Supernatural epistemology?

[Neithan]

I was agreeing with your changes until I hit this part above. Now I agree with what you say here, except that it doesn’t apply to Aquinas’ arguments: why?

Aquinas’ premises are not inductive. Induction is reasoning from detailed facts to general principles. But Aquinas relies on abstraction with regards to the very nature of change. One could disagree with his principle and try to show how he is wrong, but if the principle is wrong than *any *example of change could be used to prove him wrong. And any example of change is sufficient to abstract the principle of causality.

Basically, Aquinas was in the business of demonstrations. And demonstrations are very specific kinds of arguments. They are deductive and must be logically valid and sound. There is no reason why one can’t have a deductive argument that has some premises based upon experience (a posteriori).

Aha. So his arguments use deduction, but his premises are the result of induction right? Like deductive arguments inferring from inductive conclusions?

 

[Shike]

Aha. So his arguments use deduction, but his premises are the result of induction right? Like deductive arguments inferring from inductive conclusions?

Well, I would go one step further and say that even his premises are not the result of induction. Take for instance a summary of Aquinas’ 1st way:

Argument from change

1. Some things change.
2. Everything that changes is made to change by something else.
3. The chain of causes can’t go back to infinity.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause of change that does not itself change.

Which of these 1-3 would be the inductive premise(s)? Well, let’s first be clear on the definition of induction. Taken from Philosophy Dictionary, one of the definitions reads ‘A method of reasoning by which one infers a generalization from a series of instances.’ But more poking around on the net led me here and here. Which leads me to believe that there are a number of different kinds of inductive reasoning, generalization only being one kind. And it also leads me to believe that “infers” from the Philosophy Dictionary definition must introduce the notion of probability–and as taken from your post discussing your changes.

I really think the notion of probability is key, while inferring from one group to another group (of however many or few entities one wants).

So, is #1 taken from induction? Well, at the very least #1 is taken from experience. But there doesn’t seem to be any inductive inference; it seems to be an immediate kind of thing. Do I infer from the group of one thing changing to the conclusion that some things change? Well no, not if you take “infer” as indicating some level of probability. That some things change is just a logical deductive corollary of my experience of one thing changing. So, #1 is not reached by induction. I daresay someone could still try to argue this by questioning how we could know that any object of experience exists in the first place and that it might just be an illusion: for now I will not travel down that road unless someone wants to.

I really think #2 is the best candidate for a premise arrived at by induction. But does one infer from one instance of change (something being changed by another) that everything that changes is being changed by another? Well, first off, this conclusion is not what #2 states. #2 states that ‘Everything that changes is made to change by something else’, which means it’s not talking about the actual state of affairs directly but any possible state of affairs. So is Aquinas’ guilty of such a horendously weak induction, where he goes from what he sees here and now to not only what he doesn’t see, but that which will ever be?
I don’t think so. In metaphysics, if you follow an aristotelian line of reasoning about being from our everyday experience (which includes change) you come to two principles that must hold for any possible change to occur. #2 is just the result of abstraction and understanding the nature of change, at least enough to declare what is necessary for change. So instead of Aquinas seemingly making an induction from one instance of change to every possible instance of change; rather, Aquinas has understood the nature of change enough to say that if you have an instance of change, these principles must be in effect.
Now the further question remains, is induction used in an aristotelian line of reasoning about being? As far as I can tell, no. Inductive reasoning seems to remain probable because the attribute in question is not a necessary feature of the entity or at least not known to be a necessary feature. With change we can find necessary features. Therefore, induction does not apply.

Is #3 arrived at by induction? I don’t think so. It seems #3 follows upon the nature of change, at least regarding the two fundamental principles of change. So for the same reasons as with #2 I would have to say no, unless I am failing to see something.

So it would seem that Aquinas’ 1st way (and I would argue all of the other ways) does not involve induction. If one takes induction as merely getting a general principle from a particular thing and excludes the notion of probability… then maybe, just maybe one could claim induction in Aquinas’ arguments. But I think that’s a stretch.

Any probability in Aquinas’ 1st way is due to any probability that one might not actually experience change, but might be tricked by an evil demon, ect. And there doesn’t seem to be any reason why we shouldn’t trust our immediate experience, in general.

These kind of mistakes, of supposing abstraction and apprehension of necessary features of a nature are actually discovered by induction and therefore not necessary, can be traced to nominalism and a denial of essences in modern philosophy. One way modern philosophers fell into this trap was an erroneous conception of experience: many times they thought that we only have access to “representations” of objects rather than the objects themselves (come to think of it, that might be due to a rejection of final causality, leading credence to a recent book I read). Cue much of the havoc and confusion in philosophy.

Questions?

• Michael

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I say that the “animating principle” is an incoherent term. It does not matter, how many people say that they “understand” what it is, can they explain it? If someone can explain what that means, then I may still disagree, but at least I would know what it is all about. But that is not really important. I accept your defintion, and now the ball is in your court. Explain how do you assign a “true” or “false” evaluation to the proposition: “humans have an immortal soul”.

I do not accept this TS. I did not say that the SM is sufficient for ALL knowledge. Statements about ethics are not about facts, they are about “ought”-s or "should’-s. Statements about art are subjective opinions. Sure, one can ask: “what is more beautiful, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, or Ravel’s Bolero?”. Such questions may be asked, but they are nonsensical, despite the fact that they are valid lingustical constructs. Observe the emphasized “ALL” - which I DID NOT assert. Statements about the future cannot be evaluated to be “true” or “false”, until that future rolls around. “Tomorrow it will rain at this specific location at that particular hour” is neither true nor false. But the most important point is that the “scientific method” belongs to epistemology, and not to metaphysics. More about this below.

Just Google it. I would have to do the same.

Why would it be self-refuting? It is not a statement about anything. It is simply a method and moreover, it is a counterfactual. A method is neither true, not false. It is either useful or not. It is either rigid or not. It is either applicable or not. It is quite possible that there are some “basic principles” which will never need to change, but we cannot know that a-priori. Therefore we stay open to the possibility, and if it never arises, no harm was done.

I differentiate between “axioms” and “basic principles”. Axioms pertain to formal, deductive axiomatic systems. Principles belong to open, inductive systems. Axioms are neither “true” nor “false” - epistemically speaking. They are declared “true”. Basic principles (like the conservation of matter / energy) are held provisionally true, until some counter example is found. Axioms cannot be “found” incorrect, basic principles can be.

Again, incorrect usage of the word: “supeceeded”. No, it is simply unusable, inapplicable for “basic” propositions. Remember: “to explain something is to reduce it something even more basic, even simpler”. By definition, a basic concept cannot be reduced.

No impact at all, since your objections were inapplicable and bogus.

See post below.

 

[Neithan]

Questions?

• Michael

I would say you’re right! Thanks for that. There is still the *possibility *of nominalism and phenomenalism, though, so that could be argued (as can anything really).
But does that mean this article from the old Catholic Encyclopedia (under “Theistic Proofs”) falsely equivocates *a posteriori *and inductive reasoning? And that the article on Induction (under “III. Rational Foundations and Scope of Induction” fourth paragraph towards the end) incorrectly uses the word “infers” for *a posteriori *arguments proving the existence of God? It does, however, say that “we must abandon induction proper” for such arguments.

 

[Spock]

Your paragraph above alone will serve as a useful illustration.

As far as I am concerned, “reality” = “physical reality”, but I want to make sure that I accommodate the possibilty of some “non-physical reality”, too. Warning: “non-physical reality” is not “abstractions” or “concepts”! God or the soul are not supposed to be mere concepts, they are supposed to be some kind of “reality”. That is why I used the term of “metaphysical reality”, which is different from abstractions made about that reality.

Yes, epistemology is a collection of methods to gain knowledge about that reality.

The best summary of philosophy I ever read was this:
“Metaphysics = what exists?”
“Epistemology = how do we know it?”
“Ethics = so how should we behave?”

In this thread I would like to see some propositions concerning that alleged “non-physical reality”, and some methods of “how do we gain knowledge about that reality”. So far very little progress (read: none) have been made along those lines.

But I don’t in the least confuse metaphysics with epistemology, nor metaphysical propositions with epistemological propositions. I do maintain that they have something in common: they both assert true propositions about a domain of investigation–either true statements about the most general properties of reality (metaphysics) or such about human knowledge.

This is problematic. A true proposition concerning metaphysics means that the proposition reflects correctly its referent (the reality). That is fine. However, the very idea that a proposition about gaining knowledge can be “true” or “false” is only meaningful if “true” means that the method works, and “false” means that it does not work.

A suggested epistemological method might be: “if you wish to know the weather, go out and check it for yourself”. The method would yield good results, and therefore it is “true”. Another suggested epistemological method might be: “if you wish to know the weather, listen to the radio’s weather forecast”. This method may yield good results sometimes, and bad ones at other times. The question if the method “true”, does not really make sense. A third epistemological method might be: “if you wish to know the weather, roll a dice with its sides describing “good weather”, “storms”, “rain”, etc… and that will tell you what the weather is outside”. Obviously this third “method” is inferior to the others. But even this ridiculous “method” might yield correct result sometimes, so in a sense, it is not completely “false”.

Now if you maintain epistemology = method = a series of pragmatic procedural steps that someone goes through that produces valid results until something better comes along (w/o the intellect being able to ascertain any certain and unchangable truths about the mind and reality), then I would be confusing terms in your school of thought, but not mine.

I never said that “truths” about the external reality are “certain” and “unchangable”. Let’s differentiate here between “brute facts” - like “it is raining” and explanations about the brute facts. Of course, simple observations about reality are “certain” and “unchangable”. But that is not what we are supposed to talk about.

IOW, I concede if knowledge = temporarily valid results of temporarily valid pragmatic procedural steps, then there would be no self-referential inconsistency in N. However the policy statement N, in the school of thought I belong to = “There is no certain knowledge.” Ergo, the self-refuting consequences I pointed out, which then do hold.

Then there is a problem with your school of thought. Knowledge = infomation about the external reality (or a valid dedustion in an axiomatic system - but we should disregard that part). Knowledge is partly “what happens” - which is brute facts, and what is “behind the scenes?” what causes it, how do the different parts of reality work - the explanation for the events. This latter one is which is inductively achieved, and which is therefore always tentative, in the sense that it MAY be superceeded later. It is quite possible that some of our explanations are “final”, that they will be good “forever”. But we don’t know that. And again, in a deductive, axiomatic systems we do have certain knowledge. the Pythagoras theorem will always be true in the Euclidean geometry. No, there is no self-referential problem here.

Consequently in your thinking, the SM produces temporarily valid results by using temporarily valid pragmatic procedural steps. I do get it the idea. But I don’t buy it.

Ok. So what now?

OK, so the SM is sufficient for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false.

In conjunction with the statement you made re the SM (“As with everything in the SM, we are open to see if a “better method” or “better explanation” comes out, and if it does, we shall happily accept it. But no matter how many times we ask for a better method, we receive no answers.”) does this mean you adhere to a temporary PS, i.e., as of now in this discussion?

Sure, we receive answers. But those answers are tentative. I would be glad to see some answers in this discussion, even if they are tentative.

Everyone, not just skeptics, needs sufficient reasons for what they hold.

What is the “sufficient reason” for the propostion: “on the chessboard the bishop can only move diagonally”?

What does it mean to say “the mind is the activity of the brain?” If you’ll pardon the irony, flesh it out for me. Give to a skeptical mind the evidence that will back up what you say.

It means the same thing as: “the walking is the activity of the muscles in the leg”.

 

[Shike]

I would say you’re right! Thanks for that. There is still the *possibility *of nominalism and phenomenalism, though, so that could be argued (as can anything really).
But does that mean this article from the old Catholic Encyclopedia (under “Theistic Proofs”) falsely equivocates *a posteriori *and inductive reasoning? And that the article on Induction (under “III. Rational Foundations and Scope of Induction” fourth paragraph towards the end) incorrectly uses the word “infers” for *a posteriori *arguments proving the existence of God? It does, however, say that “we must abandon induction proper” for such arguments.

With regards to your first question, it sure seems like those matchings are wrong. And I initially thought so. But there does seem to be a way of interpreting the term a posteriori that avoids the problem. The following is written mostly for my understanding, but hey others might get something out of it or correct me if I am wrong.

Hume divided our propositional knowledge into two categories: those which are facts about the world and those which are relations of ideas, they can be called the synthetic a posteriori and the analytic a priori respectively. Here analytic is contrasted with synthetic. In an analytic proposition the concept of the predicate is said to be found in the concept of the subject. In a synthetic proposition the concept of the predicate isn’t found in the concept of the subject (though not contrary to the subject either). And a priori is here contrasted with a posteriori. A priori knowledge can be known without leaving your home while a posteriori knowledge requires you to leave your home (roughly). It seems to me that this (rough) definition is somewhat artificial, being a functional definition rather than being an essential definition, though it may still be somewhat useful. Also, I think it is a mistake to define a priori as meaning ‘without experience’ and a posteriori meaning ‘with experience’ because all knowledge originates in experience anyways.

Anyhow, Kant was very famous in divvying up our propositional knowledge into 3 categories: the analytic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori, and the famous synthetic a priori. The synthetic a priori would mean that the concept of the predicate is not found in the concept of the subject, however, the predicate could still be discovered without leaving your home. Basically, it seems that he is making room for necessary propositions about the world. And purposely being very general and vague and not attributing the definitions of Kant to these thinkers, one could say that this is actually old news, since philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas were in the business of finding necessary propositions about the world–and a host of others I presume.

Now, under these definitions, it would seem like the old Catholic Encyclopedia article is correct because deduction would always be associated with the a priori and deduction with the a posteriori (method). So in this sense Aquinas’ arguments wouldn’t be a posteriori. But if a posteriori means merely from experience, then Aquinas’ arguments are most definitely a posteriori. I think there is a confusion when using the word a posteriori, whether one means to talk about the method of justification for or the origin of knowledge.

In the past I used to say Aquinas’ 5 ways are a posteriori in the sense that they are from experience. While not incorrect, I think it would be more in keeping with the history of philosophy and stating the obvious much less by saying Aquinas’ 5 ways are not a posteriori (method).

I see again how important it is to first define one’s terms. Doh.

With regards to your second question and the word “infer”, I am not totally convinced that the word has to be used in association with inductive arguments only. For instance, a quick search for the definition of the word means to ‘deduce or conclude’ which could really be used with any kind of argument. In the same section of the article, however, I think the use of a posteriori is either wrong or fairly obvious. If he means it in the sense of the origin of knowledge, then it is obvious that Aquinas’ arguments are from experience; maybe he was trying to emphasize this point while distancing the arguments away from induction. But if he means it with regards to method, as I (roughly) defined it above, then I think he’s wrong because in this sense Aquinas’ arguments are not a posteriori.

Again, I think all of this highlights the need to define one’s terms. Now the article may be very clear about the terms being used or they may be able to be disambiguated from the context, but I’m not going to spend an enormous amount of time on the matter; I’ve already spent quite a bit.

ciao,
Michael

 

[Shike]

The best summary of philosophy I ever read was this:
“Metaphysics = what exists?”
“Epistemology = how do we know it?”
“Ethics = so how should we behave?”

That is a useful summary. One that also seems to imply that the is-ought guillotine is BS.

In this thread I would like to see some propositions concerning that alleged “non-physical reality”, and some methods of “how do we gain knowledge about that reality”. So far very little progress (read: none) have been made along those lines.

That’s not true. I gave you a method (the method of metaphysics), I just can’t help it that your epistemology unjustly excludes it. You still haven’t refuted Aquinas’ 1st way.

And there is no problem that the ‘bishop moves diagonally’. I just want to know why other pieces can’t move also.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

**How do we know if a proposition concerning the supernatural is true or false? ** In other words, what are the means or methods of supernatural epistemology?

The foreseeable answer: “by revelation” is not acceptable. Most of us never get a revelation, no matter how fervently and honestly we pray for one. The second possible answer would be: “by testimonials” - which is also unacceptable, since it would only push the problem one step back. How would we decide if the testimonial is without error, since we are fallible human beings?

The fact that not everyone gets verification does not invalidate “revelation” as an answer to the question. Verificationism is a well known logical contradiction. Your exclusion of the correct answers is not supported by reason.

 

[Spock]

That is a useful summary. One that also seems to imply that the is-ought guillotine is BS.

Huh? What are you talking about?

That’s not true. I gave you a method (the method of metaphysics), I just can’t help it that your epistemology unjustly excludes it.

Metaphysics is not a method. Metaphysics is the “musing” (contemplation) of “what exists”. You seemed to agree with that.

And there is no problem that the ‘bishop moves diagonally’.

There is no “sufficient reason” for the rule that there must be a bishop, and that the bishop is restricted to move only diagonally.

I just want to know why other pieces can’t move also.

Of course they can move, but the rule for them is different - because we agree to define as such.

 

[tonyrey]

“natural” - and therefore “supernatural” - is never clearly defined. It is a nebulous term which can accommodate any discovery and enables the “naturalist” to establish an impregnable position which is totally immune to falsification!

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

As far as I am concerned, “reality” = “physical reality”, but I want to make sure that I accommodate the possibilty of some “non-physical reality”, too. Warning: “non-physical reality” is not “abstractions” or “concepts”! God or the soul are not supposed to be mere concepts, they are supposed to be some kind of “reality”. That is why I used the term of “metaphysical reality”, which is different from abstractions made about that reality.

Would this be a fair paraphrase: As far as I am concerned now], “reality” = “physical reality”, but I [also] want to make sure that I accommodate the possibilty of some “non-physical reality”, too.

Assuming yes, here’s some questions that perhaps can cut though the different definitions of epistemology and metaphysics we employ. These may get us through your fair q: “So what now?”

(1) Do you see how someone [not necessarily you] espousing TS (=SM is sufficient for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false) would simply be rephrasing the atheist claim?
By definition what is not physical/material (or verifiable by scientific experiment) is beyond the scientific method which evolved historically to deal with physical/material reality and (legitimately for that enterprise) expressly eliminates God from consideration (or anything else not empirically verifiable) as a cause or a reality. No scientist doing research can invoke God as a cause, principle, or explanation: science is methodologically materialistic/physicalistic.

To take the scientific method, which ex professo does not and cannot involve God, and then use it to determine if there is a God is about as circular and self-confirming as it gets.

(2) Do you see how someone [not necessarily you] using PS (=only science’s practical procedural methods are used for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false) would be employing a method of testing that is blind to the very object it is investigating? Even if God did exist that method could never find Him.

(3) Do you see how if either person [again, not necessarily you] then threw up their hands and said the following, it would be a charade? “I would like to see some propositions concerning that alleged ‘non-physical reality’, and some methods of ‘how do we gain knowledge about that reality’. So far very little progress (read: none) have been made along those lines.”

True, God is understood not to be a concept but a reality.

Incidentally, what is you take on the cognitive status of universals, abstract concepts. Do they represent the intellect’s grasp of an inherent, essential nature of a class of individual objects of investigation? That there is something some way in reality that answers for the concept in my mind?

Raw sense (name removed by moderator)ut considered in itself as Hume rightly observed does no more than make impressions on individual sense organs which are retained in memory. Such data gives us no more than the brute fact (re causality) that one event often follows another. It is the intellect that grasps the operation and nature of causality. Ditto for the judgment of existence of something.

This is problematic. A true proposition concerning metaphysics means that the proposition reflects correctly its referent (the reality). That is fine. However, the very idea that a proposition about gaining knowledge can be “true” or “false” is only meaningful if “true” means that the method works, and “false” means that it does not work.

Agreed re definition of truth in metaphysics. The difference begins with your definition of epistemology as method and method as a temporally valid set of practical procedural steps virtually identified with the SM because, as you acknowledged, reality=physical reality.

A suggested epistemological method might be: “if you wish to know the weather, go out and check it for yourself”. . . . .But even this ridiculous “method” might yield correct result sometimes, so in a sense, it is not completely “false”.

Example of reality is a physical, empirically-observable reality, which is not the formal object of metaphysics as it has been traditionally defined.

I never said that “truths” about the external reality are “certain” and “unchangable”. Let’s differentiate here between “brute facts” - like “it is raining” and explanations about the brute facts. Of course, simple observations about reality are “certain” and “unchangable”. But that is not what we are supposed to talk about.

That was my point: given your method you never said that.

Then there is a problem with your school of thought. Knowledge = infomation about the external reality . . . No, there is no self-referential problem here.

Again, that was my point for your definition of epistemology–no self-referential problem.

And perhaps I could have been clearer: I don’t dispute the validity of science, nor the scientific method, nor that tentativeness of some scientific propositions and for the very reasons you give.

I dispute TS and PS as defined above, and the identification of epistemology with method, virtually the SM. As I mentioned, I side with the consensus in the philosophical community on the nature of epistemology and epistemological propositions. On epistemology this, I think, is where our difference lies.

What is the “sufficient reason” for the propostion: “on the chessboard the bishop can only move diagonally”?

That someone decided the rule of the game was thus and stated it sufficiently explains the proposition.
Am I missing something? That seemed too easy.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

It means the same thing as: “the walking is the activity of the muscles in the leg”.

This is not particularly helpful. Let me see if I can clarify things.

“The mind” as generally used is the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality. I start with this as a phenomenological definition.

So to say “the mind is the activity of the brain as the walking is the activity of the muscles in the leg" means . . . what?

The brain causes the mind. The mind can therefore be reductively explained by brain activity: it is nothing but neuronal activity.

If so, what is the proof for this assertion, temporarily valid though it may be?

If not, what are you saying and how do you support it?

 

[Shike]

Good posts, Fr. of Jazz. It again sums things up pretty nicely.

Metaphysics is not a method. Metaphysics is the “musing” (contemplation) of “what exists”. You seemed to agree with that.

So say you.

Metaphysics is the study of being as being. It has an object of knowledge and a method.

Ciao,
Michael

 

[Spock]

Would this be a fair paraphrase: As far as I am concerned now], “reality” = “physical reality”, but I [also] want to make sure that I accommodate the possibilty of some “non-physical reality”, too.

Yes, precisely.

(1) Do you see how someone [not necessarily you] espousing TS (=SM is sufficient for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false) would simply be rephrasing the atheist claim?
By definition what is not physical/material (or verifiable by scientific experiment) is beyond the scientific method which evolved historically to deal with physical/material reality and (legitimately for that enterprise) expressly eliminates God from consideration (or anything else not empirically verifiable) as a cause or a reality. No scientist doing research can invoke God as a cause, principle, or explanation: science is methodologically materialistic/physicalistic.

To take the scientific method, which ex professo does not and cannot involve God, and then use it to determine if there is a God is about as circular and self-confirming as it gets.

Not exactly. Science does not invoke God, because the scientists see no need for that hypothesis. Even religious scientists do not say about their own discipline: “this phenomenon is forever inexplicable for us, because God, using undetetectable means made it somehow happen”. The religious scientists use the same materialistic / physicalistic method as their atheist brethren, don’t they? And the reason is simple: they want explanations and the religious “answer”: “an unknowable being using inexplicable means made it somehow happen” - is the very antithesis of an explanation.

The believers of paranormal express the same grudge; they say that science does not take them seriously. The reason is simple: the suggested experiments, rigorously performed: all come out negative. However, if one of their experiments would show significant positive results, you can be rest assured that science would jump on the possibility to examine the claims. (Maybe you heard of the James Randi fund to explore any “non-physical” claims, be they paranormal, or supernatural. There are few takers, and no winners yet. The usual excuse for not participating is that “dirty” monetary rewards are beneath the dignity of the experimenters.)

(2) Do you see how someone [not necessarily you] using PS (=only science’s practical procedural methods are used for all statements “about facts,” i.e., statements that can be either true or false) would be employing a method of testing that is blind to the very object it is investigating? Even if God did exist that method could never find Him.

Actually it could, by taking the believers at their word, namely that God interferes with reality. At the point of interference the “intrusion” could be detected - because it would be at least partially within the physical realm. Most Christians profess that prayer “works”, in the sense that God can be “nudged” or “influenced” to perform actions that will interfere with the natural flow of events in their favor. (As Ambrose Bierce said in the Devil’s Dictionary: “To pray (v.): To ask that the laws of the universe be annulled on behalf of a single petitioner, confessedly unworthy.”).

If they are correct, then we could make progress by using a statistical method of investigation. It would not be able to prove causation, but at least it would be able to present a correlation. A positive correlation then would be the starting point to investigate further. But, of course there are no positive results either. Now consider the usual “reply”: God intentionally “skews” the results, because he wishes to stay hidden. Such intellectually dishonest “cop-outs” justly remove the proponents from serious consideration.

(3) Do you see how if either person [again, not necessarily you] then threw up their hands and said the following, it would be a charade? “I would like to see some propositions concerning that alleged ‘non-physical reality’, and some methods of ‘how do we gain knowledge about that reality’. So far very little progress (read: none) have been made along those lines.”

Let me make sure that I accommodate you. You do the definition of God, and the soul. You tell me how the propositions “God exists as reality” and “the human soul is immortal” can be ascertained. You tell me your metaphysics and your epistemology. Forget about mine, it is irrelevant. Don’t try to do what others did before, who said: “What is the use? You will discard what I say anyhow”. Maybe I will, maybe I will not. Try me.

 

[Spock]

Incidentally, what is you take on the cognitive status of universals, abstract concepts. Do they represent the intellect’s grasp of an inherent, essential nature of a class of individual objects of investigation? That there is something some way in reality that answers for the concept in my mind?

Oh, brother. That would take us far off course. But it is one of my pet-peeves. Let’s do it, but not within this thread, unless you think that it is instrumental to this discussion.

Raw sense (name removed by moderator)ut considered in itself as Hume rightly observed does no more than make impressions on individual sense organs which are retained in memory. Such data gives us no more than the brute fact (re causality) that one event often follows another. It is the intellect that grasps the operation and nature of causality. Ditto for the judgment of existence of something.

For causality, yes, for existence, no. Existence is obvious, casuality is not obvious. I am aware that there are some “solipsists”, who deny the existence of the external world. But I see no reason to take them seriously, just like I would not take someone seriously who asserts that he is a “hen”, or he is “Napoleon”.

Agreed re definition of truth in metaphysics. The difference begins with your definition of epistemology as method and method as a temporally valid set of practical procedural steps virtually identified with the SM because, as you acknowledged, reality=physical reality.

Virtually indentical? What does it mean? Any epistemology must allow us to find out if a propositon is “true”, or “false”, or maybe “undecidable”, or… “meaningless / nonsensical”. That is what epistemology is supposed to do. The fact that I consider reality=physical reality plays no part here. The word “method” is as broad as it can be. It simply signifies that we must take certain steps from “A” to “B”. It says nothing about the steps themselves.

And perhaps I could have been clearer: I don’t dispute the validity of science, nor the scientific method, nor that tentativeness of some scientific propositions and for the very reasons you give.

Thank you.

I dispute TS and PS as defined above, and the identification of epistemology with method, virtually the SM. As I mentioned, I side with the consensus in the philosophical community on the nature of epistemology and epistemological propositions. On epistemology this, I think, is where our difference lies.

Very true. But I am open to suggestions. As long as there is an objective method, We can get closer to agreement.

That someone decided the rule of the game was thus and stated it sufficiently explains the proposition.
Am I missing something?

I think so. There is no “reason” why it should be as it is. You said that the PSR tells us “why something is the way it is, why it cannot be otherwise”. Here we deal with a perfectly random declaration of a “rule”, which could be totally different, if we wanted to, and there is no “reason” to choose one over the other. As you say (and I agree) it was simply a “decison”.

 

[Spock]

This is not particularly helpful. Let me see if I can clarify things.

“The mind” as generally used is the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality. I start with this as a phenomenological definition.

Agreed.

The brain causes the mind. The mind can therefore be reductively explained by brain activity: it is nothing but neuronal activity.

“Causes” is nebulous. To use another metaphor, the “mind” is to the brain, as the “program” is to the computer. On the same “hardware” a lot of “programs” can run. No, the mind cannot be reduced directly to the neurons, just like the “wetness” of water cannot be reduced to the 2 hydrogen and one oxygen atoms it is composed of. The mind is an emergent property or activity of the brain, just like “walking” or “kicking” are dependent on the muscles, but cannot be fully reduced to the muscles. Observe, the walking or kicking are two, very different activities both performed by the muscles, just like there are very different activities perfomed by the mind.

If so, what is the proof for this assertion, temporarily valid though it may be?

The whole neurophysics, with all its achievements. Admittedly we barely scratched the surface of the problem, but so far results support the hypothesis.

 

[John_Russell_Jr]

I have been asking these questions, within threads, and no one, ever attempted to give an answer. So I am devoting a thread to this problem. The question is simple:

**How do we know if a proposition concerning the supernatural is true or false? **In other words, what are the means or methods of supernatural epistemology?

It is asserted that the supernatural (God, souls, angels, whatevers) are not physical, and therefore they cannot be verifed empirically, by observation. (Of course there is a question then, how do these entities interact or influence the physical world. But that is a side problem at this moment.) Concentrate on the main question: “what is the supernatural epistemology?”. How do we gain knowledge about the supernatural?

The foreseeable answer: “by revelation” is not acceptable. Most of us never get a revelation, no matter how fervently and honestly we pray for one. The second possible answer would be: “by testimonials” - which is also unacceptable, since it would only push the problem one step back. How would we decide if the testimonial is without error, since we are fallible human beings?

Is there an objective, repeatable method, which would allow to separate the wheat from the chaff, which does not necessitate the a-priori acceptance of the claim (in other words, which can be used by a non-believer)?

… dear spock ,

… my own thinking , all is supernatural – no exceptions , matter is just a different type and varying degree of the spiritul to that traditionally known as spirit / ual , understanding in fallen man is shot to pieces , he has plenty of knowledge , more than enough already to solve all problems actually , but he cannot understand it hardly at all nor appreciate what he understands , this is why these debates like on here go on endlessly , none can nderstand anything hardly i’m afraid , one should see truth and accept and appreciate it almost intuitively , and understand and appreciate it , but it remains jibberish babbe for fallen man , the sole purpose of all human communication is to solve problems in the pursuit of truth , the only way man can believe anything is on the basis of faith , he cannot prove anything at all – except one thing only , that he exists and that is all , he cannot prove who or what he is , only that he himself exists , and he knows this because he has experiences , if he did not exist he would have no experiences , there would be nothing , he woukld be nothing and not exist , so it is not unreasonable to believe on the basis of faith – it is the normal modus operandi for all human belief , and as to proofs for anything , the problem is man is fallen and can barely understand or appreciate any of the knowledge he has , if he was non - fallen he could solve all problems necessary for man both individually and collectively , as it stands fallen man cannot even solve one single problem , to solve a problem you must do so perfectly – you must solve it completely , perefctly and permanently , none here today can do this , we just keep getting more and more problems and the human situation just keeps getting worse and worse as a result , not any true human progress is happening at all – man keeps going off at a tangent , atheists need to know they cannot solve a single problem and accept they need faith and to understand their fallen natures with minds very defective , hope this helps dear friend ,

… may god bless and love you ,

… john …

 

[Spock]

. my own thinking , all is supernatural – no exceptions , matter is just a different type and varying degree of the spiritul

Sorry. There can be no understanding between us. If you say that everything is “super”-natural, then your “super” prefix is meaningless, since you do not think that there is anything “natural”. But, thanks for your remarks, anyhow.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Sorry. There can be no understanding between us. If you say that everything is “super”-natural, then your “super” prefix is meaningless, since you do not think that there is anything “natural”. But, thanks for your remarks, anyhow.

Presuming the natural/supernatural dichotomy is absolute, is a presumption I doubt you can support. The dogmatic assertion that only those entities available to our physical senses constitute an ontologically separate class of beings is rather ludicrous.

 

[John_Russell_Jr]

Sorry. There can be no understanding between us. If you say that everything is “super”-natural, then your “super” prefix is meaningless, since you do not think that there is anything “natural”. But, thanks for your remarks, anyhow.

… dear spock ,

… i only wrote a few mins work and did not incl clarification of definitions , in all charity it’s a bit nazi - like to scrap me like this when the communication process has not even begun in an attempt to solve the problem as we seek the truth , any word has infinite meaning for each most infinitesimal part of that word and every most infinitesimal part of that def has infinite meaning about it and on and on it goes like this ad infinitum , not to mention the def is completely different in each mans mind – this is how a living human mind works with language , so defs are quite involved and i cannot pen one completely , but you definied supernatural as the invisible world like soul , spirit , angel , god etc , and this is true and i went with the spirit of your def , supernatural = above nature , but that does not mean unnatural or not nature , supernatural is considered a higher order of nature but still nature , i am simply redefining nature as a type of super - nature , i hope you understand me , our thoughts are spiritual and cannot be seen but are no more important than anything else human in general , human problem solving is a dialogue of seeking truth with pure objectivity , logic , rational , sanity , huamnity , common sense , reason , sound thinking and is done with love , if you or any really want to solve the problem i’m all ears , the rules and laws in peolkes minds are the biggest obstacle to normal problem solving , overcome these and we really get places-- we can just talk freely and get the job done with no hassles no matter what this way – if poss , try it maybe , it’s up to you dear friends ,

… may god bless and love you ,

… john …