This may also be a major contributor to why people do not want to pursue ethical thinking to its appropriate end. Even if their own moral senses tell them some action is wrong, the unwillingness to appear “holier than thou” and, perhaps, even the accusations of it may be dissuasive to right moral thinking. Think about who launches the “holier than thou” accusation. It is usually someone with a moral agenda of some kind, typically in opposition to the one stated.
That is why I think the OP was quite careful about saying these were his authentic moral “feelings” and did not want to portray them as anything else.
This is an untenable moral position because it presumes to “lump in” homosexuality as a legitimate moral behavior. Let’s apply this thinking, as you say, to “any group.”
"Before you make a generalization about any group - sex addicts, murderers, thieves, child abusers, pimps, stamp collectors, politicians, lawyers…put yourself in that sentence. Think about how you would feel if others were to marginalize one of these groups if you belonged to it.
The problem with this argument is that it presumes that your presence in the group is going to nullify your moral feelings about the kind of behavior undertaken by the group, the moral rightness of that behavior and any truthful conclusions you could arrive at as a member.
I understand this is a difficult point to understand, but just my membership in a group is not what legitimizes that group. That should not be the basis upon which anything is justified morally. My being a pimp does not make pimping legitimate. To argue that others don’t know what it’s like to be a pimp and therefore they should be more tolerant of the pursuit is an appeal to egoism. Your claim is that one must have their ego embrace the behavior before they have any right to make a judgement about the behaviour. The snake, in other words, was right, Eve had to taste the fruit before she really understood the full moral implications of the act. No one else, not even God presumably, would have a right to judge her action until they, too, took a bite.
So far, the argument against the opening post has been an appeal to emotion and nothing but. Here’s how it breaks down
Qoeleth stated he has certain feelings about homosexual behavior (disgust, repulsion, etc) that he is naturally inclined to have.
Others have raised grave concern about his natural inclination of being repulsed by homosexual behavior because there do exist in the world certain individuals who have certain feelings or inclinations, attractions really, towards others of their same sex.
So, the claim is that Qoeleth is wrong because he has certain natural feelings, but that he should abandon these because others have certain other feelings, also apparently “natural,” they they should be allowed to follow. For some undisclosed reason their feelings should trump his feelings. The question Qoeleth is asking, and quite legitimately so, is why should their feelings take precedence over his? It would seem unfair to legitimize some feelings and not others, no?
More importantly, he is asking why should those particular feelings (same sex attractions) be legitimized when people are inclined to have all kinds of “feelings” about things that lead to morally questionable practices. Feelings or attractions are not the best indicators of right conduct precisely because they lead, frequently without thought or reason, to nasty consequences.
The ultimate moral question in dispute here is, “Why should these feelings of same sex attraction be legitimized when many ostensibly equal and even more commonly experienced feelings are not?”
Most people are inclined to have feelings of anger or hate towards others and most of us have been in “this group” many times in our lives. Why is it not legitimate to give into these feelings and carry out what we are feeling? It would appear that “just feeling” something is not sufficient to give a mode of behavior moral approval, nor should it be when it comes to feelings of same sex attraction. Yet that would seem to be the only point being made in support of the position.
Aristotle had it fundamentally right when he claimed that emotions should be ordered to properly reasoned ends. It seems to me that Queleth has properly ordered emotions because they are in line with the appropriate ends of sexual capacity. Others are arguing he should disorder his emotions and align them instead to an embrace of same sex attraction because of (unsubstantiated) claims that no proper ends exist when it comes to sex. This group, fundamentally, is proposing that sex has no purpose except to be gratified. These people need to read Nichomachean Ethics to gain a different perspective, one not grounded on impulse.
I am still waiting for someone to properly address the amorous alien problem in post #18 and explain why sexual relations with this alien would be any more wrong than with another person of the same sex?
