The law of double effect takes this into account, which is why there is that clause “without grave reason”. I would be careful about pasting different sections of the catechism together. I have seldom seen it done with the precise meaning intact. So what does your priest say on this scenario?
That’s the standard you’re holding to? That it has to be literally and explicitly mentioned in the Catechism?!? Puh-leeze…Gorgias:
I read them. Not one of them mentioned this trolley problemPsst… did you see those quotations from the Catechism that I provided? You know… the ones from ‘authority’ and ‘from the Church’? I brought something other than my own opinion, too…
I’m not attempting to ‘contradict’ double effect – just trying to point out to you that your appeal to it is in error.
I can respect that. I think you’re wrong, but at least you’ve hit on the source of your disagreement.
Umm… ok. What do you mean by ‘application’, though? Do you mean ‘particular circumstances’?
He agrees with me. (We’ve talked about moral theology.
)As @Gorgias has laid out, when you take the 4 people on track A out of the equation and have the trolley heading down an empty track A, does the nature of the act of pulling the lever to divert the trolley to track B where one person is tied to the tracks and faces certain unavoidable death qualify as morally good or indifferent?
There is no difference. The actor in either case targets minimum harm, not some individual.
I didn’t stipulate that.
By whom? A link reference would be handy.
No. Utilitarianism / consequentialism ignore the moral object of the act. Could you advise whether in the Evil Bomber scenario it is permissible to take an action that would unavoidably also kill the hostage in the plane?
If man “B” is known to be there, and this description captures all morally relevant facts, then I can’t see how. But this is unenlightening - You cannot identify the moral object of the act (that’s what matters, not the physical motions one could capture on a movie camera) if you deconstruct the situation. Is it moral to inject something into your blood to stop your heart. No. Unless I’m about to put you on heart bypass.
The act is not made good by the good intent or by the overall good outcome. You are taking as a given that the “act itself” was wrong, but is being justified by Intent and Circumstance. That’s not the case. The debate is about the Moral Object, and whether it is Evil or not. We know that for a prospective act to be morally good, the Intent AND the moral object AND the expected outcome must be good. The ccc quotes you provided outlaw what is not being relied upon.
Though several have addressed a matter where there is actually no disagreement.
Not the case in the trolley. Never do we intend a death.
We act with grave reason.
We act to render assistance.
Applies to us.
We had proportionate reasons.
to just avoid trolleys minus the “eys”.
More to the point, utilitarianism justifies its decisions on the outcome. That’s what you and @pnewton have done here. To refresh your memory:Gorgias:
No. Utilitarianism / consequentialism ignore the moral object of the act
The intent to “choose the lesser evil” is not morally licit, according to Catholic teaching. It doesn’t get any clearer than that, especially we’re seeing that assertion from your very own posts.
It would be unhelpful to do so, since that example includes the considerations of “just war theory.” Those considerations are not in play in our example of the trolley.
No, that’s exactly what you need to do, in order to identify the morality of the object of the act without entangling intention or circumstance into the discussion. It’s not “deconstruction”, it’s “decomposition” into parts.
It all depends on the object of the act. In the former case, it’s (presumably) to cause harm to the person (since you conclude that it’s immoral), while in the latter, the object is “prepare for life-saving surgery.”
Wait… “expected outcome”? No… that’s not part of the consideration. (If memory serves, that is part of the analysis of just war, but not the general case of determining the moral quality of an act.) The three issues are object of the act, intent/end, and circumstances.
It’s actively causing the death of an innocent (who, in the absence of the act, would not be killed). What would you call the act of killing an innocent person?
I haven’t noticed any trolls in this thread. Have you?AveOTheotokos:
minus the “eys”.
That’s right, which it does by ignoring the moral object. There is no evil moral object in the acts briefly described as to: divert the tram, divert the airliner, shoot down/divert the terror bomber, etc.
I may absolutely choose the lesser evil when such term is a reference to a physical evil - as in the consequences.
What war? There is a nut case in a plane about to drop bombs. Does his human shield render me unable to act?
Precisely. The object could only be determined by at looking more than the physical act and recognising its object. The object of switching the track is not to kill an innocent. Evil object and evil consequence are not the same.
From the Compendium of the Catechism:
Given our context, I’d first frame the right question. An act which will likely lead to the death of innocents need not be murder.
Again, you’re moving the goal posts by mis-stating the act. It’s not simply “diverting the tram”, it’s “diverting the tram onto a track with a man tied to the tracks.” The former might be absent of moral content; the latter clearly is immoral. Only by misstating the act can you avoid the assertion of “no moral evil.”Gorgias:
That’s right, which it does by ignoring the moral object. There is no evil moral object in the acts briefly described as to: divert the tram, divert the airliner, shoot down/divert the terror bomber, etc.
Not sure what you’re attempting to claim by calling it a “physical evil”. Perhaps you might explain what you’re trying to say. (Regardless, however, one may not choose an evil act, no matter how much you want to claim that the Church says you can.
)You’re confusing the “object of the act” with the “intent of the act.” The object of the act is to switch the track… which necessarily kills an innocent.
OK. But read the full catechism – the circumstances do not determine the moral content of the action.
OK, it’s about time to call you out on this one: you keep changing the statement of the problem from an action which definitely results in the killing of the one person. You keep mis-stating it as “likely lead to death”. (This is a rather subtle nuancing of the problem statement. By calling death “likely” rather than “definitely”, you’re softening the assessment of the act.)
I stated I was “summarising” the act. For brevity. The fact that an act will likely cause someone (an innocent) to die does not in itself reveal the moral object of the act. Do you accept that much?
Again, “evil act” and “evil consequence” are not the same thing. The latter are routinely accepted subject to them not outweighing the good consequences.
We can evaluate the consequences of human acts. Harm in the consequences is a kind of physical evil. For those human acts that are moral, the balance, the net, of good and evil in the consequences must be good. It is not required that there be no evil consequences. The evil that one may not choose is “moral evil”. An evil moral object.
On this there is no disagreement, nor has there ever been, so long as you understand “an evil act” refers to moral evil. But I may choose an act that among other things has bad consequences - a type of evil. I may choose physical evil - eg. If a person is trapped in their burning house, I may bash down their door to effect rescue. The physical damage is a kind of evil, though not moral. Were I a vandal (acting as such), the act would be morally evil.
I’m not confusing them. Further, the death is in the consequences (circumstances).
Do you think I haven’t? If we are considering an act, and we judge that it will do more harm than good - could it ever be a good act? Is it your view that a good outcome assures us of a good outcome? I think we agree the answer to both is “NO”. The statement in the Catechism to which you refer is usually used to explain an idea such as: The amount stolen does not bear on the nature of the act as “theft” - intrinsically wrong. It’s explaining that “theft” was determined in the moral object, and other details can’t change that.
Please don’t impugn my motives and I’ll show you the same respect (as I’ve done).
I think that you are right on that.
No. Pulling the lever is akin to turning the wheel of the madman terrorist’s car away from the crowd crossing the road knowing full well that some on the footpath will still die.