Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

Sin is ultimately knowingly and fully voluntarily choosing something that is essentially irrational to do for the alleged purpose chosen.

Assuming sin is irrational, I would probably agree.

Is it credible someone can see the situation and not believe they are involved? I don’t think so.

I think “seeing” a situation is a bit vague, but clearly someone in a position to act in a situation is involved.

But are they wholly free in any choices they make? I think not.

Agreed; the choices are limited by the situation.

Is it credible to say that the freedom involved in the act to save four is greater than the freedom in the act of killing the one. I think so.

I’m less convinced of this one; I imagine it depends on how you define “freedom”. I think you are free to choose: throw the switch, or don’t throw it, but it is that very freedom that brings responsibility with it. We are not responsible where we are not free.

No different than PODE like lethal self defence?

I think the situation is exactly like killing in self defense. We may not choose to kill in defending ourselves even if the act we choose to commit will inevitably lead to the attacker’s death. There is no justifiable way to claim we “chose” to kill him simply because his death was the inevitable result of our act. If this was not so there would be no way to justify such a killing given that we may not choose evil for any reason.

 

[Ender]

The proximate end(s) belongs to the act.

The proximate end belongs to the object of the act, but because it is an end it is also a choice.

The act is chosen, which means its ends are chosen. What ends (in terms of morality) are inherent to the act? Surely it is the saving of the 4, but why do you say it is not the death of the 1 innocent in no prior danger?

The intent of the act is to save the four, but I don’t believe that is the proximate end… Assume one of the PE’s was the death of the one. Does throwing the switch achieve that? No. The immediate consequence of the act is not the death of the one; it is the redirection of the trolley. Suppose someone else freed the person before the trolley got to him? Clearly in that case the consequence - which the proximate end was intended to produce - cannot be death because no one died. The trolley, however, is still on the other track, which is the immediate consequence the act was intended to produce. That is the proximate end.

Do you believe “immediate” has something to do with time?

I see “immediate” as the cause of the first in a series of consequences where the “intent” is the final intended consequence in that chain. If I light the fuse on a bomb what is my proximate end? It is to detonate the bomb. The reasons I have for blowing up something are either justifiable or not, but the proximate end every time a bomb’s fuse is lit is the same: to detonate the bomb.

 

[Ender]

But the intention or the purpose in dropping the atomic bomb on japan was to save lives and end the war, not to kill anyone.

I agree with you, but this line of thought will just take us off on a tangent. My original bombing situation referred to the raids on the Schweinfurt ball bearing plants, something I don’t believe anyone could reasonably condemn. Civilians were killed in those raids, and even though that was never intended it was also inevitable. I don’t see a reasonable distinction between dropping the bombs and throwing the switch.

 

[Ender]

It is a good act to save those millions. If there would be any other way to do it, it would be the one to choose. In this example the act is directed toward saving millions of people. The only available option is to kill the carrier of the virus.

I don’t deny the validity of your question, but I wish you would put it at least temporarily on hold - or start another thread. We already have one dilemma that we cannot resolve, adding a second one isn’t going to help.

 

[Scowler]

I don’t deny the validity of your question, but I wish you would put it at least temporarily on hold - or start another thread. We already have one dilemma that we cannot resolve, adding a second one isn’t going to help.

I agree, so I opened a new thread, under the title: “No runaway trolley this time”. See you there.

 

[BlackFriar]

Your quote doesnt actually say an act can only have one primary object.
It says an acts object has only one primary end.

In any case Aquinas contradicts neither statement.
The whole point of the praeter intention is that it preserves the intuited reality (that you seem able to accept while Rau does not) most of us accept that in PODE scenarios the evil is at some level knowingly chosen also.
Aquinas seems to accept this also. In other words this is what today is called “indirect intent”, a secondary intention.

Secondary doesnt mean primary.
All intentions have objects and therefore it also has an object and an end.
However it is not the primary object. It is a secondary (usually evil) object. It is not the object font…how can it be…if it were the evil would be fully and directly willed which is never morally good.
No, the object of the beside intent is to be found in the details of the event that lie outside those details that define the primary object. Hence the “beside object” is constituted by the “circumstances font”.

Also, for this intent to be “beside” and secondary it must in some way be vitiated in terms of “intent” itself. There must be an aspect of less than full knowledge or less than full voluntariness in its nature. Uncertainty of outcome is one way in which full knowledge may be lacking even though we generally can know evil consequences all the same. Aquinas’s self defence argument may rest on the presence of risk rather than certainty in dealing a blow that could be lethal. Lack of choice may also perhaps identify an indirect intention.

Hence in the trolley case at least one person will die either way…so making the primary choice that 4 extra may live is a fully free good intent while there is less personal freedom in the knowing choice to kill the one.
Therefore choosing to kill the one, while evil choosing, is not the primary intent. It is not the “intent font” of the moral act. It is indirect intent only and, in proportional good evil cases cannot make the overall intent bad.

I would be very surprised if a Google search on Aquinas and PODE or indirect intention does not deliver you a slew of fertile reading results.
He founded the principle afterall. Though he never used the modern “means” criterion bandied about today.

 

[o_mlly]

I have several times asked you to define the object of this act.

C’mon, man! Clearly, Mrs. Ender now has our utmost sympathy.

Think of the dilemma this way. How many deaths does throwing the switch prevent?

 

[Ender]

Your quote doesn’t actually say an act can only have one primary object.

The quote goes to the general point which seems apparent: only one thing can be primary.

The whole point of the praeter intention is that it preserves the intuited reality (that you seem able to accept while Rau does not) most of us accept that in PODE scenarios the evil is at some level knowingly chosen also.

I think our terms are not being carefully used (or perhaps clearly understood). I agree that in a PODE scenario the actor accepts the bad outcome, but I deny that he chooses it. You can argue that in choosing to commit an act I have chosen all the consequences I foresee.

I can only object that if this was true, and I have chosen the evil effect, then I have sinned because I am never allowed to choose to do evil. The problem is that if I choose not to act I have also “chosen” to let four people die, which is also evil. That is, I sin no matter which choice I make, and such a scenario is not possible. Furthermore, given that the church accepts valid PODE scenarios (where by definition one consequence is evil) she cannot also accept that this effect has been chosen in any morally applicable way.

All intentions have objects and therefore it also has an object and an end.

All actions have objects, and intentions. Objects are proximate ends, and an end is a choice, but the intention of the object is very different than the intention of the act.

Also, for this intent to be “beside” and secondary it must in some way be vitiated in terms of “intent” itself. There must be an aspect of less than full knowledge or less than full voluntariness in its nature.

Since the evil consequence is not voluntary, even though it is inevitable, it isn’t clear how we can be morally responsible for it.

Therefore choosing to kill the one, while evil choosing, is not the primary intent. It is not the “intent font” of the moral act. It is indirect intent only and, in proportional good evil cases cannot make the overall intent bad.

Well, we have taken different (and still disputed) paths, but we have arrived at the same conclusion.

 

[Ender]

Think of the dilemma this way. How many deaths does throwing the switch prevent?

No, this will not do; it is another evasion. I have defined the object (the proximate intent) of the act of throwing the switch as “to redirect the trolley away from the five people tied to the track.”

I have yet to see anyone attempt to define the object, so while my definition may or may not be too loose, no one has directly contested it by offering an alternative.

 

[AlNg]

Therefore choosing to kill the one, while evil choosing, is not the primary intent. It is not the “intent font” of the moral act. It is indirect intent only and, in proportional good evil cases cannot make the overall intent bad.

I don’t see why this line of argument would not work for dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. The primary intent was to save lives and end the war, not to kill civilians. Yet we have Roman Catholic bishops who say that it was wrong.

 

[Rau]

I have yet to see anyone attempt to define the object,

Are you overlooking those answers not in accord with your own?

Your object is not an object until you express the end in terms of morality.

 

[BlackFriar]

I agree that in a PODE scenario the actor accepts the bad outcome, but I deny that he chooses it. You can argue that in choosing to commit an act I have chosen all the consequences I foresee.

The issue is whether there can be degrees of intent that bind the actor to the object. Is it a link of iron (ie it is either present or not present) or is it one of rubber (admitting degrees).
Aquinas’s amalysis is clearly assuming that the “beside intent” has an attenuated linkage to its object compared to that of the primary intent.
As the moral culpability for an act is wholly determined by the strength of this linkage then we must accept that one can indirectly choose evil objects without culpability if other aspects of the event are in accord with usual PODE criteria.

So “choosing” can refer to a variety of degrees of intent and to that extent little or no culpability re evil choices. The objective evil/disorder of the “beside object” remains. But due to the weak intent linkage the choice is not a moral evil/disorder that contaminates me personally.

You can argue that in choosing to commit an act I have chosen all the consequences I foresee.

It is technically incorrect to say that “indirectly intended” objects are “committed”.
In Catholic Moral Theology the verb “committed” means a choice of an object that is direct - ie fully free and fully understood. Indirect objects are truly chosen, but if indirect not “committed” because by definition they are not totally free/knowing choices. Such attenuated choices are still choices. In moral theology there are a variety of graded verbs used to instantiate the genus “choice”.

I agree that in a PODE scenario the actor accepts the bad outcome, but I deny that he chooses it.

OK, then you do not accept Aquinas’s analysis/hypothesis of the “beside intent”.

You can argue that in choosing to commit an act I have chosen all the consequences I foresee.

Yes that is what a “committed” choice means.
But a “beside intent” is not a “committed” choice, it is a weak/attenuated choice in some way.

CONTINUED…

 

[BlackFriar]

…CONTINUED FROM ABOVE

[If] I have chosen the evil effect, then I have sinned because I am never allowed to choose to do evil.

Yes we are, so long as it is an indirect intent, a weak intent, a subordinated intent. I personally tire of Catholic analyses that pretend a surgeon does not choose to kill the embryo embedded in the 1cm tube I just excised from my patient or tens of thousands of non-combatants in Nagasaki. From previous discussions I thought you were of the same mind (you once gave an example of a nest/bird in a tree I saw).
These choices are genuine but weak choices to me. They are not fully free and they are subordinated to an overriding and proportionally greater good and the connection between the two is often arms length which makes it easier to pretend it is not an intent at all…but to me this is often less than convincing. Its a weak intent to do evil.

Yes the object is objectively evil - but if the intent is weak then the doing is not grave moral evil…and coupled with the primarily intended greater good the moral evil, if any, is obviously able to be neutralised and the whole act considered good.

The problem is that if I choose not to act I have also “chosen” to let four people die, which is also evil.

Yes I agree. I do not consider a decision not to execute a physical behaviour means it cannot be a moral act like any positive behaviour. Moral acts are of the will not the body.

A decision not to act can be as primary and immoral as any decision to do something.
If I believed saving the four was the better choice then according to the objects perceived by me I would be bound to throw the switch and to not do so would be objectively immoral for me.
But of course the real world is not like that. Most of us would be very confused as to what the objectively right thing was and in such situations most of us freeze and let nature take its course without intervening.
If I knew I should have thrown the switch then I mentally engaged in an objectively disordered act (by not physically acting) yet I was not culpable due to lack of freedom to execute the physical behaviour required of my arm.

Obviously an understanding of the different faculties of human nature involved (and the different decisions of the different faculties) need to be teased out here. There is the will (the seat of morality and culpability) and there are other executive bodily faculties involved also.

That is, I sin no matter which choice I make

That is a false moral principle. There can be no moral scenario where all possible choices are personally and culpably sinful. There may be a situation where all choices (including doing nothing) result in grave objective evil outcomes but if one is not free then one is not free and so at least one of them must be potentially capable of a fully committed choice that is not personally culpable and is perceived (at least subjectively) as objectively good.

 

[Rau]

If I light the fuse on a bomb what is my proximate end? It is to detonate the bomb. The reasons I have for blowing up something are either justifiable or not, but the proximate end every time a bomb’s fuse is lit is the same: to detonate the bomb.

This has no relevance to the moral object of a human act. The moral object is an end in terms of morality.

 

[o_mlly]

No, this will not do; it is another evasion. I have defined the object (the proximate intent) of the act of throwing the switch as “to redirect the trolley away from the five people tied to the track.”

I have yet to see anyone attempt to define the object, so while my definition may or may not be too loose, no one has directly contested it by offering an alternative.

Another evasion? I have not evaded your or other’s questions – “What about a bomber?”, “What about abortion?”. Rather, it is you who evade mine – “Did you pull the trigger?”.

It’s insincere to dismiss posts which cite alternative objects and then claim you have not seen them. As I recall, you evaded my post citing alternative objects with a quibble. Indulging the quibble, I re-posted the following.

The act has two proximate ends – kills 1 innocent and saves 4 innocents.

The non-act also has two proximate ends – allows 4 innocents to die by another’s hand and saves 1 innocent from death at your hand.

Is permitting an evil morally equivalent to committing an evil? I think not. Permitting an evil to avoid committing an evil (c.p.) prevents an eternal evil – the damnation of one’s soul – and outweighs any temporal evil, even if that evil is the massacre of an entire nation.

Please spend more time on ingesting/digesting the teaching. The confusion your posts seem to portray is in the definition of terms and misapplication of the fonts.

I have defined the object (the proximate intent) …

 

[Elf01]

Am I correct in assuming that the reason the bomber is moral in your view is because there are unjust aggressors involved and operating on the mother is moral because the baby would die anyway?

 

[o_mlly]

Think of the dilemma this way. How many deaths does throwing the switch prevent?

No, this will not do; it is another evasion.

Very clever. Another evasion claiming an evasion.

The answer to the question is 0. The act does not prevent any deaths. What the act does is put one soul into the breach for eternal damnation.

 

[o_mlly]

Am I correct in assuming that the reason the bomber is moral in your view is because there are unjust aggressors involved and operating on the mother is moral because the baby would die anyway?

Absent a just war, the bomber may not bomb.

Absent an expectation that without surgery the mother will die, the surgeon may not operate. Given this expectation, the moral surgical remedies are further limited so as to not directly cause the child’s death.

I believe that for most, if not all, tubal pregnancies the prognosis is, untreated, if miscarriage does not occur spontaneously that both mother and child will die.

 

[Ender]

Are you overlooking those answers not in accord with your own?

Your object is not an object until you express the end in terms of morality

Which definitions do you refer to? Where is yours? Fine: the object (proximate end) of the act of throwing the switch is to redirect the trolley away from the group of people tied to the track. The intent is to save their lives. The consequences are that the group lives and the one dies. The intent is morally good. Redirecting the trolley is morally neutral. The consequences are both good and bad, but the good outweighs the bad. This is a case of PODE.

Now, you try it.

 

[Ender]

This has no relevance to the moral object of a human act. The moral object is an end in terms of morality.

An act has three components: an intent, an object, and the consequences, all of which may be morally judged. I believe that any of them can be morally neutral, but if you believe they must be good or bad then (by my criterion) you have lumped the neutral acts/components along with the good.

I don’t know what this means: “The moral object is an end in terms of morality.” I throw a light switch. That is a human act. The intent is to provide light so I can read, the proximate end is to turn the light on, the consequence is that the light shorts out and burns down my house.

How do you judge the morality of the object in this case?