No, that is not the question. You can choose to take vanilla, or nothing. That would be an acceptable argument. But there is no chocolate, there will be no chocolate. As such you cannot choose chocolate.
Two thoughts:
FIrst, you seem to be implying that free will requires the ability to make all choices at all times. If you placed all possible flavors of ice cream in front of me, and my choice was “1988 Convertible Ford Mustang”, then likewise you would conclude that I had no free will – after all, I wasn’t able to make the choice that I wanted! That, naturally, is absurd!
Second, If we condition the question of free will on the particular choices available, then we’re saying that free will is a question of
environment and not of the
rational agent. If your definition of free will is “what the world gives me”, then you’ve stopped making sense. I would argue that free will is something that is intrinsic, not external to the rational agent.
Just like everyone else. No degree of freedom. Your turn to answer.
“No degree of freedom
of action”, you mean.
You often reference the example of prisoners, whose ability to act has been curtailed. You mention this, I presume, as an example of “no degrees of freedom”; in other words, you’re making the case that prisoners have no free will.
I have problems with this on two counts: first, it says that free will is a function of situation – as I’ve mentioned before to you, what you’re saying is that a person goes through various states of free will throughout his life, with the possibility of relatively less and relatively more (and maybe even completely none) at various times. That doesn’t seem right: free will is, or it isn’t.
Second, you’ve used the notion of constraint to argue against free will in various situations: hostages, crimes of rape. Let’s use this prisoner example that you’ve made recourse to. We have a prisoner sitting in his cell. His ability to actualize his decisions has been taken away. According to you, he has no free will.
However, some small percentage of prisoners, under the same set of constraints, decide that the best course of action is to attempt escape. They may or may not succeed, but that is immaterial: according to you, “zero degrees of freedom” means “no free will”. Yet, some take this “zero degrees of freedom” and make choices substantially different than others. Your example, then, says that the two prisoners – all other things being equal – demonstrate ‘free will’ and ‘lack of free will’ simultaneously. In other words, we’ve reduced your definition to an absurdity…