It is the inherent ordering of the act (towards something) that identifies the object. The knowing choice of the act (with its object) identifies an “intent”. The “Intention” (font) does not itself identify the moral object, and changing Intention does not change the moral object.
Did not the VS quote (post #366) refer to the species (moral nature), rather than morality as a whole? That is, murder remains murder regardless of anything in the circumstances.
I don’t think so. Too simplistic.Ender:
It is the inherent ordering of the act (towards something) that identifies the object. The knowing choice of the act (with its object) identifies an “intent”. The “Intention” (font) does not itself identify the moral object, and changing Intention does not change the moral object.
Alms giving to the poor and hungry has a good moral object, regardless of a good or self-serving motivation.
Oh well, in that case…
According to JPII the “object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision”, but an end is an objective…a purpose.
Intention (2cd font) is distinct from object (1st font), but by object “one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order.” The proximate end (an intent) is different than the intention (2cd font), and is part of the 1st font.
The mother’s operation directly (inevitably) kills her child; the bombs directly kill innocent civilians. These are not considered murders. Your definition is too broad.
The proximate end is an inherent end of the act, and gives the act moral meaning. If I am a sharpshooter and you are standing in my trajectory (targeting another person) I am morally forbidden to shoot, no matter the amount of good my shot may produce. The object is not “squeeze trigger” (purely physical, no moral content) but something morally meaningful - determined by the end, in terms of morality, to which the act is ordered.
The act has two ends – kills 1 innocent and saves 4 innocents.
I identified two separate scenarios: one action is intended to save five people, the other is intended to kill one person. The physical acts are identical, as are the consequences; the intents are obviously different. So: are the objects the same for both actions, or, as I claim, are they different? If you think they are the same then describe what you think the object to be.
A surgeon that directly kills a child anywhere in the mother’s body is a murderer.
The pilot that directly bombs a legitimate enemy target anywhere is not a murderer.
You predicate “ends” as being in the person acting, rather than the inherent ordering of the act. Thus you see 2 cases - according to the goal of the actor. I believe this is why @o_mlly rightly remarks you confuse intentions.
I think it would depend on whether it is a just war or not. Further, I think that it is immoral to drop an atomic bomb even if you target a legitimate enemy because the inevitable result of dropping an atomic bomb would be the murder of thousands of innocent people. Both Cardinal George and the bishops of England and Wales have said that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be morally justified. Further, there is an article posted on CAF which says that it was morally wrong to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.
This would likely depend on the scale of nuclear bomb contemplated. The radius over which destructive power (fireball, radiation, air blast, thermal radiation) various considerably. It is difficult to imagine a legitimate military target for which an atomic bomb at the high end of the scale (eg. 100 Megaton) is the appropriate weapon. It is hard to argue that such a bomb is ordered to destroying a realistic target.
Is @Ron_Conte an active user these days? [I see his last post was Sept 29.]
A “legitimate enemy target” presupposes a just war. In an unjust war there is no legitimate target.
I asked about the objects of the two acts; your response is about the consequences of the acts. Beyond that, an end relates to an intent, an objective, and it is not true that the person throwing the switch intends both consequences even thought they are both inevitable.
You were the one who turned me on to the nature of the object as containing an end ('The moral object is a kind of “end” (sometimes called proximate end), distinct from “Intention”.’ post 305), and JPII was pretty explicit in rejecting a mechanical view of the object (“one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order”). So yes, the object is the immediate end the actor has chosen, and choice involves intent.
This act does not have two proximate ends since the end includes an intent, which is to direct the trolley away from the five. The act has two consequences but only one object.
Dropping a bomb leads inevitably to death, the operation leads inevitably to death, throwing the switch leads inevitably to death. Your distinction is not subtle, it is non-existent.