Runaway trolley problem

[o_mlly]

I asked about the objects of the two acts; your response is about the consequences of the acts.

Isn’t that a bit of a quibble? Then, call the objects I listed as proximate ends (using JPII’s adjective).

Beyond that, an end relates to an intent, an objective, and it is not true that the person throwing the switch intends both consequences even thought they are both inevitable.

I still believe you invert the relationships between object and intent. The object lists all proximate ends. The intent specifies the end(s) in view of a particular actor. For instance, if the one tied to the tracks is specified as “Fred” then a proximate end to throwing the switch changes to: “kills one innocent person named Fred.” If the actor’s intention is to kill Fred, his arch-enemy, then the act is immoral in its intention.

Please respond then to the edited post’s main questions: Are acting and not acting morally equivalent?:

The act has two proximate ends – kills 1 innocent and saves 4 innocents.

The non-act also has two proximate ends – allows 4 innocents to die by another’s hand and saves 1 innocent from death at your hand.

Is permitting an evil morally equivalent to committing an evil? I think not. Permitting an evil to avoid committing an evil (c.p.) prevents an eternal evil – the damnation of one’s soul – and outweighs any temporal evil, even if that evil is the massacre of an entire nation.

 

[JustLamb]

Good grief. The answer is simple.

To the individual:

“Mate!. It’s your life or theirs. Need an answer now!.”

Good answer. Why should a third party make a decision on the life of another? Ask the other. If you can see them they can hear you.

 

[o_mlly]

Good answer. Why should a third party make a decision on the life of another? Ask the other. If you can see them they can hear you.

An avoidance of the dilemma. Make the one tied on tracks a 2 month old infant.

 

[Ender]

Isn’t that a bit of a quibble?

It isn’t a quibble to ask about the object, and then object that your response is about the consequences.

I still believe you invert the relationships between object and intent. The object lists all proximate ends.

It isn’t clear how one object can be multiple proximate ends.

The intent specifies the end(s) in view of a particular actor. For instance, if the one tied to the tracks is specified as “Fred” then a proximate end to throwing the switch changes to: “kills one innocent person named Fred.”

The intent is to kill Fred, but the proximate end, which will admittedly lead to his death, is different. It is to redirect the trolley at Fred. That is the object of throwing the switch.

Please respond then to the edited post’s main questions: Are acting and not acting morally equivalent?

This is a different question, and is going to lead us in another (tangential) direction. I haven’t thought this through, but I am inclined to believe the person who sits on his hands and allows five people to die because of his inaction is as guilty as the person who sits on his hands at poolside and allows a toddler to drown, also because of his inaction.

The non-act also has two proximate ends – allows 4 innocents to die by another’s hand and saves 1 innocent from death at your hand.

Again you equate the object (proximate end) with the consequences. Are you saying the object of sitting still is to let four people die? I think a better understanding of the (proximate end of the) inaction would be “to not get involved”. Even “to not commit a sin” could be a valid description of the object of inaction, but in no case is it “to allow people to die.”

Is permitting an evil morally equivalent to committing an evil? I think not.

I’m not sure, but this begs the question of whether throwing the switch is an evil act. That’s what we’ve been discussing. This is an entirely different question.

 

[o_mlly]

I’m not sure, but this begs the question of whether throwing the switch is an evil act. …

This observation would take us back to square one. “Throwing the switch” is insufficient as a description of a human act; a chimp could do the same.

I can only hope that you do not frequent train stations too often.

 

[Scowler]

Is permitting an evil morally equivalent to committing an evil? I think not.

This is the critical point. There is no difference at all. If one is in the position to interfere and thus prevent an evil act (without exposing himself to any danger), and fails to do so, that agent is precisely as guilty as one who actually commits it - all other things beings equal. Of course it is obvious that you will never agree to this. The reason is simple: if you did you would have to admit that God is evil for allowing all the evils of the world. And that is the absolute no-no for believers, to criticize God.

 

[BlackFriar]

Please respond then to the edited post’s main questions: Are acting and not acting morally equivalent?:

I would say deciding not to physically act is as much a moral act as any intended physical act.

Moral acts reside in the will - as acts of the faculty of will.
They need not have physical indicators which come from subordinated acts of the bodily executive faculties which impliment decisions of the will.

 

[BlackFriar]

This act does not have two proximate ends since the end includes an intent, which is to direct the trolley away from the five. The act has two consequences but only one object.

Of course it can have two objects and two ends.
Aquinas clearly says so many times when he speaks of the “beside intent”.
That sounds like two intents and therefore two objects in the one composite act to me.

Why doesnt it to you?

 

[BlackFriar]

JustLamb:

Good answer. Why should a third party make a decision on the life of another? Ask the other. If you can see them they can hear you.

An avoidance of the dilemma. Make the one tied on tracks a 2 month old infant.

Can each tied party be considered an agressor to the other party.

A 3 year old suicide bomber walking to checkpoint Charile is not really an innocent innocent.

 

[o_mlly]

This is the critical point. There is no difference at all. If one is in the position to interfere and thus prevent an evil act (without exposing himself to any danger), and fails to do so, that agent is precisely as guilty as one who actually commits it - all other things beings equal.

How about exposing another to danger? The trolley exercise considers an act which does not merely save the four but also kills another.

CCC #1753 … Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

If we may not kill another to save a nation then we certainly may not kill another to save four.

Of course it is obvious that you will never agree to this. The reason is simple: if you did you would have to admit that God is evil for allowing all the evils of the world. And that is the absolute no-no for believers, to criticize God.

No, I do not believe so. Recall, I argue for no action – the bystander may not throw the switch.

 

[BlackFriar]

I think a better understanding of the (proximate end of the) inaction would be “to not get involved”. Even “to not commit a sin” could be a valid description of the object of inaction, but in no case is it “to allow people to die.”

Lets try a zoom out. I think the whole point of the three font model is to answer the following question.

Is the reasonably objectively discerned intrinsic ordering of the behaviour chosen by the actor credibly consonant with the rationale alleged by the actor for choosing that behaviour?

Is it credible that a shepherd use a very sharp spear as a crook for his sheep or a car to get from Britain to France before the chunnel.

Sin is ultimately knowingly and fully voluntarily choosing something that is essentially irrational to do for the alleged purpose chosen. For the only reason such a person would do such a thing can be out of weakness, ignorance or malice as Aquinas states.

Is it credible someone can see the situation and not believe they are involved? I dont think so.
But are they wholly free in any choices they make? I think not. They are not free to save all, but they are free to save some.

Is it credible to say that the freedom involved in the act to save four is greater than the freedom in the act of killing the one. I think so.
Therefore there is more unfreedom in the act of killing the one that is intrinsically linked to the wholly free act of saving the five.

A bad intent that is not wholly free compared to the linked good intent that is wholly free (and a greater proportional good) sounds like an indirect bad intent to me.

No different than PODE like lethal self defence?

 

[Rau]

So yes, the object is the immediate end the actor has chosen, and choice involves intent.

The proximate end(s) belongs to the act. The act is chosen, which means its ends are chosen. What ends (in terms of morality) are inherent to the act? Surely it is the saving of the 4, but why do you say it is not the death of the 1 innocent in no prior danger? Is it because of a short time lag? Because safety of the 4 is achieved prior to death of the 1? Does time delay matter? Do you believe “immediate” has something to do with time?

 

[Scowler]

How about exposing another to danger? The trolley exercise considers an act which does not merely save the four but also kills another.

You asked a generic question about the difference between committing an act vs. allowing one - and that is what I answered. There is no difference. In the trolley case both the action and the inaction lead to death to some people. In other words, you are between a rock a hard place - due to no fault of your own. If both of your options will cause harm to others, then the only rational solution is to cause as little harm as possible - all other things being equal.

If we may not kill another to save a nation then we certainly may not kill another to save four.

I don’t accept irrational arguments, no matter where they come from.

There are many forms of these dilemmas. Here is one:

Suppose there is someone who carries a deadly virus. If you allow that person to mingle with others, a huge epidemic will break out; killing millions. Your only option to prevent this epidemic is to kill the carrier of the virus. According to the catechism it is impermissible to kill the carrier of the virus. Instead you are supposed to allow the person to cause the epidemic, which will kill millions of innocent people. Sorry, there is no rational argument you (or anyone else) could bring up for this approach.

Of course there is a good, Catholic argument to take this approach. Do what you have to do and then go to a confession and ask for forgiveness. Since your act is not a blasphemy, you will be given absolution. Easy as a breeze.

 

[Elf01]

Of course there is a good, Catholic argument to take this approach. Do what you have to do and then go to a confession and ask for forgiveness. Since your act is not a blasphemy, you will be given absolution. Easy as a breeze.

No. Not that easy. That would be the sin of presumption and you have to repent to be forgiven.

 

[Rau]

Suppose there is someone who carries a deadly virus. If you allow that person to mingle with others, a huge epidemic will break out; killing millions. Your only option to prevent this epidemic is to kill the carrier of the virus.

I believe we have discussed this before. Confinement is the appropriate course of action. And if that is resisted, force may be used to comply since the carrier now directly threatens.

 

[Rau]

You asked a generic question about the difference between committing an act vs. allowing one - and that is what I answered. There is no difference. In the trolley case both the action and the inaction lead to death to some people. In other words, you are between a rock a hard place - due to no fault of your own. If both of your options will cause harm to others, then the only rational solution is to cause as little harm as possible - all other things being equal.

There are systems of ethics under which that is the case. But Catholic Moral Theology does not permit bringing about a (perceived) better set of outcomes by doing anything at all.

 

[Wampa]

response to original post: faulty problem, the scenarios are not comparable – the man sitting in the waiting room is under no threat of death, like the one person tied to the track.

You are correct. I tried pointing out that fault in the scenario, to which the OP replied that “he is also in mortal danger, just as everyone is in mortal danger all the time” from earthquakes/hurricanes/tornadoes/auto accidents/terrorists/sinkholes/water shortages/etc. After such a preposterous reply, I assumed the OP was not serious and dropped out.

I’m a little surprised that a 416-post thread has ensued from such a faulty analogy, but some of the other posters took it in some worthwhile directions.

 

[Scowler]

No. Not that easy. That would be the sin of presumption and you have to repent to be forgiven.

According to the Catholic teaching the only sin which cannot be forgiven is the blasphemy against the holy spirit. You can perform the necessary action, then repent and be forgiven. It is not a “presumption” to rely on this Catholic teaching.

I believe we have discussed this before. Confinement is the appropriate course of action. And if that is resisted, force may be used to comply since the carrier now directly threatens.

If confinement is possible. But that assumption changes the parameters of the problem. The only two options would be either allow the virus to spread or to kill the carrier. Those scenarios which allow some third option to escape a dilemma are not true dilemmas. The real problems are the ones when you are forced to choose between two really “unpalatable” options.

There are systems of ethics under which that is the case. But Catholic Moral Theology does not permit bringing about a (perceived) better set of outcomes by doing anything at all.

I understand, and that is the reason why I reject the Catholic approach. Any ethical system which allows the outcome to be disregarded is incorrect. Now you need to understand that the “end does not justify the means” is a valid principle; and I support it totally. It is not the end that justifies the means. It is that the means and the end must be considered together to find out if they form a “justifiable” sequence.

 

[Rau]

The only two options would be either allow the virus to spread or to kill the carrier. Those scenarios which allow some third option to escape a dilemma are not true dilemmas. The real problems are the ones when you are forced to choose between two really “unpalatable” options.

A dilemma is hardly that when the scenario defies any kind of reality in this world. That’s where you are right now.

There are scenarios imaginable where “stopping” the carrier might lead to his death, but none where directly ending the existence of an innocent person is the necessary act. They are scenarios where the carrier is no longer “innocent” as that term is used in theological discussion.

You can perform the necessary action, then repent and be forgiven. It is not a “presumption” to rely on this Catholic teaching.

I’m not going to remark further on this other than to say you should not make assertions you don’t have the knowledge to support.

Any ethical system which allows the outcome to be disregarded is incorrect.

I don’t really care to go over old ground with you again just because you change your screen name.

 

[AlNg]

Dropping a bomb leads inevitably to death,

But the intention or the purpose in dropping the atomic bomb on japan was to save lives and end the war, not to kill anyone.