St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

[Eleve]

No. But I wasn’t claiming to do that, only to correct belorg’s misunderstanding of the doctrine.

 

[davidv]

Which “claim” would that be?

This one:

belorg:

The problem is that under Thomism there is no logical connection between the something in existence (God) and the other things that come into existence.

 

[belorg]

No. When you say something like “U was nothing,” you’re treating U as a singular term, which is exactly what the author of that post was writing against.

The author is writing against using “nothing” as a singular term, not afgainst using U as a singulal term.

And if different theists do use the word differently, that still doesn’t make it terribly impressive to knock down the weakest version. Here, let me give what I take to be a clear explication of the theistic view:
If nothing exists, then nothing can begin to exist.

That is what I, and I would reckon anyone with an actual job in the philosophy of religion, take to be the meaning of Ex nihil nihilo fit. But how is that a problem for theism? According to classical theism, God always existed, so it was never the case that nothing existed.

Becuase that would entail creatio ex deo, which contradicts God’s ilmmutable nature.

 

[belorg]

No. But I wasn’t claiming to do that, only to correct belorg’s misunderstanding of the doctrine.

I do not misunderstand the doctrine, I am just pointing out the logical difficulty tghat Linux was describing. So, to counter my argumejnt, you will have to show that God could logically create something out of absolutely nothing.

 

[belorg]

This one:“The problem is that under Thomism there is no logical connection between the something in existence (God) and the other things that come into existence.”

I have never said that Thomas or any other Thomist claim that, what I say is that Thomism logically entails it.

 

[Paddy_Walker]

The presence of God has nothing to do with the absence of everything else.

the presence of God is not nothing, it is everything since everything was created not from nothing but from the will of God.
do you imagine that God was one area in an infinite space of nothing and that he turned that nothing into U, matter.
there never was any nothing. there was only Gods presence, not nothing. and it was his will which created U from Gods presence, not from nothing.
if you were to unravel matter completely then it would cease to be matter and energy but it would not become nothing. it unravels to become Gods will to create it in his presence. it is always in the mind of God, an eternal being.

 

[belorg]

the presence of God is not nothing, it is everything since everything was created not from nothing but from the will of God.
do you imagine that God was one area in an infinite space of nothing and that he turned that nothing into U, matter.
there never was any nothing. there was only Gods presence, not nothing. and it was his will which created U from Gods presence, not from nothing.
if you were to unravel matter completely then it would cease to be matter and energy but it would not become nothing. it unravels to become Gods will to create it in his presence. it is always in the mind of God, an eternal being.

Then it is creatio ex deo. I have nothing against that, but it contradicts God’s mmutabiluty.

 

[Paddy_Walker]

Then it is creatio ex deo. I have nothing against that, but it contradicts God’s mmutabiluty.

no it isn’t. there is a distinction between creatio ex deo and ex deo’s presence and will.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Except: we do not know it happens.

By " we, " you and some others of course but " we , " does not include quite a large number of professional and ordinary men and women. Most people would recognize the validity of argument by inference demands the existence of a God who created the universe as I have reiterated endlessly. Linus

 

[Eleve]

The author is writing against using “nothing” as a singular term, not afgainst using U as a singulal term.

But when you identify U with nothing, you’re treating “nothing” as a singular term.

Or you could be treating it as a predicate, but the same post also goes against treating it as a predicate.

Becuase that would entail creatio ex deo, which contradicts God’s ilmmutable nature.

Please, explain how.

Read a certain way, it seems that you think the theist view is that the universe is made of God in the way that a chair is made of wood. Is that what you mean to say?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

No. When you say something like “U was nothing,” you’re treating U as a singular term, which is exactly what the author of that post was writing against.

And if different theists do use the word differently, that still doesn’t make it terribly impressive to knock down the weakest version. Here, let me give what I take to be a clear explication of the theistic view:

If nothing exists, then nothing can begin to exist.

That is what I, and I would reckon anyone with an actual job in the philosophy of religion, take to be the meaning of Ex nihil nihilo fit. But how is that a problem for theism? According to classical theism, God always existed, so it was never the case that nothing existed.

It is a red herring erected by Sophists. Socrates held such in high disdain, so did Aristotle. ST. Thomas and the Church apparently thought the age of the Sophist was past. Now we see that they are alive and well.

So let us say that God created the universe neither out of his own being, nor out of the being of any other substance. That should give meaning to the " nothing " in the statement " Ex nihil, fit. " In this phrase, nihil means " no being, " or " no existing matter or substance. "
I don’t see how the Sophist can get around that. Linus

 

[belorg]

But when you identify U with nothing, you’re treating “nothing” as a singular term.

But I do not ide,ntify U with nothing, I identify U with something.

Or you could be treating it as a predicate, but the same post also goes against treating it as a predicate.

I treat ‘nothing’ the way the author of the article treats “nothing.”

Please, explain how.

I responded to Paddy’s claim that "it was his will which created U from Gods presence, not from nothing…if you were to unravel matter completely then it would cease to be matter and energy but it would not become nothing. "

Read a certain way, it seems that you think the theist view is that the universe is made of God in the way that a chair is made of wood. Is that what you mean to say?

That seems to be Paddy’s view, although I am not certain he is a theist.
And it follows from the claim by some theists that the universe consists of thoughts in the mind of God.

 

[belorg]

By " we, " you and some others of course but " we , " does not include quite a large number of professional and ordinary men and women. Most people would recognize the validity of argument by inference demands the existence of a God who created the universe as I have reiterated endlessly. Linus

I do not know about ‘most people’. Most people in the world are not Thomists. Most Catholics aren’t Thomists either, and neither are most porfessional philosophers. That does not mean Thomism is wrong, but it does mean that claims that we know it happens /B] are , to say the least, premature.

 

[Eleve]

You identified U with nothing when you said “U was nothing.” And I assure you that the way you are treating the word “nothing” is at odds with the position taken by the guy writing the reddit post. Don’t believe me? Go on reddit and ask him.

Frankly, whatever Paddy’s saying looks pretty idiosyncratic and I wouldn’t take it as representative of theism.

And you’re right that divine immutability is a problem for the view that objects persist as ideas in the mind of God. But I don’t think Berkley’s idealism and empiricism are very likely stances for a classical theist, anyway.

 

[belorg]

You identified U with nothing when you said “U was nothing.” And I assure you that the way you are treating the word “nothing” is at odds with the position taken by the guy writing the reddit post. Don’t believe me? Go on reddit and ask him.

I indetified U with nothing, meaning that there was no U such that U existed. Completely in line with what the guy wrinting the reddit said.

Frankly, whatever Paddy’s saying looks pretty idiosyncratic and I wouldn’t take it as representative of theism.

I frankly have no idea who would be ‘representative of theism’. Anyway, my remark was made in the context of what Paddy said. And was corrcet in that context.

And you’re right that divine immutability is a problem for the view that objects persist as ideas in the mind of God. But I don’t think Berkley’s idealism and empiricism are very likely stances for a classical theist, anyway.

I do not think a classical theist had a real stance on what exactly objects are and how they can pop into existence froma state at which there was no object such as that object existed

 

[John_Martin]

I do not misunderstand the doctrine, I am just pointing out the logical difficulty tghat Linux was describing. So, to counter my argumejnt, you will have to show that God could logically create something out of absolutely nothing.

Let’s see how Thomas shows this, explaining what he knows (creation from nothing) by presupposing it rather than concluding from logic:
**Whether to create is to make something from nothing? **

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.”
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition “from” [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the beginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to make something from nothing.”
I answer that, As said above ([2]), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is “nothing.”
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term “whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” corresponding to the term “whereto,” may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term “wherefrom” in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term “wherefrom” in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term “whereto” is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term “wherefrom” is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition “from” [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, “from morning comes midday”–i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition “from” [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word “nothing,” or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, “It is made from nothing—i.e. it is not made from anything”—as if we were to say, “He speaks of nothing,” because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition “from” [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

John Martin

 

[Paddy_Walker]

…
I responded to Paddy’s claim that "it was his will which created U from Gods presence, not from nothing…if you were to unravel matter completely then it would cease to be matter and energy but it would not become nothing. "

That seems to be Paddy’s view, although I am not certain he is a theist.
And it follows from the claim by some theists that the universe consists of thoughts in the mind of God.

what is your problem with Paddy’s thoughts.
as Creation is a once-off event, there is nothing like it in creation. no analogy will suffice to describe it properly. it has never happened before.
if you were to construct, or try to construct an analogy of sorts you might say something like the following;
god is the mind of man, that is his person and being, the mind lives in the brain, the brain in the body, the body in the world, the world in the universe. none of these things can be extracted without destroying the whole. god is, is the final answer, but gods person resides in a place within himself.
like an electron, not to demean the infinite, but like an electron which does not exist in any place in an atom but in the place you look for it, god resides everywhere but also resides in his particular place in himself.
as an electron resides everywhere at the same time in theory it also only resides only where it is particularly found by experiment.
as there is nothing else but god before anything is created, god is everywhere at once but also has his particular place of abode when he is found.
when he creates he is not changed but he transformes his place, his presence, into a creation, not eternal without time, but temporal, with a perception of a quality called time.
so we live in him and move, and have our being in him, but are also not god ourselves but ancilliary to him. all of creation is as a wish, a will of his for a thought of his for a maid-servant to god. as a thought of a girl is in the mind of her lover. the lover is not god nor is it a change in god as it was always there. we happen to live, to exist, within this temporal creation within eternity as that ancilliary of gods will.

 

[belorg]

what is your problem with Paddy’s thoughts.
as Creation is a once-off event, there is nothing like it in creation. no analogy will suffice to describe it properly. it has never happened before.
if you were to construct, or try to construct an analogy of sorts you might say something like the following;
god is the mind of man, that is his person and being, the mind lives in the brain, the brain in the body, the body in the world, the world in the universe. none of these things can be extracted without destroying the whole. god is, is the final answer, but gods person resides in a place within himself.
like an electron, not to demean the infinite, but like an electron which does not exist in any place in an atom but in the place you look for it, god resides everywhere but also resides in his particular place in himself.
as an electron resides everywhere at the same time in theory it also only resides only where it is particularly found by experiment.
as there is nothing else but god before anything is created, god is everywhere at once but also has his particular place of abode when he is found.
when he creates he is not changed but he transformes his place, his presence, into a creation, not eternal without time, but temporal, with a perception of a quality called time.
so we live in him and move, and have our being in him, but are also not god ourselves but ancilliary to him. all of creation is as a wish, a will of his for a thought of his for a maid-servant to god. as a thought of a girl is in the mind of her lover. the lover is not god nor is it a change in god as it was always there. we happen to live, to exist, within this temporal creation within eternity as that ancilliary of gods will.

FYI, Paddy, I am much more sympathetic towards your panentheistic view than I am towards creatio ex nihilo. But in this thread we are discussing Thomas’ motion arguments, so I would like to stick to Thomism here.

 

[belorg]

Let’s see how Thomas shows this, explaining what he knows (creation from nothing) by presupposing it rather than concluding from logic:
**Whether to create is to make something from nothing? **

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.”
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition “from” [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the beginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to make something from nothing.”
I answer that, As said above ([2]), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is “nothing.”
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term “whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” corresponding to the term “whereto,” may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term “wherefrom” in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term “wherefrom” in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term “whereto” is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term “wherefrom” is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition “from” [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, “from morning comes midday”–i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition “from” [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word “nothing,” or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, “It is made from nothing—i.e. it is not made from anything”—as if we were to say, “He speaks of nothing,” because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition “from” [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

John Martin

Yes, Thomas of Aquino believed that creatio ex nihilo is possible. What I was asking, however, was for someone to show me it is possible, not just assert it, as Thomas is doing here.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Let’s see how Thomas shows this, explaining what he knows (creation from nothing) by presupposing it rather than concluding from logic:
**Whether to create is to make something from nothing? **

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.”
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition “from” [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the beginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to make something from nothing.”
I answer that, As said above ([2]), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is “nothing.”
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term “whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” corresponding to the term “whereto,” may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term “wherefrom” in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term “wherefrom” in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term “whereto” is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term “wherefrom” is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition “from” [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, “from morning comes midday”–i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition “from” [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word “nothing,” or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, “It is made from nothing—i.e. it is not made from anything”—as if we were to say, “He speaks of nothing,” because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition “from” [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

John Martin

Thank you. Linus