Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

My post and your citation from VS are identities. Do you see a contradiction?

Sometimes I feel like this is a game of whack-a-mole where it is new and different terms that keep popping up. For example, you spoke of the “moral goodness” of an act as well as its “moral object”. By “moral goodness” do you mean the moral character of an act? That is, simply whether it is moral or immoral? As for “moral object”, did you mean something other than the “object” (the first font in determining the morality of an act)?

Foreseeable consequences may be circumstantial if, and only if, the consequences do not change the moral object or are in the pre-moral order.

The consequences are part of the circumstances just as an engine is part of a car, and as I understand what JPII says in Veritatis Splendor, he rejects the concept of a pre-moral order (#48).

A freedom which claims to be absolute ends up treating the human body as a raw datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accordance with its design. Consequently, human nature and the body appear as presuppositions or preambles, materially necessary for freedom to make its choice, yet extrinsic to the person, the subject and the human act. Their functions would not be able to constitute reference points for moral decisions, because the finalities of these inclinations would be merely “physical” goods, called by some “pre-moral”. To refer to them, in order to find in them rational indications with regard to the order of morality, would be to expose oneself to the accusation of physicalism or biologism. In this way of thinking, the tension between freedom and a nature conceived of in a reductive way is resolved by a division within man himself.

This moral theory does not correspond to the truth about man and his freedom.

The evaluation of the consequences of the action, based on the proportion between the act and its effects and between the effects themselves, would regard only the pre-moral order. VS 75

In that section he is discussing “The teleological ethical theories (proportionalism, consequentialism)…” and he goes on to say: "These theories cannot claim to be grounded in the Catholic moral tradition." (#76)

 

[Ender]

Continued…

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.

This is surely one of the more confusing sections in the catechism. In 1755 it does seem to say exactly what you claim, even as it has just finished asserting (1754) that: “The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act… Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves”. The latter statement is confirmed by VS 77: “The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.”

Where the (anticipated) consequences would affect the moral nature of an act is in the case of PODE, where one of the criteria is that “The good effect must be at least equal in importance to the evil effect.”

Otherwise, if I do something with a good object, a good intent, and with due care that in fact turns out horribly, I have not sinned, and the action was not evil. That could not be true if a good consequence was necessary for an action to be moral.

 

[Rau]

VS 77: “The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.”

Correct. What’s the problem? Murder is not made murder or not murder by virtue of consequences. Note here that the species of acts we might call murder or attempted murder are the same, because it’s about ordering not effectiveness.

 

[Rau]

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. This is surely one of the more confusing sections in the catechism.

If in considering some act, we conclude that the bad consequences exceed the good, then we safely conclude that it would be immoral to pursue that act. You’ve concurred with that sentiment in the past (eg. in the capital punishment context) so not sure why it presents any difficulty now. I suspect it’s not this statement that is the problem, but rather 1754 which you are misreading.

 

[o_mlly]

Sometimes I feel like this is a game of whack-a-mole where it is new and different terms that keep popping up.

The terminology can be confusing. “Moral object” is a synonym for “moral species.” So, my post and your citation of VS are identical:

Circumstances cannot change the moral object of the act.

“… circumstances … cannot alter its [the act’s] moral species.” (Veritatis Splendor, #77)

The consequences are part of the circumstances just as an engine is part of a car, and as I understand what JPII says in Veritatis Splendor, he rejects the concept of a pre-moral order (#48).

Perhaps this logic will help:
If circumstances cannot change the quality (good or evil) of the act and if a particular consequence does change the quality of an act then that particular consequence is not a circumstance and must be considered as part of the act’s object (the first font).

For instance:
Initial description of an act: sexual intercourse with one’s spouse.
Object: unity and procreation - good
Intent: unity - good
Circumstance: (where, when?) - Bleachers, Section 183, Progressive Field, Cleveland, Ohio; 7th inning stretch - evil.

Since a circumstance cannot change the quality of an otherwise good act into an evil act, this circumstance must collapse into the description of the act.

Corrected description: sexual intercourse with one’s spouse in public.
Object: Indecent exposure - evil

The same method of analysis would require that the death of an innocent person in the trolley exercise not be treated as mere circumstance but must also collapse into the object of the act.

A pre-moral consequence is a circumstance that has no moral bearing on the quality of the act. For instance, iff the bystander throws the switch then the bystander will not see the outcomes – does not change the morality of the act so is considered pre-moral.

A consequence that does affect the morality of the act, as JPII teaches against consequentialism, cannot be considered pre-moral.

Did you “pull the trigger”?

 

[o_mlly]

“The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, … (JPII).

… if I do something with a good object, a good intent, and with due care that in fact turns out horribly, I have not sinned, and the action was not evil. That could not be true if a good consequence was necessary for an action to be moral.

Your example is true iff you did not (reasonably) foresee the horrible outcomes. Therefore, your example does no illustrate JPII’s point that some foreseeable consequences are circumstances.

 

[Ender]

If in considering some act, we conclude that the bad consequences exceed the good, then we safely conclude that it would be immoral to pursue that act.

Perhaps it is the word consequences that is inadequately defined. If I foresee bad consequences (ignore PODE cases) yet commit an act anyway then my intent was bad: I did something I knew to be harmful and the act is immoral. If I commit the same act, however, expecting it to turn out good I have not sinned regardless of the consequences. In these two acts the objects (morally neutral) and consequences (harmful) are the same, but one act is moral and the other is immoral. This isn’t because of the consequences but because of the intent.

 

[o_mlly]

In these two acts the objects (morally neutral) and consequences (harmful) are the same, but one act is moral and the other is immoral. This isn’t because of the consequences but because of the intent.

In the concrete, a human act cannot be neutral in its object since the object chosen morally specifies all the acts of the will regardless of actor. The intent, or end in view, specifies the first goal of any particular actor.

I cannot readily imagine an act evil in its intent and good in its (adequately described) object. Do you have an example?

 

[Ender]

If circumstances cannot change the quality (good or evil) of the act and if a particular consequence does change the quality of an act then that particular consequence is not a circumstance and must be considered as part of the act’s object (the first font).

If circumstances cannot change the morality of an act, but the consequences can, then the consequences cannot be part of the circumstances. Since, however, the consequences are defined as part of the circumstances, and the latter cannot alter the quality of the act, then neither can the former.

Since a circumstance cannot change the quality of an otherwise good act into an evil act, this circumstance must collapse into the description of the act.

Acts do not occur in a vacuum. I don’t think it is so much that the circumstances collapse into the other fonts of an action as that the intent is different depending on the situation.

The same method of analysis would require that the death of an innocent person in the trolley exercise not be treated as mere circumstance but must also collapse into the object of the act.

The object is the proximate end and involves an intent (but not the second font intent): what was the immediate purpose of the act? If the (second font) intent is to kill the one then the object (proximate end) is to direct the trolley at that person. If the (second font) intent is to save the five then the object is to direct the trolley away from them.

The consequence of both acts is the same: the one person dies, but since the morality of the act is not determined by the consequence, the act of saving the five is moral because the intent is good, and the object, the proximate end (the immediate purpose) was not immoral.

A consequence that does affect the morality of the act, as JPII teaches against consequentialism, cannot be considered pre-moral.

But it is JPII who teaches that a consequence is part of the circumstances, and that circumstances do not change the morality of an act.

Did you “pull the trigger”?

I took evasive action and avoided the question.

 

[Ender]

In the concrete, a human act cannot be neutral in its object…

The first condition for an act to be justifiable under PODE is this:

“The action to be performed must be morally good in itself or at least morally indifferent or neutral.”

I suspect that most of our acts are morally neutral. I’ve got to go out and work in my yard today. Pulling weeds may be miserable work, but it is morally neutral nonetheless.

I cannot readily imagine an act evil in its intent and good in its (adequately described) object. Do you have an example?

CCC 1753 “…an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).”

 

[o_mlly]

I suspect that most of our acts are morally neutral. I’ve got to go out and work in my yard today. Pulling weeds may be miserable work, but it is morally neutral nonetheless.

Why did you decide to pull weeds? To beautify your yard? To prepare yourself a veggie lunch? A human act is one which involves the will. All deliberate acts, willful acts, have a moral content, that is they are not morally neutral.

> 1749 When he acts deliberately, man is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen … can be morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.

The object is the proximate end and involves an intent (but not the second font intent): what was the immediate purpose of the act?

Not quite. The object of an act (what) is unique to that human act. The same description of that human act retains the same moral object (objective) regardless of who acts. The purpose of an a human act (why) is unique to the subject (subjective).

Your analysis confuses the two fonts. There is no “purpose” expressed in the object. And the object of an act does not change if the subject’s intention changes. The intent may be dependent on the object but not vice versa.

The consequence of both acts is the same:

There is only one act.

But it is JPII who teaches that a consequence is part of the circumstances, and that circumstances do not change the morality of an act.

The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species (VS77).

Do you interpret the above as stating that all consequences are circumstances? That would be incorrect. In VS 77, JPII is arguing against the moral philosophy of consequentialism – the morality of an act is solely dependent on “a calculation of foreseeable consequences.” This is the referent for his subsequent use of the word “consequences.” Consequences that are circumstantial do not determine the morality of the act.

In the trolley exercise, relegating an effect of this willed act – the killing of an innocent human – to the circumstantial font is grossly wrong. Any act which directly kills an innocent human being is murder, an intrinsically evil act. Intrinsically evil acts are acts evil in their object, that is, incapable of being ordered to God.

JPII cites acts that are evil in their object as acts that are "hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide …’” (VS 80).

 

[BlackFriar]

In the trolley exercise, relegating an effect of this willed act – the killing of an innocent human – to the circumstantial font is grossly wrong. Any act which directly kills an innocent human being is murder, an intrinsically evil act. Intrinsically evil acts are acts evil in their object, that is, incapable of being ordered to God.

Your expositions to date are well put.
This one may have a few speed wobbles I think.
The evil effects of an act can be relegated to the circumstances font I would think if the choice was a secondary one “besides” a proprtional good outcome which was the direct intent.

You said as much below, though you left out considerations of the nature of intent.

The problem I see in all these three font whack a mole tautologies is that most people assume intent is single and binary in nature. In choices involving multiple good and evil outcomes this isnt the case…unless we posit many different acts somehow subordinated to each other.

But if we agree that the trolley scenario involves a single moral act we must accept we are dealing with composition.

In a composite act intent is inevitably pared in some way and to that extent the border between the circumstance and object fonts is a movable feast dependent on the paring of the actors perspective.

So we outsiders move wildly from judging moral to immoral depending on how we see the objective reality forcing the pared intent of a good actor to legitimately perceive the scene.

Maybe our unresolved debate here indicates there are many double effect scenarios where there is no clear objective answer to be found in the objects themselves.
The actual object is too slippery to clearly define.

 

[Rau]

Perhaps it is the word consequences that is inadequately defined. If I foresee bad consequences (ignore PODE cases) yet commit an act anyway then my intent was bad: I did something I knew to be harmful and the act is immoral. If I commit the same act, however, expecting it to turn out good I have not sinned regardless of the consequences. In these two acts the objects (morally neutral) and consequences (harmful) are the same, but one act is moral and the other is immoral. This isn’t because of the consequences but because of the intent.

Consequences always refers to what is foreseen, not what transpired, and it is right to observe that the Consequences proceeds from the other 2 fonts. (Intentions, the essential moral nature of the act itself, and factors having no moral significance are all excluded form Circumstances.)

The reasonably anticipated consequences of a chosen act are placed in the 3rd font and go to whether that font is good or bad. It needs to be good for a good act.

 

[BlackFriar]

Do you have authoritative sources for your above interpretations of how the 3rd font works?

 

[Rau]

Not to hand I can reference for you. Was there something in my post that your authoritative references reject or contradict?

 

[BlackFriar]

I have never come across anything like it but am open to learning something new.

 

[Rau]

Fair enough. Was every part of what I wrote new to you, or can you identify the new parts?

 

[BlackFriar]

May I order the works?

 

[Rau]

What works? I have no particular reference in mind.

 

[BlackFriar]

You’ve never ordered breakfast at a diner?
“Give me the works”.