Let’s grant this for a moment: Aquinas’ arguments are all apriori, conceptual, question begging, etc.
My question is, if God’s existence is beyond demonstration – on what epistemological and practical grounds do you go on to conclude you ought not to think he exists, and how is your reason an objectively “good” one?
It’s only objectively superior due to the lack of any positive evidence to the contrary. It’s performative AND parsimonious. The theist intuition is equally performative (God can be used to explain
any scenario), but it’s gratuitous, not parsimonious.
If you don’t find economy or parsimony to be “objectively good” in terms of epistemology, so be it. That would reduce the question to parity, which is fine by me, anyway – the question isn’t a frutiful one, given the Christian concepts of God (as opposed to more concrete ideas that
would afford us some traction on, say, Zeus). Like I said to JDaniel, it reduces to “not even wrong”, as it has become epistemically inert. It’s not an epistemic question at that point, but a kind of intution or preference.
If, however, you think parsimony has epistemic value, as a heuristic, then theism comes up short. It’s gratuitous vs. agnosticism/atheism. It’s not economical.
In other words, what is “wrong” with practically concluding that I ought to think he exists, if he cannot be definitively shown to exist one way or the other?
“Definitive” is an over-narrow criterion. If we only embrace what is “definitive”, life is practically impossible to navigate. The superiority of unbelief (“wrong” seems problematic, here, unless you just mean “not intellectually superior”, or similar) is that the model provides a more thorough accounting of the world we observe around us, and makes better predictions, with less explanatory resources.
I think that is a three-way basis for thinking that unbelief is intellectually superior. But admittedly, it presumes that model-based epistemology and parsimony are virtues in judging.
It seems to me that you make an unjustified (at least an objectively unjustified) jump when you move from “God cannot be demonstrated to exist” to the practical conclusion “I ought therefore not to think he does.” Can you give me a good reason why I ought to conclude similarly?
It’s the null hypothesis! Same with unicorns. They may exist, but from everything we can see and observe, and for all the models we build that perform, God and unicorns don’t factor in. Psychologically, we are evolved with a god-impulse, as we are creatures who’ve adapted to survive the eons through a well-honed stance of intentionality. We are design-freaks by disposition, so we are inclined to see everything as designed, intuitively.
But reason and critical thinking are evolved resources we have at our disposal as well, and these find the intution at odds with the facts and models, or at least superfluous with respect to them. It’s as simple as concluding that we don’t
intellectually begin with a reason to presume God’s existence, and the evidence and reasoning from all of that doesn’t get us there. Ergo, we just have no need or warrant for it, intellectually.
Psychologically, emotionally, though, it’s a different story. We are superstitious beasts, and enslaved to our intuitions for all the best AND worst reasons, to varying degrees. This question nets out to kind of referendum of the intuition against a counter model that derives from intution subjected to skeptical criticism. It just comes down to whether you trust brute intuition over intution accountable to skeptical reasoning.
If you don’t find such liability to your intuitions preferable, then I got nothing, and have no reason why you can’t and shouldn’t just embrace whatever your intutions prompt you toward.
-TS