Should A.I. ever be granted rights?

[Rolltide]

We’ve explored the idea of artificially created beings and their soul-status (and basic rights) in two of our anthologies:

Infinite Space, Infinite God (Catholic themed SF) didn’t look at AIs so much as genetically engineered beings and artificially created bodies that housed the human intellect, as well as clones. http://tinyurl.com/isigamazon

In Leaps of Faith (general Christian SF), androids were the object of discussion. This has an interesting parallel to the discussion here, because the (Anglican) archbishop was saying that he’d as soon give the sacraments to his TV tan an android. Meanwhile, one of the priests is marrying and baptizing the children of android/human marriages. tinyurl.com/lofamazon

This topic was also, of course, famously discussed in the Star Trek: The Next Generation Episode “The Measure of a Man”, where Data was put on trial to determine whether he could be forced to submit to a dangerous experiment because he wasn’t “really” living. The question posed was simply, “Does Data have a soul”? They concluded that such a question could never truly be answered, but he was granted the right to refuse the experiment.

 

[cymonk]

This topic was also, of course, famously discussed in the Star Trek: The Next Generation Episode “The Measure of a Man”, where Data was put on trial to determine whether he could be forced to submit to a dangerous experiment because he wasn’t “really” living. The question posed was simply, “Does Data have a soul”? They concluded that such a question could never truly be answered, but he was granted the right to refuse the experiment.

Go Star Trek… The Simpsons probably covered this too.

 

[po18guy]

All “rights” have their origin in God alone. Among other documents in the secular world, The US declaration of Independence recognizes this. Since those rights come from God, and apply to His ultimate creation in man (who is capable of returning love to God), no such rights apply to man-made creations. This would equate, at some level, man with God inasmuch as man would be the bestower of rights upon his own creation (A.I.). Should any form of A.I. be somehow granted “rights”, would it not then follow that it would also possess a legal foundation for authority over man, in similar fashion to that granted to courts and judges with jurisdiction over, for example, accused lawbreakers? Could this not progress to a point at which we find ourselves subject to the electronic whims and glitches endemic to A.I.? Man, the imperfect, remains incapable of creating perfection.

At some stage, A.I. may be brought to a form nearer perfection than any single human or assembly of humans may possess, based upon the advantages of the cumulative nature of its intellect - sourced in a conglomeration of human reason and intelligence. This entity, if granted “rights”, could/would then be viewed as superior to man, and capable of consultation, if not control, over legal, moral and ethical matters. Would we then have created our own god? Would we then have reached the age of HAL9000?

 

[KarinaFabian]

This topic was also, of course, famously discussed in the Star Trek: The Next Generation Episode “The Measure of a Man”, where Data was put on trial to determine whether he could be forced to submit to a dangerous experiment because he wasn’t “really” living. The question posed was simply, “Does Data have a soul”? They concluded that such a question could never truly be answered, but he was granted the right to refuse the experiment.

I remember that episode. I also remember not being very impressed with their decision, though it’s been so long I don’t remember why.

Still, it’s not a new question, to be sure and I’m sure the Simpsons have covered it. Haven’t they covered just about everything?

I don’t think any of us are trying to add to Scripture here. Just wondering how Scripture applies to such a considerations–and let’s face it, ancient Man would not have understood if God had come down and said, “Someday, you’ll create artificial intelligence, so just remember…” That’s why we have a living Church.

 

[Anthony_A]

Thank you all for this latest batch of replies. Good points raised by all - I’ll address a few here:

Sailor Kenshin,
I suppose you’re right that animals have no rights afforded to them, it’s more of restrictions put on us humans. For instance, you can’t skin a dog and pop its eyeballs out for amusement. Or maybe I’m completely off. Maybe there aren’t any legal restrictions (I’m not fluent in law) but there are certainly common decency restrictions we place on ourselves. Someone wrote about this earlier in the thread when discussing virtue theory.

Aeropagite,
If you look carefully at one of my previous posts, I mentioned how I think that AI actually would have an immaterial nature. I’m taking the position of a functionalist - the view that the mind is an immaterial property that ‘emerges’ when a sufficiently complex functional system is active. So, I think if/when AI gets to that level of sophistication where they have a component which functions in the same complex way that a brain does, an immaterial consciousness will be found. You could always object to functionalism if you wish. (side note: most functionalists would not agree with me when I say the emergent property of consciousness is immaterial).

Cymonk,
You bring a very interesting point which I have been thinking about lately. You say

“For instance, we might be able to program some of our “conscience” into it, but I don’t think we will be as good of a programmer as God is.”

And I think you might be on to something here. Since, in general, I find myself trying to be a Thomist, this might be the distinction that needs to be made. Remember, Aquinas never really talks about “consciousness” as we talk about it today. He was concerned with the “intellect”. So this is probably right. Even if we manage to get conscious AI robots, it would still be man made and would lack the human intellectual soul, and this is because it would lack the form of man.

Now as for whether this kind of distinction works outside of a Thomist metaphysical system is another question, but I would think the Thomist (or at least I) would have to make that clear distinction between consciousness and intellect.

Even though I have been arguing in favor of AI, I want to specify that I don’t necessarily think that we will achieve true AI in the next decade or the next 100 years. I want to say that my arguments have been for AI in principle should the progress ever occur. Also I should note that I don’t think any AI robot we have seen to date is anywhere near “true” AI. Again, this more speculative theorizing than preparing for the new I-Phone release.

 

[Areopagite]

If you look carefully at one of my previous posts, I mentioned how I think that AI actually would have an immaterial nature. I’m taking the position of a functionalist - the view that the mind is an immaterial property that ‘emerges’ when a sufficiently complex functional system is active. So, I think if/when AI gets to that level of sophistication where they have a component which functions in the same complex way that a brain does, an immaterial consciousness will be found. You could always object to functionalism if you wish. (side note: most functionalists would not agree with me when I say the emergent property of consciousness is immaterial).

I see what you’re saying. Well, Aquinas would say,* interestingly, that material things can never affect immaterial things … unless of course the immaterial thing specifically allows itself to be affected.* This is because the nature of physical things is such that it can only touch physical things. Immaterial things, however, can affect physical things, as is evident with God, angels, and even us, because our will is immaterial and yet our choices affect physical actions. He also says that in the case of, for example (and there are countless ones), of feeling something with our senses and then, with our intellect, understanding what it is, it may seem that the physical is affecting the non-physical. But really, the intellect is allowing it to be affected by the physical sense perception insofar as the intellect “looks” at it. Our emotions (which are physical) and our will (which is immaterial) works much the same way (but that’s another discussion).

In the case of the theory of emergent consciousness due to complexity, it violates this Thomistic (and Aristotelian) principle … and I believe Plato would even agree with them. For it would be that a physical thing creates an immaterial thing, without the immaterial thing’s consent (for something that does not exist cannot consent to being created).

Our intellect’s existence is not due to the complexity of our brain. Our intellect resides in the soul and not the body whatsoever. The brain’s function (as held by Aristotle) is to process mental data from the senses into a coherent capacity so that our intellect can then use it to come up with immaterial concepts and thus understand the underlying truths that the data points to. The more complex our brain, the more it can juggle around large amounts of sensory images and impulses in a quick and efficient manner for the intellect to then understand. The clearer and larger the data, the more reliable the conclusions our intellect can make.

In theory, an animal could have a brain as complex as ours but still not have an intellect (and, hence, not a consciousness either) because it would have an animal soul and not a human soul. Complexity in the physical makeup does not result in a specific immaterial reality.

I’ve thought about this a lot and really want to go on and on and on on on. But … I won’t. I won’t be offended if you’re not buying it. There’s a couple elaborations that would help but that I’ll save for later (in necessary).

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

Thank you all for this latest batch of replies. Good points raised by all - I’ll address a few here:

Sailor Kenshin,
I suppose you’re right that animals have no rights afforded to them, it’s more of restrictions put on us humans. For instance, you can’t skin a dog and pop its eyeballs out for amusement. Or maybe I’m completely off. Maybe there aren’t any legal restrictions (I’m not fluent in law) but there are certainly common decency restrictions we place on ourselves. Someone wrote about this earlier in the thread when discussing virtue theory.

.

Animal ‘rights’ have nothing to do with the good work performed by the ASPCA, or with rejecting kindness to animals. The animal-‘rights’ movement is not about common decency but degrading humans to the level of meat without spirit.

PETA calls meat-eaters murderers, destroys public and private property, and is apparently just fine with abortion.

I repeat, they have no rights. They are animals. Only human beings with a God-created soul can have rights.

How many in the animal ‘rights’ movement do the actual dirty work of rescue and rehabilitiation of animals from cruel and abusive owners? How many have no qualms whatever about destroying human life from conception to natural end?

Look up the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement. Eye-opening, to say the least.

And if you think PETA is bad, wait until the ‘machine-rights’ activists start destroying public and private property in pursuit of their agenda.

It’s not about affording respect to other forms of life. It’s about flouting the law of God.

 

[Anthony_A]

I’ve thought about this a lot and really want to go on and on and on on on. But … I won’t. I won’t be offended if you’re not buying it. There’s a couple elaborations that would help but that I’ll save for later (in necessary).

Thanks for such a thoughtful reply. I have to apologize for using the term “emerges” which then lead to your rejection of physical to mental causation. Laziness kept me from explaining the actual theory is use for this - supervenience.

Supervenience is easiest to explain using an example. I typically use this one - when an object is constructed in 360 degrees, the shape of a circle (or ‘circleness’) supervenes on the object. To be clear, this is not a 1, 2, … procedure. The object has the supervenient property. Chalmers explains supervenience with the following examples:

“Even God could not have created a world that was physically identical to ours but biologically distinct. There is simply no logical space for the biological facts to independently vary.” (in this example biology is the supervenient property of the physical facts)

“If there is a living kangaroo in this world, then any world that is physically identical to this world will contain a physically identical kangaroo, and that kangaroo will automatically be alive.”

And so in this way I think I have side stepped your problem of physical to mental causation. Any action (like raising your arm) will have a neural base and a mental supervenient base. So consciousness becomes a supervenient property of my physical composition. So consciousness, the immaterial thing in question, is not created by the physical (nor does it emerge in the same way that biology does not emerge from the physical facts of my body), it supervenes on the physical.

As for animals, I think they are conscious, but a “lighter shade” so to speak. I think that self-consciousness is a property that could only supervene on a physically complex organisms such as our brains. A system would have to be smart enough to be aware of itself in the way that we are. In this way I think that AI could have consciousness - perhaps even self consciousness. And in this way I do not think that consciousness entails human intellect (because of my thinking that animals have consciousness yet do not have the human intellect).

This is all in direct opposition to your statement, “Complexity in the physical makeup does not result in a specific immaterial reality.” which I think you may be arguing against the evidence. I think it is pretty safe to say that a monkey, a dog, a horse, a cow, etc are all consciously experiencing the world. I believe that their conscious experience is immaterial just like ours - for example I don’t think the sensation of of pain a horse feels when it breaks its leg is completely reducible to physical terms. At the same time, I think its safe to say that these animals are having less of a conscious experience than we are because they are not aware that they are aware. To me, you need a more sophisticated brain to be able to do that self reflection. To put it in a way that you mentioned: the less complex an animal brain is, the less it can juggle around and ultimately be aware of.

I’ll even be bold and say that I’m giving a more (perhaps not completely) Thomistic account than you are. My gradation of consciousness and intellect is based on the complexity of the brain, but it would also have to rely on body it is put in. For instance, a human brain put in a box (aside from being dead) would not be able to see or hear - it has no eyes or ears. So when Aquinas talks of the form of man, I think he is taking into consideration all of the physical aspects of man as well. To clarify, if a human brain was put into a dog’s body, it would not have the rational (intellectual) soul of man because it has got the wrong body. Or if you want to leave the brain of this, a human soul could never occupy a dog’s body because it simply isn’t in the form of man. My point is that the brain, and the complexity of our, is an essential feature to the form of man. I do understand that Aquinas say that thought does not go on in the brain, and I’m with him. The supervenient property of an immaterial self-conscious mental life is “where” the thought would be going down.

I too could go on and on but I’ll wait for your reply.

 

[Anthony_A]

Sailor Kenshin,

I think you may be committing one major ad hominem. So what if people in these animal rights organizations are hypocrites? It still doesn’t detract from the message they want to spread. Much in the same way that The Crusades and Spanish Inquisition are examples of hypocrisy, but to say the Catholic Church is in vain because of the people in it is attacking the person and not the doctrines.

 

[Anthony_A]

Man, the imperfect, remains incapable of creating perfection.

Would AI have to be perfect to work? If man is imperfect, yet still capable of abstraction, he could always make an imperfect - AI. Also, the only thing perfect is God. So, yea man could not make God, but since AI isn’t thought of as being perfect your argument doesn’t really work.

 

[Newbot]

Correct me if I am wrong, but does this idea of a ‘supervenient reality’ and an underlying ‘physical reality’ correspond to Aristotle’s form and matter? Your example of the circle seems to suggest it – that there are such and such material parts related at equal angles or however one might express it, which constitute the ‘physical reality’, but because they are so related they possess a certain form, namely circularity, which is the ‘supervenient reality’. Put another way, one does not create the other, but both are aspects or components of a single real thing.

And with the kangaroo, it is a creature with such and such organs arranged in such a way, skin with such and such a molecular composition, etc. (this being the matter), and as a result the whole must have the nature or form of ‘kangarooness’. And you also said, “Any action (like raising your arm) will have a neural base and a mental supervenient base.” Which seems to me very similar to what Aristotle said when he wrote that a passion such as anger has a bodily or material aspect (blood pounding, turning red, etc.) and a formal aspect (the experience moving us to action etc.).

Let me know if this is remotely similar to what you were saying. If so, your disagreement with Areopagite would simply be on the basis that matter and form are correlative, and matter is adapted to its form. Or put another way, it is not that we have a material thing and a immaterial thing with animals or animal-like AIs; rather there is a physical or material aspect and a supervening or formal aspect of the same one thing, consciousness (meaning, I presume, an awareness of sensation, emotion, etc.) belonging to the supervening aspect.

If, however, there is some faculty belonging to men which has no corresponding bodily organ, such that it could exist separate from any body, then it would not seem to be a faculty that could supervene upon a body. It might use the body; it might rely on the body so completely that it could not function without it. But one could not simply point to the the existence of appropriate physical makeup and conclude that thus this other creature also possesses the faculty. I believe this is what Areopagite is saying, that the intellect must be such a separable aspect or reality of humans, since its object is reality abstracted from material (to a greater or lesser degree).

I hope I haven’t sidetracked this (most interesting) conversation too much, but I find this idea of supervenience intriguing and want to make sure I understand it.

Newbot

 

[Anthony_A]

Newbot,

I can’t find any objection to your understanding of supervenience - I think you have a clear picture of it. It’s funny that you bring up Aristotle because I wrote a paper in Ancient Philosophy called “Supervenience and the Forms” in which I basically connected the dots as you have done. I don’t know for sure that there is any difference in supervenience and Aristotle’s forms. I have not read any paper on the history of supervenience or a very advanced technical article solely on supervenience. Intuitively I want to say there has to be something different about the theories. If not, why on earth did philosophers make up such an ugly word when the continued use of “form” would of sufficed?

You make a interesting observation the arguments put forth by myself and Aeropagite. Perhaps the intellect is something not even reducible to the mental? Is that what you might be saying? This kind of troubles me because now we have moved from dualism (physical & nonphysical) to a “trism” (?) (physical, nonphysical, and ?) Maybe we call it dualism just the same but the dualism involves 3 parts (1 physical and 2 nonphysical). To me this gets on really shaky ground though. There is already an interaction problem between physical and nonphysical things which the theory I put forth might take care of (the immaterial being another “aspect”). If we are to add another component to this mix, especially a component which you say does not supervene on the physical but nevertheless is there and uses the physical (and the mental?!) I fear I might have to jump ship

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

Sailor Kenshin,

I think you may be committing one major ad hominem. So what if people in these animal rights organizations are hypocrites? It still doesn’t detract from the message they want to spread. Much in the same way that The Crusades and Spanish Inquisition are examples of hypocrisy, but to say the Catholic Church is in vain because of the people in it is attacking the person and not the doctrines.

In what way are the Crusades and the Inquisition examples of hypocrisy, and what on earth do they have to do with the fact that animals can NOT have rights, nor can machines?

 

[HickmanJosh]

The day A.I. starts believing in God is the day it should be given rights. The day A.I. starts lieing is the day it should be destroyed.
HickmanJosh

 

[Anthony_A]

In what way are the Crusades and the Inquisition examples of hypocrisy, and what on earth do they have to do with the fact that animals can NOT have rights, nor can machines?

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem

The Crusades and Inquisitions are examples of hypocrisy because of all the, you know, murders that took place in the name of God. And I don’t know that you are right with your claim that animals can’t have rights. Care to elaborate beyond a question begging argument as to why animals can’t have rights, even if it’s humans within a certain legal system who afford them the rights?

Just in case you need this one too:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Question_begging

 

[Newbot]

I’m glad that what I said was accurate .

This kind of troubles me because now we have moved from dualism (physical & nonphysical) to a “trism” (?) (physical, nonphysical, and ?) Maybe we call it dualism just the same but the dualism involves 3 parts (1 physical and 2 nonphysical).

You bring up a good point, and one which confuses me as well. I do not think Areopagite, and I know I did not, wish to suggest a ‘trism’ in things; yet if, as you say, we suppose that in a single being, there are, beyond the physical component, both supervening and non-supervening elements, it is hard to see how we can avoid considering them distinct components and hence ending up with a trism. In Aristotelean terms, if matter and form are correlative, and we already have a matter and a form, what is this third component which is not correlative to any matter?

Before going into this, I would like to make sure I am clear on a few points. You seem to be using ‘nonphysical’ and ‘immaterial’ synonymously. By ‘physical’, I believe, is meant what is material in a thing: such and such atoms, perhaps in such and such an arrangement (which would, if the instance of the circle is correct, already imply some supervenience, but we would call it material relative to some further possible supervenience… perhaps?); so that the nonphysical would be what is not so. This would be a distinction different from that between a physical or nonphysical thing: a physical thing would be what possesses such a physical component, while a nonphysical thing would be what lacks it (if anything does lack it; presumably angels would be an instance).

If the above (which is rather vague) be true, then it seems conceivable that although this supervenient aspect is called immaterial to distinguish it from the physical aspect, that does not mean that it can exist separate from the physical aspect. Circularity seems a case of this: although it may be called immaterial (and rightly, as we are using the word) this does not mean that there can be any circularity unless this block of wood, say, is shaped like a circle. It still needs the physical component, and together with it makes a single physical thing. At the same time, neither does this exclude the possibility of something immaterial and separate from any physical aspect (again, the angels seem to be an instance).

Which leads again to your difficulty. Can there be some creature which has a dualism such that it is constituted of one physical and one nonphysical component, and yet be such that the nonphysical component is both supervenient and separable from the body? In other words, such that although it has in some way a supervenience with regard to the body (making sensation, consciousness, etc. possible), this supervenience is not all that it is – when the body is gone, it still may persist? I must say this leaves me rather confused, and I hope Areopagite or you will be able to clarify this.

Incidentally, I’m a little unsure what you mean by ‘mental’. Presumably not all supervenient properties are mental: circularity, for instance, is not mental. Likewise plants, although we call them living, do not seem capable of mental activity: rather we call them living because they grow, nourish themselves, reproduce, etc. If mental means merely the processing of sensory information performed by the brain, then it would seem correct to say that intellectual thought is not mental, since it is abstract. However, we often use ‘mental’ to refer to all thought, whether at the level of imagination or intellect. I hope I’m not misunderstanding you here.

Newbot

 

[fosio]

For a while I arguing this point on campus quite a bit, but I’m reassessing my position as of late. I’m particularly influenced by David Chalmers’ book “The Conscious Mind” in which he argues for what he calls “natural dualism”.

This theory says that consciousness is not a logical necessity of a complex neural system because he constructs an argument for philosophical zombies (creatures that are physically identical to us, yet lack consciousness and thus qualitative experiences). Though, he says, it is a natural (contingent) fact of the world that when we have a sufficiently complex neural system (the brain) that consciousness arises. Therefore he comes to his “natural dualism” conclusion.

One should always be in a state of reassessment, but that book is a poor basis to reassess from. I would recommend “Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem” instead. Also this paper by Karen Bennett

people.cornell.edu/pages/kb383/zombies.pdf
written while she was at Princeton

One can be a “physicalist” and still be a Christian and one should always let yourself “run free” in philosophy. If your line of thought leads you to a philosophical conclusion incompatible with your faith, then deal with it at that point by either rejecting your faith or rejecting philosophy or reason – but don’t preemptively deal with it by precluding some positions from consideration on the basis of faith.

There are many problems with Chalmer’s zombie argument but here’s one that is so plainly obvious that I am surprised his argument has gained so much currency or efforts to refute it. Let’s suppose that both physicalism is true and that there is some intrinsic connection between the physical arrangement of the brain and consciousness – some connection that we do not grasp or conceive at present. Well, in that case, you would STILL be able to “conceive” of those zombies since we do not grasp their impossibility in our minds at present and Chalmer’s argument would “work” just as – poorly. The fundamental problem with his argument is that there is no way to tell whether his argument in fact works without knowing whether there is in fact some intrinsic connection between the physical order of the brain and consciousness – his argument thus accomplishes nothing since the question it sets out to decide must itself be decided BEFORE we can tell whether his argument works at all.

If we had a comprehensive understanding of the physical order of the brain and human physiology then his argument could work. But no one has such an understanding.

My suspicion is that the key to consciousness lies in the quantum properties of the brain and human physiology. I think it a mistake to limit the operation of consciousness to the brain since our extremities are “conscious” too, we are conscious in them.

Later in his book he argues that if A.I. had a comparable complex functional device like the brain we should expect for the robot to actually have consciousness and experience qualia.

The fact that experience of qualia is necessary for consciousness suggests that consciousness is intimately and intrinsically connected with the physical since qualia are all grounded in physical experience or memory thereof or imagination thereupon. If dualism were true, consciousness ought be possible without qualia.

It is a mistake to equate function with consciousness. One can be completely immobile, completely paralyzed and yet be conscious.

We generally agree that a dog has a conscious experience of the world, so why wouldn’t A.I. be able to?

Becaus consciousness is not about function but about awareness which is an internal understanding. Searle’s arguments have shown that symbol manipulation which is the basis for all of today’s computing can never have consciousness. There must be a synergy of qualia and internal understanding that gives rise to consciousness.

 

[Anthony_A]

Newbot,

I fear now you have moved into a misunderstanding - partly from my usage of vague terms that I don’t spell out entirely. I apologize, it’s just when you are so deep within a particular field you tend to talk as though everyone knows what you mean by such and such word. So, to answer some questions:

Yes, immaterial and non-physical are the same concept. Just a slight nitpick with your definition of a physical thing. A physical thing is something that is physical - like a staple. The reason I want to clarify from what you said (“what possesses such a physical component”) is because by that definition, I am a physical thing. This certainly isn’t completely false because I surely do have a physical body. I’d even say that most of me is physical. Yet, I consider myself both physical and non-phsyical (dual) since I have a non-physical aspect to me. So, a physical thing would be something that is wholly physical. And yes, an angel would be an example of a non-physical (immaterial) being. So would God.

Your 3rd paragraph is wonderful. You bring up a very good point about the supervenient property of “circleness” not being able to exist without the physical base. I hope I did not lead you on to thinking that all supervenient properties are non-physical. Indeed I would have to say that “circleness” is a supervenient property which is physical (has no non-physical component). As are probably 99% of other supervenient properties. Just think of the example where biology was the supervenient property. The biological facts are surely physical.

Think of it this way: biology is grounded in chemistry, and chemistry is grounded in physics. Yet, biologists don’t do work on the physics level - it’s too “basic” for their purposes and so they work at the biological level. And biology is what it is - when I say “oww my stomach hurts” I don’t mean to say “oww there are atoms and quarks moving in such and such way to produce a stimulation of c-fibers in my brain which then…” (this maybe be a sketchy example because it gets into a debate of whether the first statement about my stomach is actually a useful statement. Statements of this sort are called Folk Psychological statements…and it’s just not a debate I want to get in)

Like I said earlier, when it comes to supervenience, most of the properties are physical. The mind happens to be that one percent which isn’t, and, upon short reflection, I really don’t know if I’m willing to say that there are any other supervenient properties which aren’t physical.

What I meant by “mental” is the things which the mind does such as think, will, perceive, experience emotions. So my concern was that you seemed to be bringing in a 3rd part which would be using date present in the physical (my body) and all the date in my mind (as listed above) and then do its abstract, rational thinking. So what I want to say is: No need for a 3rd party. This abstract thinking goes on in me. I just happen to have 2 aspects to me, a physical and a non-physical. Therefore when I am thinking an abstract thought, such as the universal conception of circularity, you will be able to spot out neural correlates in my brain, and that is the physical “part” of that thought. The non-physical “part” will not be reducible to the neural correlate, but only observable in my inner, subjective self experience.

You are concerned whether that immaterial aspect is enough, so to speak, to survive my death. And, this is probably where I will lose you and most anyone else who is even moderately interested in my position. I don’t think it is important for an immaterial aspect of a person to “survive” physical death. The reason I think this is because I “look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come”. When we overly concern ourselves a soul surviving death we tend to shoot the physical world down in terms of importance. But when you look at the world as God created it - it sure is physical. Like I said earlier, I would think that the mind is about the only non-physical thing existent (aside from angels and God) so that leaves the other 99% of the universe as being physical. This, I think, is not a mistake.

When we focus on immateriality as the true essence of being (instead of a dual aspect) I think we make a statement that the physical world is somehow a mistaken reality. I can’t help but take very seriously the fact that the second person of God - The Son - became man, experienced the physical world, experienced physical pain, experienced a physical death, and ultimately experienced a physical resurrection. I know my position on persistence after death is not common, I hope you will at least consider my reasons for not thinking its of the utmost importance (and indeed I want to say that it doesn’t happen).

 

[Anthony_A]

Fosio,

I’m not entirely sure what you are accusing me of. You seem to attribute some sort of blind faith to me, or a commitment to Cartestian dualism (or both?). I hope I haven’t implied that physicalism is incompatible with Christianity. I think if you read my latest response to Newbot you will find my position damn near physicalism. Ultimately I’m not opposed to changing my position to physicalism in the future, I just don’t see a full physical reduction of the mental phenomena happening. And to clarify, my position is not Cartesian dualism. Cartesian (substance) dualism is much more committed to the immaterial than I am. I take property dualism (double aspect theory) to be true.

My reply to your Zombie argument objection:

I have never denied that there is a physical correlate to consciousness. I do think there is one - one that is intrinsic as you say. I’m not sure if you read my explanation of supervenience, but rest assured that (in at least my theory) an immaterial consciousness is tied at the core to the physical system of the brain.

Perhaps I am misreading you, but you do not seem to have a firm grasp of what exactly Chalmers is trying to accomplish. With the zombie argument, Chalmers wants to show that consciousness is ultimately not reducible to the brain. He doesn’t want to say that consciousness has nothing to do with the bran, just that you can’t reduce conscious experience to a physical explanation.

As for your scenario where physicalism is true and we would still be able to conceive the zombies, here is where it would ultimately happen:
We would say “Okay Chalmers, I can conceive of a zombie world much in the way that I can conceive of a trillion-billion sided square. But just because I can conceive the zombies does not mean its possible. In fact, it would not at all be possible because whenever you are consciously experiencing any ‘mental’ state (like the qualia of pain) I can show and explain to you how this experience is entirely a physical one.”

To say this you would have to account for pain not just at the neural correlative level (c-fiber stimulation) but also the subjective experience of what it’s like to be in pain. That, Chalmers and I argue, is not reducible to physical terms.

Your understanding and objection of functionalism is even weaker. You say: *“It is a mistake to equate function with consciousness. One can be completely immobile, completely paralyzed and yet be conscious.” * I have never denied this. This sort of objection may be applicable to a Behaviorist theory of mind, but not my property dualistic functional account. In fact, I’m with you 100% that you could be completely immobile and be conscious. You might to carefully re-read my posts and see that I have argued that the mind is a function of the brain - when the brain attains an “internal understanding” of itself you then have consciousness.

Just a side issue, but have you actually read Chalmers’ book? Your flippant dismissal of his work is concerning. You questioned my motives for entertaining dualism (which if you actually expect that to work as a refutation you would be commiting the genetic fallacy) but that certainly cannot be said of Chalmers - he is an atheist.

 

[Anthony_A]

A note to anyone else who wants to ask me a question or raise an objection:
I’ll be leaving in the morning for a short vacation and I don’t know if I will have access to a computer with an internet connection. So, I will respond to any further comments as soon as I can.