St. Thomas' Argument from Contingency

[polytropos]

Either there is a reason why God chose to create A and not B, and than we have a problem for Actus Purus or there isn’t, in which case the fact that A was created was just by chance.

This is a false dichotomy. Both worlds are good. God can create either of them; he has a reason to do so. He does not need a reason not to create the world he does not create. There are infinite such worlds.

It is not by chance either, anymore than anyone’s choice between two contraries can be rightly said to be by chance.

Anyway, if God created A, then God had a will to create A and if God created B, then he had a will to create B. Since god is Actus Purus, there is no distinction in Him, so God doesn’t have a will, He is His will. And since He can apparently have two wills, there are two possible Actus Purus, which is incoherent.

As I said earlier, “He created world A. That doesn’t mean that he does not in A still have reasons for creating B which he could have created but did not, and which is also good. It simply means that he created A. His acting one way or another does not change him substantially (it is “a mere Cambridge change”).” The situation you propose does not imply that God would have different wills in different possible worlds.

 

[polytropos]

God’s nature is logically necssary, that means that because of the laws of logic, God’s nature cannot be other than what it is and, which means that the necsseary existence of god presupposes logic. IOW logic is based on the nature of God which is based on logic which is based on the nature of God … and infinite regress.

The mistake being made by others here is to suppose that there are laws of logic that in some sense govern the nature of things. This seems to be a mistake. We can use modal logic to talk about God’s necessity, but on the ontological level, God’s necessity has nothing to do with being on some index that says, “God exists in all possible worlds.”

(Possible worlds are, of course, a completely human-centric metric for this sort of thing. The reason God is necessary is because his nature is self-subsistent. To say he’s necessary is purely descriptive. To propose a possible world is to make a judgment based on our intuitions about contingency.)

 

[belorg]

The mistake being made by others here is to suppose that there are laws of logic that in some sense govern the nature of things. This seems to be a mistake. We can use modal logic to talk about God’s necessity, but on the ontological level, God’s necessity has nothing to do with being on some index that says, “God exists in all possible worlds.”

(Possible worlds are, of course, a completely human-centric metric for this sort of thing. The reason God is necessary is because his nature is self-subsistent. To say he’s necessary is purely descriptive. To propose a possible world is to make a judgment based on our intuitions about contingency.)

The question is: can God make it so that logic is different from what it is?

 

[belorg]

This is a false dichotomy. Both worlds are good. God can create either of them; he has a reason to do so. He does not need a reason not to create the world he does not create. There are infinite such worlds.

It doesn’t matter whether both worlds are good or not.
And of course he does need a reason not to create A insteadof B. And that reason is a preference.

It is not by chance either, anymore than anyone’s choice between two contraries can be rightly said to be by chance.

My choice bewteen two contraries depends on my preference.

As I said earlier, "He created world A. That doesn’t mean that he does not in A still have reasons for creating B which he could have created but did not,

Why didn’t He create B when he had reason to create it?

and which is also good. It simply means that he created A. His acting one way or another does not change him substantially (it is “a mere Cambridge change”)." The situation you propose does not imply that God would have different wills in different possible worlds.

It is not a Cambridge change. God in W1 wills the creation of A and in W2 wills the creation of B. The reasons for this are completely withing God, they are not relational changes because the will is prior to the existence of A or B, so the cahnge is not in A or b but in God.

 

[belorg]

The mistake being made by others here is to suppose that there are laws of logic that in some sense govern the nature of things. This seems to be a mistake. We can use modal logic to talk about God’s necessity, but on the ontological level, God’s necessity has nothing to do with being on some index that says, “God exists in all possible worlds.”

(Possible worlds are, of course, a completely human-centric metric for this sort of thing. The reason God is necessary is because his nature is self-subsistent. To say he’s necessary is purely descriptive. To propose a possible world is to make a judgment based on our intuitions about contingency.)

Can God have a different nature and if not, why not?
If it is just a description, then there is no reason why other descriptions would not be possible.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

The question is: can God make it so that logic is different from what it is?

The laws of logic are necessary entities; if they weren’t, there’s be a possible world in which logic itself doesn’t exist. So no, He can’t.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Can God have a different nature and if not, why not?
If it is just a description, then there is no reason why other descriptions would not be possible.

No, because His nature is necessary.

 

[belorg]

The laws of logic are necessary entities; if they weren’t, there’s be a possible world in which logic itself doesn’t exist. So no, He can’t.

I am glad to hear that. Unfortunately not everybody in this thread seems to agree with that.

 

[belorg]

No, because His nature is necessary.

Polytropos doesn’t seem to agree.

 

[polytropos]

The question is: can God make it so that logic is different from what it is?

No. But that is not because logic is something above God or even intrinsic to God (accept in, perhaps, a very broad, trivial sense).

On Aquinas’s theory of knowledge, the rules of logic are entia rationis (beings of reason). They are mental entities that do not have definite referents in the world. So there are not laws of logic for God to act on and “make different from what [they are].”

The principle of non-contradiction seems to provide some linkage between being and logic, but it is not a foundation for a non-interest-relative logical system.

For instance, what are the laws of logic? People on this forum talk a lot about the laws of logic. (Some have said that God is Logic.) But what we have are logical systems. Some people use quantificational logic. Standard quantificational logic is inconsistent with an empty world, so some people modify it so you cannot prove that something exists from the law of excluded middle. Some (Fred Sommers and James Ross come to mind) have argued that there are problems with quantificational modal logic.

Which logical system we use is interest-relative and mind-dependent. It is more of an issue of dialectic than ontology. There is not something that “logic is.”

 

[polytropos]

The laws of logic are necessary entities; if they weren’t, there’s be a possible world in which logic itself doesn’t exist. So no, He can’t.

Is the Brouwer axiom a “necessary entity”? What would that even mean?

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Is the Brouwer axiom a “necessary entity”? What would that even mean?

Well, I guess necessary truths, but the point still holds.

 

[polytropos]

It doesn’t matter whether both worlds are good or not.

Sure it does. It means that God has a reason to create either of them.

And of course he does need a reason not to create A insteadof B. And that reason is a preference.

I deny that when a choice is made, a rather-than is a necessary condition. That an agent is free and has some reason to act is a sufficient condition of the agent’s action.

My choice bewteen two contraries depends on my preference.

Your choice may depend on your preference, if your preference is a component of your reasons. But it need not be, if your reasons consist in something else.

Why didn’t He create B when he had reason to create it?

Who knows. There are an uncountable infinity of worlds that God had reason to create but did not. The reason is that he chose not to and was not constrained to.

It is not a Cambridge change. God in W1 wills the creation of A and in W2 wills the creation of B. The reasons for this are completely withing God, they are not relational changes because the will is prior to the existence of A or B, so the cahnge is not in A or b but in God.

The reasons for creating A or B are present in any world. The difference between the two worlds is which reasons he acts upon.

 

[belorg]

No. But that is not because logic is something above God or even intrinsic to God (accept in, perhaps, a very broad, trivial sense).

On Aquinas’s theory of knowledge, the rules of logic are entia rationis (beings of reason). They are mental entities that do not have definite referents in the world. So there are not laws of logic for God to act on and “make different from what [they are].”

The principle of non-contradiction seems to provide some linkage between being and logic, but it is not a foundation for a non-interest-relative logical system.

Can something be and not be, Polytropos? If not, why not?

For instance, what are the laws of logic? People on this forum talk a lot about the laws of logic. (Some have said that God is Logic.) But what we have are logical systems. Some people use quantificational logic. Standard quantificational logic is inconsistent with an empty world, so some people modify it so you cannot prove that something exists from the law of excluded middle. Some (Fred Sommers and James Ross come to mind) have argued that there are problems with quantificational modal logic.
Which logical system we use is interest-relative and mind-dependent. It is more of an issue of dialectic than ontology. There is not something that “logic is.”

Do you agree that some things are possible and others are not?

 

[polytropos]

Can God have a different nature and if not, why not?
If it is just a description, then there is no reason why other descriptions would not be possible.

When I say, “To say he’s necessary is purely description,” 1). I am referring to necessity in the logical sense, and 2). I mean extrinsically descriptive. To say that something exists in all possible worlds alone does not tell you everything about it. Possible worlds are (IMO) at best logical constructs that we use to phrase our notions of impossibility, contingency, and necessity. (I would not use that language if other people did not.) My point is that describing God as existing in all possible worlds does not make God’s nature dependent on the “laws” of modal logic, which are interest-relative human dialectical tools.

 

[polytropos]

Can something be and not be, Polytropos? If not, why not?

I said, “The principle of non-contradiction seems to provide some linkage between being and logic, but it is not a foundation for a non-interest-relative logical system.” I hope that did not seem like a repudiation of the principle of non-contradiction, because it was not at all. I am not taking a relativist position with respect to logic. I think the principle of non-contradiction is an ontological principle (grounded in the intelligibility of being). And for that reason it clearly grounds rules of inference like the law of excluded middle. But the law of excluded middle is still an entia rationis and an abstraction from the nature of being.

My point is just that the details of a logical system have a lot to do with what we are using it for, and that the laws of logic are not entities.

Do you agree that some things are possible and others are not?

Yes.

 

[belorg]

Sorry, but that was a typical knee jerk reaction to something you haven’t read. Not only have you refused to read Aquinas’ commentary on the Physics, you haven’t read what I have given in my post ( # 34 ). Read it again. The argument is that your " little push " requies that the movent be brought into existence first. If it doesn’t exist it can’t " push " anything. You can read Aquinas’ commentary to the eighth book of the Physics here:
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Physics8.htm

I was merely responidng to your last sentence “But that the first immobile mover must have infinite power he proves from something previously demonstrated, namely, that it is impossible for something to be moved for an infinite time by a finite power.”

Regardless of the rest of your post, or what Aristotle and Aquinas have to say about the movent needing to be brought into existence first, what you say in this sentence is false.
Infinte motion does not require infinite power. In fact it only needs a tiny amount of power.

 

[belorg]

Sure it does. It means that God has a reason to create either of them.

Yes, but that is not relevant here.

I deny that when a choice is made, a rather-than is a necessary condition. That an agent is free and has some reason to act is a sufficient condition of the agent’s action.

You said yourself that he also has reasons to create B, so, on this logic, the reasons God has to create b are also sufficient conditions of God’s actions.

Your choice may depend on your preference, if your preference is a component of your reasons. But it need not be, if your reasons consist in something else.

But God’s reasons, by your own admission (that he has reasons to create A as well as B), do not consist in anything else.

Who knows. There are an uncountable infinity of worlds that God had reason to create but did not. The reason is that he chose not to and was not constrained to.

And what’s the rason why He chose not to?

The reasons for creating A or B are present in any world. The difference between the two worlds is which reasons he acts upon.

And why does He act upon one reason and not another?
There are only three possibilities: necessity, chance of preference. And only the first is consistent with Actus Purus, but it entails thelogical fatalism.

 

[polytropos]

Yes, but that is not relevant here.

I disagree, for reasons I have given.

You said yourself that he also has reasons to create B, so, on this logic, the reasons God has to create b are also sufficient conditions of God’s actions.

Given the creation of B, God’s reasons to create B (along with his freedom) would be sufficient to explain the existence of B. But a sufficient explanation is not antecedently causally necessary.

And what’s the rason why He chose not to?

And why does He act upon one reason and not another?
There are only three possibilities: necessity, chance of preference. And only the first is consistent with Actus Purus, but it entails thelogical fatalism.

I believe this is a false trilemma. His reasons for creating do not require him to create (for creating is not an end that can improve him and on which he must act), but if he does create, his reasons constitute a sufficient condition of that creation. Reasons for not creating some other world are not required.

 

[belorg]

I disagree, for reasons I have given.

Given the creation of B, God’s reasons to create B (along with his freedom) would be sufficient to explain the existence of B. But a sufficient explanation is not antecedently causally necessary.

I believe this is a false trilemma. His reasons for creating do not require him to create (for creating is not an end that can improve him and on which he must act), but if he does create, his reasons constitute a sufficient condition of that creation. Reasons for not creating some other world are not required.

If A is a sufficient condition for B, that means if A then B, so His reasons to require Him to create. That’s the first part of the trilemma. Unless, of course, His reasons do not constitute a sufficient condition in which case the sufficient condition for creating is either chance or preference. Or perhaps, some kind of infinite regress, but I don’t think you want to open that can of worms.