Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

Another evasion? I have not evaded your or other’s questions

Either you have defined the object of throwing the switch or you haven’t. If you have, point to the post where you did so. If you have not, why are you unwilling to do so?

 

[o_mlly]

Either you have defined the object of throwing the switch or you haven’t.

To review and summarize my umpteen posts in this thread:
Act: Throwing a switch that one foresees will kill one innocent person with the intention of saving the lives of four innocent persons.
Object: Direct killing an innocent person - murder.
Intention: Save 4 lives.
Circumstances: Premeditated.

Act is immoral. Fails in its object.

 

[BlackFriar]

I think the situation is exactly like killing in self defense. We may not choose to kill in defending ourselves even if the act we choose to commit will inevitably lead to the attacker’s death. There is no justifiable way to claim we “chose” to kill him simply because his death was the inevitable result of our act. If this was not so there would be no way to justify such a killing given that we may not choose evil for any reason.

Here we likely differ. For example if I am an old man and if I dont kill my young attacker in the next 20 secs then I will tire and die…I have no qualms choosing to pull the trigger of my hidden gun. I do not deny my immediate pupose in pulling the trigger was to kill him. Yet that choice was only made subordinated to my primary choice to defend my family. Pulling the trigger was indeed an evil choice. But it was a beside intent, not a fully free standalone intent. It depended on my primary intent for its existence.
But it cannot be denied it was a considered choice all the same.
And overall this was a single act, made up of two related choices, and the act was good because all fonts were good. I accept that the intent font, like the circumstances font, was of a composite nature…but the good parts outweighed the bad on a proportionality basis. The proportionality consideration of the two intents was valid to make because this was a single act, not two acts (eg stealing to give alms).

 

[BlackFriar]

Yes there is no agreement by weighty authorities on either side re the bombing.
This is true of many PODE scenarios.
I believe it is generally admitted that Catholic Moral Theology does not yet have a coherent set of analytical tools that consistently resolve all moral conundrums. Some are used in one situation, some for another with no real rhyme or reason why …other than to achieve the final decision that most agree is the correct one intuively guided by the Holy Spirit.
Whuch is probably how it should be. In the end it is the sensus fideli that decides not maths … there may well be cases too complex to admit an objectively discernible answer.

I believe that, despite Netwons iron laws, it is impossible to predict the trajectories of more than three orbiting celestial bodies closely interacting with each other via gravity. No doubt it is predictable, but its just too complex to work out even for computers.

 

[Ender]

Act: Throwing a switch that one foresees will kill one innocent person with the intention of saving the lives of four innocent persons.

Object: Direct killing an innocent person - murder.
Intention: Save 4 lives.
Circumstances: Premeditated.
Act is immoral. Fails in its object.

Thank you. Now:
Describe the action: a person throws a trolley switch. That’s it, that is the entire act. This doesn’t address why the switch was thrown, or what the consequences will be, but it does describe the entire observable action.
What is the immediate consequence of that act? The trolley goes left instead of right.
What is the consequence of its going left? It heads toward a person tied to the track.
What will be the final consequence of the act? Under the conditions set for the dilemma the person is run over by the trolley and dies.

Now consider the scenario where there is no one on the second track, In both of these cases the visible action is identical - which admittedly says nothing about whether they were moral acts or not.

What is the object of the act in case (2)? Isn’t it the same immediate (proximate) end as in case (1): to send the trolley left instead of right? Granted, the intent and the consequences may be different, but objects are the same. There is no reasonable way to categorize the object of the act in case (1) as murder, but if you did, you would have to categorize the object of the act where the person’s act is sitting still as murder as well, which would make you guilty of murder no matter which choice you made.

The proximate end, the immediate reason, for throwing the switch is to reroute the trolley. That is in fact the only immediate result, and it is obviously the result (the end, the object) immediately intended. If murder was intended, that is the intent. It is not part of the object.

 

[BlackFriar]

If I light the fuse on a bomb what is my proximate end? It is to detonate the bomb. The reasons I have for blowing up something are either justifiable or not, but the proximate end every time a bomb’s fuse is lit is the same: to detonate the bomb.

This is not a moral choice and therefore not a moral intent but some form of amoral, mechanical executive choice of a faculty other than the heart of the will.
Therefore it is incomplete and cannot be considered either a proximate or a remote intent. Nor can it therefore be considered some alleged evil means to a good end.
Yes it is a choice, but not one of moral intent.

Now if I lit the fuse to blow up a pro abortion parliament to put a Catholic party in the proximate end is to kill the pro abortionists. That is the proximate end not the lighting of the fuse. The final end would be to install my party.

Thats my take anyhow.

 

[BlackFriar]

Throwing a light switch is not by itself a moral object and therefore indicates no moral intent. It is a choice though.

We must know how to distinguish neutral mechanical acts (the action of a man) from morally potent acts (human acts). This foundational distinction is taught in all MTheology 101 papers.

Deciding to scratching my bum has no moral object or intent no matter how evil my worn out cushion or the mites may be.

 

[o_mlly]

Describe the action: a person throws a trolley switch. That’s it, that is the entire act. This doesn’t address why the switch was thrown, or what the consequences will be, but it does describe the entire observable action.

Merely defining the observable action is an inadequate description of a human act. Every human act has more than a physical aspect. One must also disclose the spiritual aspects in order to determine the act’s object. For instance, you see a photo of a man taking my TV. Is he stealing my TV? Or, is he my authorized TV repairman?

What is the object of the act in case (2)? Isn’t it the same immediate (proximate) end

No, in your case (2) the ends materially change. The human act includes all the foreseeable ends. If no one is on the second track then the foreseeable end that kills an innocent person vanishes.

Here, I think, is where we differ. In the concrete, is any human act neutral? No. Resolving this issue may help lead to an illusive consensus:

Redirecting the trolley is morally neutral.

In the concrete, there are no neutral human acts; all human acts have moral component.

More important than who or how many die in this exercise is what happens to the soul of the actor. Every moral action forever changes the actor, for better or worse.

> It may be asked whether every human act is either good or evil. We must make a distinction.
_> _
> 1. An act considered in the abstract, i. e., apart from all circumstances, may be specifically neither good nor evil. For instance, walking, riding, reading, etc., are acts that in themselves do not imply a tendency to our last end or a departure from it. All such are called indifferent acts: specifically, they are neither good nor bad.
_> _
> 2. But every moral act considered individually, i. e., as done in such and such circumstances of time, place and persons, is necessarily either good or bad. For, since we distinguish a good from a bad act by its conformity with fixed principles known to reason, it follows that when reason approves, the act is right; when it disapproves, the act is wrong. Now, in every individual human act, reason approves the act as a fit object for a deliberate choice, or disapproves it as an unfit object for such choice; therefore, every individual or concrete human act is either right or wrong.
Brief Textbook of Moral Philosophy 2

 

[Ender]

This is not a moral choice and therefore not a moral intent but some form of amoral, mechanical executive choice of a faculty other than the heart of the will.

I agree, but what I was describing was not the ultimate intention behind the action, but the object (the proximate end) of the act, and I think the proximate end of an act can be morally neutral even if the intent is immoral. I suspect this is the normal case.

Therefore it is incomplete and cannot be considered either a proximate or a remote intent. Nor can it therefore be considered some alleged evil means to a good end.

Why wouldn’t it be considered the proximate end? Nothing requires the object to be specifically morally good or morally evil. It seems to me the object is nothing more than choosing the expected, immediate, consequence of an act.

I push the channel button on my TV remote: what is the object of that action? Pretty clearly it is simply to change the channel, and the object is the same whether the channel I select is WETN or PORNTV. The object is neutral. The act can be morally judged, but it cannot be immoral (in this case) because of the object.

Yes it is a choice, but not one of moral intent.

Aren’t most of our actions morally neutral?

Now if I lit the fuse to blow up a pro abortion parliament to put a Catholic party in the proximate end is to kill the pro abortionists. That is the proximate end not the lighting of the fuse. The final end would be to install my party.

I don’t think so. The intent behind the action (lighting the fuse) is to kill the pro-abortionists. The object of lighting the fuse is to explode the bomb. That is the object every time a bomb’s fuse is lit. What makes the action immoral is the intent, not the object.

What if I lit the fuse thinking it was nothing more than a fire cracker? Would I be morally responsible for blowing up parliament if I had no idea what consequences would flow from the act? If I don’t know I’m blowing up parliament then that can hardly be part of the object, but whether I think I’m blowing up people or blowing up a tin can, the object - the proximate end - of the act of lighting the fuse in either case is identical: to explode whatever is attached to the fuse.

 

[Ender]

How about this as the answer to the trolley question:

1737 An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother’s exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.

Isn’t this exactly the case we’re discussing: someone dies while aiding someone in danger? In which case “the bad effect is not imputable”. As far as I can see, this section explicitly resolves this issue.

 

[Rau]

The intent behind the action (lighting the fuse) is to kill the pro-abortionists. The object of lighting the fuse is to explode the bomb. That is the object every time a bomb’s fuse is lit. What makes the action immoral is the intent, not the object.

The moral meaning of exploding the bomb [in the scenario described - a concrete human act] is to deprive innocents of their lives [and this, presumably, serves our ultimate “Intention” that gave rise to the proposition to plant a bomb]. The is the relevant proximate end. It is not the expansion of the material of the bomb, or the production of sound waves, heat or light [=“explode the bomb”]. Intrinsically evil acts are not neutral in their moral object; they are not deemed intrinsically evil because of some bad Intention of the actor.

It seems you are dividing up the Human Act into “Intentinon”; “intent”; “Act itself with its Object”; Consequences. You are reducing the act itself to something with no moral meaning and thus an object with no moral meaning. But the object is more fully named “Moral Object”.

In the trolley, it seems to be (I could be mistaken) you see it like this: the Act of our hero (switching of the tracks) you see as neutral (mechanical, no moral content, like lighting a fuse), you then consider “Intent” (no longer needing to think about the act itself) and blur this (unwittingly perhaps) with the “Intention”. All else falls to Consequences.

 

[BlackFriar]

I think you may be conflating “object” and “end”. They are not the same.

 

[BlackFriar]

There is no possibility of one person not dying whatever decision is made.
Therefore the agent does not have a possibility of avoiding it and it is a tolerable evil consequence choosing either scenario.
As it is better to kill 1 rather than 5 the good choice is clear?

 

[AlNg]

As it is better to kill 1 rather than 5 the good choice is clear?

Was it better to drop the atomic bomb on japan and save lives?

 

[Rau]

Was it better to drop the atomic bomb on japan and save lives?

Those who authorized the act must have rationalized it in some fashion to conclude they chose the “better course”. Perhaps they did not look beyond the alternative set of consequences - do the history books or memoirs of the involved explain the reasoning? No doubt your point is that success in saving lives cannot alone make the act permissible. I think all here accept that. The debate all along has been about the moral object(s), not the balance of foreseeable consequences.

 

[AlNg]

The debate all along has been about the moral object(s), not the balance of foreseeable consequences.

Is it? I see it as a simple question:

As it is better to kill 1 rather than 5 the good choice is clear?

Is it OK to kill a few in order to save many, many more? Or IOW, are there circumstances where a good end will justify an immoral means.

 

[BlackFriar]

Is it OK to kill a few in order to save many, many more? Or IOW, are there circumstances where a good end will justify an immoral means.

If that is your counter to the subtle principles in play discussed to date I don’t think there is any further answer I can provide that can help you understand the counter arguments more deeply.

 

[o_mlly]

Isn’t this exactly the case we’re discussing: someone dies while aiding someone in danger?

One may sacrifice their own life for another; not another innocent, even to “saving the nation” (CCC #1753).

The last sentence CCC#1737 specifically denies our bystander the moral right to throw the switch for the bystander both foresees and can avoid killing the innocent person.

> For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.

 

[Ender]

The moral meaning of exploding the bomb [in the scenario described - a concrete human act] is to deprive innocents of their lives [and this, presumably, serves our ultimate “Intention” that gave rise to the proposition to plant a bomb]. The is the relevant proximate end. It is not the expansion of the material of the bomb, or the production of sound waves, heat or light [=“explode the bomb”]. Intrinsically evil acts are not neutral in their moral object; they are not deemed intrinsically evil because of some bad Intention of the actor.

It seems you are dividing up the Human Act into “Intentinon”; “intent”; “Act itself with its Object”; Consequences. You are reducing the act itself to something with no moral meaning and thus an object with no moral meaning. But the object is more fully named “Moral Object”.

I have been struggling to understand the nature of the “object” of an act, and I don’t think I’ve got it yet. That said, I’m going to abandon this line of argument and address the comment in 1737 since I think that section deals directly with our situation.

 

[Ender]

One may sacrifice their own life for another; not another innocent, even to “saving the nation” (CCC #1753).

There is no sense of sacrificing one to save four any more than one is sacrificing four to save one. An unavoidable death is not a sacrifice.

The last sentence CCC#1737 specifically denies our bystander the moral right to throw the switch for the bystander both foresees and can avoid killing the innocent person.

But that’s the entire point of the dilemma: innocent death is utterly unavoidable. The only choice is whether one will die or four.

It seems to me the basis of the “don’t throw the switch” argument is that a decision not to act frees one from responsibility from the consequences that will inevitably result, but this cannot be true.

1731 Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility.

We are responsible for the consequences of the choices we freely make, and choosing to do nothing and let four people die when we could save them makes us responsible for that consequence. Choosing to do nothing is a moral choice for which we are just as responsible as if we chose to do something.