Teleological suspension of the ethical?

[ThomasToo]

I’ve been reading some about Kierkegaard and a series of questions he raised in Fear and Trembling have been giving me trouble and if any of y’all have insight it would be much appreciated. I’ve already stumped one priest who I asked in passing then the question slipped my mind until just now.

Kierkegaard writes about the binding of Isaac (Genesis 22) and offers alternative re-tellings of the story. He ends up with a couple of questions–which may in a way go back to Plato (I’ll expand below).

1. Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? (I.e. is Abraham’s intention to sacrifice Isaac truly good given that human sacrifice is intrinsically evil?)
2. Is there an absolute duty to God [beyond what is ethical]?

I think the question may, somewhat at least, boil down to that asked by Plato in the Euthyphro ‘Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?’ (10a). In other [Christian] words, is the good commanded by God because it is morally good or is it morally good because it is commanded by God? (cf. John Austin’s command theory of law).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I’ve been reading some about Kierkegaard and a series of questions he raised in Fear and Trembling have been giving me trouble and if any of y’all have insight it would be much appreciated. I’ve already stumped one priest who I asked in passing then the question slipped my mind until just now.

Kierkegaard writes about the binding of Isaac (Genesis 22) and offers alternative re-tellings of the story. He ends up with a couple of questions–which may in a way go back to Plato (I’ll expand below).

1. Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? (I.e. is Abraham’s intention to sacrifice Isaac truly good given that human sacrifice is intrinsically evil?)
2. Is there an absolute duty to God [beyond what is ethical]?

I think the question may, somewhat at least, boil down to that asked by Plato in the Euthyphro ‘Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?’ (10a). In other [Christian] words, is the good commanded by God because it is morally good or is it morally good because it is commanded by God? (cf. John Austin’s command theory of law).

i vote for divine command theory

 

[ThomasToo]

i vote for divine command theory

So there are no intrinsically evil acts? Moral norms exist only in conjunction with the threat of eternal damnation and are liable to change at God’s whim?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Thomas,

I believe St. Thomas answered that question by saying that God did not dispense Abraham from following the 5th Commandment. Rather a principal condition in Abraham’s act was changed such that what Abraham’s act constituted was not an act prohibited by the 5th Commandment. In short, what Abraham chose to do was not murder.

Any help?

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

Thomas,

I believe St. Thomas answered that question by saying that God did not dispense Abraham from following the 5th Commandment. Rather a principal condition in Abraham’s act was changed such that what Abraham’s act constituted was not an act prohibited by the 5th Commandment. In short, what Abraham chose to do was not murder.

Any help?

VC

Frankly, no. That sounds like heavy handwaiving to try and reconcile what seems to be a rather glaring contradiction but I may do better with the original text if you have the citation. Imagine, for a moment, that Abraham’s hand was not stayed in time and he did sacrifice Isaac–was his action still not a violation of the Fifth Commandment? Was it a sanctioned violation thereof? Was special dispensation given? Was the record of the violation expunged?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Imagine, for a moment, that Abraham’s hand was not stayed in time and he did sacrifice Isaac–was his action still not a violation of the Fifth Commandment?

According to St. Thomas, no.

Was it a sanctioned violation thereof?

Likewise, according to St. Thomas, no.

Was special dispensation given?

Likewise, no.

Was the record of the violation expunged?

Likewise, no.

Here is a start, but I think there are other places to look as well:
Summa Theologiae I-II, 100, 8, ad 3

VC

 

[fkjuliano]

Virtue or good is devotion to God; non-virtue or evil is the opposite.

In my view, God devised this trial in order to teach Abraham and Isaac (and through Scripture, the rest of us), in the most unforgettable way possible, that He will provide for those who give Him total devotion. But even if God’s actual intention had been the sacrifice of Isaac, that would have been within His infinite prerogative, since Isaac was God’s property and so was Abraham, as are we all, though we receive the grace of being treated as His children. In any case, it was proper and virtuous for Abraham to be totally obedient to his Lord and Creator in this test of faith.
As to the conjecture that Abraham’s hand might have slipped, etc., that is non-sense since God is omnipotent. If it was not His desire that Isaac be killed, then there was absolutely no possibility of that happening.

 

[ThomasToo]

Here is a start, but I think there are other places to look as well:Summa Theologiae I-II, 100, 8, ad 3

I just read that section of the Summa and frankly I’m hard pressed to agree with him. If, as Aquinas argues, in so ordering any action God ordains it and makes it–at the very least–morally licit then how is there objective good? In the Old Testament when God orders genocide (1 Samuel 15:2-3) is it truly to be believed that such an act is licit or–perish the thought–blessed? If someone today claimed that God came to him and said God ordered him to kill, for example, all ethnic Kurds I think the Church would be incredulous under the rubric that such an act is intrinsically wrong.

Side question, is there one specific translation of the Bible people here prefer, I know King James is persona non grata but I don’t know which version is held in best esteem.

 

[ThomasToo]

f it was not His desire that Isaac be killed, then there was absolutely no possibility of that happening.

Question of clarification: does the above principle stand today? Is it God’s desire then that the world look anything like it does (the poor, homeless, addicted, unwanted, hungry, lonely, &c)?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

If, as Aquinas argues, in so ordering any action God ordains it and makes it–at the very least–morally licit then how is there objective good?

Hi Thomas,

Can you show us what you are referring to?

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

Hi Thomas,

Can you show us what you are referring to?

VC

Aqunias:

He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. (ST, I-II, q, 100, 8, reply to objection 3)

It’s implicit in Aquinas’s writing that the very supposition ‘God is a murder’ is absurd. If we can agree that murder is an objective wrong then it seems that regardless of who ordains such a murder would be morally culpable. As Aquinas’s argument rests on God being the lord of life and death perhaps a slightly different example would better suit our purposes.

Suppose, for a moment, that instead of ordering what still seems to me to be murder (Genesis 22) or genocide (1 Sam 15:2-3) God commanded a person to rape a given woman (NB this is not an argument of whether or not God would do such a thing or if we are to believe someone who makes the claim such a claim has occurred, let us stipulate this for a moment). Is such a command morally licit? Is it, by virtue of being a divine command, in fact good and not simply allowed (blessed as opposed to licit)?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

It’s implicit in Aquinas’s writing that the very supposition ‘God is a murder’ is absurd. If we can agree that murder is an objective wrong then it seems that regardless of who ordains such a murder would be morally culpable.

That’s right. But you have to carefully define what murder is – of what the act of murder consists. That is the basis of St. Thomas’ argument here, and it may be missed.

As Aquinas’s argument rests on God being the lord of life and death perhaps a slightly different example would better suit our purposes.

Ok.

Suppose, for a moment, that . . . God commanded a person to rape a given woman. Is such a command morally licit? Is it, by virtue of being a divine command, in fact good and not simply allowed (blessed as opposed to licit)?

I believe St. Thomas would say that if the action is unjust or otherwise disordered than God cannot lawfully command it. I believe St. Thomas says that God does not dispense from any of the Commandments of the Decalogue.

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

That’s right. But you have to carefully define what murder is – of what the act of murder consists. That is the basis of St. Thomas’ argument here, and you may have missed it.

That’s why I presented the second example.

I believe St. Thomas would say that if the action is unjust or otherwise disordered than God cannot lawfully command it. I believe St. Thomas says that God does not dispense from any of the Commandments of the Decalogue.

Then it’s a good thing (for the purposes of this discussion) that nothing in the Decalogue says anything about rape (assuming adultery is not at issue). I would argue that the genocide I’ve twice cited is intrinsically disordered but that doesn’t stop anything but we can disagree on this point for a moment.

If an act (such as the rape discussed above) can be unjust as such then aren’t concepts of moral rightness ontologically prior to the concept of God?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

So there are no intrinsically evil acts? Moral norms exist only in conjunction with the threat of eternal damnation and are liable to change at God’s whim?

its even simpler than that.

what G-d says is good, is good. what G-d says is evil, is evil.

G-d doesnt change, and it doesnt have anything to do with ‘eternal damnation.’

people make this much more complicated than it need be.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

If an act (such as the rape discussed above) can be unjust as such then aren’t concepts of moral rightness ontologically prior to the concept of God?

Can you explain more what you mean when you ask if something is ontologically prior to the concept of God?

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

Can you explain more what you mean when you ask if something is ontologically prior to the concept of God?

VC

I mean that of the two options presented in the original post, it seems that good commanded by God because it is morally good. The alternative to that is that the concept of God is ontologically prior to the concept of the good; the good is good because it is commanded by God.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I mean that of the two options presented in the original post, it seems that good commanded by God because it is morally good. The alternative to that is that the concept of God is ontologically prior to the concept of the good; the good is good because it is commanded by God.

Any room for a third option?

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

Any room for a third option?

VC

No that I can see or imagine.

 

[fkjuliano]

Question of clarification: does the above principle stand today? Is it God’s desire then that the world look anything like it does (the poor, homeless, addicted, unwanted, hungry, lonely, &c)?

Surely you see the difference between the extraordinary event that was the near sacrifice of Isaac from the everyday occurrences of our imperfect, sinful world.

 

[ThomasToo]

Surely you see the difference between the extraordinary event that was the near sacrifice of Isaac from the everyday occurrences of our imperfect, sinful world.

I don’t.

God is omnipotent. If it was not His desire that Isaac be killed, then there was absolutely no possibility of that happening.

How is that principle not universalizeable?