The definition of free will

[Gorgias]

(4) For coincidence miracles to occur every time they would be required would cause drastic revisions in our concepts of Laws of Nature.
Answer: Yet another dumb argument. The laws of nature can stay alone. Only a minor, even unobservable interference is needed. For example: When a rape is intended, a cop shows up “miraculously” in time. No one would know if that was a simple coincidence, or a “miracle”.

This seems reasonable on the micro scale, but in the macro scale, it quickly spirals into absurdity. In fact, in this universe, there’s no such thing as “coincidence” or “miracle”, at least to the viewpoint of humanity – there’s only goodness and happiness (except that you have no freedom to think about doing things that go against the grain). Your conception is, essentially, the world of Pleasantville before the introduction of color: because of the way that the world is set up, people don’t even realize that they have the opportunity to make free choices, so they don’t. They just do what they feel the world expects them to.

(Please also note that the “miraculous” appearance of police, every time a crime is intended, may help the potential victims… but is, in itself, a violation of the police officers’ free will! Your construction requires free will to not exist; therefore, it is invalid. )

(5) Such revisions would prevent creatures from ever being cognitively free with respect to God.
Answer: the top of idiocy. We would be free from baseless and blind faith, on the other hand it would give us a meaningful option to worship God, or not.

You’ve moved from argument (inasmuch as “nonsense!” can be considered an argument) and firmly into the realm of dogma. Care to explain these assertions?

It argues that if the “intent only” would matter and the action would be thwarted, it would make the “free will” a futile endeavor. As such it proves MY POINT: the intent AND the ability to carry out that intent would be a valid concept of “free will”.

No… it demonstrates that, in the complete absence of free action, free will is thwarted. I’m not claiming that there’s no relationship between will and action, mind you! I’m just claiming that ‘free will’ is located within the agent, in the ‘act’ of deciding.

This whole “free will defense” is based on a fallacy: “it assumes that the existence of the free will (intent + ability) will necessarily lead to an actualization of some morally evil act”. And that is simply not true. There is no LOGICAL connection between the ability to do evil and the actualization of evil. Of course, the ability to do evil leads logically and inevitably to the POSSIBILITY of evil.

I don’t know where you’re getting this from. Can you provide a citation demonstrating that this is what the ‘free will defense’ claims? Cause everything I’ve read suggests that the free will defense is all about the possibility of evil! You’re setting up a straw man here, and I’m not certain what you think you’re accomplishing by knocking him down…

It is possible to create a world, where everyone has “REAL free will” (intent + ability) and yet there is no evil at all. But this is another conversation.

Look up the articles I referenced and read them. They’ll help point out to you that this isn’t, in fact, possible. Dilley’s description of the consequences of such a miracle world addresses your contention head-on.

 

[Serious]

However, these articles are a demonstration of exactly the opposite point: these arguments aren’t coming from the hopes of making a reductio ad absurdum argument – they’re starting from an acceptance of the notion of free will, and moving forward!

What “free will” ??? The “fantasy / pie in the sky / daydream version” or the “decide and DO it version”?

 

[Serious]

No… it demonstrates that, in the complete absence of free action, free will is thwarted. I’m not claiming that there’s no relationship between will and action, mind you! I’m just claiming that ‘free will’ is located within the agent, in the ‘act’ of deciding.

You contradicted what you said so far. If the absence of “free action” invalidates the “free will”, then the “free action” is an inseparable part of that “free will” - and that is what I have been saying all along. Without free action there is no free will. At last… it took a long time to get here.

 

[Gorgias]

You contradicted what you said so far. If the absence of “free action” invalidates the “free will”, then the “free action” is an inseparable part of that “free will” - and that is what I have been saying all along. Without free action there is no free will. At last… it took a long time to get here.

I made this point in another thread, but since we’re talking about free will, it makes sense to add it to this discussion, too:

You keep trying to assert this false dichotomy. It’s not that ‘will’ and ‘act’ have no connection; trying to remove ‘act’ and then making a statement about ‘will’ changes the game so fundamentally that any assertions you make about this new world have no bearing on reality!

However, even though ‘will’ and ‘act’ are connected through causal relationships, this doesn’t imply that ‘free will’ is located in both!

It’s as if you’re saying that ‘thinking’ resides in the head and in the body and I’m saying it resides in the head alone. Then, you propose chopping away my body from my head, saying that, by showing that I no longer think, you’ve proven that the body is involved in the act of thinking! Of course, that’s sheer idiocy: by decapitating me, you’ve only demonstrated the ability to destroy the system within which thinking takes place! You haven’t, of course, demonstrated that head + body is the locus of thought!

 

[Serious]

You keep trying to assert this false dichotomy.

What false dichotomy? You “will” something. It can either be carried out or not. If it cannot be carried out, it IS a daydream, or a fantasy.

It’s not that ‘will’ and ‘act’ have no connection; trying to remove ‘act’ and then making a statement about ‘will’ changes the game so fundamentally that any assertions you make about this new world have no bearing on reality!

It is you who attempted to remove the “act” part… and indeed it has no bearing on reality.

However, even though ‘will’ and ‘act’ are connected through causal relationships, this doesn’t imply that ‘free will’ is located in both!

It is not “located” in both, it requires both to be present.

 

[Gorgias]

What false dichotomy? You “will” something. It can either be carried out or not. If it cannot be carried out, it IS a daydream, or a fantasy.

It is you who attempted to remove the “act” part… and indeed it has no bearing on reality.

It is not “located” in both, it requires both to be present.

If what you mean is “the theoretical possibility of action”, then yes – that is, the domain of free will is the set of moral actions. However, you’ve been asserting that the completed act in itself is necessary.

If we were to say that free will simply maps to actions that are plausible (without asserting that they’re actualizable in a given circumstance), then sure, that’s reasonable. I’m not claiming that I have free will because I can desire to flap my arms and fly! However, if I will some act with moral content, and that act is plausible (in theory), and yet you prevent me from actualizing that act… I say that ‘free will’ is present, and you say ‘no’. In this case, ‘will’ and ‘act’ are present, but ‘act’ is not executed. We still meet your requirements for ‘presence’, but we do not reach the conclusion you wish to assert.

 

[Serious]

If what you mean is “the theoretical possibility of action”, then yes – that is, the domain of free will is the set of moral actions. However, you’ve been asserting that the completed act in itself is necessary.

If we were to say that free will simply maps to actions that are plausible (without asserting that they’re actualizable in a given circumstance), then sure, that’s reasonable. I’m not claiming that I have free will because I can desire to flap my arms and fly! However, if I will some act with moral content, and that act is plausible (in theory), and yet you prevent me from actualizing that act… I say that ‘free will’ is present, and you say ‘no’. In this case, ‘will’ and ‘act’ are present, but ‘act’ is not executed. We still meet your requirements for ‘presence’, but we do not reach the conclusion you wish to assert.

Maybe we can get closer in the definition business. First, I want to emphasize that the moral content is only a subset, and it is not necessary that the dilemma should have moral overtones.

You say: “I’m not claiming that I have free will because I can desire to flap my arms and fly!”.
You said before (paraphrased): “I’m claiming that I have free will because I can desire to flap my arms with the intent to fly, even though I cannot fly!” - which is very different.

Also, I rejected your “false dichotomy” claim. If one “wishes” or “wills” to perfom an action, which is impossible to carry out, then that “will” is justly called “fantasy”. What would be “false” about that?

You also say: “However, if I will some act (…), and that act is plausible (in theory), and yet you prevent me from actualizing that act… I say that ‘free will’ is present, and you say ‘no’.”
Not precisely: I say that your free will was negated, overridden, invalidated, or I imposed my will and forced my will unto you.

We are back to square “something”. It may be boring to repeat it, but the problem of “rape” is very pertinent. The woman “wills the act to escape”. The rapist “prevents” it. You say that she had her “free will” intact, but it was prevented from being carried out. I say that her “free will” was overridden. The rapist imposed his will upon her. It is not just semantics that we disgree upon.

This is what you said: “…it demonstrates that, in the complete absence of free action, free will is thwarted.” So on what grounds do you say that the “free will” of the woman is both “intact” and “thwarted” - at the same time, and in the same respect?

 

[Gorgias]

First, I want to emphasize that the moral content is only a subset, and it is not necessary that the dilemma should have moral overtones.

I’m not absolutely certain I agree with this, but I can set it aside for the moment…

You said before (paraphrased): “I’m claiming that I have free will because I can desire to flap my arms with the intent to fly, even though I cannot fly!” - which is very different.

I don’t think I ever said that. If you can find somewhere I did, it would be interesting to discuss it.

Also, I rejected your “false dichotomy” claim. If one “wishes” or “wills” to perfom an action, which is impossible to carry out, then that “will” is justly called “fantasy”. What would be “false” about that?

“impossible” on the grounds that it is not humanly possible, or “impossible” on the grounds that someone is actively attempting to thwart the action? The former seems not like a free will issue, while the latter is an instance of free will in action (but which is not actualized, due to some sort of un-natural constraint.)

If you took me to mean the former, then you’re mistaken – perhaps we both could’ve stated things earlier in such a way that this misunderstanding wouldn’t have occurred. However, I do hold to the latter – if one takes an action which makes a potential action impossible (at the moment), this does not impact the notion of free will.

You also say: “However, if I will some act (…), and that act is plausible (in theory), and yet you prevent me from actualizing that act… I say that ‘free will’ is present, and you say ‘no’.”
Not precisely: I say that your free will was negated, overridden, invalidated, or I imposed my will and forced my will unto you.

No, you didn’t impose your will upon me – you imposed an action on me. Big difference. My will remains, but your action simply prevents my action.

We are back to square “something”. It may be boring to repeat it, but the problem of “rape” is very pertinent. The woman “wills the act to escape”. The rapist “prevents” it.

Right: the “it” that the rapist prevents is ‘escape’, not ‘will’.

I say that her “free will” was overridden.

No, her action was overridden; the rapist cannot touch ‘free will’.

This is what you said: “…it demonstrates that, in the complete absence of free action, free will is thwarted.” So on what grounds do you say that the “free will” of the woman is both “intact” and “thwarted” - at the same time, and in the same respect?

You’re mixing two references, from two completely different situations, in a way that’s invalid. In the “complete absence of free action” example, we have your construction: there’s no such thing as free action, since God controls things in a way that only allows ‘good’ action. In this example, by definition, no one acts on his will; rather, actions reflect only the will of God.

The second reference was from your attempt at the real-world scenario: the victim’s will remains intact, although her attempts at action are thwarted.

Therefore, your example shows neither “at the same time” nor “in the same respect”: it mixes two thought experiments in order to point out the examples you wish to find. In that way, you cannot assert that the principle of non-contradiction has been violated.

 

[Serious]

I don’t think I ever said that. If you can find somewhere I did, it would be interesting to discuss it.

Obviously you used different words. You said that freedom to will something is what matters, but the inability to act upon that will is irrelevant. The meaning is the same as the words I used.

“impossible” on the grounds that it is not humanly possible, or “impossible” on the grounds that someone is actively attempting to thwart the action? The former seems not like a free will issue, while the latter is an instance of free will in action (but which is not actualized, due to some sort of un-natural constraint.)

There is no difference. The constraints can be natural or artifical. The result is the same: “the attempt to put the will into action” is prevented. Where is the false dichotomy here? You can either act on your will, or you cannot act upon it. In the latter case you engage in fantasizing.

No, you didn’t impose your will upon me – you imposed an action on me. Big difference. My will remains, but your action simply prevents my action.

I use my will, I put it into action, and thus I prevent your will to be put into action. Your will may be the same, but it is worth less than a used piece of Kleenex. You know, I wonder, if you would be exposed to such a scenario (and I fervently hope that it will never happen) how much solace would you find from repeating to yourself: “but they could never touch my free will, they could only take away my freedom action… nyah, nyah…nyah…”.

You’re mixing two references, from two completely different situations, in a way that’s invalid. In the “complete absence of free action” example, we have your construction: there’s no such thing as free action, since God controls things in a way that only allows ‘good’ action. In this example, by definition, no one acts on his will; rather, actions reflect only the will of God.

The second reference was from your attempt at the real-world scenario: the victim’s will remains intact, although her attempts at action are thwarted.

Therefore, your example shows neither “at the same time” nor “in the same respect”: it mixes two thought experiments in order to point out the examples you wish to find. In that way, you cannot assert that the principle of non-contradiction has been violated.

They are the same. It does not matter who imposes the will, God or someone else. The contradiction stays.

 

[Gorgias]

Obviously you used different words. You said that freedom to will something is what matters, but the inability to act upon that will is irrelevant. The meaning is the same as the words I used.

And we have used this discourse to reach an important clarification. I’m not attempting to say that free will applies to notions that are a priori impossibilities and contrary to reality. You can now quit attempting to ‘disprove’ my assertions on that basis, thank you very much! Now: let’s get back to the meat of the matter – I still assert that free will has to do with the ability to choose (things that aren’t contrary to reality).

There is no difference. The constraints can be natural or artifical. The result is the same: “the attempt to put the will into action” is prevented. Where is the false dichotomy here? You can either act on your will, or you cannot act upon it. In the latter case you engage in fantasizing.

But your approach requires successful action, which is irrelevant. By your definition, only the Wright brothers “willed” flight – all those who preceded them, but didn’t fly, weren’t exercising the free will to fly. And that’s just ludicrous…

You know, I wonder, if you would be exposed to such a scenario (and I fervently hope that it will never happen) how much solace would you find from repeating to yourself: “but they could never touch my free will, they could only take away my freedom action… nyah, nyah…nyah…”.

And yet, isn’t that what we hear from those who have been held captive: “they can control my body, but they couldn’t control my mind”…?

They are the same. It does not matter who imposes the will, God or someone else. The contradiction stays.

They are not the same – in the case of your example, God imposes his will always and in each case; in the other example, it’s a temporary restraint. To claim determinism in the first case makes sense – in the second case, it’s silly, for any meaningful notion of “determinism”! The claim for ‘free will’ or for ‘determinism’ is that they either exist, or they don’t; not that sometimes one exists and at others, the other exists!

 

[Sair]

The claim for ‘free will’ or for ‘determinism’ is that they either exist, or they don’t; not that sometimes one exists and at others, the other exists!

These things are only contradictory if one adheres to the notion of contra-causal free will, and believes that any decision causally preceded by some other factor (whether another decision, a biological predisposition, an environmental influence or a synapse firing in the brain) is not, thereby, ‘free’.

Yet this is what Daniel Dennett would probably call an unnecessary shrinking of the ‘self’ - that is, the entity who wills - into something so small it cannot be located. If I am not my brain, my body, my biology, my responses to the environment, then what am I?

What’s more, when it comes to practical decision-making, and even moral decision-making, advocates of free will appear to think they want free will to be contra-causal - that is, the ‘self’ must be the first cause, somehow, of any decision made - but in reality, we are always looking for the reasons for someone’s actions. Even those who, for example, consider the individual conscience to be the source of one’s moral (or immoral) actions, what is it that formed the conscience in the first place? I recall the Catholic idea of “false conscience” that leads one down the wrong moral paths, even though one may think one is doing right; who or what is responsible for this false conscience? Is it the ‘self’, the ‘I’? Or is it some other influence in the development of the agent in question?

Dennett claims that determinism is not the same as inevitability, and I am at present inclined to agree, or at least to appreciate his argument. Even if everything in the universe is causally determined (which it quite possibly isn’t, given the occurrence of what seems to be genuine randomness at the quantum level), if we are not the sort of beings who can know the entirety of the causal web, we can only make decisions on the basis of such information as is available to us. As physical beings, we are undoubtedly part of the causal web - integral to it, in many ways determined by it, but with the ability - thanks to our complex powers of perception and processing of information - to do our own determining. Our (relatively great) freedom to act within the causal web is very likely, in itself, causally determined in all its incremental steps by our evolution as large-brained, social, language-using, culture-producing animals. The idea of a human ‘essence’ or ‘soul’ or whatever is considered by proponents of contra-causal free will to be the “uncaused cause” of our decisions may, in fact, be just a fantasy.

 

[Serious]

They are not the same – in the case of your example, God imposes his will always and in each case; in the other example, it’s a temporary restraint.

So what? As long as there is any barrier to carry out what you desire - be it God’s decision, another human’s decision or simply a physical constraint, your “freedom” is gone. Who or what inhibits your ability is totally irrelevant. And you admitted that in God’s case, and you deny it in other cases. And that is the contradiction. Now you try to deny it. Sorry, I am not interested any more. This is intellectual dishonesty. Good bye.

 

[tonyrey]

What’s more, when it comes to practical decision-making, and even moral decision-making, advocates of free will appear to think they want free will to be contra-causal - that is, the ‘self’ must be the first cause, somehow, of any decision made…

Being the cause of one’s actions does **not **entail contra-causality but transcendence of physical causes by directing them.

but in reality, we are always looking for the reasons for someone’s actions.

Very often we know that a person has no reason for his or her action.

Even those who, for example, consider the individual conscience to be the source of one’s moral (or immoral) actions, what is it that formed the conscience in the first place?

The conscience is not immutable.

I recall the Catholic idea of “false conscience” that leads one down the wrong moral paths, even though one may think one is doing right; who or what is responsible for this false conscience? Is it the ‘self’, the ‘I’? Or is it some other influence in the development of the agent in question?

That is a false dilemma because it may be either.

Dennett claims that determinism is not the same as inevitability, and I am at present inclined to agree, or at least to appreciate his argument. Even if everything in the universe is causally determined (which it quite possibly isn’t, given the occurrence of what seems to be genuine randomness at the quantum level), if we are not the sort of beings who can know the entirety of the causal web, we can only make decisions on the basis of such information as is available to us.

Ignorance is an inadequate reason for being capable of self-determination.

As physical beings, we are undoubtedly part of the causal web - integral to it, in many ways determined by it, but with the ability - thanks to our complex powers of perception and processing of information - to do our own determining.

Complexity is an inadequate reason for being capable of self-determination.

Our (relatively great) freedom to act within the causal web is very likely, in itself, causally determined in all its incremental steps by our evolution as large-brained, social, language-using, culture-producing animals.

Freedom that is causally determined is an oxymoron.

The idea of a human ‘essence’ or ‘soul’ or whatever is considered by proponents of contra-causal free will to be the “uncaused cause” of our decisions may, in fact, be just a fantasy.

Rationality is a fantasy if it is attributed to an irrational odyssey!

 

[tonyrey]

So what? As long as there is any barrier to carry out what you desire - be it God’s decision, another human’s decision or simply a physical constraint, your “freedom” is gone.

It is only your freedom of expression that has gone - temporarily.

 

[Bobber90]

These things are only contradictory if one adheres to the notion of contra-causal free will, and believes that any decision causally preceded by some other factor (whether another decision, a biological predisposition, an environmental influence or a synapse firing in the brain) is not, thereby, ‘free’.

Yet this is what Daniel Dennett would probably call an unnecessary shrinking of the ‘self’ - that is, the entity who wills - into something so small it cannot be located. If I am not my brain, my body, my biology, my responses to the environment, then what am I?

What’s more, when it comes to practical decision-making, and even moral decision-making, advocates of free will appear to think they want free will to be contra-causal - that is, the ‘self’ must be the first cause, somehow, of any decision made - but in reality, we are always looking for the reasons for someone’s actions. Even those who, for example, consider the individual conscience to be the source of one’s moral (or immoral) actions, what is it that formed the conscience in the first place? I recall the Catholic idea of “false conscience” that leads one down the wrong moral paths, even though one may think one is doing right; who or what is responsible for this false conscience? Is it the ‘self’, the ‘I’? Or is it some other influence in the development of the agent in question?

Dennett claims that determinism is not the same as inevitability, and I am at present inclined to agree, or at least to appreciate his argument. Even if everything in the universe is causally determined (which it quite possibly isn’t, given the occurrence of what seems to be genuine randomness at the quantum level), if we are not the sort of beings who can know the entirety of the causal web, we can only make decisions on the basis of such information as is available to us. As physical beings, we are undoubtedly part of the causal web - integral to it, in many ways determined by it, but with the ability - thanks to our complex powers of perception and processing of information - to do our own determining. Our (relatively great) freedom to act within the causal web is very likely, in itself, causally determined in all its incremental steps by our evolution as large-brained, social, language-using, culture-producing animals. The idea of a human ‘essence’ or ‘soul’ or whatever is considered by proponents of contra-causal free will to be the “uncaused cause” of our decisions may, in fact, be just a fantasy.

I’m really pleased to see people thinking about Dennett’s writing on this issue, as I found it very stimulating. But most of all I found it frustrating! I could not in the end accept that any free will worth wanting is compatible with determinism. As you say, contra-causal free will is ruled out by determinism, but you also think that what freedom of action we do have is also ‘very likely, in itself, causally determined in all its incremental steps by our evolution as large-brained, social, language-using, culture-producing animals.’

If determinism is true (forgetting indeterminism at the quantum level), then the whole of the past and future is visible in the thinnest slice of the present, because the present is given by the past, and the future by the present etc etc. When Dennett says that things which come our way are not inevitable, I don’t think he denies the givenness of the future, instead he seems to be saying that there are threats which are avoidable by us as long as we have prior warning or can perceive them. That is the evolution of free will. But, frankly, we cannot choose to avoid being avoiders. If there is only one future and it is already fixed, then surely it’s game over for free will no matter how our actions and beliefs are dressed up. If I am going to avoid being hit by a car, then that is what I will do and there is nothing at all I can do to change it without contra-causal free will. That’s the frustrating thing which I never got my head around regarding Dennett - how determinism doesn’t make the future inevitable, or if it does, how that wouldn’t matter for free will.

I too was ‘willing’ to appreciate Dennett’s rescue of free will, but Sam Harris’s account in his new book/pamphlet seems sadly easier to believe.

 

[Gorgias]

So what? As long as there is any barrier to carry out what you desire - be it God’s decision, another human’s decision or simply a physical constraint, your “freedom” is gone. Who or what inhibits your ability is totally irrelevant. And you admitted that in God’s case, and you deny it in other cases. And that is the contradiction. Now you try to deny it. Sorry, I am not interested any more. This is intellectual dishonesty. Good bye.

No, I wasn’t making a special pleading based on the presence of God; I was claiming that it was the distinction between a situation in which there was complete determinism and one in which there is only arbitrary restraint. Twice, now, you have attempted to construe my case as special pleading, and it’s not. Apparently, I don’t have a monopoly on “intellectual dishonesty.”

But, now that I’ve clarified my position vis-à-vis impossible actions, and you can no longer accuse me of nonsense, perhaps the fun’s gone out of the game for you. So long, and thanks for all the dialogue!

 

[Scapegoat]

I guess, I will have to emphasize it again: “You can WILL it day in and day out. Your will is futile. You have no free will in THAT RESPECT!!!” Do you get it? Or should I use even larger letter size?

I’m sure the contradiction of this statement has been pointed out, since how can someone will if they do not have the freedom to will? Someone is either free to will or not free to will; there is no such thing as one person having 50% free will. Furthermore to will even in thought is an action in itself, so even if someone is paralized from the toes to the head, they still have total free will if they’re mentally capable to reason.

 

[Serious]

I’m sure the contradiction of this statement has been pointed out, since how can someone will if they do not have the freedom to will? Someone is either free to will or not free to will; there is no such thing as one person having 50% free will. Furthermore to will even in thought is an action in itself, so even if someone is paralized from the toes to the head, they still have total free will if they’re mentally capable to reason.

If you confuse the concept of “free will” with the concept of “free fantasizing” or “free daydreaming” or “free wishful thinking” and you think that these are the same, then there would be a contradiction. But only a few people make that particular mistake. Most people understand that the correct definition: “free will means that you come to a decision and you are able to carry out that decision - free and unhindered”. In other words: “freedom of will” cannot be separated from “freedom to act upon that will”.

As I already pointed out, if only the “freedom of will” mattered, then God could take away the “freedom to act” from all the evil people, when they “will” something evil - and their “free will” would not be violated. What is so difficult to understand this, is a “mystery” - like so many logically incoherent “arguments”.

 

[Sair]

Being the cause of one’s actions does **not **entail contra-causality but transcendence of physical causes by directing them.

But you still want us to be the first cause of our actions. It’s quite unclear how this is to be possible.

Very often we know that a person has no reason for his or her action.

How can we know this? By the person’s own admission? But the person in question may have reasons for concealing his/her reasons or intent. What then?

The conscience is not immutable.

Don’t recall saying that it was. What I asked is who is responsible for shaping it? We ourselves, alone, or other influences in our world?

That is a false dilemma because it may be either.

I didn’t pose a dilemma - I merely rephrased, with an illustrative example, the question of who is responsible for the formation and shaping of conscience.

Ignorance is an inadequate reason for being capable of self-determination.

And that’s an inadequate reading of what I wrote. The fact that we are subjectively ignorant of much of our brain’s processing capacity is what makes the concepts of consciousness and free will notoriously difficult to approach. We may think we know what the answers are - “I” feel like I make decisions, therefore I do - but we project the idea of a homunculus indwelling our physical being, directing all its actions. As Dennett has said, and I have quoted in a previous post, if you make yourself small enough, you can externalise everything - even, I would add, the very causes and processes of our own behaviour.

Complexity is an inadequate reason for being capable of self-determination.

Why? Certainly it doesn’t actually provide explanations for our manifold capabilities as organisms, but it does open the way for very interesting possibilities.

Freedom that is causally determined is an oxymoron.

Freedom that is randomly enacted is also an oxymoron. But they seem to be the only available choices. No-one has yet identified a location small enough and independent enough to be the seat of the “self” posited by many philosophers and religionists alike.

Rationality is a fantasy if it is attributed to an irrational odyssey!

Why? What do you think rationality actually is?

 

[Sair]

I’m really pleased to see people thinking about Dennett’s writing on this issue, as I found it very stimulating. But most of all I found it frustrating! I could not in the end accept that any free will worth wanting is compatible with determinism. As you say, contra-causal free will is ruled out by determinism, but you also think that what freedom of action we do have is also ‘very likely, in itself, causally determined in all its incremental steps by our evolution as large-brained, social, language-using, culture-producing animals.’

If determinism is true (forgetting indeterminism at the quantum level), then the whole of the past and future is visible in the thinnest slice of the present, because the present is given by the past, and the future by the present etc etc. When Dennett says that things which come our way are not inevitable, I don’t think he denies the givenness of the future, instead he seems to be saying that there are threats which are avoidable by us as long as we have prior warning or can perceive them. That is the evolution of free will. But, frankly, we cannot choose to avoid being avoiders. If there is only one future and it is already fixed, then surely it’s game over for free will no matter how our actions and beliefs are dressed up. If I am going to avoid being hit by a car, then that is what I will do and there is nothing at all I can do to change it without contra-causal free will. That’s the frustrating thing which I never got my head around regarding Dennett - how determinism doesn’t make the future inevitable, or if it does, how that wouldn’t matter for free will.

I too was ‘willing’ to appreciate Dennett’s rescue of free will, but Sam Harris’s account in his new book/pamphlet seems sadly easier to believe.

I do have Sam Harris’s thin tome in hand, and intend to read it once I have finished absorbing Dennett’s arguments.

At this point, I am inclined to think that causal unpredictability is important for our perception and exercise of something like free will - and I say “something like” because I simply don’t believe that there is some localised or supernatural “seat of the self” that does the willing.

Be that as it may, if the ends of our lives, and the future of the entire universe, are determined from the point of its beginning (however that occurred), then that is how our lives will pan out and there actually is nothing we can do to prevent it. If determinism = inevitability, that is. What if there are multiple influences acting upon a particular event? Is it predetermined which of these influences will win out? I don’t know. What is important to remember, I think, is that we - whatever “we” are, in the sense of how we perceive ourselves - are integrated into this causal web. Whatever the deterministic events that make up my actions, my conscious experience, my interactions with my environment (and the other “selves” in that environment) they are not things that are just carrying “me” along on a wave of causation - they are actually fundamental to what and who “I” am.

In any case, I think the idea that determinism has mapped a course from the beginning to the end of the universe, one in which we are powerless to change what was “decided” at the beginning, is one that owes its bleakness to the religious idea of predestination and the “all-knowingness” of God. That requires someone at the beginning of time to have set the whole agenda from start to finish, someone who knew all possible outcomes and determined that things could only go one way. That is why the unpredictability of complex causality is important. If it’s all decided already, who did the deciding? If there was no planning, then the progress of the universe from its start to its end is simply a blind succession of events, which may go one way or another before any particular event has occurred, especially if there are multiple causes competing for influence - which there almost always are. If there are those who think they can explain why God’s omniscience is compatible with free will - and there are such people - then I think it should be a relatively easy task to come to terms with the idea that natural determinism is compatible with free will.