The argument of free will and suffering

[Vera_Ljuba]

I appreciate you reading it. The Euthyphro dilemma itself, if you’re not familiar with it, is whether God loves things because they are holy or whether things are holy because God loves them (and in modern ethical discussions it substitutes “good” for “holy”). So it’s not about the PoE, but I think it may help clarify a little an Aristotletean take on moral law versus other conceptions.

Of course I am familiar with it. I am curious if the author has anything interesting to say about this literally “age-old” subject.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Well, I did skim through it. I will not get into details, but it is not helpful - at least not for me. The main problem is that it neglects to define what “goodness” is? There is no “objective” goodness, something is only “good” in a specific relationship. To use an old phrase: “what is good for the goose is NOT necessarily good for the gander”.

And, of course it goes on into the morass of Platonic “essences”, which are really nonsensical. Existence always comes first, and essence can come only later. To speak of the “essence” of a non-existent “cow” is sheer nonsense. But that could be discussed in a separate thread of it own. It has nothing to do with “free will”.

 

[MPat]

It did not look like it. It still does not.

If I had failed to understand your sarcasm, I would have decided that you are content with the answer and commented accordingly. I haven’t done so. Therefore, I have understood your sarcasm. Q.E.D.

Thus my answers still stand: 1) your answer depends on an emotional reaction (you talk about “consolation”, not about logical self-contradictions), 2) in the real world the Christianity (including answers like that) is more of a consolation than atheism.

What are you talking about? A suicide attempt?

Nonsense. But even it were true, in every specific instance there is only one attacker and one intended victim.

But free will would be gone in all instances. And thus, for example, you would lose the potential to insult us (for example, like in the next paragraph). For yes, you are an attacker here, although I am pretty sure that you haven’t noticed that.

We all hurt others once in a while. It is just that we often do not notice that, or find excuses (Oh, he deserved that! Everyone does it! It is just a trifle!). And non-Catholics, who do not go to confession, do not have to look for those cases during examination of conscience.

No, you speak as one who DOES NOT CARE. Who “values” the free will of the attacker over the suffering of the victim. But I bet, if it was your loved one, who is about to be victimized and you had the wherewithal to stop the act, you would join me in saying: “to hell with the attacker’s free will”.

So, an insult.

But let’s look at the argument behind it.

You say that right after a being a victim of a crime or something we would be angry and in our anger would prefer the loss of free will.

At this point I have to say that it might well be so.

Yet we think that this emotional reaction is outranked by “cold” reason. Thus if, with my judgement clouded by anger, I would think that free will has to be removed, I would be wrong.

You, on the other hand, seem to think that emotional reaction outranks reason.

The desire, which is not acted upon is not problematic. (Notwithstanding what Jesus said about the “adultery in his heart”.) But if there is no desire, we nipped the problem in the bud.

You were saying:

Nonsense. Do you have any desire to hurt someone? No?

So much for that case then…

Gandhi? Mandela? All those who choose silent, passive resistance over violence.

As one might note from, let’s say, nationalreview.com/article/366317/remembering-mandela-without-rose-colored-glasses-andrew-c-mccarthy , it is not the only possible opinion…

I’m afraid that you are not going to find anyone sinless among adult healthy (not insane) men after filtering out saints and other Christians (after all, that does exclude Mary)…

 

[Wesrock]

Well, I did skim through it. I will not get into details, but it is not helpful - at least not for me. The main problem is that it neglects to define what “goodness” is? There is no “objective” goodness, something is only “good” in a specific relationship. To use an old phrase: “what is good for the goose is NOT necessarily good for the gander”.

And, of course it goes on into the morass of Platonic “essences”, which are really nonsensical. Existence always comes first, and essence can come only later. To speak of the “essence” of a non-existent “cow” is sheer nonsense. But that could be discussed in a separate thread of it own. It has nothing to do with “free will”.

The article puts forth some definitions of goodness on pages 10 and 11.

Did you get in depth enough to distinguish between the hard realism of Platonism with the moderate realism of Aristotleanism? Because the author himself, while presenting a Platonist conception and its modern spin that that there are eternal physical laws that apply to reality (and contrasting these with other popular views such as a traditional Humean conception and Divine Command Theory), doesn’t endorse it for reason’s similar to your objection.

Anyway, it may require additional background information to make sense.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

I’m afraid that you are not going to find anyone sinless among adult healthy (not insane) men after filtering out saints and other Christians (after all, that does exclude Mary)…

Since “sin” is a religious concept, I do not accept it.

And to “insult” someone, the desire to “hurt” must be present. A long time ago we had a good conversation with a friend, who happens to be a psychologist. Someone in the group said that her mother feels insulted by some remarks. The psychologist replied: “did you intend to hurt her”? When the answer was “no”, the psychologist said: “then it is her problem, not yours”.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

The article puts forth some definitions of goodness on pages 10 and 11.

In the on-line article there are no page numbers. If you would present a few words which I can search for, it might be useful. But only if it is not inconvenient. Or you can present it with your own words.

Did you get in depth enough to distinguish between the hard realism of Platonism with the moderate realism of Aristotleanism?

No, I can’t say I did. The whole Aristotelian metaphysics and Plato’s ideal essences are nonsensical.

 

[goout]

Since “sin” is a religious concept, I do not accept it.

Sin is not a purely religious concept, whether you accept it as religious or not.

And to “insult” someone, the desire to “hurt” must be present. A long time ago we had a good conversation with a friend, who happens to be a psychologist. Someone in the group said that her mother feels insulted by some remarks. The psychologist replied: “did you intend to hurt her”? When the answer was “no”, the psychologist said: “then it is her problem, not yours”.

"But but but, I didn’t mean to pull the trigger. It’s someone else’s problem. "
I find it hard to believe that you really believe that.

 

[Wesrock]

In the on-line article there are no page numbers. If you would present a few words which I can search for, it might be useful. But only if it is not inconvenient. Or you can present it with your own words.

Oops, sorry. It’s under the section for Natural Law.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, ‘Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.’49 This conception of goodness has made a comeback within modern philosophy, primarily due to the work of Geach and Foot.50 A core idea is that ‘there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so.’51 That is good and bad are made only in reference to specific functions of substances, and therefore what is good for X’s may not be good for Y’s. Teichmann thus writes, ‘In ‘a good F’, the concept ‘F’ will involve some sort of goal, or function, or role, or characteristic mode; hence being a good doctor, or a good parent, or a good neighbour, is a matter of doing what can reasonably be expected of a person with that goal, or function, or role, or characteristic mode.’52 Metaphysically this conception holds that substances have essences,53 and that their natural appetites or ends are determined by a substance’s essence, with the fulfilment of those ends being its good, resulting in the substance’s flourishing. Foot puts it this way writing, ‘‘natural’ goodness, as I define it, … is intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species.’54 Further, this conception of goodness is not limited to persons,55 as Chappell notes, ‘goods are not, or not essentially, aspects of human flourishing. What they are essentially is this: they are the ideal standards that apply in the different normative dimensions. Things can be worse or better in ever so many different ways; and the variety of goods corresponds to that variety.’56** I will assume this theory of goodness for the remainder of this paper and follow Oderberg’s definition of the good as ‘that which satisfies a thing’s natural appetites, or that which fulfils a thing’s nature.’57**

No, I can’t say I did. The whole Aristotelian metaphysics and Plato’s ideal essences are nonsensical.

I don’t have great confidence that you really understand Platonism or Aristotleanism or have the sufficient background knowledge to honestly consider them, so I don’t buy your statement.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Oops, sorry. It’s under the section for Natural Law.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, ‘Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.’ ** I will assume this theory of goodness for the remainder of this paper and follow Oderberg’s definition of the good as ‘that which satisfies a thing’s natural appetites, or that which fulfils a thing’s nature.’57**

Thank you.

This definition of “good” is specific. An eye burrowing worm en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loa_loa does "what it is supposed to do, it is “useful” for itself, but I would not call that “good” for the victim, whose eye is destroyed.

But the example is useful, because it proves that “goodness” is not an absolute phenomenon, something is “good” for the “goose” and other things are “good” for the gander.

I don’t have great confidence that you really understand Platonism or Aristotleanism or have the sufficient background knowledge to honestly consider them, so I don’t buy your statement.

You don’t have to. Meaning is not something that is intrinsic to a proposition. If I would present an essay in a language that you don’t speak, it would be meaningless gobbledygook for you, and perfectly sensible for someone else.

 

[Vonsalza]

This definition of “good” is specific. An eye burrowing worm en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loa_loa does "what it is supposed to do, it is “useful” for itself, but I would not call that “good” for the victim, whose eye is destroyed.

The eye is almost never destroyed. Most afflicted with this pest aren’t even aware of it. At least per CDC.

If you’re going to cite this pest, it would be nice if you referred to it accurately rather than your usual Lovecraftian theatrics.

 

[MPat]

Since “sin” is a religious concept, I do not accept it.

You are free to translate it to “secular-speak” if you want to. The point still stands.

And to “insult” someone, the desire to “hurt” must be present. A long time ago we had a good conversation with a friend, who happens to be a psychologist. Someone in the group said that her mother feels insulted by some remarks. The psychologist replied: “did you intend to hurt her”? When the answer was “no”, the psychologist said: “then it is her problem, not yours”.

So, you do not want to remove one’s ability to hurt others unintentionally? Why?

Also, it’s a pity that you didn’t answer anything about the relationship between reason and emotional reaction - which outranks which… It is rather important here…

By the way, it is interesting that you did not assert that the desire to hurt was not present. No, it does not make much of a difference - I doubt any of us got angry - although it is not inconceivable that someone might have.

 

[fhansen]

To keep a tight biblical comparison here, the attack ultimately happened because of the sins of both the attacker, the attacked and the “good person”. It is merely one ripple from the consequential tsunami generated by their own choices.

It has nothing to do with the sinfulness of the attacked but everything to do with living in an effectively godless world where free will can give rise to the moral evils that we witness, experience, or hear about everyday in the news. It’s what a human may well do to another human especially if they think they can get away with it anyway. It’s basic lack of love and respect for each other.

 

[Vonsalza]

It has nothing to do with the sinfulness of the attacked but everything to do with living in an effectively godless world where free will can give rise to the moral evils that we witness, experience, or hear about everyday in the news. It’s what a human may well do to another human especially if they think they can get away with it anyway. It’s basic lack of love and respect for each other.

What I was alluding to there, if poorly, was the non-pristine state of creation; made so by the choices of mankind. There are none innocent of this tragedy that have realized their will for they all add to it.

 

[Wesrock]

Thank you.

This definition of “good” is specific. An eye burrowing worm en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loa_loa does "what it is supposed to do, it is “useful” for itself, but I would not call that “good” for the victim, whose eye is destroyed.

But the example is useful, because it proves that “goodness” is not an absolute phenomenon, something is “good” for the “goose” and other things are “good” for the gander.

True. Though goodness is based upon the ends of what the subject is, and since humans are all the same type of being, it is argued the same moral standards apply to all men and women, and that the same dignity be afforded to all.

You don’t have to. Meaning is not something that is intrinsic to a proposition. If I would present an essay in a language that you don’t speak, it would be meaningless gobbledygook for you, and perfectly sensible for someone else.

Well, yes… words have no intrinsic teleology in themselves. We use them as pointers to something beyond the simple sounds or patterns they make to indicate particular concepts, which are themselves universal, even if the words we use to point to them are not. So there’s no intrinsic meaning in the spoken or written word of itself, but the proposition does have meaning when the concepts are held within a mind.

 

[fhansen]

What I was alluding to there, if poorly, was the non-pristine state of creation; made so by the choices of mankind. There are none innocent of this tragedy that have realized their will for they all add to it.

I see-maybe jumped in too soon there. I meant to address the root cause of human sin and suffering.

 

[Bradski]

Your wedge here is contrived. In the provided example, the attack and the suffering are inseparably linked.

There’s no wedge. This is a real life example. The attack and the potential suffering are linked, but in the case cited, there was no suffering. The suffering was prevented. I’m sure we can all agree that that was a good thing.

The justice that the terrorist experienced as absolutely based on the suffering that he would have caused…It still bears a relationship to the degree of suffering planned. Tell the cop that you’re going to burn spiders in your back-yard and he may give you an odd look. Tell him you’re going to burn people, out come the cuffs.

Quite right. If your dad saw you with a magnifying glass intending to burn spiders, then the punishment would have been be appropriate. A couple of hours in your room perhaps. Planning on blowing up a theatre? Well, that’s life in the slammer. Proportional, preventative and just punishment in both cases.

Once again, the atheist must put away his well-worn straw-man; that poor, tired old chap…

This is no straw man. We have real life examples of how we expect this to work. It seems that you would expect, if not demand, that we are all obliged to prevent evil if it is our power so to do. And this covers everyone, not just those we love. You wouldn’t ignore the terrorists actions simply because nobody you know is going to the theatre that night.

Yet when it comes to God…

But when the theatre does go up in flames, at least we can take comfort in the fact that it was for the greater good. At least, that’s what you can tell yourself.

 

[Bradski]

Yes, but God has no obligation or responsibility or duty to step in and prevent such things, if that’s your point.

Yes, but God has no obligation or responsibility or duty to step in and prevent such things, if that’s your point.

It is indeed my point. And you don’t see the problem of the concept of a loving God who does nothing to protect those who love him in return?

If it was within a father’s power to prevent harm coming to his family yet did nothing, then you could not describe him, by any stretch of the imagination, as a loving father.

How you deal with this bizarre contradictory concept of God is utterly beyond my comprehension.

 

[goout]

Yet when it comes to God…

Good observation started there.
God is God.
Brad is Brad.
I am me.
I am a lot like you, but you and I are not very much like God.

That’s all true, and that truth is not just idle observation, it has meaning and significance. So, given these nuanced distinctions, what does that mean for our expectations of “behavior” on the part of God?

What if God is not you, and doesn’t behave just like you?

Put another way, given that your son misbehaves, why did you not imprison him in his room to prevent his misbehavior like another parent might do?
Prevent risk. Prevent suffering. Prevent evil.
That’s the expectation of God we hear a lot.

 

[Wesrock]

It is indeed my point. And you don’t see the problem of the concept of a loving God who does nothing to protect those who love him in return?

If it was within a father’s power to prevent harm coming to his family yet did nothing, then you could not describe him, by any stretch of the imagination, as a loving father.

How you deal with this bizarre contradictory concept of God is utterly beyond my comprehension.

The issue comes from an anthropomorphic conception of God.

 

[goout]

The issue comes from an anthropomorphic conception of God.

Not just anthropomorphic.
Homogenized and self enclosed anthropomorphic.