”, though the potentiality is there.

I am still having trouble with this. Maybe someone could address it.

This is it, folks. You cannot “hide” behind the “free will defense” any more.

Not decided just yet!

God bless,
jd

 

[awatkins69]

I have no problem with the classical theism at all. Certainly no “secular God”, for me. But I am interested in secular arguments concerning God. You see, if you wish to tell me what the classical theism says about God, that is fine. I appreciate your effort to show me how you think, and what the underpinning of your thoughts might be. Just don’t confuse it with an argument. I cannot accept something like: “since the Cathecism says ‘X’, therefore ‘X’…”. Does it make sense?

I understand that is not an argument lol. However, all I am saying is that people here are trying to eliminate the logical problem of the existence of evil with the existence of the classical God. If your conclusions disprove the Manichaean God or the Platonic God that’s going to be irrelevant. If your arguments do not prove a logical contradiction between the classical God and evil’s existence, then there is no longer a “problem of evil”, at least for us, and we can try and prove God’s existence without anyone going “well, don’t forget about evil!”

Ok. Evil is: “intentionally causing or allowing unnecessary harm to someone or something that has an ability to perceive that harm (not necessarily consciously)”. For example torturing an animal is considered evil, if done by a human, but not when it is done by another animal. This is why I don’t like to use the term “natual evil”, since there is no intent in an earthquake or a wildfire, or even when a cat “plays” with the mouse.

We’ll go with this for now, although I do find it somewhat hard to account for the normal semantic usage of the word “evil”. It seems that in both phrases they are used univocally. But we can just go with this.

I see the reason for the misunderstanding. Looks like I was not clear enough. I used the terms world-A and world-B somewhat ambiguously, which is my fault. Let’s break it down. There is the original world (“world-X”), up until the point of the decision. When the agent makes the morally right decision, we shall call the result world-A. Likewise when the agent makes the morally wrong decision, we shall call it world-B. Once the decision is made, the freedom to change it disappears. There are no more moral dilemmas. So the agent made the decison freely. Is this clear now?

Okay. So God brings about world-X if and only if world-A obtains? It seems to leave us with the same problem.

I think your objections are largely similar to those of a guy named JL Mackie (interesting metaphysician by the way). Take care.

 

[JDaniel]

Well I had to read up about what Molinism is on Wikipedia and apparently I’m against it. I’m not focused so much on what God can and can’t know/conceive, since he must be able to conceive anything beyond our minds. What I’m concerned with is that God could not base his decisive non-creation of a world on the action of an agent that would require the world to exist in the first place.

As for the eternal action issue, I would say that we must view God more as the principle for the universe’s existence than a temporal cause. Without God, the universe cannot exist. Without the universe, God can exist. I’ll think about your second paragraph for a bit longer before I reply to it.

Luke:

This argument was originally from RD to me, because I asked to see it. Nonetheless, RD is assuming that my take is correct, that since God is infinitely immense, all is happening simultaneously, at this moment of Creation. Therefore, God knows what will happen as the on-going Creation takes place, yet prior to any man’s knowledge. Consider that that is precisely what is happening as we speak. Consider also God’s immensity.

God bless,
jd

 

[Luke_K]

Luke:

This argument was originally from RD to me, because I asked to see it. Nonetheless, RD is assuming that my take is correct, that since God is infinitely immense, all is happening simultaneously, at this moment of Creation. Therefore, God knows what will happen as the on-going Creation takes place, yet prior to any man’s knowledge. Consider that that is precisely what is happening as we speak. Consider also God’s immensity.

God bless,
jd

I know what the idea is. R Daneel is rejecting it.

That is a very problematic. To say that for one observer (us) the agent has not been born YET, but he already exists from the viewpoint of God (if he will actualize the agent) sounds like utter nonsense to me. To two different observers the same fact may look different, for sure. But to say that the fact is real for one (God), but not real for the other one (us) is a logically contradictory assertion, just like a “square circle” which “IS” a square from one observer’s point (God), but which “IS” circular from another observer’s point (us). For this reason I reject the so called “eternal now”.

It’s not a contradictory assertion because the fact will become real for us when it is present to us. When that future birth of the agent becomes the present, it is known to us in immediacy. For God however, every moment IS present to him. In other words, the same fact is real for both observers when it is present to both of them. For God, this is always.

Here’s an analogy: A wall in a museum has several paintings hung on it. The human stands five feet from the wall and only has one painting in his field of vision at at time. God stands 30 feet away and has all the paintings in his field of vision at once. No matter what painting the human looks at, one at a time, God sees that painting as well as all the others.

 

[colmcille1]

Here’s an analogy: A wall in a museum has several paintings hung on it. The human stands five feet from the wall and only has one painting in his field of vision at at time. God stands 30 feet away and has all the paintings in his field of vision at once. No matter what painting the human looks at, one at a time, God sees that painting as well as all the others.

Hi Luke K,
As an artist, I like this analogy. Very good post, sir!
God Bless,
Colmcille.

 

[R_Daneel]

There is no logical or theological problem with the statement that the existence of free will necessitates the potential of evil but does not necessitate the act of evil. As The Exodus already said, the beings in heaven possess free will and yet never exercise it to act in an evil manner.

Yes, and I am happy to say that now we have two agreements.

The problem is going to come about when you attempt to apply that conclusion to a reality without evil acts, which only exists in the mind as pure potency, and claim that the fact that this reality of pure potency doesn’t have being (instead of the reality which actually does have being) somehow proves that there is no God or no free will.

As I said before, the scope of this thread is very narrow: to show that the so-called “free will defense” is incorrect. I am not trying to draw conclusions here. That should be reserved to a different thread.

Clearly you reject or at least give little regard to metaphysics. Clearly you also have a different concept of God than what the Church teaches. If you’re going to craft a logical statement with God in it to try and show that the teaching of the Church is incorrect, you should be talking about God in the same terms as the Church (omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, first cause, etc). Talking about God as existing in some sort of realm or experiencing time means that even if your argument is valid, it’s not sound because it is based on a premise of God which is different from what the Church teaches.

My arguments start from the official teachings, and examine its corollaries. And if the logical corollaries prove that the Church’s teaching is in error, then this does not make my conclusion “unsound”. The truth is that I was not interested in going into this venue. Words have meanings, and the word “action” logically and inevitably leads to a “before” and and an “after”. If you examine Genesis, it clearly talks about God acting on the first day, and then acting on the second day, etc… Even if these “days” are used metaphorically, and not literally, they certainly depict a sequence of actions. I have no idea when the alleged “timeless” existence of God was conceived, but whoever came up with it, really created an oxymoron and made a disservice to the Church. But again, this should be reserved to another thread. We are drifting from the topic, I don’t think it is a good idea.

 

[R_Daneel]

They’re not completely wrong. We believe God is Love. So you can see the dilemma.

God actually Loves us. We should respectfully return that divine act. IOW, we are to Love God in return. We are to Love god in return . . . not as mindless robots. But, as human beings with the full and absolute capability of telling Him, “No!”

I am not happy that we are drifting now into the meaning of “love” here. But maybe it is necessary. The problem is linguistical in nature. In the two sentences: “God loves us”, and “We love God” the word “love” means something totally different. God’s “love” is agape, not eros, or philia or storge. Our “love” for God is not and cannot be “agape”. It could be translated into “worship”, which is completely different. But I cannot see what does that have to do with the question at hand.

That is true. But, the Creation is God’s outpouring of the Love that He is.

I don’t see how does this answer the problem I presented.

 

[R_Daneel]

I understand that is not an argument lol. However, all I am saying is that people here are trying to eliminate the logical problem of the existence of evil with the existence of the classical God. If your conclusions disprove the Manichaean God or the Platonic God that’s going to be irrelevant. If your arguments do not prove a logical contradiction between the classical God and evil’s existence, then there is no longer a “problem of evil”, at least for us, and we can try and prove God’s existence without anyone going “well, don’t forget about evil!”

Again, I am not talking about the “problem of evil” - per se. Only about the so called “free will defense”.

We’ll go with this for now, although I do find it somewhat hard to account for the normal semantic usage of the word “evil”. It seems that in both phrases they are used univocally. But we can just go with this.

Sounds good to me.

Okay. So God brings about world-X if and only if world-A obtains? It seems to leave us with the same problem.

And what would that problem be?

 

[dskysmine]

Right. And the reaon is: the rock has no nervous system. You cannot torture a rock or even a plant, even though the plant is alive. Now can we get to the point?

That’s why I said that there is no “torture” in a bubble where there is only 1 moral agent.
You are making the hypothesis of a world without actual “free will”.

Nonsense, even by Catholic standards. When Adam was alone (according to the Catholic mythology) he was already a human.

But, more to the point: I was not speaking of “humans”. I was speaking about moral agents. Can we now dispense with the nonsense?

It’s not nonsense. It goes to the point you are making about morality.
How can we consider a bubble world with 1 moral choice where there is no morality?
This Universe has morality because we are in it… when there weren’t humans around do you think that there was morality? To consider a bubble world with 1 moral choice you have to:
1-define morality in that bubble world.
2-explain how that morality relates to the one we have in our world
3-explain how that possibility can and would be “better” than what we currently have

Without these 3 arguments the discussion is moot because your bubble world is just a chimera… something we can’t really discuss about.

Take care

 

[awatkins69]

And what would that problem be?

The problem would seem to be that our agent necessarily will choose the moral action. Thus, we’re lead into the compatibilist vs incompatibilist debate.

 

[R_Daneel]

It’s not a contradictory assertion because the fact will become real for us when it is present to us. When that future birth of the agent becomes the present, it is known to us in immediacy. For God however, every moment IS present to him. In other words, the same fact is real for both observers when it is present to both of them. For God, this is always.

Here’s an analogy: A wall in a museum has several paintings hung on it. The human stands five feet from the wall and only has one painting in his field of vision at at time. God stands 30 feet away and has all the paintings in his field of vision at once. No matter what painting the human looks at, one at a time, God sees that painting as well as all the others.

The analogy is nice, but does not solve the problem. The reason is simple: those pictures we “don’t see yet” will be painted by us. For simplicity’s sake let’s say that there is one paining out there, which we don’t see yet (which represents our future). It is contingent upon our action of painting it. So what does God see? We can paint many different things, depending on our free choices. But we can actually paint only one. Suppose God can see all the possible paintings we could paint - which is the middle knowledge. But there is one actual which will be painted. God would see all the possible ones, and the actual one, too. Moreover, God also knows which one is the actual one, and knows the others as “could have beens”. So far, so good. This is the traditional view, with a touch of Molinist flavor.

But there are two huge problems here. One is that the actual picture God sees is static! And in a static world there can be no free will. In a dynamic one, there can be, but not in a static one. Mind you it is NOT God’s knowledge which robs us our free will, it is the fact that the picture (our future) is already there, already static.

And the other problem is even worse. Since our free actions are what decide what that picture (our future) will be, it is our actions which determine God’s knowledge. And that is a very serious problem. If God’s knowledge is caused by our actions, then God’s knowledge is contingent, not absolute. And since God is “simple” (also a traditional view), then God is contingent. And that is a logical contradiction.

 

[R_Daneel]

That’s why I said that there is no “torture” in a bubble where there is only 1 moral agent.
You are making the hypothesis of a world without actual “free will”.

There still can be animals, which are not moral agents. And torturing them would still be immoral.

But if you are adamant, you can contemplate a slightly different (but not significantly different) scenario. There are as many moral agents in this simple world as you wish, but only ONE morally significant decision. Is it possible for God to create this world where the dilemma is solved in a moral fashion? You define “moral” as you wish.

3-explain how that possibility can and would be “better” than what we currently have

That is not part of the discussion. So far I am not interested in drawing conclusions. The only aim of this “game” is to show that free will does NOT logically lead to immoral (or evil) decisions. Nothing more, nothing less.