The abortion memo

[HarryStotle]

The morality of an act, however, is not determined by the consequences.

It most certainly is. The reason any act is immoral to begin with is that a being with moral standing is harmed in some way by that act.

Murder is immoral because someone is unjustifiably deprived of their life. The consequences are what make the act immoral.

The morality or immorality of any act cannot be separated from the consequences of that act. To do so is to abstract morality from reality.

If a piano is rigged up such that pressing any key causes someone in another room to be blown up, then the morality of the act of playing the piano is, indeed, determined by the consequences. You might object and claim playing a piano is a morally neutral act so no one can stop you from playing if you want, but the fact that a roomful of people are dead as a consequence of you playing Chopsticks argues against you.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Ender:

The morality of an act, however, is not determined by the consequences.

It most certainly is. The reason any act is immoral to begin with is that a being with moral standing is harmed in some way by that act.

Murder is immoral because someone is unjustifiably deprived of their life. The consequences are what make the act immoral.

But if you try to murder someone and fail to do so, there are no consequences, but it was still an immoral act. Similarly, if you accidentally hit someone with your car and kill them, they are also unjustly deprived of life, but it is not an immoral act. Ender is right on this point. The morality is determined in this case by the intent more than the consequences.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

Ender:

The morality of an act, however, is not determined by the consequences.

It most certainly is. The reason any act is immoral to begin with is that a being with moral standing is harmed in some way by that act.

Murder is immoral because someone is unjustifiably deprived of their life. The consequences are what make the act immoral.

But if you try to murder someone and fail to do so, there are no consequences, but it was still an immoral act. Similarly, if you accidentally hit someone with your car and kill them, they are also unjustly deprived of life, but it is not an immoral act. Ender is right on this point. The morality is determined in this case by the intent more than the consequences.

That would be because of a flagrant and culpable disregard for the consequences (death of someone) or because the harmful consequences occurred accidentally and not essentially nor foreseeably as an aspect of what the individual was doing at the time, i.e., the consequences were clearly not intended nor reasonably foreseen by the individual. So the consequences still come into play to determine or discount culpability.

 

[Rau]

Are you familiar with the 3 font model used to describe the morality of human acts?
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

But if you try to murder someone and fail to do so, there are no consequences, but it was still an immoral act. Similarly, if you accidentally hit someone with your car and kill them, they are also unjustly deprived of life, but it is not an immoral act. Ender is right on this point. The morality is determined in this case by the intent more than the consequences.

That would be because of a flagrant and culpable disregard for the consequences (death of someone) or because the harmful consequences occurred accidentally and not essentially nor foreseeably as an aspect of what the individual was doing at the time, i.e., the consequences were clearly not intended nor reasonably foreseen by the individual. So the consequences still come into play to determine or discount culpability.

You just said that accidental death can happen without culpability, and therefore without immorality, which argues against your point. Also you did not address that case of attempted murder that fails and has no consequences. But don’t take my word for it. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, sections 1749-1761 tells you everything there is to know about the morality of human acts. “Consequences” are mentioned only in paragraph 1754 as a secondary element, modifying the seriousness of the act. It says "Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. "

(I see @Rau beat me to it while I was composing mine.)

 

[Rau]

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, sections 1749-1761 tells you everything there is to know about the morality of human acts.

Well, actually it is a rather brief summary!

 

[HarryStotle]

You just said that accidental death can happen without culpability, and therefore without immorality, which argues against your point.

I am not seeing how it argues against my point.

Also you did not address that case of attempted murder that fails and has no consequences.

Clearly the culpability is not for murder since no murder occurred. The consequences relate to the evil or harm done to the agent him/herself as someone who willed the death of another person.

But don’t take my word for it. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, sections 1749-1761 tells you everything there is to know about the morality of human acts. “Consequences” are mentioned only in paragraph 1754 as a secondary element, modifying the seriousness of the act. It says "Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. "

Circumstances are NOT consequences. Circumstances are the aspects of the situation surrounding the commission of the act.

The consequences would be part of the second and not the third dimension or font.

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

Consequences are part of the intended “ends.” Determining whether an act is in itself evil is based upon the consequences or ends of the action, which is accounted for in the intention and commission of the act.

 

[Rau]

Circumstances are NOT consequences.

Circumstances include consequences. However, when a consequence is intrinsic to the act done, that consequence may be “upgraded” eg. To the object font. Incidental consequences remain in the circumstances font.

We would not pursue an act if we judged the balance of consequences to be weighted to more harm than good, regardless of whether our motivation is good and the object good.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

Circumstances are NOT consequences.

Circumstances include consequences. However, when a consequence is intrinsic to the act done, that consequence may be “upgraded” eg. To the object font. Incidental consequences remain in the circumstances font.

I wouldn’t quite put it that way. The consequences which are not merely accidental but are essential to the chosen act are the object of intention. They are the outcome or ends which are willed.

This is why, to answer @LeafByNiggle’s query regarding attempted murder having no consequences, the CCC clearly states the choice by itself can entail a disorder of the will or moral evil. No one, I think, would claim that the individual chose to disorder their own will, but rather that the individual’s will was essentially disordered when they chose to carry out the act but didn’t succeed.

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

Even though the CCC appears to say consequences are secondary and are included in the circumstances, it appears that the authors mean “consequences” to refer to accidental effects, while the object or intended ends are the essential and intended effects. These are, I would argue, the most critical of the consequences since they are what the moral act was for. So they are consequences – certainly a “higher” and more critical class of consequences, but that shouldn’t lead us to claim the ends are not consequences.

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

So a more precise reading of the moral dimensions would be something like this:
1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object [intended good outcome], of the end [essential outcome or consequences], and of the circumstances [situation and accidental consequences or “fallout”] together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

 

[Ender]

That statement is likely to confuse some readers. An act is surely immoral (for the actor) if he assesses it, forms a view that the bad consequences outweigh the good, and yet pursues it. But of course, different actors may legitimately reach different assessments of the balance of consequences.

If I anticipate a bad consequence and commit the act, this goes to the intent: I commit the act in anticipation of its consequence. I intend the bad outcome. If someone else supports the same act expecting a good outcome, his act is not immoral. In both cases the morality of the actions are determined by the intent; in neither case do the consequences change the nature of the act.

Certainly how we respond to refugees asking for help is a matter open to moral assessment. As is our approach to those contemplating abortion and to their children at risk of imminent death.

As I pointed out above, if I genuinely intend to do the right thing then the outcome is (morally) irrelevant. The difference between immigration and abortion is that for the latter the intent alone is not sufficient to justify ones position.

You may judge a person’s position to be mistaken, but you may not judge it to be evil because this would involve a judgment of intent. While this is true of immigration it is not true of abortion. In the latter case you may judge a position to be evil because what is being judged is not the intent but the object.

 

[Ender]

If something more than a practical solution is warranted and those involved must be compelled to carry out certain actions, moral warrant would seem to be required and a grounding set of moral principles impinging on the issue would need to be spelled out and appealed to as justification for taking the step from merely practical strategy to legal sanction.

Given that we are discussing political issues I think it can be assumed we are speaking of issues of law: what we should be required, allowed, or forbidden to do. Nor am I referring to the moral justification for government and for laws in general.

What I am trying to address is the all to common habit of claiming that political issues are moral issues with the inevitable result that those holding a particular position are judged to be acting sinfully.

This is morally wrong and unjustifiable. What is being judged is not the position itself, but the people who hold it, and the judgment is rash and uncharitable. It is the judgment itself that is the fault, not being on this or that side of an issue.

 

[Ender]

Ender:

The morality of an act, however, is not determined by the consequences.

It most certainly is. The reason any act is immoral to begin with is that a being with moral standing is harmed in some way by that act.

If I intend a harmful consequence my act is sinful whether or not things turn out as I expect. If I intend a good consequence (standard caveats here), then my action is moral even if things turn out horribly.

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. … Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves;

 

[Ender]

The reason there is a difference between the things you are comparing is that they are not parallel things. Abortion is an issue. CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program) is a solution. Issues and solutions are not comparable.

I understand the distinction you make, but I don’t think it’s accurate. Yes, CHIP is a solution, but it is also an issue because people will disagree over whether it is a good solution. Take raising the minimum wage: that is clearly a solution offered to help the poor, but it is undeniably an issue because so many people believe it will in fact do more harm than good.

The same is true of abortion. It is an issue because it is offered as a solution to other problems: contraception failed? Get an abortion. Congenital defect? Get an abortion. Don’t want a girl? Get an abortion.

Everything that government controls is an issue because it will be contested by those on opposite sides.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

The reason there is a difference between the things you are comparing is that they are not parallel things. Abortion is an issue. CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program) is a solution. Issues and solutions are not comparable.

I understand the distinction you make, but I don’t think it’s accurate. Yes, CHIP is a solution, but it is also an issue because people will disagree over whether it is a good solution. Take raising the minimum wage: that is clearly a solution offered to help the poor, but it is undeniably an issue because so many people believe it will in fact do more harm than good.

The same is true of abortion. It is an issue because it is offered as a solution to other problems: contraception failed? Get an abortion. Congenital defect? Get an abortion. Don’t want a girl? Get an abortion.

You are still talking about non-parallel things. Your example of abortion as a solution is where it is a solution to some other problem: congenital defects, etc. To be parallel with health care you would have to compare abortion with the evil counterpart to health care - sickness. Seeing abortion as a solution to an inconvenient pregnancy is like seeing sickness as a solution to some other problem. One that comes to mind is using sickness as a tool in conquest, which some of the early European conquerors were accused of doing. I don’t want to get into a discussion of whether they really were guilty of it, or whether it was just an accident of no immunity among the indigenous people, but as a theoretical concept, one can see how sickness might be used as a tool in this manner. Even if we suppose that the conquest was a good thing, the hypothetical use of sickness as a tool to get there is morally questionable. This is a closer parallel to using abortion to solve the problem of an unintended pregnancy.

Given that abortion is evil, it really should not be compared to good things like healthcare. It can be compared with sickness though. In that sense, abortion and sickness are very similar in that people can disagree about solutions to these issues as agreed-upon problems. For sickness, we may disagree about single-payer health insurance, vaccines, and the benefit of eating apples. But we cannot disagree that sickness is a bad thing. Similarly for abortion, we can agree that it is a bad thing, yet still disagree about how to solve it (i.e. prevent it). I gave two examples of such solutions earlier. So far things are still parallel.

If you want to compare against health care, then you should compare it with the prevention of abortion. Then the two things are very comparable. There is just as much morality (or lack of it) in deciding upon how to accomplish the former as there is in how to accomplish the later.

 

[Ender]

You are still talking about non-parallel things. Your example of abortion as a solution is where it is a solution to some other problem: congenital defects, etc. To be parallel with health care you would have to compare abortion with the evil counterpart to health care - sickness.

A political issue is anything that can be controlled by law. Sickness, like hurricanes, can be mitigated, but neither banned nor required. Abortions can be both. You might compare sickness to spontaneous abortions (miscarriages), but not to elected abortions.

Given that abortion is evil, it really should not be compared to good things like healthcare.

This is not a useful distinction. The church does not argue that all evils should be banned by law, and many people even within the church do not consider abortion to be evil. Again, anything that can be required, permitted, or banned by law may become a political issue if enough people form on opposite sides.

Similarly for abortion, we can agree that it is a bad thing, yet still disagree about how to solve it (i.e. prevent it).

You and I may agree that abortion is a bad thing, but our positions carry no more political weight than the opinions held by those who view it differently. I could as easily declare immigration to be a bad thing. That conclusion is relevant only to me.

If you want to compare against health care, then you should compare it with the prevention of abortion. Then the two things are very comparable. There is just as much morality (or lack of it) in deciding upon how to accomplish the former as there is in how to accomplish the latter.

I can pass a law banning abortion, but I cannot pass a law banning sickness. These things are not comparable. Your distinction is arbitrary. Abortion is not a natural phenomenon, it is a choice, and choices may be controlled by laws. Sickness is not a choice. We may take steps to mitigate it in the same way we take steps to mitigate the effects of hurricanes, but an abortion is not an act of nature.

 

[HarryStotle]

Given that we are discussing political issues I think it can be assumed we are speaking of issues of law: what we should be required, allowed, or forbidden to do. Nor am I referring to the moral justification for government and for laws in general.

What I am trying to address is the all to common habit of claiming that political issues are moral issues with the inevitable result that those holding a particular position are judged to be acting sinfully.

I think this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It could very well be true that political issues are, at base, moral issues, but that they are very complex with consequences that are not easy to predict or quantify which is why no one ought to condemn a particular position as sinful or immoral precisely because there is uncertainty all around.

If the consequences were easy to foresee, the morality or immorality of political positions would be clear and determinable.

The problem is that ideologies propose simple and supposedly clear cut solutions which are entirely based upon the ideological presuppositions underpinning the policies. It is those who have proclivities towards ideological views that condemn the other side as immoral or sinful based upon their ideological bias.

A moral realist, at least partially, understands the complexity of the moral landscape and would not so easily side with a particular ideologically based solution.

This is morally wrong and unjustifiable. What is being judged is not the position itself, but the people who hold it, and the judgment is rash and uncharitable. It is the judgment itself that is the fault, not being on this or that side of an issue.

I would agree that condemning others holding a different position is wrong and unjustifiable, but most times that is because those doing the condemning are ideologues who believe themselves to have arrived at the “final solution” and therefore believe their condemning of the opposition is justified.

The reason they think that, is because they have abandoned seeing the issue in all its true complexity and have opted for a simplified view (ideology) that purports to be the only correct one.

The error isn’t one of conflating morality and politics, but of simplifying both based upon a low-resolution, and simplistic view of reality. The reason ideologies are compelling to many is precisely because they are simplistic and susceptible to propagandizing.

‘Punch a Nazi’ is a simple, clear, rallying cry, but is sheer nonsense in its application.

 

[Ender]

I think this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It could very well be true that political issues are, at base, moral issues, but that they are very complex with consequences that are not easy to predict or quantify which is why no one ought to condemn a particular position as sinful or immoral precisely because there is uncertainty all around.

Are we not in agreement here? I am holding that political issues are seldom moral issues precisely because consequences are largely unforeseeable, and if I do what I perceive to be a good thing it is morally acceptable regardless of consequences.

I would agree that condemning others holding a different position is wrong and unjustifiable…

Despite which, this is what is implied when bishops pronounce a position on political issues other than those which involve intrinsic evils. This is why I really regret their forays into politics.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

A political issue is anything that can be controlled by law. Sickness, like hurricanes, can be mitigated, but neither banned nor required. Abortions can be both.

I don’t know how you can say that sickness cannot be controlled by law. We certainly do have laws that relate to sickness: mandatory vaccinations for school, mandatory quarantine of people with certain diseases. Sickness is a political issue, just like abortion. I am losing track of how this relates to abortion being fundamentally different as a political issue from other political issues in terms of morality.

 

[Ender]

I don’t know how you can say that sickness cannot be controlled by law.

I said before that sickness, like the effects of hurricanes, can be mitigated by law, but no law can compel you to either get sick or get well. Laws can, however, compel one to have or not have an abortion. One can decide not to have an abortion. One cannot decide not to have a cancer.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

I don’t know how you can say that sickness cannot be controlled by law.

I said before that sickness, like the effects of hurricanes, can be mitigated by law, but no law can compel you to either get sick or get well. Laws can, however, compel one to have or not have an abortion. One can decide not to have an abortion. One cannot decide not to have a cancer.

That’s not what the law is about. The law is about vaccinations. The law can compel one to have a vaccination, or to forbid it. One can decide not to have a vaccination. So please restate your distinction between abortion and most other political issues, rather than chasing down this particular side thread any more, and we can see if this side thread is relevant or not.