Teleological suspension of the ethical?

[Verbum_Caro]

Disagreeing with I-I, 2 (which is not applicable to this question and I understand not allowed on the forum) I have a hard time taking much from the rest of the section–for me it is on par with trying to identify the china pattern on Russell’s teapot.

Thomas,

If you mean that disagreeing with the response to I, q. 2, a. 3 makes the rest of of Part I inaccessible or unintelligible then I’m not sure exactly why that would be so necessarily (although I don’t call into question your own experiences). It seems to me that one could take the this article as an *"*assuming arguendo" and go on from there. That seems to be how you framed your question at the outset, since you talk about God. (As an aside, I think you could also take I, q. 2, a. 3 in a limited way. One commentator makes the point that that St. Thomas is here only saying that the question “Why does everything exist?” is a legitimate question, and the kind of question that has an answer, and that we can reason out the answer. The answer happens to be “that which we call God”, but “God” is somewhat of placeholder for whatever it is that answers that question.)

As for the analogy of the China pattern on Russel’s teapot, perhaps it is more akin to thinking about teapots in general, their shape, the various patterns possible, their topology, the orbit, etc. Those things make sense to talk about even if you haven’t been able to see the teapot itself.

If there can be said to be such a thing as divine goodness then it seems the first of our two options applies (good is ontologically prior to God) or perhaps I’m having linguistic issues.

Thomas, I can see why what you say here could be the case if divine goodness described a thing that was extrinsic to God, like an accident that inhered in Him. What I am suggesting is a third way, which might be a solution to the dilemma.

I’m thinking something along the lines of this from the old Catholic Encyclopedia:

while truth, goodness, wisdom, holiness and other attributes, as we conceive and define them express perfections that are formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality — the one infinitely perfect and simple being.

VC

 

[warpspeedpetey]

it still seems no more complicated to me than this.

What G-d says is good, is good.

 

[ThomasToo]

it still seems no more complicated to me than this.

What G-d says is good, is good.

Then, and I say this with all due respect, stop telling us. We have assumed what you said for the purposes of this conversation and are trying to ask why it is true.

A parallel would be Newton’s theory of gravity; you are saying that you feign no hypothesis (hypotheses non fingo, Newton in General Scholium) while we are trying to figure out how gravity works. For the interested, it seems this is still an open question but on the large scale Einstein’s theory of relativity explains the distortion effect of large bodies on the fabric of space-time.

 

[ThomasToo]

If you mean that disagreeing with the response to I, q. 2, a. 3 makes the rest of of Part I inaccessible or unintelligible then I’m not sure exactly why that would be so necessarily (although I don’t call into question your own experiences). It seems to me that one could take the this article as an *"*assuming arguendo" and go on from there. That seems to be how you framed your question at the outset, since you talk about God. (As an aside, I think you could also take I, q. 2, a. 3 in a limited way. One commentator makes the point that that St. Thomas is here only saying that the question “Why does everything exist?” is a legitimate question, and the kind of question that has an answer, and that we can reason out the answer. The answer happens to be “that which we call God”, but “God” is somewhat of placeholder for whatever it is that answers that question.)

I meant that almost exactly. I would like to say thank you for not presuming to call into question my experiences; that is a mark of respect that I very much appreciate.

I suppose I could take it as an arguendo but I, for one, have a hard time with it. My father always says it is because I cannot (in his words refuse to) see with the eyes of faith but I’ve always had a hard time understanding stuff like the finer points of theology.

As for ‘why does everything exist?’ this is of course a great question but we need to be careful to examine the assumption that it is the natural state of things to not exist; doubly so when the answer to our question is that something (God) always existed. If we’re talking about Einstein’s god which is semantically equivalent to the fundamental constants of the universe or a deist clockmaker we’re a long way away from the Judeo-Christian God.

As for the analogy of the China pattern on Russel’s teapot, perhaps it is more akin to thinking about teapots in general, their shape, the various patterns possible, their topology, the orbit, etc. Those things make sense to talk about even if you haven’t been able to see the teapot itself.

But the whole point of Russell’s teapot is that such a teapot doesn’t exist. As such talking about its orbit (or the orbit of any extraterrestrial teapot) or its pattern is, I think we can agree, nonsense.

Thomas, I can see why what you say here could be the case if divine goodness described a thing that was extrinsic to God, like an accident that inhered in Him. What I am suggesting is a third way, which might be a solution to the dilemma.

I guess the problem I have, as may be evident at this point, is that I simply cannot wrap my head around any entity that is not externally related to everything else.

 

[Areopagite]

First of all, does everyone here agree that “killing” can be morally licit sometimes. Yes, right?

Okay, now do we all agree that God (if He exists of course) has the authority to end human life without consideration of circumstances? Or is that authority out of His hands? Is the idea that “What God has given, God can take away” wrong?

This question must be addressed before this conversation can go anywhere.

I believe St. Thomas answered that question by saying that God did not dispense Abraham from following the 5th Commandment. Rather a principal condition in Abraham’s act was changed such that what Abraham’s act constituted was not an act prohibited by the 5th Commandment. In short, what Abraham chose to do was not murder.

Yes, I agree. And what that “principal condition” was shall become apparent once we answer whether God has the authority to take away life.

That’s right. But you have to carefully define what murder is – of what the act of murder consists. That is the basis of St. Thomas’ argument here, and it may be missed.

Amen. A definition of murder would actually help this question a lot, wouldn’t it? I might have missed it … but has anyone ventured a definition yet?

This might be unhelpful and might demand correction, but murder seems to simply be “unjust killing.” Now, to determine whether Abraham attempted “unjust killing,” we must first determine whether God has the right to end human life no matter what circumstances.

 

[ThomasToo]

First of all, does everyone here agree that “killing” can be morally licit sometimes. Yes, right?

How about human sacrifice can be morally licit sometimes? I think that seems a bit closer to the question at issue.

Okay, now do we all agree that God (if He exists of course) has the authority to end human life without consideration of circumstances? Or is that authority out of His hands?.. This question must be addressed before this conversation can go anywhere.

This is exactly the question we’re trying to address. I think your phrasing may be better than that which I presented in my OP but suffers in that it is narrowly tailored to the question of ending human life instead of being open to all moral issues (I used rape as an example above).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

We have assumed what you said for the purposes of this conversation and are trying to ask why it is true.

where was this at? post number please.

A parallel would be Newton’s theory of gravity; you are saying that you feign no hypothesis (hypotheses non fingo, Newton in General Scholium) while we are trying to figure out how gravity works. For the interested, it seems this is still an open question but on the large scale Einstein’s theory of relativity explains the distortion effect of large bodies on the fabric of space-time.

i have a hypothesis, that is, what G-d says is good, is good. because He said so.

 

[Areopagite]

Few people are satisfied with divine command theory. I don’t even think that that is the Catholic answer to this question.

I think you’re right, Leela. It frankly smells like Protestantism.

If God commands something BECAUSE it is good, then God must be appealing to some standard for goodness which is external to God.

I don’t think this would necessarily follow. God can command appealing to Himself because He IS goodness … thus goodness would not be external to God.

Believers and nonbelievers alike generally agree that moral concerns are concerns for the wellbeing of sentient creatures and not merely arbitrary divine decrees. With such a view of morality it is possible to say that there are true and false things to be asserted about what really does contribute to wellbeing. There is nothing arbitrary about morality. Humans can have knowledge when it comes to morals and this knowledge is not rooted in what pleases or displeases a deity but rather in what makes our lives better or worse–what promotes happiness and frees us from unnecessary suffering. We then don’t gain access to such knowledge only through divine revelation (if at all) but also through better understanding the causes and conditions that facilitate human happiness.

I agree with most of what you say here. I believe morality can be discovered via natural means (i.e. without the aid of divine revelation). And I also believe morality is meant for (and even defined as) making our lives better.

With that said, I disagree that divine decrees are ever arbitrary but rather always done with a view for bettering human life (crazy! huh?). I also believe that ethical behavior always pleases God (and so “what pleases God” and “what is moral” are never at odds).

What I think we both agree on is that a true system of ethics is dependent on a correct view of human nature. Because we first must know what human nature to some extent before we can assuredly have a correct view on what fulfills that human nature (i.e. happiness). Human happiness is thus determined by what human nature is.

Now I also believe that God could have created human nature in a different way than from how it is … and hence human happiness would differ accordingly. Also, therefore, morality would differ as well. In some sense, and in that sense at least, happiness and morality are defined by “arbitrary divine” decisions.

Even if you think it is essential to God’s nature that he only does what is in the interest of the well-being of sentient creatures the notion of “it is good to be concerned with the wellbeing of others” is not equivalent to the notion of God.

It depends on what your notion of God is. Certainly it’s considered a revealed truth that God is Love … and hence God is certainly concerned with the wellbeing of others (for what is love besides that?)

 

[ThomasToo]

where was this at? post number please.

1

Is the good commanded by God because it is morally good or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?

The implicit assumption here is that what God says is good is good.

i have a hypothesis, that is, what G-d says is good, is good. because He said so. [Emphasis added]

That’s a different claim than simply ‘what God says is good is good’ ‘o’ added and comma removed]. In the above you are actually attempting to answer the question as presented; you chose the second for the two options presented in the first post (and above in this post).

Welcome to the party.

 

[Areopagite]

How about human sacrifice can be morally licit sometimes? I think that seems a bit closer to the question at issue.

Was that a yes or no? I’ll repeat my question, otherwise I won’t know what your beliefs are and won’t know how to respond to them …

Is killing morally licit sometimes? (i.e. is all killing morally evil?)

This is exactly the question we’re trying to address. I think your phrasing may be better than that which I presented in my OP but suffers in that it is narrowly tailored to the question of ending human life instead of being open to all moral issues (I used rape as an example above).

Once again, you didn’t give me an answer to the question I asked … here it is again …

Does God (if He exists … and if He created everything) have the authority to end any human life?

Now, to your questions … here are my answers (I am open to correction) …

Can human sacrifice be morally licit?
Yes, it can. And I think this will become apparent once we resolve both questions that I asked. But give me some answers first.

Is God’s authority “open to all moral issues”? (or something … right?)
In short, it depends what you mean. God will always work toward our ultimate fulfillment and happiness. However, there are certain things He can do to change the conditions of an action that would otherwise be immoral if He had not done so. Can that ever be the case with rape? I have no idea. I haven’t thought about it enough.

Hopefully the answer shall become more apparent … after you answer my questions.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I meant that almost exactly. I would like to say thank you for not presuming to call into question my experiences; that is a mark of respect that I very much appreciate.

You are welcome to that, and I meant it sincerely.

But the whole point of Russell’s teapot is that such a teapot doesn’t exist. As such talking about its orbit (or the orbit of any extraterrestrial teapot) or its pattern is, I think we can agree, nonsense.

I don’t want to sidetrack on this issue at all, so let me just say that I meant that if you are saying that you can’t think about things concerning the teapot because the teapot doesn’t exist (or you think it doesn’t) then I was pointing out that this mightn’t be the case necessarily. Russell himself, in setting forth the idea, describes things about the teapot (it’s size, it’s orbit, it’s albedo). That is what I was getting at. Teapots in general have a shape, a topology, a function even if they are conceptual or not actually existent. Again, I don’t want to take you down this path, I was just responding to your mention of the teapot.

I guess the problem I have, as may be evident at this point, is that I simply cannot wrap my head around any entity that is not externally related to everything else.

I can sympathize with not feeling able to wrap one’s mind around something. I’m not sure, though, about what you say regarding an entity not externally related to everything else. I think we could say that God is transcendent (as well as imminent) and so there are external relationships. What I was thinking of though, and this refers back to the Catholic Encyclopedia article, is the idea that goodness isn’t an accidental property of God so that you don’t need to consider good as prior to God. But maybe I misunderstand your point here, and perhaps too the entire question.

I appreciate the conversation. Thank you.

VC

 

[ThomasToo]

Was that a yes or no? I’ll repeat my question, otherwise I won’t know what your beliefs are and won’t know how to respond to them …

Is killing morally licit sometimes? (i.e. is all killing morally evil?)

There exist situations in which killing is morally justified (e.g. self-defense).

Does God (if He exists … and if He created everything) have the authority to end any human life?

In the same cases as anyone else would but I would argue that moral norms exist and that if God exists then He/She/It would be bound by them same as the rest of us.

Can human sacrifice be morally licit?
Yes, it can. And I think this will become apparent once we resolve both questions that I asked. But give me some answers first.

Without irony, I look forward to hearing this and, frankly, I hope it’s not a Jesus thing. I would like to clarify that I mean human religious sacrifice not laying one’s life down to save one’s friend by stepping in front of a bullet or jumping on a grenade.

Is God’s authority “open to all moral issues”? (or something … right?)
In short, it depends what you mean. God will always work toward our ultimate fulfillment and happiness. However, there are certain things He can do to change the conditions of an action that would otherwise be immoral if He had not done so. Can that ever be the case with rape? I have no idea. I haven’t thought about it enough.

I think the rape case is a better example than the killing because the Lord of life and death argument doesn’t apply.

 

[ThomasToo]

I don’t want to sidetrack on this issue at all, so let me just say that I meant that if you are saying that you can’t think about things concerning the teapot because the teapot doesn’t exist (or you think it doesn’t) then I was pointing out that this mightn’t be the case necessarily. Russell himself, in setting forth the idea, describes things about the teapot (it’s size, it’s orbit, it’s albedo). That is what I was getting at. Teapots in general have a shape, a topology, a function even if they are conceptual or not actually existent. Again, I don’t want to take you down this path, I was just responding to your mention of the teapot.

I misunderstood you but that’s an interesting argument and honestly thought provoking. I suppose that’s what this discussion is too (and a couple of the other threads I have going). Interesting…

I can sympathize with not feeling able to wrap one’s mind around something. I’m not sure, though, about what you say regarding an entity not externally related to everything else. I think we could say that God is transcendent (as well as imminent) and so there are external relationships. What I was thinking of though, and this refers back to the Catholic Encyclopedia article, is the idea that goodness isn’t an accidental property of God so that you don’t need to consider good as prior to God. But maybe I misunderstand your point here, and perhaps too the entire question. I appreciate the conversation. Thank you.

My point about externally related relationships is that everything we see is externally related to everything else. My parents, despite bearing me and bringing me forth, are still only externally related to me; I will go on after they die. God, however, according to Catholic theology (well my [very Catholic] metaphysics professor) is the wellspring of esse and only through a continual act of goodness and love pumps being into the universe lest it simply cease to be.

Thank you as well.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

1

The implicit assumption here is that what God says is good is good.

That’s a different claim than simply ‘what God says is good is good’ ‘o’ added and comma removed]. In the above you are actually attempting to answer the question as presented; you chose the second for the two options presented in the first post (and above in this post).

Welcome to the party.

oh…sorry.

 

[ThomasToo]

oh…sorry.

Haha. Don’t be sorry but I should probably be the one to apologize. I assumed you were just being obstinate and I should have given you the benefit of the doubt.

 

[Areopagite]

There exist situations in which killing is morally justified (e.g. self-defense).

Thank goodness. This will make my life easier. If you were a complete pacifist, I’d have to change my whole strategy entirely …

In the same cases as anyone else would but I would argue that moral norms exist and that if God exists then He/She/It would be bound by them same as the rest of us.

And what moral norm is that exactly? I must know what you think that is before I can go further. Is it: “No one must never kill except in self-defense”?

Also, I’m going to ask you why you hold such a norm. In fact, what do you think the purpose of morality is?

Without irony, I look forward to hearing this and, frankly, I hope it’s not a Jesus thing. I would like to clarify that I mean human religious sacrifice not laying one’s life down to save one’s friend by stepping in front of a bullet or jumping on a grenade.

Yeah, yeah. Don’t worry.

I think the rape case is a better example than the killing because the Lord of life and death argument doesn’t apply.

I want to address your Abraham and Isaac thing first … since that is the particular issue at hand … the one you brought up in the beginning at least.

I intend to give you an answer to the rape question eventually. In fact … I think I’ll have one next post … provided you answer my questions.

 

[ThomasToo]

And what moral norm is that exactly? I must know what you think that is before I can go further. Is it: “No one must never kill except in self-defense”?

Also, I’m going to ask you why you hold such a norm. In fact, what do you think the purpose of morality is?

Without deep thought and research and answering from the soles of my feet I would say ‘one ought not to deliberately take a human life excepting in those situations in which one’s life is in immediate jeopardy, when one–as a lawful combatant–kills another lawful combatant in a just war and when a state executes a criminal of sufficiently grave a crime who cannot otherwise safely be removed from society.’

As for why I think it is because the general moral norm is ‘do not deliberately take a human life’ and those are the only licit exceptions I can think up at the moment. It’s late and I’m not in a state to try and form a high level moral theory that unites the exceptions.

The purpose of morality as a study of what actions are right is in order to act rightly.

The purpose of acting morally/rightly–that is of pursuing the good–is self-evident; the good is that which is pursued for its own sake. My Aristotle is showing here I suppose. There are other answers which, depending on how one defines the good, can vary widely. For example, Kant’s categorical imperative rests less on any transcendent than the notion that we all, basically, want to be treated the same way and we should therefore act to universalize our moral norms. Mill and Bentham’s Utilitarianism rests more on the principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (these two taken together the define as ‘the good,’ cf. Aristotelian morality) for the greatest number. Frankly I’ve always had trouble sussing out exactly which of these three (Aretaic ethics, deonotological ethics and consequential ethics) provides the best underpinning for moral reasoning but thankfully, the vast majority of my moral decisions don’t need ethical reasoning nearly this complex and I rely on a much simpler rule: ‘be a nice guy.’

 

[Areopagite]

Without deep thought and research and answering from the soles of my feet I would say ‘one ought not to deliberately take a human life excepting in those situations in which one’s life is in immediate jeopardy, when one–as a lawful combatant–kills another lawful combatant in a just war and when a state executes a criminal of sufficiently grave a crime who cannot otherwise safely be removed from society.’

Quite admirable.

The purpose of morality as a study of what actions are right is in order to act rightly.

The purpose of acting morally/rightly–that is of pursuing the good–is self-evident; the good is that which is pursued for its own sake.

Self-evident, eh? I don’t know about that. But, nonetheless, I agree that acting rightly is to pursue the good.

Now, of course, we have the colossal task of defining what “the good” is. For without a clear conception of that, we are unequipped to show how our moral norms assist in the attainment of the good.

My Aristotle is showing here I suppose.

Good man! If you like Aristotle, I count you as a dear friend!

There are other answers which, depending on how one defines the good, can vary widely. For example, Kant’s categorical imperative rests less on any transcendent than the notion that we all, basically, want to be treated the same way and we should therefore act to universalize our moral norms. Mill and Bentham’s Utilitarianism rests more on the principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (these two taken together the define as ‘the good,’ cf. Aristotelian morality) for the greatest number. Frankly I’ve always had trouble sussing out exactly which of these three (Aretaic ethics, deonotological ethics and consequential ethics) provides the best underpinning for moral reasoning but thankfully, the vast majority of my moral decisions don’t need ethical reasoning nearly this complex and I rely on a much simpler rule: ‘be a nice guy.’

Well, I’m sorry, you should first parse out what you think “the good” is before you start preaching what you think moral norms should be. That’s my advice, if one wishes to play the role of the serious philosopher and pass judgment on God’s acts. Do you disagree?

 

[Areopagite]

But, as I promised, I shall now answer your questions:

First of all, I would say, for humans, that “the good” (i.e. what morality aims to achieve) is merely what fulfills human nature, i.e. what makes us attain happiness. Those actions which advance us toward our perfection as humans are called moral, and those which deter us from it are called immoral. This is how morality/ethics is defined, I think. Aristotle seems to say exactly this in the Nicomachean Ethics.

Now, God by nature is fulfilled and perfect. Hence, “the good” with reference to God is entirely different. There is nothing that will make him less perfect, otherwise He wouldn’t be God by definition. Thus, you cannot simply impose “human morality” on God … unless perhaps by some nuanced analogical qualification … but you would need to back your claims up very carefully.

I would also add that God is entirely the creator of everything. There is nothing that is not His completely. It’s all His … every possible thing you could think of. Since He has such complete ownership over everything, it is completely within His right to take back what He gave … because God doesn’t lose ownership of something after He creates it. What God gives, God can take away. Hence, God can give life, and He can take it away … and there’s no saying “Hey, that’s not yours to take away” or anything like that.

Now, since it is completely with God’s jurisdiction to take life away, it is also within His authority to be able to grant human agents authority to take life away as well. Abraham would normally not have the right to kill his son Isaac, but if he was given the authority by God, then certainly Abraham would then have the authority to do so. This is what Thomas Aquinas said. And frankly, it makes a lot of sense.

Now … the very interesting question regarding rape. Can God grant someone the permission to rape another person? Can God make it moral for someone to have sex against the other person’s will? First of all, to thoroughly investigate the question, we must examine why rape is considered immoral. We would have to establish what exactly the nature of sex is and how its proper use necessarily involves it being consensual and why violating that would inhibit human fulfillment. JP2 obviously has a lot to say about this.

But before I myself painstakingly examine the points (many of which are indeed obvious), I will first throw out my initial theory …

Since God has complete ownership and power over everything, God has even more rights regarding people’s bodies than those people do. Just because a person is unwilling for something to be done to them does not take away God’s right to have something done to them. Thus, it seems He could authorize someone to rape another, since consent of the person does not seem necessary for the aforementioned reason.

Now, would God ever do that? Does the act of rape, despite hypothetical divine permission, intrinsically make the rapist hateful of the one being raped? If so, then God would never permit it because it will be transgressing love of neighbor, and it seems that God, as evident in revelation, has made it clear that He will never permit us from taking exception to that … for it appears too intricately bound up with “the good” for us.

But who knows? I might be totally and devastatingly wrong. I admit I have not devoted much thought to this particular issue. I am open to harsh criticism. What do I know? I’m just some guy.

 

[murmur]

First of all, I would say, for humans, that “the good” (i.e. what morality aims to achieve) is merely what fulfills human nature, i.e. what makes us attain happiness.

I don’t think morality can be explained away that simply. To say it is the fulfillment of our happiness sounds nice, but I can’t see how it holds water. For many people, something that might make them happy would come at the expense of another. Indeed, that is why morality it tricky. I think that sometimes we need to postpone or deny our own happiness so that a fellow human may get closer to it. If morality simply followed the route of our own happiness, would it not come more easily? I think the difficulty in pinning down morality shows just how complicated it can be. I will grant this, our happiness may be a component of it, but I think there is too much more to it for that to stand alone.

Now … the very interesting question regarding rape. Can God grant someone the permission to rape another person? Can God make it moral for someone to have sex against the other person’s will? First of all, to thoroughly investigate the question, we must examine why rape is considered immoral. We would have to establish what exactly the nature of sex is and how its proper use necessarily involves it being consensual and why violating that would inhibit human fulfillment. JP2 obviously has a lot to say about this.

But before I myself painstakingly examine the points (many of which are indeed obvious), I will first throw out my initial theory …

Since God has complete ownership and power over everything, God has even more rights regarding people’s bodies than those people do. Just because a person is unwilling for something to be done to them does not take away God’s right to have something done to them. Thus, it seems He could authorize someone to rape another, since consent of the person does not seem necessary for the aforementioned reason.

If you are conceding that God could allow rape to be moral, you are in essence saying that anything can become moral if dictated by God. Then morality no longer becomes a separate ideal. It is whatever God says. The word good would become meaningless, because although we may view something one way currently in accordance with God’s rules if he decrees something completely against the current rules then this new decree becomes moral. I find that type of morality much less desirable than a morality independent of God. God, who knows of privileged information, can guide us, but is ultimately separate from morality.

Now, would God ever do that? Does the act of rape, despite hypothetical divine permission, intrinsically make the rapist hateful of the one being raped? If so, then God would never permit it because it will be transgressing love of neighbor, and it seems that God, as evident in revelation, has made it clear that He will never permit us from taking exception to that … for it appears too intricately bound up with “the good” for us.

I dislike using this line, but it was tossed around a lot when I was in Catholic school growing up. People would say that we cannot pretend to know the will of God. You may think things make sense one way, but He may cause something completely different to happen. He is so far beyond us that for us to wager what he would or might do it impossible.

With that in mind the crux of the argument becomes is morality something separate from God, or is something moral because God says it is?

.murmur.