Supernatural epistemology?

[Shike]

1. Per se chains could possibly be infinite.
2. Per se chains could be cyclical with no definite “first” entity.
3. We don’t have a scientific way to demonstrate that the universe is part of a per se chain. It might be the case that the universe could exist no matter which entities are absent.

1. Not possible on pain of contradiction.
2. Not possible on pain of contradiction.
3. Science has really nothing to do with it, if you acknowledge the existence of at least one per se causal chain (or at least a couple links of it) then you must agree with Aquinas’ conclusion. Only later are arguments presented that show that all causal chains must have their origin in the Unmoved Mover.

Let me explain…

I define an event simply as a duration of time–an event need not contain a cause and an effect. Rather, if I were talking about causes and their effects, I would take each to be a separate event, with the “effects” being those events which are dependent on their respective “causes”, which are also events.

Then if this is your definition of an event, that is, merely a duration of time, so be it. Now it is generally understood that time is a measurement of change. So if you have time that passes (ie. a duration) then you necessarily have change that happens. And change requires two entities in a cause/effect relationship. So, in conclusion, it doesn’t make much sense that an event (defined as some duration) could cover only an effect or only a cause.

But perhaps this is less important to the argument at hand, that is if we focus on causal chains of things rather than events. You agree?

So would you say that Aquinas believed the history of the universe should be seen as a per se chain rather than a per accidens chain? I mean, did he believe the entire chain of events would simply end if certain entities weren’t present?

Aquinas most assuredly recognized both kinds of causal chains in history precisely because of the examples he offered that could have easily been found in history. And to answer your second question, since he believed that all things involved in per accidens chains need to be involved in at least one per se causal chain, he would believe that things would go out of existence, here and now, if certain entities ceased to exist.

Suppose hypothetically that the universe began as a combination of three objects: A, B, and C. They all appeared simultaneously. Further, A must exist for B to exist, B must exist for C to exist, and C must exist for A to exist. Would this be a per se chain?

It’s not much of a chain but a circle. And although there does seem at first to be a per se relationship between the objects, the circularity suggests that A causes the existence of A, which is contradictory. Now if instead you meant that these are just three parts of a whole and if you remove one of them then the whole no longer exists, then the problem would disappear. However, you spoke of chain and so I must presume a causal chain.

This is because hierarchies are linear, but I think there’s a possibility, at least, that chains may be cyclical rather than linear in the case of objects that appear simultaneously. But this seems like an open question because of our ignorance of how the universe works–we don’t know whether fundamental laws, for example, sustain each other or are sustained by some other entity.

These cyclical per se causal chains are not possible, unless you want to get rid of the law of non-contradiction.

Further, science doesn’t offer us a way of determining which entities, if any, are necessary for the universe to persist. Take the point you mentioned about the strong nuclear force, for example. You were right in saying that a person could not exist without such a force holding the nuclei of his atoms together. But we don’t know if this thinking can be extended to the entirety of the universe. What has to fail to exist for all causal chains (i.e., all interactions in the universe) to cease? How could we prove that such a condition is the case?

Aquinas’ argument only requires us to acknowledge that at least one per se causal chain exists, whether or not we can only see a couple links or the entire chain. Hence premise #1. That’s all he needs in order to prove the existence of an Unmoved Mover (that is #1 and logic). Once that has been established he goes on to derive the conclusions that follow from the existence of such a being: some of which are that there can’t be any other being like it, that it is the origin of all causal chains. But these are only arrived at after one of his initial arguments succeed.

Science really doesn’t have much to say with regards to Aquinas’ arguments. They are metaphysical arguments that don’t rely on science. Basically, if you agree with #1 and the laws of logic you must (logically) accept the conclusion. Unless you can use science to disprove #1, it really has no place.

And this leads to the next question: Why can’t per se chains extend backward indefinitely? It’s certainly counterintuitive, perhaps even more counterintuitive than the notion of an infinite per accidens chain. However, I don’t see how the existence of such a thing would lead to a contradiction unless you make more assumptions.

Let me answer this question this time by saying, ‘can an infinitely long train move without an engine?’

I appreciate your charity in discussion and your willingness to ask respectful questions. Thank you.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Let me review my stated intention here. I am simply arguing for using a intrinsic method of “testing” for God in RE adequate to the subject (an encounter between persons) and giving reasons why I think it is legitimate for that purpose. I am not advancing a formal proof for the existence of God.

That is fine. Can you pass on the method over to me, so I can emulate what you expereinced? Keep in mind, that I was religious (most especially when I was a child) that my faith was as pure and honest as ony a child can have, and I never (and I mean: NEVER) experienced anything even remotely akin to be “close to God”. I asked for “favors” again as honestly as only a child can ask, and they never got fulfilled.

I appreciate your sharing your childhood religious life. Have you considered trying again as an adult using an intrinsic method of “testing?”

You got that right. But if we generalize from the particulars to the generic, there is no real difference. Make predictions, and see if they are borne out the actual events. That is all.

Too generic. Atheists can engage in creating hospitals (etc…), does that lend any credence to the atheistic worldview?

A similar cataloging of multiple methods of verification for atheism represented by as many people would legitimately provide MGSC.

Again, partially agreed. It is impractical to verify personally each and every claim. We need to trust the testimony of others. So far I agree with you. However, there is a fundamental difference (and I hope this is not news to you), namely, that there is an end of the chain in the case of physical sciences, where the “testimony” is not evoked any more, when the actual demonstration takes place. In other words, in the physical sciences, the reference to an authority is merely an epistemologial shortcut and not epistemology itself. No matter which religious authority I would go to, the final claim will be: “you must accept it on faith, becuase I cannot demonstrate it”.

Re (1)
Missing the point. The end is your testing it and finding the results—yea or nea–as with any fundamental experience or perception in life. The claim is that it is a fundamental intuition and encounter: one has to see it for them self. I can report to you that the senses give me access to reality. I can’t prove to you that the senses give you access to reality. It is not that you have to take it on faith. I outlining the validity of a method of testing.

My point is that from my experience—you’re of course free to take it or leave it—again that the domain of RE is not primarily one of a physical or metaphysical explanation of objects, but of an encounter and relationship between subjects (divine and human). Consequently, approaching RE and traditions (in view of some adjudication) a priori and detached is not methodologically consistent with the subject matter. You would not approach any personal relationship exclusive or even mainly with the SM. Try that with your wife or girlfriend and see what happens. God is understood as personal, so you tell me if exclusively relying on the SM to test makes sense.

Put another way, to take the SM which you are evidently doing (repeatability on demand, predictability, demonstration on demand, that enables you to “emulate what * experienced” on demand, needs objective facts, not intrinsic states of mind) which deals with objects we observe (not subjects who relate) and stipulate that God must fit into it is like the guy that says I’ll believe in atoms when I can see them with the naked eye: even if God did exist you would never find Him. You have designed an experiment, as it were, that even if the object under investigation did exist, the experiment would be unable to detect it. No scientist would do that. Likewise it is a joke to use that for an intrinsic method of “testing” for God.

Maybe, or maybe not. Besides, we are deal here with intrinsic states of the mind, and not objective facts.

Re (2)
Misses the point. I am advocating a proposed method of testing. But by your language “intrinsic states of the mind, and not objective facts” it looks like you’re methodologically committed to the SM almost exclusively and so likely the attendant assumption that only what is physical/material is real and objective.

I asked you this up front so we wouldn’t waste time. If you’re going to absolutize the SM, you need to give an epistemological justification for this when dealing with the question of God or “testing” for God in RE. Since by definition God is inaccessible to the SM, to rely on it w/o justification is a charade.

I don’t want to hurt you, but it sure sounds like the request of a snake-oil peddler: “trust me”. You need to trust first, because if you do not trust (a-priori) then the phenomenon will not happen. Does the name of Uri Geller ring a bell?

Re (3)
I think you mean this for (2). Read (3) again. I am saying in (2) one should be consistent in their openness to similar ways in which experiences enter our lives. Again I’m talking about how to test for a Who in RE and why, not giving a formal proof for an object.

I don’t see the relevance.

Re (4)
It is relevant for people absolutizing a method, usually the SM.

Please. The “argumentum ad numeram” is an ancient - but not respectable fallacy.

Re (5)
MGSC for the method, not a formal proof.*

 

[Neil_Anthony]

I think that this is a very fair assessment of religious experience
Again, this is by far the best answer provided to the actual OP question. I see huge problems with applying it practically myself; and I think the case is far from made that it gives answers that are congruent with reality, nevertheless it is at least an honest attempt to answer the actual question.

What are the rules, and how have they been validated to be rules that reliably evaluate things learned in prayer? - that is really exactly what the OP and I are looking for - how can we distinguish true from false propositions about the supernatural.

Alec

In my experience the rules sound like gobldygook to someone who isn’t a mystic. Mystical writings were just meaningless words to me until I developed a better prayer life. Now the mystical writings about the first levels of prayer make sense to me, but the more advanced ones remain mysterious. So I suspect they wouldn’t impress a nonbeliever.

One rule that’s fairly understandable is confirmation. If a message you receive in prayer is real then you will receive confirmation, that is, you will get the same message again in a different way in the near future. And it will be in a way that leaves you with no doubt.

You could google spiritual discernment and see what’s out there.

 

[Oreoracle]

Science has really nothing to do with it, if you acknowledge the existence of at least one per se causal chain (or at least a couple links of it) then you must agree with Aquinas’ conclusion. Only later are arguments presented that show that all causal chains must have their origin in the Unmoved Mover.

If Aquinas is essentially arguing that some entity must exist for any changes at all to occur in the universe, then his argument can only get off the ground if he demonstrates that the universe itself is a link in the per se chain. Let’s go back to our strong nuclear force example. I’m no physicist, but if the strong nuclear force didn’t exist, the worst-case scenario would be that atoms couldn’t be sustained, right? No matter. The universe would still have subatomic particles, energy, space, and time. Changes would continue to occur even though that particular per se chain disappeared.

In order for all changes to be eliminated by the removal of one entity, everything must be part of the same per se chain, and this hasn’t been shown to be the case. We can remove smaller chains (which in this case should probably be called “branches”) without destroying the whole chain.

So, in conclusion, it doesn’t make much sense that an event (defined as some duration) could cover only an effect or only a cause.

In physics, I believe events are taken to be instances in spacetime. This means that the duration of time in an event is infinitesimal, and therefore you wouldn’t see change in that amount of time (It would be like looking at a photo.). I defined “event” so that it would be inclusive of the physics definition; they can last any duration of time, whether it be finite or infinitesimal.

It’s not much of a chain but a circle. And although there does seem at first to be a per se relationship between the objects, the circularity suggests that A causes the existence of A, which is contradictory.

Well, I think even though we’re talking about causal chains, “cause” is the wrong word to use here. Remember, each of these entities appeared simultaneously, and so it’s misleading to state that any of them “causes” the others to exist, because none of them came first chronologically. They are sustaining, not exactly causing.

Anyway, A is not sustaining itself. Rather, it is sustaining other entities such that they sustain it. This sort of thing doesn’t appear to be impossible, either. I’ll cite another example in physics: As we all know from Newton’s Third Law, forces can only be exerted between objects in pairs; the existence of one force “causes” another force of equal magnitude in the opposite direction. Each force sustains the other, just as the entities involved in my circular per se chain sustained each other. If either force were to vanish, the other would follow suit.

And even if A did sustain itself, would that truly be any more objectionable than the Christian notion of God being self-sustaining?

Science really doesn’t have much to say with regards to Aquinas’ arguments. They are metaphysical arguments that don’t rely on science.

It’s hard for me to believe that metaphysics derives its principles without science. For example, where do you get the idea that something can’t cause itself without inducing it from a wide range of empirical observations? You can try to prove it with logic, but then, you only have a valid argument at best. You can’t demonstrate its soundness without some kind of induction, such as that offered by the scientific method.

Let me answer this question this time by saying, ‘can an infinitely long train move without an engine?’

Why leave out the engine? I don’t think an infinite per se chain would be unable to induce changes in the universe. I don’t see how the length of a per se chain relates to its influence on per accidens chains.

I appreciate your charity in discussion and your willingness to ask respectful questions. Thank you.

You’re welcome.

 

[Spock]

Therefore my appeal to the voice of the majority of mankind or the common estimation of mankind in whatever relevant group does not fall under the fallacy ofargumentum ad numeram. I am advancing these as motivation or warrant for giving serious consideration to something =MGSC]. In my world the voice of the relevant majority of mankind on something does motivate me to give it serious consideration.

Ok, I see you now. Though I am a bit confused why did you consider it important to emphasize this. After all I am already here, asking my questions. Besides, just the number of people who take a concept seriously would not sway me to give it serious consideration. Look at the number of New Agers. When we evaluate a new (or claim) we already build upon the existing knowledgebase we accumulated through the ages. The sheer nonsense of “pyramidal shapes have certain curative powers” (just to pick one) is so ridiculous scientifically, that it would be a huge waste of time to give it “serious consideration”.

Look at it this way, millions of physicists understand the math involved in quantum mechanics: they say it makes sense, advances legit definitions and draws valid conclusions. They say it’s legit. But it’s all gibberish to me right now. Does their cumulative voice means nothing regarding the meaningfulness or intelligibility of the math?

It does not have to. After all, if you do not wish to delve into the math, you are not “worse off”, than those who do. In a very good sense, it does not matter for the everyday people. After all almost none of us knows in precise detail how does the internal combustion engine work. All you need to know is how to operate the car. Do you know how your computer “works”, do you have any knowledge about programming in assembler language? Probably not, and it does not matter.

This is not the same when it comes to religious claims. Those claims are supposed to be matter of utmost importance. It is not the number of believers which makes it relevant to discuss. It is the alleged importance of the claims.

If the answer were “the cause means we found the set of events and/or circumstances that made the crash happen” that would more adequately answer it. This the operative definition in scientific journals and research design. This is how it is defined and understood by millions of researchers and philosophers. So is that in insight by the intellect into the nature of reality beyond reporting sense impressions?

Sure, but we still need to know “how” does that “causation” work! Some people assert that there is “telekinesis”, where you can cause a remote object to move by sheer willpower. To debunk such claims we must know how the causative agent exerts an effect on something else. Scientifically speaking “telekinesis” is just as ridiculous as “let there be light”.

Also causation in science is not limited to bare interaction between elementary particles. There is the causation by magnetic fields, gravitational fields, forces like momentum, and light (not being an atom or part of an atom).

Actually they do. All the actions (strong, weak, electromagenetic and gravitational forces) are the exchange of some elementary particles, and they have been empirically verified - with the exception of “gavitons”, which still need to be discovered.

You are speaking about a pragmatic justification (works for technology) for the SM and not epistemic justification (why the SM yields true statements about physical reality) like you want regarding God. How can you articulate the intellectual foundations supporting why the SM yields truth about reality? Or do you think it doesn’t?

I am simply not interested in making some theoretical justification for the scientific method - simply because it would be futile. It is futile, because we are not omniscient. We can all see that it works, and thus its usage is justified. As with everything in the SM, we are open to see if a “better method” or “better explanation” comes out, and if it does, we shall happily accept it. But no matter how many times we ask for a better method, we recieve no answers.

Our reasoning is based on two great principles: the first, that of Contradiction. . . . And the second, the principle of Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise.

Again, this is fine, but it is not “absolute”. The basic premises, principles and axioms cannot be reduced to something even “more” basic. They must be accepted as self-evident or axiomatic. If later we realize that our basic “stuff” is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea. The Euclidean geometry had its famous “fifth postulate”. Mathematicians eventually (after many hundreds of years) realized that the fifith postulate is not self-evident, and created 2 new “geometries”. For example, the rule that the queen on the chessboard can move both horizontally, vertically and diagonally cannot be “justified” with sufficient reason. It could be “defined” otherwise, but then it would not be a “queen” any more. Its movement is decided by mutual agreement.

We’re way before issues of credence. We’re talking about understanding the topic of discussion, before we even look for evidence of its existence. It is defined (not proven, and not demanding assent) by legitimate, established authorities at defining terms and explaining concepts; and billions of people understand or have understood the definition whether they agree with it or not.

I certainly agree to make the concepts as clear as possible.

 

[Spock]

Let me review my stated intention here. I am simply arguing for using a intrinsic method of “testing” for God in RE adequate to the subject (an encounter between persons) and giving reasons why I think it is legitimate for that purpose. I am not advancing a formal proof for the existence of God.

Ok. It would be nice if you could, after all the Catholic Church asserts that “one can know Gods existence with absolute certainty by the light of human reason”. Of course such an ironclad assertion would gain more respect, if it would tell us: “how”.

I appreciate your sharing your childhood religious life. Have you considered trying again as an adult using an intrinsic method of “testing?”

Yes, and no. It is impossible for me to get back to the unquestioning faith I used to have. But apart from that, yes, I tried. I was told to go and pray the rosary, as honestly as I can, and God will answer. Of, course there was no answer that I would recognize as such.

A similar cataloging of multiple methods of verification for atheism represented by as many people would legitimately provide MGSC.

Since atheism is merely a lack of belief, there is no need and no way to “verify” it.

You would not approach any personal relationship exclusive or even mainly with the SM. Try that with your wife or girlfriend and see what happens. God is understood as personal, so you tell me if exclusively relying on the SM to test makes sense.

First, I have no doubt about the “actual existence” of my wife. And my relation with her is definitely built upon millions of pieces of verifyable evidence. The evidence is every smile, every hug, every conversation, every agreement and every disagreement (they occur, though rarely). I find it impossible to build a relationship with someone, whose very existence is in question. Of course, if God wished to take the first step, and make sure that his existence is no more in doubt, then and only then could a relationship-building be started. Since I cannot make that first step, since it is impossible, while God could make it, if he wanted, I don’t think it is unreasonable to wait for that opening move. And, no, I do not accept such open-ended “promises”, like: “if you persevere long enough, hard enough and honestly enough, the surely God will answer, if it is his will. If it is not his will, then tough luck. He will still judge you accordingly”. Sorry, no dice.

Put another way, to take the SM which you are evidently doing (repeatability on demand, predictability, demonstration on demand, that enables you to “emulate what * experienced” on demand, needs objective facts, not intrinsic states of mind) which deals with objects we observe (not subjects who relate) and stipulate that God must fit into it is like the guy that says I’ll believe in atoms when I can see them with the naked eye: even if God did exist you would never find Him. *
Why would it be like that? I am as open as I can be. I am not unreasonable. If God wanted to fulfill my very simple criteria, he could. If he is “gun-shy”, then it is his fault that the relationship-building never takes off. Of course, if God wants me to have “blind faith”, while giving me this highly skeptical mind, then he is unreasonable.
Fr of Jazz;8298655:

You have designed an experiment, as it were, that even if the object under investigation did exist, the experiment would be unable to detect it. No scientist would do that. Likewise it is a joke to use that for an intrinsic method of “testing” for God.

Nonsense. God can do whatever he wants. If he wanted to expose himself to me, he could. There is no logical contradiction here.

I asked you this up front so we wouldn’t waste time. If you’re going to absolutize the SM, you need to give an epistemological justification for this when dealing with the question of God or “testing” for God in RE. Since by definition God is inaccessible to the SM, to rely on it w/o justification is a charade.

That would be an acceptable outcome. God cannot be known, unless you have faith in him. The propostion of “every human has an immortal soul” cannot be rationally demonstrated, it requires faith to accept it. Of course one needs God’s grace to have faith in the first place (as it has been stated so many times). To be blunt: “there is no supernatural epistemology apart from faith”. I would be glad to accept this resolution.

 

[Shike]

If Aquinas is essentially arguing that some entity must exist for any changes at all to occur in the universe, then his argument can only get off the ground if he demonstrates that the universe itself is a link in the per se chain. Let’s go back to our strong nuclear force example. I’m no physicist, but if the strong nuclear force didn’t exist, the worst-case scenario would be that atoms couldn’t be sustained, right? No matter. The universe would still have subatomic particles, energy, space, and time. Changes would continue to occur even though that particular per se chain disappeared.

Correct. And it is a good thing Aquinas’ 1st way does not depend upon a particular per se chain… it only requires that at least 1 per se chain exists, here and now. We do not need to talk about the whole universe, we only need to see if at least one per se causal chain exists. If that chain ends in the Unmoved mover, great! If not it will end in some other being, and, by virtue of its composition, will rely on other per se causal chains which will eventually lead to the Unmoved Mover.

In order for all changes to be eliminated by the removal of one entity, everything must be part of the same per se chain, and this hasn’t been shown to be the case. We can remove smaller chains (which in this case should probably be called “branches”) without destroying the whole chain.

The dependence of all change upon Unmoved Mover is a further conclusion reached only after the conclusion of Aquinas’ 1st way is established. The argument focuses on the existence of an Unmoved Mover, not what follows from that conclusion. And I agree that we can remove smaller branches without destroying everything.

In physics, I believe events are taken to be instances in spacetime…

If you don’t mind I’m going to drop talking about the word “event” because it isn’t relevant because we aren’t using the terminology in our discussion of the argument at hand.

Well, I think even though we’re talking about causal chains, “cause” is the wrong word to use here. Remember, each of these entities appeared simultaneously, and so it’s misleading to state that any of them “causes” the others to exist, because none of them came first chronologically. They are sustaining, not exactly causing.

If you use the words “causal chain” then “cause” is a very apt word. And yes, in your example you are trying to show the example of a circle of sustaining (per se) causes that don’t point beyond themselves; it is not possible. The circularity is what does it in, since you are in effect saying that the whole reason for the existence of A can be attributed to C and that the whole reason for the existence of A is A—both cannot be true.

This sort of thing doesn’t appear to be impossible, either. I’ll cite another example in physics: As we all know from Newton’s Third Law…

It is really impossible to find a counterexample to Aquinas’ arguments from science. The only thing that could disprove it would be to deny #1, that some things change. That is because this is a metaphysical argument: anyways, there is no problem with two objects involved in a per se causal chain; there is a problem when you say that two objects wholly and totally sustain each other and do not point beyond each other, most especially when you have objects that are in some way composite. And Newton’s 3rd law applies to composites.

And even if A did sustain itself, would that truly be any more objectionable than the Christian notion of God being self-sustaining?

No, it wouldn’t be all that objectionable at all as long as you see that in this case “sustains” is being used in a way more general than “sustaining cause”. If A did wholly sustain (general sufficient reason sense) itself it would then be nonsense to say that C wholly sustains (particular causal sense) it. In that case A would be the Unmoved Mover that Aquinas is trying to prove all along and we would see all sorts of conclusions follow from it.

It’s hard for me to believe that metaphysics derives its principles without science.

My question to you: do all observations about the universe fall under the scientific method? Science seems to take some things for granted such as the existence of objects and change in general. But the existence of objects and change in general seem very much about the world we live in and something we observe. We don’t learn the most fundamental and basic principles about reality from induction, but rather from abstraction and apprehension from the world.

Metaphysics is the study of being as being. Science presupposes being. Therefore any principles I correctly derive in metaphysics will be more general and inclusive than any possible example you can give me in science. In other words, if metaphysics is done correctly, no possible counterexample from science can be offered. Of course, that does not mean metaphysicians cannot sometimes be wrong. It only means you must engage in their method to prove them wrong.

Why leave out the engine?

The “engine” is necessarily part of any per se causal chain. My point was that such an infinite per se chain is impossible by definition. If you remove the “engine” then you must be dealing with either a per accidens causal chain or just nonsense.

Book recommendation yet?

Ciao,
Michael

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Ok, I see you now. Though I am a bit confused why did you consider it important to emphasize this. After all I am already here, asking my questions. Besides, just the number of people who take a concept seriously would not sway me to give it serious consideration. Look at the number of New Agers. When we evaluate a new (or claim) we already build upon the existing knowledgebase we accumulated through the ages. . . . is so ridiculous scientifically, that it would be a huge waste of time to give it “serious consideration”.

I’m am only talking here about the effort to under a term in order to discuss the question of it’s existence.

It does not have to. After all, if you do not wish to delve into the math, you are not “worse off”, than those who do. In a very good sense, it does not matter for the everyday people. . . . do you have any knowledge about programming in assembler language? Probably not, and it does not matter.

This is not the same when it comes to religious claims. Those claims are supposed to be matter of utmost importance. It is not the number of believers which makes it relevant to discuss. It is the alleged importance of the claims.

Yeah. I does have to. If I had learn about these topics to because I chose to debate their validity or existence, you can bet I would be obligated to give serious consideration to trying to get the idea.

Again, the only issue at this point is to understand the definition of a term, ”soul,” not accept the claim that it exists as true. That fact that millions of knowledgeable authorities at defining terms and explaining concepts whether they believe it or not, and billions of people likewise in history have understood it should suggest that it is possible to understand it in order to then move on to discussing its existence or not.

Sure, but we still need to know “how” does that “causation” work! . . . Scientifically speaking “telekinesis” is just as ridiculous as “let there be light”.

Scientific accounts of causation yield perfectly valid scientific accounts of causation. I have no problems with science.

If one works out of theoretical scientism (“The SM is sufficient for all knowledge.” or “What natural science cannot tell us mankind cannot know.”) when dealing with the question of God they have to justify it first since it just rephrases the atheistic claim without proof.

Actually they do. All the actions (strong, weak, electromagenetic and gravitational forces) are the exchange of some elementary particles, and they have been empirically verified - with the exception of “gavitons”, which still need to be discovered.

I’ll certainly go with interactions between elementary particles.

If you’re saying magnetic or gravitational fields exert their action by somehow shooting particles of matter that collide with an object so influenced by the field, give me some literature that asserts that this is an accepted scientific finding. I’ve never hear that before. If it bears out, I will have learned something.

I am simply not interested in making some theoretical justification for the scientific method - simply because it would be futile. It is futile, because we are not omniscient. We can all see that it works, and thus its usage is justified. As with everything in the SM, we are open to see if a “better method” or “better explanation” comes out, and if it does, we shall happily accept it. But no matter how many times we ask for a better method, we recieve no answers.

We’ll come back to this in post below.

Again, this is fine, but it is not “absolute”. The basic premises, principles and axioms cannot be reduced to something even “more” basic. They must be accepted as self-evident or axiomatic. If later we realize that our basic “stuff” is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea… . . For example, the rule that the queen on the chessboard can move both horizontally, vertically and diagonally cannot be “justified” with sufficient reason. It could be “defined” otherwise, but then it would not be a “queen” any more. Its movement is decided by mutual agreement.

Some interesting questions arise.

Let “If later we realize that our basic ‘stuff’ is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea.” =N.

Then is N an absolute? If so, N is self-refuting. If not, there exists some unchanging axioms.

Is N absolutely true? If so, N is self-refuting. If not, there exists some foundational truths about thought and reality that cannot be superseded.

Does N = there are no certain truths? If so, N is self-refuting. If not, there are.

Does N mean the principle of non-contradiction may be contradicted one day? If so, a foundational contradiction results . . . but I guess it would be OK then.

Does N mean the PSR will one day be superseded? Will sufficient reasons be given to justify this? If so, that is self-refuting? If not, there will be no reason to accept the change.
Or will people just not be interested and choose, like the conventions of a chess game, to define thinking otherwise . . . for no sufficient reason of course?

What impact will this have on science and the SM?

I certainly agree to make the concepts as clear as possible.

So, again, if you don’t understand the definition of “soul,” even though billions of people and relevant knowledgeable authorities do, we obviously cannot discuss its existence.

If “no” is your final answer, there is a related topic you brought up in your responses I will discuss.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

You are not responding to what I am saying. I am talking about a method of “TESTING” for an encounter with God based on the definition of God. The “results” may be yes or no. I am NOT asking you to accept any claims about God’s existence based on faith.

Responses indicating you understand what I’m saying would be along the lines of the following.
(1) “This is not a reasonable method of TESTING for God Who is understood as personal, because x, y, and z.”

(2) “This is a reasonable method of TESTING for God Who is understood as personal. The 5 justifications you give for employing this method of TESTING are reasonable. I’ll decide whether or not I give it a try. Perhaps I’ll let you know what I discover.”

Important questions to answer in bold.

Ok. It would be nice if you could, after all the Catholic Church asserts that “one can know Gods existence with absolute certainty by the light of human reason”. Of course such an ironclad assertion would gain more respect, if it would tell us: “how”.

I did offer an intrinsic method of “testing.” And I characterized it and I gave reasons why it is reasonable. I also showed from my own and others’ RE that it takes time to get clear results either way.

Yes, and no. It is impossible for me to get back to the unquestioning faith I used to have. But apart from that, yes, I tried. I was told to go and pray the rosary, as honestly as I can, and God will answer. Of, course there was no answer that I would recognize as such.

Consider the method I suggest.

First, I have no doubt about the “actual existence” of my wife. And my relation with her is definitely built upon millions of pieces of verifyable evidence. The evidence is every smile, every hug, every conversation, every agreement and every disagreement (they occur, though rarely). I find it impossible to build a relationship with someone, whose very existence is in question. Of course, if God wished to take the first step, and make sure that his existence is no more in doubt, then and only then could a relationship-building be started. Since I cannot make that first step, since it is impossible, while God could make it, if he wanted, I don’t think it is unreasonable to wait for that opening move. And, no, I do not accept such open-ended “promises”, like: “if you persevere long enough, hard enough and honestly enough, the surely God will answer, if it is his will. If it is not his will, then tough luck. He will still judge you accordingly”. Sorry, no dice.

Irrelevant. We are talking about a “TEST” for existence, which is exactly what we have in question and hope to resolve. The issue is not your wife’s existence, but that she is a person. And you wouldn’t approach a person in view of a possible relationship exclusive or even mainly with the SM. So if you are going to test for God (who is understood as a person) intrinsically as a participant observer in a way adequate to the subject, you need to test as you would for a person, not for an impersonal, physical object or phenomenon with the SM.

If you can expect God to take the first step why would it be contrary to reason for you to consider taking the first step? IOW, should one not TEST in a way that provides the conditions for whatever they are testing for (God as personal in this case) to show itself? How could that possibly be unreasonable? I am talking about TESTING—the answer may be yea or nea.

Why would it be like that? I am as open as I can be. I am not unreasonable. If God wanted to fulfill my very simple criteria, he could. If he is “gun-shy”, then it is his fault that the relationship-building never takes off. Of course, if God wants me to have “blind faith”, while giving me this highly skeptical mind, then he is unreasonable.

Alright let me dramatize to show what it is like. Someone decides solemnly investigate the question of God. They will use the SM. . . . and examining with a microscope, a telescope and various lab equipment . . . and going out into the field for observational findings . . . and applying the principle of parsimony and checking carefully over our work we find . . . uh . . . yep . . . there is no God. [Whew, never saw that one coming!]

So might you not be skeptical about using the methods and approach of the SM when “TESTING” for a relationship with a person who is not defined as a physical object. Perhaps you are not doing this, but do you acknowledge that it would be a foolish charade to do so w/o justifying first that the SM is all sufficient?

A relationship with God is not raw assent by sheer force of will to a set of propositions. It is rooted in an encounter.

Nonsense. God can do whatever he wants. If he wanted to expose himself to me, he could. There is no logical contradiction here.

I didn’t say logical contradiction. I said a poorly designed experiment that wouldn’t reveal what is being investigated even if it did exist.

Do you acknowledge that such an error could be made in a scientific experiment and should be avoided?

Do you understand and affirm the general proposition that if one is TESTING for God by an intrinsic method, they should not make the same error?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

That would be an acceptable outcome. God cannot be known, unless you have faith in him. The propostion of “every human has an immortal soul” cannot be rationally demonstrated, it requires faith to accept it. Of course one needs God’s grace to have faith in the first place (as it has been stated so many times). To be blunt: “there is no supernatural epistemology apart from faith”. I would be glad to accept this resolution.

I am not asserting that God cannot be known unless you have faith in Him. See above on method.

“The propostion of ‘every human has an immortal soul’ cannot be rationally demonstrated, it requires faith to accept it.”
I dispute this. But you can’t comprehend the term “soul”, so how can we investigate it rationally. Further, I take it that “rationally’ to you is broader than theoretical scientism (“The SM is sufficient for all knowledge.” or “What natural science cannot tell us mankind cannot know.”). You haven’t acknowledged this as your method when directly asked up front several times.

Now you may say that you don’t subscribe to a theoretical scientism =TS] (because of the reasons given above for not defending the SM epistemically), but that you do subscribe to a policy scientism =PS]. This would be along the lines of: I personally choose to investigate all of reality using only the SM because when I use it I always get results and anything outside of or not amenable to the SM and its discourse I deem nonexistent or meaningless.

Your responses and treatment of issues lean strongly toward PS. I’ve seen nothing outside of the approach of the SM for your treatment of subjective topics (e.g., intrinsic testing) and the SM itself for objective ones.

E.g., for intrinsic testing and human subjectivity (repeatability on demand, predictability, demonstration on demand, that enables you to “emulate what * experienced” on demand, needs objective facts, not intrinsic states of mind; the mind is the activity of brain, which activity will cease when the brain goes dead.)

E.g., for objective questions (ancient nonsense; the mind is the activity of brain, which activity will cease when the brain goes dead.)

It’s a free country: you can choose whatever you like. But there are consequences. If you do subscribe to PS, since you don’t epistemically justify the SM much less TS, you have no justification to evaluate the claims of others on subjects not amenable to the SM for truth or falsity. You can only say it doesn’t fit your policy.*

 

[Oreoracle]

The dependence of all change upon Unmoved Mover is a further conclusion reached only after the conclusion of Aquinas’ 1st way is established.

Two things:

1. We probably don’t need to debate this any more because you agree that the 1st Way does not demonstrate that an unmoved mover exists.
2. Secondly, the argument does not show that something exists which fails to change, as I’ve pointed out. Even if we accept the notion of a per se chain along with the proposition that one exists, all that will show is that if a “sustainer” disappears or changes, the rest of the links of its chain will disappear or change. It doesn’t tell us that some object exists that is simply incapable of changing. As I’ve said, even the fundamental laws of the universe might have differed in one of its past forms. Now it might be possible to show that one sustainer sustains everything such that it can’t change, but this conclusion would require further argumentation to support it.

My question to you: do all observations about the universe fall under the scientific method?

Yes. Science studies the observable universe.

Science seems to take some things for granted such as the existence of objects and change in general.

Right. So what?

But the existence of objects and change in general seem very much about the world we live in and something we observe. We don’t learn the most fundamental and basic principles about reality from induction, but rather from abstraction and apprehension from the world.

Observation beats intuition, I’m afraid. Aristotle was fond of philosophizing rather than experimenting and because of that, he insisted that more massive objects fell faster than less massive ones. All he had to do was drop two objects of unequal weight, equal shape, and equal density from a tall building to see that his intuition was wrong.

Heck, even our intuitive notion of time is incorrect. I’m sure that without rigorous experimentation, people would still think that time is absolute rather than relative.

Metaphysics is the study of being as being.

Metaphysics isn’t a “study”. It is a subject of philosophy in which people (who are already biased because of the empirical observations they’ve made, I might add) make conjectures about the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysics is also in the business of proposing means of verification and falsification. As the source of these methods, metaphysics isn’t really subject to its own methods of proof. Rationalism, empiricism, materialism, etc., can’t prove themselves, for example. They are all axiomatic, i.e., conjectural, in nature.

To demonstrate the fact that metaphysics is so fundamental that it can’t truly be tested or studied, think about this: If a solipsist tells you that you are a figment of his imagination, how do you prove him wrong? You can’t use empirical observations, because he doesn’t believe that the universe exists (nor could you prove that the universe exists). You can’t use pure logic because, like Descartes, he is extremely skeptical of his own ability to reason. How do you show that he’s wrong?

The “engine” is necessarily part of any per se causal chain. My point was that such an infinite per se chain is impossible by definition.

The definition of a per se chain you provided only required that one or more links depend on the existence of another link. If A depends on B, B depends on C, C depends on D, and so on ad infinitum, this chain would satisfy that definition.

 

[Shike]

Two things:

1. We probably don’t need to debate this any more because you agree that the 1st Way does not demonstrate that an unmoved mover exists.

Nope! I said that the conclusion that ‘the Unmoved Mover upholds all causal chains’ is a further conclusion after we establish its existence. Aquinas’ 1st way establishes its existence.

1. Secondly, the argument does not show that something exists which fails to change, as I’ve pointed out. Even if we accept the notion of a per se chain along with the proposition that one exists, all that will show is that if a “sustainer” disappears or changes, the rest of the links of its chain will disappear or change. It doesn’t tell us that some object exists that is simply incapable of changing. As I’ve said, even the fundamental laws of the universe might have differed in one of its past forms. Now it might be possible to show that one sustainer sustains everything such that it can’t change, but this conclusion would require further argumentation to support it.

There are at least two problems with this argument:

1. Aquinas’ 1st way does not end with merely a sustainer of a particular causal chain. If one were to reach the end of a particular per se causal chain and found out that it wasn’t the Unmoved Mover, Aquinas’ 1st way would necessitate that a further per se causal chain exists, and so on, and so on, ect. until the Unmoved Mover is reached. I am open with discussing this point further, though I’ve already mentioned a couple things on the matter before.
2. How fundamental are the fundamental laws you have in mind? Remember that this is a metaphysical argument so that its principles are very closely tied to the laws of logic. Do you think that the laws of logic can change?

My question to you: do all observations about the universe fall under the scientific method?

Yes. Science studies the observable universe.

Science seems to take some things for granted such as the existence of objects and change in general.

Right. So what?

These two responses of yours are contradictory. You are correct that science studies the observable universe. But not all observations fall under the scientific method as you concede by saying ‘Right. So what?’ Because science takes some observations/facts about the world for granted, they do not fall under the realm of science but are presupposed by science. This is enough to prove that one of your two claims must be revised.

Observation beats intuition, I’m afraid.

I never mentioned intuition.

Aristotle was fond of philosophizing rather than experimenting and because of that, he insisted that more massive objects fell faster than less massive ones.

We shouldn’t throw out some of his metaphysical argumentation just because he made mistakes with some of his scientific claims. Aristotle was an eminent logician, and logic, rather than science, is what we should be most concerned about.

By the way, just how much of Aristotle have you read?

Heck, even our intuitive notion of time is incorrect. I’m sure that without rigorous experimentation, people would still think that time is absolute rather than relative.

With regards to the second point, not quite, since Aquinas thought that time was relative. This follows from the insight that time is a measure of change.

Continued…

 

[Shike]

Metaphysics isn’t a “study”. It is a subject of philosophy in which people (who are already biased because of the empirical observations they’ve made, I might add) make conjectures about the fundamental nature of reality.

So which premise of Aquinas’ 1st way is biased? #1?

Metaphysics is also in the business of proposing means of verification and falsification. As the source of these methods, metaphysics isn’t really subject to its own methods of proof. Rationalism, empiricism, materialism, etc., can’t prove themselves, for example. They are all axiomatic, i.e., conjectural, in nature.

It is true that one cannot prove the laws of logic, but must largely accept them as axioms or principles of being. Of course, one can always disprove any objection to the laws of logic. With regards to the second point, rationalism, empiricism, and materialism all make mistakes so they can definitely be disproved.

How much have you read with regards to the history of philosophy?

To demonstrate the fact that metaphysics is so fundamental that it can’t truly be tested or studied, think about this: If a solipsist tells you that you are a figment of his imagination, how do you prove him wrong? You can’t use empirical observations, because he doesn’t believe that the universe exists (nor could you prove that the universe exists). You can’t use pure logic because, like Descartes, he is extremely skeptical of his own ability to reason. How do you show that he’s wrong?

For being so skeptical of reason, Descartes sure used a lot of it!
Let’s pretend for one crazy moment that the solipsist proves his claims. Then it would still be the job of metaphysics to study being as being. Your example doesn’t prove what you want it to.

The definition of a per se chain you provided only required that one or more links depend on the existence of another link. If A depends on B, B depends on C, C depends on D, and so on ad infinitum, this chain would satisfy that definition.

Incorrect. The definition I gave for a per se causal chain requires that all links be dependent on the first link (not in time but logical hierarchy). And why are you debating with me again when you posit that you don’t accept metaphysics as a legitimate enterprise?

Really I am somewhat surprised by your recent post. You spent a lot of words discussing with me Aquinas’ 1st way, engaging with the ideas of a metaphysical argument. Now it is as if you are saying that you were only pretending before. What you now mean to posit as an objection to Aquinas’ 1st way is that all metaphysical arguments can’t really be proven anyway.

I am a human being that is subject to time, so please be respectful with me and don’t lead me on a wild goose chase. I am willing to continue this discussion if you make up your mind on which direction you want to take: criticize metaphysics or criticize Aquinas’ 1st way.

 

[Spock]

Again, the only issue at this point is to understand the definition of a term, ”soul,” not accept the claim that it exists as true.

I say that the “animating principle” is an incoherent term. It does not matter, how many people say that they “understand” what it is, can they explain it? If someone can explain what that means, then I may still disagree, but at least I would know what it is all about. But that is not really important. I accept your defintion, and now the ball is in your court. Explain how do you assign a “true” or “false” evaluation to the proposition: “humans have an immortal soul”.

If one works out of theoretical scientism (“The SM is sufficient for all knowledge.” or “What natural science cannot tell us mankind cannot know.”) when dealing with the question of God they have to justify it first since it just rephrases the atheistic claim without proof.

I do not accept this TS. I did not say that the SM is sufficient for ALL knowledge. Statements about ethics are not about facts, they are about “ought”-s or "should’-s. Statements about art are subjective opinions. Sure, one can ask: “what is more beautiful, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, or Ravel’s Bolero?”. Such questions may be asked, but they are nonsensical, despite the fact that they are valid lingustical constructs. Observe the emphasized “ALL” - which I DID NOT assert. Statements about the future cannot be evaluated to be “true” or “false”, until that future rolls around. “Tomorrow it will rain at this specific location at that particular hour” is neither true nor false. But the most important point is that the “scientific method” belongs to epistemology, and not to metaphysics. More about this below.

If you’re saying magnetic or gravitational fields exert their action by somehow shooting particles of matter that collide with an object so influenced by the field, give me some literature that asserts that this is an accepted scientific finding. I’ve never hear that before. If it bears out, I will have learned something.

Just Google it. I would have to do the same.

Let “If later we realize that our basic ‘stuff’ is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea.” =N.

Then is N an absolute? If so, N is self-refuting. If not, there exists some unchanging axioms.

Why would it be self-refuting? It is not a statement about anything. It is simply a method and moreover, it is a counterfactual. A method is neither true, not false. It is either useful or not. It is either rigid or not. It is either applicable or not. It is quite possible that there are some “basic principles” which will never need to change, but we cannot know that a-priori. Therefore we stay open to the possibility, and if it never arises, no harm was done.

I differentiate between “axioms” and “basic principles”. Axioms pertain to formal, deductive axiomatic systems. Principles belong to open, inductive systems. Axioms are neither “true” nor “false” - epistemically speaking. They are declared “true”. Basic principles (like the conservation of matter / energy) are held provisionally true, until some counter example is found. Axioms cannot be “found” incorrect, basic principles can be.

Does N mean the PSR will one day be superseded? Will sufficient reasons be given to justify this?

Again, incorrect usage of the word: “supeceeded”. No, it is simply unusable, inapplicable for “basic” propositions. Remember: “to explain something is to reduce it something even more basic, even simpler”. By definition, a basic concept cannot be reduced.

What impact will this have on science and the SM?

No impact at all, since your objections were inapplicable and bogus.

 

[Spock]

Now you may say that you don’t subscribe to a theoretical scientism =TS] (because of the reasons given above for not defending the SM epistemically), but that you do subscribe to a policy scientism =PS]. This would be along the lines of: I personally choose to investigate all of reality using only the SM because when I use it I always get results and anything outside of or not amenable to the SM and its discourse I deem nonexistent or meaningless.

There is no “policy” of scientism. Let’s take an “abstract proposition”: “all qyduose are neyaawts”. Let’s suppose that we agree on the meaning of both “qyduose” and “neyaawts”. If you say that the proposition is true, I will have two options: 1) accept your word for it (that is having faith in your word), or 2) ask you to demonstrate it, or tell me how can I verify it for myself. There is no third option. If I would accept your word, the conversation would be over, with mutually satisfactory results.

But, of course, I am a skeptic, and I need more than just your word (the word “your” is a shortcut, for anyone else, too. The word of the pope is not more convincing than yours would be.) So, can you either demonstrate the validy of your proposition, or not? That is the question for all propositons pertaining to metaphysical reality.

If you do subscribe to PS, since you don’t epistemically justify the SM much less TS, you have no justification to evaluate the claims of others on subjects not amenable to the SM for truth or falsity. You can only say it doesn’t fit your policy.

Nonsense. You make the same mistake as so many others commit, you confuse a proposition about metaphysical reality with a proposition about epistemology. They pertain to two different realms. If I say that a proposition about reality must be verifyable, it does not follow that a proposition about epistemological methods also must be verifyable. Epistemological methods are neither true, nor false, they are either useful or useless. They are applicable or not. I don’t know if your confusion is on purpose or not. But the confused usage leads to the improper application of the Russell-paradox. Which is simply not applicable.

 

[Shike]

Nonsense. You make the same mistake as so many others commit, you confuse a proposition about metaphysical reality with a proposition about epistemology. They pertain to two different realms. If I say that a proposition about reality must be verifyable, it does not follow that a proposition about epistemological methods also must be verifyable. Epistemological methods are neither true, nor false, they are either useful or useless. They are applicable or not. I don’t know if your confusion is on purpose or not. But the confused usage leads to the improper application of the Russell-paradox. Which is simply not applicable.

Perhaps Fr. of Jazz knows what you are getting at, but, at least for some of the rest of us, could you be less general in this response? For instance, instead of saying “you confuse a proposition”, could you substitute it with the actual proposition that he is confused about?

Also there are a number of Russell paradoxes. I know that the context should be a big hint, but could you name it so those of us who want to read about it can find it?

Thanks.

 

[Spock]

Perhaps Fr. of Jazz knows what you are getting at, but, at least for some of the rest of us, could you be less general in this response? For instance, instead of saying “you confuse a proposition”, could you substitute it with the actual proposition that he is confused about?

I am talking about the different types of propositions. Here are two examples of them:

1. there is a stone in front of me on the ground and
2. to see if this previous proposition is true or not, the objective and verifyable way (which does not require trust or faith) is to look at the stone and touch it, and see if it is really an actual stone.

The first proposition is about the actual metaphysical (and also physical) reality. The second one is about the epistemological approach concerning the reality. They do not pertain to the same aspect of reality, therefore it is irrational to assert that they should have equal properties.

Also there are a number of Russell paradoxes. I know that the context should be a big hint, but could you name it so those of us who want to read about it can find it?

It is the problem of the improper usage of the universal operator. He said a few times that if a proposition does not reflect itself then it is “self-refuting”.

Example:

Let “If later we realize that our basic ‘stuff’ is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea.” =N.
Then is N an absolute? If so, N is self-refuting. If not, there exists some unchanging axioms.
The very question: “is N absolute?” is ludicrous. “N” is not a statement about reality, it is a statement about “how do we approach reality?”.

 

[Neithan]

I’d just like to make a couple of amendments to my posts (on page 9), given that a few errors may have deemed them confusing and not worth responding to. I read the OP as a challenge to the Catholic dogma that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural human reason.

Knowledge of supernatural existence is gained by a posteriori demonstration of sound arguments inferring causality (Summa I, 2, ii).

I’ll change the bolded word from ‘deduce.’ Obviously we would simply infer, and could not deduce causality, from *a posteriori *demonstration.

-]A combination of correspondence and strict consistency: you can empirically verify the premises to establish correspondence, then verify the strict consistency of the conclusion./-]

Ignore this, since strict consistency doesn’t work with a posteriori argument.
Rather, the cogency of an argument for the supernatural would be verified only by the correspondence of its premises to observable phenomena.

Here is a revision of post #132:

Keep in mind that only God (‘the divine’) is supernatural. Angels are praeternatural. The soul (the mind) is natural.

1. Start with the principle of causality or sufficient reason.
2. Observation of natural phenomena.
3. Make a new speculation (attempting to explain causality). Developing an argument.
4. Test the cogency of the argument by correspondence to the phenomena.
5. If the argument is noncogent, return to step 3.
6. If the argument is cogent, we have a new proof.

I’ve erased the references to ‘soundness’ (changed to cogency) and ‘strict consistency’ since those wouldn’t apply in a posteriori argument based on inductive premises.

Basically, I think the ‘method’ of ‘supernatural epistemology’ can be distilled down to causal inference.

 

[Shike]

I’ve erased the references to ‘soundness’ (changed to cogency) and ‘strict consistency’ since those wouldn’t apply in a posteriori argument based on inductive premises.

I was agreeing with your changes until I hit this part above. Now I agree with what you say here, except that it doesn’t apply to Aquinas’ arguments: why?

Aquinas’ premises are not inductive. Induction is reasoning from detailed facts to general principles. But Aquinas relies on abstraction with regards to the very nature of change. One could disagree with his principle and try to show how he is wrong, but if the principle is wrong than *any *example of change could be used to prove him wrong. And any example of change is sufficient to abstract the principle of causality.

Basically, Aquinas was in the business of demonstrations. And demonstrations are very specific kinds of arguments. They are deductive and must be logically valid and sound. There is no reason why one can’t have a deductive argument that has some premises based upon experience (a posteriori).

I invite your questions.

ciao,
Michael

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Things in a little different order here. Bear with me.

N still = “If later we realize that our basic ‘stuff’ is not so basic after all, then we must be open enough to adjust to the new idea.”

Nonsense. You make the same mistake as so many others commit, you confuse a proposition about metaphysical reality with a proposition about epistemology. They pertain to two different realms. If I say that a proposition about reality must be verifyable, it does not follow that a proposition about epistemological methods also must be verifyable. Epistemological methods are neither true, nor false, they are either useful or useless. They are applicable or not. I don’t know if your confusion is on purpose or not. But the confused usage leads to the improper application of the Russell-paradox. Which is simply not applicable.

Alright, probably much of this is about the definitions of terms and their use in various schools of thought.

Your paragraph above alone will serve as a useful illustration. Do you understand there to be 4 terms or 3 or only 2 in bold print? I.e., Does “metaphysical reality” = “reality” and does “epistemology” = “epistemopological methods?” Further is “epistemology” = “a method?”

Epistemology as defined in Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Britannica*, and on Wikipedia asserts true statements about the nature of knowledge, truth, how we are sure we know what we know, how knowledge is justified, and the like. Metaphysics as defined in the same sources asserts true statements about the most general features of reality as a whole; the study of being as such. I side with this consensus in the philosophical community. As in other topics you may say “So what if a billion people in philosophy agree I’m going to define it as I think.” Fine. Just tell me your definitions.

But I don’t in the least confuse metaphysics with epistemology, nor metaphysical propositions with epistemological propositions. I do maintain that they have something in common: they both assert true propositions about a domain of investigation–either true statements about the most general properties of reality (metaphysics) or such about human knowledge.

Now if you maintain epistemology = method = a series of pragmatic procedural steps that someone goes through that produces valid results until something better comes along (w/o the intellect being able to ascertain any certain and unchangable truths about the mind and reality), then I would be confusing terms in your school of thought, but not mine.

IOW, I concede if knowledge = temporarily valid results of temporarily valid pragmatic procedural steps, then there would be no self-referential inconsistency in N. However the policy statement N, in the school of thought I belong to = “There is no certain knowledge.” Ergo, the self-refuting consequences I pointed out, which then do hold.

Consequently in your thinking, the SM produces temporarily valid results by using temporarily valid pragmatic procedural steps. I do get it the idea. But I don’t buy it.

I do not accept this TS. I did not say that the SM is sufficient for ALL knowledge. Statements about ethics are not about facts, they are about “ought”-s or "should’-s. Statements about art are subjective opinions. Sure, one can ask: “what is more beautiful, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, or Ravel’s Bolero?”. Such questions may be asked, but they are nonsensical, despite the fact that they are valid lingustical constructs. Observe the emphasized “ALL” - which I DID NOT assert. Statements about the future cannot be evaluated to be “true” or “false”, until that future rolls around… But the most important point is that the “scientific method” belongs to epistemology, and not to metaphysics. More about this below.

OK, so the SM is sufficient for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false.

In conjunction with the statement you made re the SM (“As with everything in the SM, we are open to see if a “better method” or “better explanation” comes out, and if it does, we shall happily accept it. But no matter how many times we ask for a better method, we receive no answers.”) does this mean you adhere to a temporary PS, i.e., as of now in this discussion?

But, of course, I am a skeptic, and I need more than just your word (the word “your” is a shortcut, for anyone else, too. The word of the pope is not more convincing than yours would be.) So, can you either demonstrate the validy of your proposition, or not? That is the question for all propositons pertaining to metaphysical reality.

Everyone, not just skeptics, needs sufficient reasons for what they hold.

I say that the “animating principle” is an incoherent term. It does not matter, how many people say that they “understand” what it is, can they explain it? If someone can explain what that means, then I may still disagree, but at least I would know what it is all about. But that is not really important. I accept your defintion, and now the ball is in your court. Explain how do you assign a “true” or “false” evaluation to the proposition: “humans have an immortal soul”.

First, what I am discussing is the existence of an immaterial human soul. But since the philosophical definition is just a meaningless string of words that you agree to talk about to see if it is true or false (and I’m not sure how you would do that), let me get to it by asking you to elaborate on an allied statement you made: “The mind is the activity of brain. the activity will cease when the brain goes dead.”

What does it mean to say “the mind is the activity of the brain?” If you’ll pardon the irony, flesh it out for me. Give to a skeptical mind the evidence that will back up what you say.