Runaway trolley problem

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The intention of re-routing the train is to save four people. Proof? If there was a third option, or no one was on the track, you would still re-route it.
The intention of taking the organs from the unwilling donor and transplanting them is to save four people. Proof? If there were willing donors who would voluntarily donate the organs, the surgeon would transplant the organs donated voluntarily.
 
So… by rerouting the train onto track B, you do not intend to doom the person tied to track B?
Correct, u do not. Knowing full well a consequence and acting anyway is to accept it, not to intend it.
DIsproportionality is not merely “body count”. Your analysis, which really boils down to “one instead of five,” is utilitarian/consequentialist at its heart. As such, it does not work in the context of Catholic moral theology.
This is wrong. It is acceptable to weigh up consequences. Consequentialism arises when the act is judged based on the consequences and without regard to the moral object.. It allows what we’d say is an intrinsically evil act to be regarded as good if it did more good than harm.
 
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The end does not justify the means. Catechism 1753
Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. Catechism 1754
A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together. Catechism 1760
Double effect: it is morally allowable to perform an act that has at least two effects, one good and one bad. This is where an action itself is good and the intended effect is good but the unintended evil effect is not greater in proportion to the good effect. (See Catechism 2263 St. Thomas Aquinas reference.)
I would add to the ones you mention, 1756:
1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
As honorable of an intention it may be to try to save the group of 4 people, knowingly committing an action that will kill the one person tied to the tracks is still not justifiable. This also applies to the patient and organ situation.
 
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The intention of taking the organs from the unwilling donor and transplanting them is to save four people. Proof? If there were willing donors who would voluntarily donate the organs, the surgeon would transplant the organs donated voluntarily.
Yes, you may have a good intention, and your proposed action will do more good than harm. So that is 2 good “fonts”. But butchering/killing a person is an evil act in itself, for that is what you do, and the good motivation and the good consequences do not overcome that. You need that person butchered to get your good result. You directly intend it.

On the trolley, we don’t need the person decapitated/dead. We need the trolley stopped or if not possible, traveling where it can do less harm.
 
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knowingly committing an action that will kill the one person tied to the tracks is still not justifiable.
On what do you base this? Your quotes do not support this. An act that among other things “will very likely kill a person” is not an act with the moral object of murder. It is not the death of the one that is the means to save four. You appear to assume otherwise.
 
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On what do you base this? Your quotes do not support this. An act that among other things “will very likely kill a person” is not an act with the moral object of murder. It is not the death of the one that is the means to save four. You appear to assume otherwise.
You don’t need the death of one to save the four. But in the scenario described, you can’t save the four unless you take an action that you know will kill the one. So you can’t save the four except by killing the one.
Killing the one is murder.
The fact you don’t want the one to die doesn’t change the fact that you know pulling the switch will kill the one.
 
The fact you don’t want the one to die doesn’t change the fact that you know pulling the switch will kill the one.
And an operation to save a mother may cause the death of baby. The baby was not murdered. Your concept of what makes murder murder is in error. The anticipated consequence is not the thing that does it.
 
For those stuck that on your opinion, might I suggest that you speak to someone like a priest trained in moral theology and seek their opinion.
 
For those stuck that on your opinion, might I suggest that you speak to someone like a priest trained in moral theology and seek their opinion.
Is it certain that all those trained in moral theology will give the same answer?
 
Is it certain that all those trained in moral theology will give the same answer?
There are matters in the practical application of the principles of moral theology where good and erudite persons, properly applying the principles, can arrive at different judgements about what is or is not the “moral” course. This is typically when the morality hinges on the foreseen consequences.

The trolley problem is not one of those. IMO, it is not possible to correctly apply the principles and conclude that a properly motivated agent commits murder when he changes the lever, as has been suggested by some on this thread.
 
It is never permissible to directly cause the death of another human being without just cause. In the first scenario, to manipulate the trolley in either way would be impermissible because it would be a direct action which causes the death of another human being without just cause.

By not pulling the lever, you have not murdered the 4 people, the man who tied them to the track is solely responsible for their deaths. By pulling the lever, you have now cooperated in the killing of one man, and therefore have become complicit in a murder, whereas by refusing to engage in the act, you remained blameless.

There is a Star Wars book where a character is faced with a similar dilemna. To cut a long story short, he is told that if he does not commit a murder, an evil alien race will destroy an entire planet. He refuses, using this argument (paraphrased)

“If I were to acquiesce to this single murder, then I will have given you the ability to control my actions forever. What if, after I have committed this murder, you decide to ask me to commit another, and then another? What if I am asked to destroy one planet to save two? To destroy half the galaxy to save the other half? At what point can I refuse? If I accept this one murder, then it will never end. I cannot take responsibility for your actions. Only mine.”

The only way to win is to refuse to play.
 
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By pulling the lever, you have now cooperated in the killing of one man, and therefore have become complicit in a murder, whereas by refusing to engage in the act, you remained blameless.
Seems reasonable to me.
 
I believe the case in Catholic moral teaching is clear enough for a consensus. At least someone with authority is better than all the guessing.

Here is another situation. Someone shoots at you. You duck and the bullet hits the person standing behind you. No moral theologian would say you actively murdered that person.
 
I believe the case in Catholic moral teaching is clear enough for a consensus. At least someone with authority is better than all the guessing.

Here is another situation. Someone shoots at you. You duck and the bullet hits the person standing behind you. No moral theologian would say you actively murdered that person.
Agreed. On the other hand if you grab someone standing next to you and pull that person into line with the path of the bullet, you have murdered that person.
 
To cut a long story short, he is told that if he does not commit a murder, an evil alien race will destroy an entire planet. He refuses, using this argument (paraphrased)
Your presumption is that the actor commits murder in the trolley problem You have confused an “evil act” with an “evil consequence”. These 2 instances of evil reside in different fonts. This is crucial to understand in evaluating the morality of the entire act. The Star Wars actor was correct in his choice.
 
The original scenario dictates that pulling the lever will definitely kill the one person tied to the track, who would otherwise not be killed if it weren’t for your deliberate choice and action to end their life. The intention of saving the life of the four does not justify taking action that will deliberately kill the one. The CCC quote I referenced directly addresses this concept.
 
if you grab someone standing next to you and pull that person into line with the path of the bullet, you have murdered that person.
So it seems only logical, that if you pull a lever, with full knowledge of the consequences, so that a train will go in line on the track where another person, tied to the track, will surely be killed, then you have murdered that person.
 
To murder is to directly and intentionally cause the death of another human. By throwing the lever, you will have participated directly in the action which killed the man.

The evil consequence would be more like the other situation brought up in this thread: ducking an oncoming projectile. You did not directly cause the projectile to be thrown. Or take it one step further, what if you actively deflect the projectile and it happens to hit another person? Again, if there is no intentional act of aiming in your deflection, you have only indirectly acted. If you were to deliberately deflect the projectile in such a way as to hit a person then you now have acted directly and intentionally.

In the trolley scenario, one cannpy accidentally or unintentionally act upon the lever, one must make an intentional act of which there is only one possible consequence. It is murder.
 
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I would add to the ones you mention, 1756:

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

As honorable of an intention it may be to try to save the group of 4 people, knowingly committing an action that will kill the one person tied to the tracks is still not justifiable. This also applies to the patient and organ situation.
So switching a train to a different track is gravely illicit? I fail to see how a railroad switch man is somehow committing an act on par with blasphemy, perjury, murder, and adultery.
 
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