E
edlinked
Guest
"
Then, interior or exterior deeds are born that have for their object merely the sexual value linked to the person. These deeds remain within the aim of the directional reaction characteristic of sensuality itself: oriented to the “body as a possible object of use”. Thus, they relate to the person in a utilitarian, consumption-oriented way. Whether the deeds are exterior or only interior depends on a large extent on the structure of sensuality itself in a given person.”
The reactions of affectivity also possess a directional character, although their direction differs from that of the reactions of sensuality. Affectivity does not tend toward the using that has for its object the “body and sexus” and seeks an outlet in “bodily love” alone. If we sometimes speak of the need for an affective outlet, it is not in the same sense as when one speaks of a sensory-sexual outlet. Concerning the former, the point is rather a satisfaction of the need for affective lived-experiences themselves, the need to “be in love” with somebody or to suffer someone’s affection (“to be loved”). Affectivity has its separate world of interior and inter-personal facts, which by themselves stay away from the concupiscence of the flesh. Affective love seems to be pure to the extent that any comparison of it to sensual passion amounts to a debasement and brutalization.
However, it does not constitute a positive and full solution to the problem of the concupiscence of the flesh. At most, affective love move this problem away from the field of consciousness, even bringing into the relation of a woman to a man (or viceversa) that idealization we spoke about in the preceding chapter.
What affectivity brings into the reciprocal relation between a woman and a man is still only the “material” of love.
Fully-mature protection against the concupiscence of the flesh is found only in the deep realism of virtue, and the point here is precisely the virtue of chastity. Affectivity, however, and this “idealization” that is born on its substratum in the relation X-Y and Y-X, can be very helpful in forming the virtue of chastity. Nevertheless, even the most delicate natural reactions that arise on the ground of affectivity with respect to “femininity or “masculinity” do not by themselves create an adequately deep basis for the love of the person to crystallize.
In fact, a certain danger exists that the concupiscence of the flesh will absorb these reactions, that it will assimilate them as a kind of “accompaniment” that will obscure its proper relation to the human being of the other sex.
It must be added that when affectivity is not strengthened with virtue but left to its own devices, and in this way made to face the powerful concupiscence of the flesh, it is most often reduced to that role. Indeed, it then adds from itself a certain new moment; it makes love something of a subjective “taboo” in which affection is everything and decides everything.
The problem of subjectivism appears right here, for it is affection more than anything else that introduces a subjective moment into human love. Affection must be distinguished from affectivity. By affectivity we understand the ability to react to certain values connected with the “human being of the other sex” (“femininity” – “masculinity” – “charm” – “strength”). Affection, however, is a subjective psychical fact bound with the reaction to various values, and therefore it is bound with deeds that are formed in the orbit of that reaction, in its extension, so to speak. So, sensual-bodily affections are joined with the reaction of sensuality and with the exterior or interior deeds that have their source in the concupiscence of the flesh. Affections are also joined with the reactions of affectivity and with deeds to which these reactions create a stimulus. When we speak of the need for integration, that is, for the correct incorporation of all that proceeds from sensuality and affectivity into an ethically and fully-mature relation of one person to another, then we take fully into account the plasticity of human affection. Affection can develop and adjust to what man consciously forms with his will. The integration of love demands that man consciously forms with his will all that the senses provide him with in the reactions of sensuality and affectivity, so that by thoroughly affirming the value of the person he places all this on the level of a relation between persons and keeps it within the boundaries of a true union of persons.
Subjectivism differs fundamentally from subjectivity, from the subjective profile of every love. Subjectivity belongs to the nature of love which concerns two subjects (a subject), Y and X. Subjectivism, on the other hand, is a distortion of the essence of love — it is such an overgrowth of the subjective moment that the objective value of love becomes partially or completely absorbed and lost In it.
"
Then, interior or exterior deeds are born that have for their object merely the sexual value linked to the person. These deeds remain within the aim of the directional reaction characteristic of sensuality itself: oriented to the “body as a possible object of use”. Thus, they relate to the person in a utilitarian, consumption-oriented way. Whether the deeds are exterior or only interior depends on a large extent on the structure of sensuality itself in a given person.”
The reactions of affectivity also possess a directional character, although their direction differs from that of the reactions of sensuality. Affectivity does not tend toward the using that has for its object the “body and sexus” and seeks an outlet in “bodily love” alone. If we sometimes speak of the need for an affective outlet, it is not in the same sense as when one speaks of a sensory-sexual outlet. Concerning the former, the point is rather a satisfaction of the need for affective lived-experiences themselves, the need to “be in love” with somebody or to suffer someone’s affection (“to be loved”). Affectivity has its separate world of interior and inter-personal facts, which by themselves stay away from the concupiscence of the flesh. Affective love seems to be pure to the extent that any comparison of it to sensual passion amounts to a debasement and brutalization.
However, it does not constitute a positive and full solution to the problem of the concupiscence of the flesh. At most, affective love move this problem away from the field of consciousness, even bringing into the relation of a woman to a man (or viceversa) that idealization we spoke about in the preceding chapter.
What affectivity brings into the reciprocal relation between a woman and a man is still only the “material” of love.
Fully-mature protection against the concupiscence of the flesh is found only in the deep realism of virtue, and the point here is precisely the virtue of chastity. Affectivity, however, and this “idealization” that is born on its substratum in the relation X-Y and Y-X, can be very helpful in forming the virtue of chastity. Nevertheless, even the most delicate natural reactions that arise on the ground of affectivity with respect to “femininity or “masculinity” do not by themselves create an adequately deep basis for the love of the person to crystallize.
In fact, a certain danger exists that the concupiscence of the flesh will absorb these reactions, that it will assimilate them as a kind of “accompaniment” that will obscure its proper relation to the human being of the other sex.
It must be added that when affectivity is not strengthened with virtue but left to its own devices, and in this way made to face the powerful concupiscence of the flesh, it is most often reduced to that role. Indeed, it then adds from itself a certain new moment; it makes love something of a subjective “taboo” in which affection is everything and decides everything.
The problem of subjectivism appears right here, for it is affection more than anything else that introduces a subjective moment into human love. Affection must be distinguished from affectivity. By affectivity we understand the ability to react to certain values connected with the “human being of the other sex” (“femininity” – “masculinity” – “charm” – “strength”). Affection, however, is a subjective psychical fact bound with the reaction to various values, and therefore it is bound with deeds that are formed in the orbit of that reaction, in its extension, so to speak. So, sensual-bodily affections are joined with the reaction of sensuality and with the exterior or interior deeds that have their source in the concupiscence of the flesh. Affections are also joined with the reactions of affectivity and with deeds to which these reactions create a stimulus. When we speak of the need for integration, that is, for the correct incorporation of all that proceeds from sensuality and affectivity into an ethically and fully-mature relation of one person to another, then we take fully into account the plasticity of human affection. Affection can develop and adjust to what man consciously forms with his will. The integration of love demands that man consciously forms with his will all that the senses provide him with in the reactions of sensuality and affectivity, so that by thoroughly affirming the value of the person he places all this on the level of a relation between persons and keeps it within the boundaries of a true union of persons.
Subjectivism differs fundamentally from subjectivity, from the subjective profile of every love. Subjectivity belongs to the nature of love which concerns two subjects (a subject), Y and X. Subjectivism, on the other hand, is a distortion of the essence of love — it is such an overgrowth of the subjective moment that the objective value of love becomes partially or completely absorbed and lost In it.
"