Returning to an old argument

[R_Daneel]

The problem would seem to be that our agent necessarily will choose the moral action. Thus, we’re lead into the compatibilist vs incompatibilist debate.

Why do you say that? The agent can choose either morally, or immorally - up until the point when the actual decision is made. Once the decision is made, it will result in making one of the possible world actualized. In each actual world any decision can be decided one way only. That does not rob us our free will. How could it? So there is no problem.

 

[dskysmine]

There still can be animals, which are not moral agents. And torturing them would still be immoral.

But if you are adamant, you can contemplate a slightly different (but not significantly different) scenario. There are as many moral agents in this simple world as you wish, but only ONE morally significant decision. Is it possible for God to create this world where the dilemma is solved in a moral fashion? You define “moral” as you wish.

That problem is the same as “our” world… the only real moral decision everyone takes (repeatedly, i guess) is “should I be moral?”…
You seem to think that God can create anything he “likes” because He is God. That isn’t really “true”. God is rational. If he weren’t we couldn’t understand him. The universe makes sense. It is rational. It is fairly stable… but it isn’t deterministic. A physical world without life would be pretty much deterministic… nothing could act independently of the preciding causes.
Can you picture a universe where gravity doesn’t exist?
If you can’t… how do you propose a bublle world where morality/free will is different from our own?
If you can… how does that bubble world can relate to our own?

That is not part of the discussion. So far I am not interested in drawing conclusions. The only aim of this “game” is to show that free will does NOT logically lead to immoral (or evil) decisions. Nothing more, nothing less.

Actually it is… it is exactly the conclusion that you want to get to: that your hypothesis is better and prove that the argument for free will isn’t tenable.
And, by the way, you still didn’t answer the 2 first points…

 

[Alindawyl]

My arguments start from the official teachings, and examine its corollaries. And if the logical corollaries prove that the Church’s teaching is in error, then this does not make my conclusion “unsound”. The truth is that I was not interested in going into this venue. Words have meanings, and the word “action” logically and inevitably leads to a “before” and and an “after”. If you examine Genesis, it clearly talks about God acting on the first day, and then acting on the second day, etc… Even if these “days” are used metaphorically, and not literally, they certainly depict a sequence of actions. I have no idea when the alleged “timeless” existence of God was conceived, but whoever came up with it, really created an oxymoron and made a disservice to the Church. But again, this should be reserved to another thread. We are drifting from the topic, I don’t think it is a good idea.

To say that the word action logically and inevitably leads to a before and after presupposes the existence of time. If God is the first cause, as the Church teaches, then we cannot presuppose the existence of time. It is necessary that time is an effect with something else as the cause for God to actually be the first cause. That’s why causality is best used to talk about such things instead of temporal terms. The creation stories in Genesis predate the development of the concept of causality, so it’s not surprising that temporal terms were used when that’s all they had available to describe such things.

But since you don’t really want to go there, feel free to ignore all that

Instead, let’s look at what you’re actually asking in your scenario. On the one hand you talk about an agent with free will, but on the other hand you talk about God “choosing” which world to bring from potency to act. So… which is it? Does your scenario have an agent who chooses how to exercise its will as it sees fit? Or does your scenario have an agent who is exercising its will according to what God has already predestined it to be? If God decides how the agent exercises its will by creating reality based on His knowledge of the two choices the agent can make, then all you’re really saying is that God can bring from potency to act a world in which no evil exists by deliberately choosing to bring from potency to act a world in which no evil exists. If the agent in your scenario possesses free will, then whatever reality God creates must by necessity not have even a single choice by a single agent predestined by God.

So God does not create either world in your scenario because both of them are based on a decision from the will of God rather than a decision from the will of the agent. God will create a third world, one in which the agent actually possesses free will, and let the agent make the choice without either option being predestined.

 

[R_Daneel]

To say that the word action logically and inevitably leads to a before and after presupposes the existence of time.

Not really, it is all interrelated. Time is the occurrance or measurement of a change. An action, which brings forth a change, also “creates” time. We could say that “action”, “change” and “time” (and this time may be completely different from our time) simply go hand in hand. If there is no “change”, there can be no time. If there is no “action” there can be no change. It all hangs together.

If God is the first cause, as the Church teaches, then we cannot presuppose the existence of time.

I don’t presuppose the existence of time. It is the logical corollary of the “action” of creation. First (and let this be causally and not temporally first) there was only God. Then God utters the words (or acts somehow, without resorting to speech) “let there be light”. And, voila, the Universe happens. So now we have God, and the Universe. Clearly a change. And that is what the Church teaches. You cannot deny the existence of the change. Time, as we speak of it, is the result of the change, which was the result of the action.

Instead, let’s look at what you’re actually asking in your scenario. On the one hand you talk about an agent with free will, but on the other hand you talk about God “choosing” which world to bring from potency to act. So… which is it?

Both. There is no contradiction here. Let’s play it out differently. Obviously, the agent has one choice with two outcomes. If he could act and make both selections there would be two resulting worlds (world-A and world-B). Reality would “fork” from one world into two worlds. Suppose God instantiates both worlds (like in the multiverse theory). Now, is there a “predestination” in either one of them? Clearly not. The two resulting worlds are completely independent. It would be illogical to say that in world-A God “forced” the good ourcome, and in world-B he “forced” the bad outcome. It was the agent, who made the choice, not God. The lack of force in both worlds is obvious, and does not depend on the instantiation of the “other” world. So, whether God instantiates both worlds, or only world-A or only world-B, it is the agent’s choice, which is the deciding factor.

 

[lemondiesel]

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the creation of a world - with one free moral agent, who faces one moral dilemma.
3. God can foresee the agent’s behavior until the dilemma occurs.
4. God foresees the agent making the decision.
5. God actualizes the world.
6. The agent makes the decision.

1. God has not created anything yet.
2. God contemplates the idea of creation, with free moral agent, who faces moral dimemmas.
3. God must “create” evil and good, therefore giving the creation the moral dilemmas.
4. God forsees the creation making immoral decisions.
5. God then actualizes the world.
6. God does this, because in order to be truly happy, one must have its ups and downs. This allows his creation to learn.
7. The creations learn from mistakes. God is happy.

 

[R_Daneel]

Just a short remark: I am off for a vacation tomorrow, so I will not be able to answer your posts immediately. But as soon as I return, I will come back to the thread, and reply. To be an old f*rt has its privileges.

 

[awatkins69]

Why do you say that? The agent can choose either morally, or immorally - up until the point when the actual decision is made. Once the decision is made, it will result in making one of the possible world actualized. In each actual world any decision can be decided one way only. That does not rob us our free will. How could it? So there is no problem.

I’m going to number my principles. Here’s the problem, since this is the way I think of free will:

(1) It is contradictory to say both that an agent (x) is *really *free, yet another agent , for every choice of x brings it about that x makes either a right choice or a wrong choice.

This seems a very plausible way to look at free will to me. You’d be hard pressed to find people who say this is not *at all *plausible. If you deny this principle, then you’re going to lead us into the never-ending incompatibilist vs compatibilist debate, which I won’t get into, but will only say that your argument is as certain as either side of that debate, i.e. not at all certain.

If you accept this, then let’s look at what it means to “bring something about,” as per the principle of double effect of Saint Thomas Aquinas (I am arguing for the Catholic God after all!). This seems to be a plausible way to look at “bringing something about”:

(2) An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.

So the problem is that in your scenario, given the definition proposed in (2), God brings it about that for every choice of x, x makes the right choice. This contradicts (1). So God cannot both make a *really *free agent, yet bring it about that they always make the right decision. Thus the argument turns to whether real freedom is a great enough good that God allow moral evil.

I’m not going to argue for these principles. All I will say is the following. The falsity of these principles is less certain to me than their veracity. Even if you choose not to accept these principles or the conclusions, you cannot say that this is off-the-walls lunacy. Thus the free will defense is at least acceptable, even if for some reason you don’t find it compelling.

 

[R_Daneel]

I’m going to number my principles. Here’s the problem, since this is the way I think of free will:

(1) It is contradictory to say both that an agent (x) is *really *free, yet another agent , for every choice of x brings it about that x makes either a right choice or a wrong choice.

What do you mean by: “really” free? No decision even happens in a vacuum. There are always some factors, which “influence” any decision. But as long it is the agent who makes the decision, and there are at least two options to choose from, we consider the decision “free”.

Here is an analogy of the problem:

A father habitually brings his child to one of two playgrounds, either A or B. On both playgrounds there are some monkey-bars and a sandbox. The fathers observes, that on playground-A the child goes to the monkey-bars, and plays there, while on playground-B the child goes to the sandbox to play. After many repetitions, the father “knows” where the child will play, depending on the playground. (This is the only part, where the analogy is “weak”, because the father needs the repetitive experiments, while God knows “up-front”, or a-priori by his omnipotence).

Now the question is: when the father makes a decision of choosing either playground-A or playground-B, does this decision “force” the child to decide where he will play (the monkey-bars or the sandbox)? Is the child’s decision free, or not? Obviously I think that the decison is free (it is the child who makes the decision, and there are two options to choose from). If you disagree, tell me, why do you consider it “forced”?

 

[awatkins69]

What do you mean by: “really” free? No decision even happens in a vacuum. There are always some factors, which “influence” any decision. But as long it is the agent who makes the decision, and there are at least two options to choose from, we consider the decision “free”.

Here is an analogy of the problem:

A father habitually brings his child to one of two playgrounds, either A or B. On both playgrounds there are some monkey-bars and a sandbox. The fathers observes, that on playground-A the child goes to the monkey-bars, and plays there, while on playground-B the child goes to the sandbox to play. After many repetitions, the father “knows” where the child will play, depending on the playground. (This is the only part, where the analogy is “weak”, because the father needs the repetitive experiments, while God knows “up-front”, or a-priori by his omnipotence).

Now the question is: when the father makes a decision of choosing either playground-A or playground-B, does this decision “force” the child to decide where he will play (the monkey-bars or the sandbox)? Is the child’s decision free, or not? Obviously I think that the decison is free (it is the child who makes the decision, and there are two options to choose from). If you disagree, tell me, why do you consider it “forced”?

Hi R_Daneel. I hope you had a good time.

Now, as for terminology, I suppose it would be better to use the word “significantly” rather than “really”. I agree that there is always some influence.

So I’d restate the principle like this:

(1) It is contradictory to say both that an agent (x) is significantly free, yet another agent , for every choice of x brings it about that x makes either a right choice or a wrong choice.

As for your analogy, I do not think it is a perfect analogy to the original one. In the original one, there is one world (world-x), where two worlds could possibly obtain (world-A or world-B). In your new analogy, there are two worlds (playground-A and playground-B) where one world could obtain each(playground-A to monkeybars & playground-B to sandbox).

Also, R_Daneel, you did not tell me whether you accepted my principles or not. Do you? Are they at all plausible? And don’t the necessary consequences follow? Best.

 

[awatkins69]

Let me add something as well. In your scenario, I don’t think the child is unfree. However, if the father, from the beginning of that child’s existence, went around, and controlled every scenario so that the child’s every decision would be exactly as the father wanted it to be, I would say the child was not actually free. I explain why. Again:

(1) If all of x’s actions are intentionally brought about by an agent, y, then none of x’s actions is free.
(2) An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.

This is all reasonable enough.

It’s also highly important that we continue to apply this to the real problem at hand, the question of moral evil and God, rather than get off-topic. So, again, if God brings about all of every person’s actions, then God appears to contradict principle (1).

 

[Alindawyl]

Both. There is no contradiction here. Let’s play it out differently. Obviously, the agent has one choice with two outcomes. If he could act and make both selections there would be two resulting worlds (world-A and world-B). Reality would “fork” from one world into two worlds. Suppose God instantiates both worlds (like in the multiverse theory). Now, is there a “predestination” in either one of them? Clearly not. The two resulting worlds are completely independent. It would be illogical to say that in world-A God “forced” the good ourcome, and in world-B he “forced” the bad outcome. It was the agent, who made the choice, not God. The lack of force in both worlds is obvious, and does not depend on the instantiation of the “other” world. So, whether God instantiates both worlds, or only world-A or only world-B, it is the agent’s choice, which is the deciding factor.

Yes, it is the agent’s choice which is the deciding factor… of which world God will decide to bring into being. And that decision from God is one you continually overlook. God deciding which world to create ahead of time based on the outcome of the agent’s decision is the DEFINITION of predestination.

 

[R_Daneel]

Thanks, friend, I did have a great time, though the weather was quite nasty for two days. The wine festival was wonderful, and we tasted quite a few great wines. But let’s go back to the topic.

Now, as for terminology, I suppose it would be better to use the word “significantly” rather than “really”. I agree that there is always some influence.

That is good. Let’s ponder this for a second. Every decision, be it morally important or not, is influenced by two things: the agent’s internal thougts, motivations and aims, and the external state of affairs, which allow some ways and means, and may render others impossible. Both of them exert influence on the decision making process. Some of these factors may strongly influence the decision making process, but as long as this strong influence does not determine the outcome of the decision, we speak of a “free decision”.

As for your analogy, I do not think it is a perfect analogy to the original one. In the original one, there is one world (world-x), where two worlds could possibly obtain (world-A or world-B). In your new analogy, there are two worlds (playground-A and playground-B) where one world could obtain each(playground-A to monkeybars & playground-B to sandbox).

Well, now this is interesting. In the example, it is the father, who makes the decision, which playground to visit, and yet, the child’s decision (which implement to play with) is freely made. You said: “I don’t think the child is unfree” (which is equivalent to “I think the child is free”). But you expessed some hesitation here. In what manner is he not “free”?

Let’s even say that the surroundings are not totally identical. Maybe there are some subtle differences in the “gadgets”. (Say, the monkey bars are a tad more challenging on playground-A, or the sand is a little bit cleaner in the other one.) None of these little differences compel, or force the child to choose as he does. If the monkey bars would be removed from playground-A (and replaced by a swing, for example), the child would choose the sand-box. And if the sand-box would be removed from playground-B, the child would choose the monkey-bars there.

So, I cannot see any “force” exerted on the child’s decision. It is as free as it gets. The father’s decision does not remove, does not even lessen the freedom of the child. And, let’s play on. Suppose the father wants the child to play on the monkey-bars. He can do this in two different ways: 1) bring the child to playground-B, and remove all the other implements, or 2) bring the child to playground-A. In the first instance, the child would be forced to act as the father wishes, since there are no alternate possibilities - and thus the child’s freedom is negated. If the father brings the child to plyaground-A, the child will freely choose as the father wishes (or wants).

Yes, it is the agent’s choice which is the deciding factor… of which world God will decide to bring into being. And that decision from God is one you continually overlook.

No, I don’t overlook that. The previous paragraphs show clearly that the there is no “force” involved. There is no “predestination”. The agent freely chooses as God wishes.

It’s also highly important that we continue to apply this to the real problem at hand, the question of moral evil and God, rather than get off-topic. So, again, if God brings about all of every person’s actions, then God appears to contradict principle (1).

First, the moral overtone of the dilemmas is irrelevant (in the greater scheme of things). The morally significant decisions are just a subset of all decisions. And God does not bring about the actions themselves, he just brings about the circumstances where the decisions can be made. And since those circumstances do not “force” the agent’s actions, the actions remain free of coercion. That is the fundamental difference.

To be explicit: your (2) criterion is correct, while your (1) criterion is off the mark.

 

[Alindawyl]

No, I don’t overlook that. The previous paragraphs show clearly that the there is no “force” involved. There is no “predestination”. The agent freely chooses as God wishes.

How can the agent have free will if the result of the choice is determined in advance by God? You are not talking about a choice merely known in advance by God and permitted to transpire in whatever way the agent sees fit. What you present is God actively deciding through His own actions which option of the agent’s choice will become reality.

You honestly don’t see the contradiction?

 

[awatkins69]

Well, now this is interesting. In the example, it is the father, who makes the decision, which playground to visit, and yet, the child’s decision (which implement to play with) is freely made. You said: “I don’t think the child is unfree” (which is equivalent to “I think the child is free”). But you expessed some hesitation here. In what manner is he not “free”?

Let’s even say that the surroundings are not totally identical. Maybe there are some subtle differences in the “gadgets”. (Say, the monkey bars are a tad more challenging on playground-A, or the sand is a little bit cleaner in the other one.) None of these little differences compel, or force the child to choose as he does. If the monkey bars would be removed from playground-A (and replaced by a swing, for example), the child would choose the sand-box. And if the sand-box would be removed from playground-B, the child would choose the monkey-bars there.

So, I cannot see any “force” exerted on the child’s decision. It is as free as it gets. The father’s decision does not remove, does not even lessen the freedom of the child. And, let’s play on. Suppose the father wants the child to play on the monkey-bars. He can do this in two different ways: 1) bring the child to playground-B, and remove all the other implements, or 2) bring the child to playground-A. In the first instance, the child would be forced to act as the father wishes, since there are no alternate possibilities - and thus the child’s freedom is negated. If the father brings the child to plyaground-A, the child will freely choose as the father wishes (or wants).

No, I don’t overlook that. The previous paragraphs show clearly that the there is no “force” involved. There is no “predestination”. The agent freely chooses as God wishes.

First, the moral overtone of the dilemmas is irrelevant (in the greater scheme of things). The morally significant decisions are just a subset of all decisions. And God does not bring about the actions themselves, he just brings about the circumstances where the decisions can be made. And since those circumstances do not “force” the agent’s actions, the actions remain free of coercion. That is the fundamental difference.

To be explicit: your (2) criterion is correct, while your (1) criterion is off the mark.

Hi R_Daneel. Glad to hear you had a good time. It may sound weird to you, but I actually like that sort of weather (unless it was hot)! Southern California has too much “perfect” weather.

Anyways, I know this will seem like a superficial reply, but I think you missed the main chunk of my argument. I don’t think the child was forced in that situation, nor did I ever say he was. I’ll re-copy that post, making a few little changes, and bold some subtle points that I think are most important to keep in mind:

"Let me add something as well. In your scenario, I don’t think the child is forced. However, if the father, from the beginning of that child’s existence, went around, and controlled every scenario so that the child’s every decision would be exactly as the father wanted it to be, I would say the child was not actually free. I would say he is being controlled. I explain why. Again:

(1) If all of x’s actions are intentionally brought about by an agent, y, then none of x’s actions is free.
(2) An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.

This is all reasonable enough.

It’s also highly important that we continue to apply this to the real problem at hand, the question of moral evil and God, rather than get off-topic. So, again, if God brings about each and every one of every person’s actions, then God appears to contradict principle (1)."

Again, if you want deny these principles, that’s all good. But they are at least plausible. Best.

 

[R_Daneel]

How can the agent have free will if the result of the choice is determined in advance by God? You are not talking about a choice merely known in advance by God and permitted to transpire in whatever way the agent sees fit. What you present is God actively deciding through His own actions which option of the agent’s choice will become reality.

You honestly don’t see the contradiction?

I don’t see any difference. The definition of free will rests on two legs: 1) the locus of decision is with the agent (which may be influenced but no determined by external circumstances) and 2) there are at least two possible options which the agent can execute to reach the desired result. Both of them are present, so we have significant free will. Maybe you wish to define free will in a different manner.

In the case presented the agent can only only create one continuation to the world by making a decision. God could do differently, he could make the world “fork” and instantiate both results. In one continuation (world-A) the agent makes the “good” decision, in the other one (world-B) the agent makes the “bad” decision. Would you now say, that God “actively decided” both results, since they both became reality, and thus the free will of the agent was “negated”?

 

[R_Daneel]

"Let me add something as well. In your scenario, I don’t think the child is forced. However, if the father, from the beginning of that child’s existence, went around, and controlled every scenario so that the child’s every decision would be exactly as the father wanted it to be, I would say the child was not actually free. I would say he is being controlled. I explain why. Again:

(1) If all of x’s actions are intentionally brought about by an agent, y, then none of x’s actions is free.
(2) An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.

This is all reasonable enough.

It’s also highly important that we continue to apply this to the real problem at hand, the question of moral evil and God, rather than get off-topic. So, again, if God brings about each and every one of every person’s actions, then God appears to contradict principle (1)."

Again, if you want deny these principles, that’s all good. But they are at least plausible. Best.

As I said, I agree with your stipulation number (2). It is number (1) which is problematic. First, in none of the examples did we talk about “all” the possible decisions. If we care about only the morally significant decisions, they are a miniscule minority among all the decisions one faces in a lifetime. But that is not the crux of the matter. Right now we just talk about one decision, and I promise you, that we shall get to the more complex problem later, with as many agents as you wish, and as many morally significant decisions as you wish.

For the time being we must concentrate on the “one decision” scenario, because that is the starting point. If we agree that God can bring forth, or instantiate or actualize a world, in which there is one morally significant decision to be made, and where the agent’s freedom is not curtailed and in which the agent chooses “rightly”, then and only then can we make the next step.

 

[awatkins69]

As I said, I agree with your stipulation number (2). It is number (1) which is problematic. First, in none of the examples did we talk about “all” the possible decisions. If we care about only the morally significant decisions, they are a miniscule minority among all the decisions one faces in a lifetime. But that is not the crux of the matter. Right now we just talk about one decision, and I promise you, that we shall get to the more complex problem later, with as many agents as you wish, and as many morally significant decisions as you wish.

For the time being we must concentrate on the “one decision” scenario, because that is the starting point. If we agree that God can bring forth, or instantiate or actualize a world, in which there is one morally significant decision to be made, and where the agent’s freedom is not curtailed and in which the agent chooses “rightly”, then and only then can we make the next step.

If in your original scenario, if that is the only decision ever made, then I would say that the agent was not free. If there are more decisions, then whether the agent is free is contingent upon whether or not all of his actions are brought about by another agent, according to the definition in (2). Best.

 

[R_Daneel]

If in your original scenario, if that is the only decision ever made, then I would say that the agent was not free.

It was the only morally significant decision. We do not care about the morally insignificant ones. But, let’s suppose that it was the one and only decision. Why do you think it was not “free”?

If there are more decisions, then whether the agent is free is contingent upon whether or not all of his actions are brought about by another agent, according to the definition in (2). Best.

None of his decisions are “made” by other agents.

 

[awatkins69]

It was the only morally significant decision. We do not care about the morally insignificant ones. But, let’s suppose that it was the one and only decision. Why do you think it was not “free”?

I’d say that he is not significantly free in this case. The reason is that it contradicts (1). Since we are only here talking about morally significant actions, we can say it as I said it earlier.

(1) It is contradictory to say both that an agent (x) is significantly free, yet another agent , for every choice of x brings it about that x makes either a right choice or a wrong choice.

Now, it’s necessary to understand what I mean by “significantly free”. An agent is significantly free if he ever performs a significantly free action. An action is performed significantly freely if, in the action, our agent is either freely refraining from doing something immoral or freely refraining from doing something moral.

None of his decisions are “made” by other agents.

This is why I highlighted (2). I know I keep repeating myself, but let’s take a look one more time. “An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.” If I know that putting my dog in my brother’s room will make him attack my brother, and I intentionally do so, I count as bringing this about, even though I’m not the direct efficient cause of the dog’s action.

 

[R_Daneel]

I’d say that he is not significantly free in this case. The reason is that it contradicts (1). Since we are only here talking about morally significant actions, we can say it as I said it earlier.

(1) It is contradictory to say both that an agent (x) is significantly free, yet another agent , for every choice of x brings it about that x makes either a right choice or a wrong choice.

Now, it’s necessary to understand what I mean by “significantly free”. An agent is significantly free if he ever performs a significantly free action. An action is performed significantly freely if, in the action, our agent is either freely refraining from doing something immoral or freely refraining from doing something moral.

And that is what is not happening here. The agent is free (not refrained) at all. He does as he does. Whether God intends it, or intends the opposite does not matter. As long as there is no “gun pointing at the agent’s head” (external force) or the agent is not “brainwashed” (internal compulsion), his freedom is intact.

This is why I highlighted (2). I know I keep repeating myself, but let’s take a look one more time. “An agent counts as bringing about a foreseen effect if and only if that agent intends that effect.” If I know that putting my dog in my brother’s room will make him attack my brother, and I intentionally do so, I count as bringing this about, even though I’m not the direct efficient cause of the dog’s action.

That is not a good example. The dog acts instinctively, and no volitional act is involved on the dog’s part.

This is how I read your argument: “If God intends that the agent acts in one specific way, then God actually robs the agent of his free will”. And I cannot accept this. It would lead to the idea that the agent is only free, if he acts against God’s intent, or, if God has no intent at all. But to say that God has no intent contradicts the idea that God is a purposeful being, who has intentions.