The demand for evidence for the existence of God

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In other words, TS thinks that if it cannot be subject to scientific falsification, it’s superfluous, even if it is true. Scientism. So he is not raising any objections so much as abdicating the discussion altogether by putting up for himself a pretty arbitrary criterion of belief.
 
LOL. That’s too funny, good luck with that. I haven’t read it yet, so perhaps this is premature, but I predict your carpet has more “solid evidence” for your puppy than our world shall ever have for this “non-mythic” God…

-TS
Dear one, as far as my pup goes, I could write a book about my puppy! 😃 The Vet told me today that I’m going to have to run her every day for the rest of my life. She goes into training classes in another couple of weeks. She is already digging for bones. He said she is the smartest breed of dogs. As far as God goes, if you do take the time to read that link (url), there is physical evidence, rebuttal evidence, and testimonial evidence.😉 Take it easy. I try my best not to kill Science off by insulting religious scientists or non-religous ones. 🙂 Peace and joy be with you.🙂
 
jd,

I don’t think the thoughtful rejection of Aquinas relies on refutation of his arguments. To say they are refutable – something that bears that kind of scrutiny – is to miss the most powerful criticism of Aquinas. Aquinas certainly had crude and now laughably primitive examples and analogies (he was in this respect more backward than Aristotle nearly 2,000 years before him, I think), but those are expositive and pedagogical flaws, not flaws with his arguments, per se.

The most potent criticism of Aquinas Quinqae viae is that they cannot be refuted, even in principle. They are not liable to being true or false, but are instead notional, intuition, gossamer. Further, I don’t think that’s controversial, if one just looks at each and asks how we would either validate or falsify any of the premises and predicates he relies on.

Not looking to bend the thread toward Aquinas, but the retort that Aquinas has not been refuted in his arguments strikes me as “true in a misleading way”. They haven’t shown themselves to even rise to the level of true or false as we understand them in the context of “refute”.

Aquinas is not wrong, but “not EVEN wrong”. He hasn’t left us in his arguments anything liable to refutation, so he truly can never, ever, possibly be refuted. He’s totally safe, but in a way that disgraces him and diminishes his contribution to the quest for human knowledge.

I’d be happy with “Aquinas has never been refuted, never will be because his arguments aren’t the time that are compatible with the concept of refutation”.

Would that work? 🙂

-TS
TS:

You always have a profound way of expressing gibberish. Ultimately, the atheist argument is simply, “I can’t possibly know, therefore you can’t possibly know.” I, on the other hand, am a man of few words. (At least here!😉 )

In all of those words (above) you say nothing. Absolutely nothing. A marvelous argument, but, not for this time or place. It is full of presumptions that are never expressed. It is full of assertions without spines. It is full of innuendos. They are superficial, to say the least.

By the way, how in the world are you? 🙂

God bless,
jd
 
TS:

You always have a profound way of expressing gibberish. Ultimately, the atheist argument is simply, “I can’t possibly know, therefore you can’t possibly know.” I, on the other hand, am a man of few words. (At least here!😉 )

In all of those words (above) you say nothing. Absolutely nothing. A marvelous argument, but, not for this time or place. It is full of presumptions that are never expressed. It is full of assertions without spines. It is full of innuendos. They are superficial, to say the least.

By the way, how in the world are you? 🙂

God bless,
jd
Good, thanks for asking! Always a pleasure sparring (or otherwise) with you. Sorry you found that overlong. But here’s is the key bits, and this I claim does say something clear and substantial:

Aquinas: Not even wrong.

From reading you, I’m quite sure you understand the meaning of that phrasing, and need not say more to make my point. Am I right?

-TS
 
The most potent criticism of Aquinas Quinqae viae is that they cannot be refuted, even in principle.
Let’s grant this for a moment: Aquinas’ arguments are all apriori, conceptual, question begging, etc.

My question is, if God’s existence is beyond demonstration – on what epistemological and practical grounds do you go on to conclude you ought not to think he exists, and how is your reason an objectively “good” one?

In other words, what is “wrong” with practically concluding that I ought to think he exists, if he cannot be definitively shown to exist one way or the other?

It seems to me that you make an unjustified (at least an objectively unjustified) jump when you move from “God cannot be demonstrated to exist” to the practical conclusion “I ought therefore not to think he does.” Can you give me a good reason why I ought to conclude similarly?
 
In other words, TS thinks that if it cannot be subject to scientific falsification, it’s superfluous, even if it is true.
If it’s true, then by my understanding it’s not superfluous. My point was somewhat different than you have it. If it’s not liable to falsification, at least in principle, then there’s no meaning left in saying “it’s true”. Even if it is true, if there’s no way to know that, or to identify the proposition as false, if it were false, it’s pointless to even invoke the terms “true” and “false”.

As for superfluity, that’s just the observation that God doesn’t add anything positive or negative to the scientific models we have. He’s just a non-object, if we are adhering to the models that perform. Unneeded. Extraneous. God may be “true” apart from science, but science doesn’t and apparently can’t benefit from any of that. It works as it does in a godless (or god-agnostic) way in performing as it does.
Scientism. So he is not raising any objections so much as abdicating the discussion altogether by putting up for himself a pretty arbitrary criterion of belief.
Not sure I grokked that, but if you suppose objective tests and methods of measurement (will the predictions of Mercury’s perihelion that come from this theory borne out by the observations we will make next month?) is arbitrary, I think there must be nothing that is not arbitrary. The scientific method is designed and implemented with the express purpose of identifying, removing and/or minimizing the arbitrary and the capricious from the process. In any system powered by humans you won’t acheive perfection on this, but I don’t think you could point me to any human enterprise that is as committed or demonstrably successful in fighting “arbitrary”.

-TS
 
Good, thanks for asking! Always a pleasure sparring (or otherwise) with you. Sorry you found that overlong. But here’s is the key bits, and this I claim does say something clear and substantial:

Aquinas: Not even wrong.

From reading you, I’m quite sure you understand the meaning of that phrasing, and need not say more to make my point. Am I right?

-TS
TS:

Nevertheless, you are absolutely wrong, in my opinion. And, again, though the statement is not quite gibberish, it has no verisimilitude. None whatsoever. It’s merely one more “naked assertion.” (Yes, it is enjoyable sparring with you!)

God bless,
jd
 
Let’s grant this for a moment: Aquinas’ arguments are all apriori, conceptual, question begging, etc.

My question is, if God’s existence is beyond demonstration – on what epistemological and practical grounds do you go on to conclude you ought not to think he exists, and how is your reason an objectively “good” one?
It’s only objectively superior due to the lack of any positive evidence to the contrary. It’s performative AND parsimonious. The theist intuition is equally performative (God can be used to explain any scenario), but it’s gratuitous, not parsimonious.

If you don’t find economy or parsimony to be “objectively good” in terms of epistemology, so be it. That would reduce the question to parity, which is fine by me, anyway – the question isn’t a frutiful one, given the Christian concepts of God (as opposed to more concrete ideas that would afford us some traction on, say, Zeus). Like I said to JDaniel, it reduces to “not even wrong”, as it has become epistemically inert. It’s not an epistemic question at that point, but a kind of intution or preference.

If, however, you think parsimony has epistemic value, as a heuristic, then theism comes up short. It’s gratuitous vs. agnosticism/atheism. It’s not economical.
In other words, what is “wrong” with practically concluding that I ought to think he exists, if he cannot be definitively shown to exist one way or the other?
“Definitive” is an over-narrow criterion. If we only embrace what is “definitive”, life is practically impossible to navigate. The superiority of unbelief (“wrong” seems problematic, here, unless you just mean “not intellectually superior”, or similar) is that the model provides a more thorough accounting of the world we observe around us, and makes better predictions, with less explanatory resources.

I think that is a three-way basis for thinking that unbelief is intellectually superior. But admittedly, it presumes that model-based epistemology and parsimony are virtues in judging.
It seems to me that you make an unjustified (at least an objectively unjustified) jump when you move from “God cannot be demonstrated to exist” to the practical conclusion “I ought therefore not to think he does.” Can you give me a good reason why I ought to conclude similarly?
It’s the null hypothesis! Same with unicorns. They may exist, but from everything we can see and observe, and for all the models we build that perform, God and unicorns don’t factor in. Psychologically, we are evolved with a god-impulse, as we are creatures who’ve adapted to survive the eons through a well-honed stance of intentionality. We are design-freaks by disposition, so we are inclined to see everything as designed, intuitively.

But reason and critical thinking are evolved resources we have at our disposal as well, and these find the intution at odds with the facts and models, or at least superfluous with respect to them. It’s as simple as concluding that we don’t intellectually begin with a reason to presume God’s existence, and the evidence and reasoning from all of that doesn’t get us there. Ergo, we just have no need or warrant for it, intellectually.

Psychologically, emotionally, though, it’s a different story. We are superstitious beasts, and enslaved to our intuitions for all the best AND worst reasons, to varying degrees. This question nets out to kind of referendum of the intuition against a counter model that derives from intution subjected to skeptical criticism. It just comes down to whether you trust brute intuition over intution accountable to skeptical reasoning.

If you don’t find such liability to your intuitions preferable, then I got nothing, and have no reason why you can’t and shouldn’t just embrace whatever your intutions prompt you toward.

-TS
 
TS:

Nevertheless, you are absolutely wrong, in my opinion. And, again, though the statement is not quite gibberish, it has no verisimilitude. None whatsoever. It’s merely one more “naked assertion.” (Yes, it is enjoyable sparring with you!)

God bless,
jd
OK, name one of the Five Ways in which the premises and the conclusion are falsifiable, even in principle. If you are not just blowharding on me, this should be straightforward!

Just to pick one from memory, as an example – Aquinas’ First way holds (among other premises):

Sequences of motion cannot extend ad infinitum

Bzzzt. OK, so that one is out. Maybe it;s one of the other four?

If you want to make me do all the toilet cleaning here and go through all five ways, perhaps I can be persuaded to do that. But why not just name the one you think is liable to falsification. The one that might even possibly be shown to be wrong.

I say you cannot, and on that ground claim that Aquinas hasn’t even reached “possibly true or false” in his Five Ways.

I stand to be corrected, by you or anyone else here, if I’m mistaken in my understanding of the Quinqae Viae.

Over to you…

-TS
 
If you don’t find economy or parsimony to be “objectively good” in terms of epistemology, so be it.
And ultimately (despite your rather wordy and obtuse attempts) that’s about all you can offer me when you sacrifice truth for subjectively idealized pragmatic performance.

We are no longer on “speculative” grounds, since you conclude there is no way of knowing if God exists, so it makes no sense to appeal to those speculative grounds themselves as reasons. Thus we move to practical grounds. And, from a practical stand point, I see no compelling (or even good) reason to move from agnosticism to disbelief, particularly since God’s existence is at least possible. It seems eminently more reasonable to me to move towards belief.

This is all granting I agree with you in the first place, of course.
 
OK, name one of the Five Ways in which the premises and the conclusion are falsifiable, even in principle.
A proposition does not have to be falsifiable in order to be true, so objecting that a proposition is unfalsifiable does not prove that it is meaningless.
 
A proposition does not have to be falsifiable in order to be true, so objecting that a proposition is unfalsifiable does not prove that it is meaningless.
That’s why I thought my summation of his thoughts was rather good. He thinks that if something cannot be subjected to scientific falsification, even if it is true, it really does not matter (or, as he has said, it loses “meaningful” truth value - in other words, useful scientific value). Obviously, the criterion itself self-refuting.

I disagree, though, that the proofs are not falsifiable. Using the good 'ol principles of reason, we can judge if an argument works or not.

(Sorry I cannot respond to you more directly, TS. Your post is just too long, and I am pressed for time.)

And, for the life of me, I do not understand why there is silence the miracles, such as the Eucharistic ones. I guess there’s a stigma (no pun intended) attached to miraculous claims, which I suppose is understandable given the the charlatans out there (and there are many). But I think the miraculous “claims” of the Church are in a different class, and their off-hand dismissal is just unserious.
 
OK, name one of the Five Ways in which the premises and the conclusion are falsifiable, even in principle. If you are not just blowharding on me, this should be straightforward!

Just to pick one from memory, as an example – Aquinas’ First way holds (among other premises):

Sequences of motion cannot extend ad infinitum

Bzzzt. OK, so that one is out. Maybe it;s one of the other four?

If you want to make me do all the toilet cleaning here and go through all five ways, perhaps I can be persuaded to do that. But why not just name the one you think is liable to falsification. The one that might even possibly be shown to be wrong.

I say you cannot, and on that ground claim that Aquinas hasn’t even reached “possibly true or false” in his Five Ways.

I stand to be corrected, by you or anyone else here, if I’m mistaken in my understanding of the Quinqae Viae.

Over to you…

-TS
Actually, TS, I began a thread, at your explicit suggestion, some time ago. You seemed to have quickly disappeared. I even tried to give it a second boost. Perhaps if you had stayed a while longer, you wouldn’t have been so prone to making such an absurd iteration of his First Way, as you’ve done above! 🤷

But, this is someone else’s thread.

God bless,
jd
 
And ultimately (despite your rather wordy and obtuse attempts) that’s about all you can offer me when you sacrifice truth for subjectively idealized pragmatic performance.

We are no longer on “speculative” grounds, since you conclude there is no way of knowing if God exists, so it makes no sense to appeal to those speculative grounds themselves as reasons.
I don’t suppose there is no way to know if God exists. I think there may be, and there is a way to know God exists, if God exists. Rather I don’t know, and can’t know that God doesn’t exist. It’s an intractable proposition, proving a hidden, supernatural god does not exist. Procing a physical Zeus like God exists, and thus knowing a god exists, does not seem at all problematic to me, however.

I maintain we remain on speculative grounds if we suppose – no god in evidence – that some god does exist, based on notions or speculations we might have, despite the conspicuous lack of evidence.
Thus we move to practical grounds. And, from a practical stand point, I see no compelling (or even good) reason to move from agnosticism to disbelief, particularly since God’s existence is at least possible. It seems eminently more reasonable to me to move towards belief.
I understand agnosticism to be disbelief, or maybe “unbelief” is more precise. But either way, a less confident lack of belief in God. But I don’t see the connection between God-as-logically-possible as any kind of grounds for belief in God. Reasonably, per your view here, unicorns are just as real as God, as well as teapots in orbit around Saturn. Those propositions are also at least possible, are you eminently more reasonable in moving toward belief in unicorns and celestial teapots???
This is all granting I agree with you in the first place, of course.
Of course. 😉

-TS
 
Absence of evidence for x is evidence of absence for x when we should expect to have evidence for x (or more than we do for x). So, if there were an elephant in my classroom right now, I would expect to see its intruding mass. That is evidence that I would expect to see for the presence of an elephant in my classroom. And so the absence of evidence for an elephant in my classroom is evidence of its absence. In the same way, we can reasonably dismiss the existence of unicorns and pieces of china orbiting planets. There is no evidence (when there should be) for the existence of unicorns, and there is no evidence of us launching pieces of china into space. We are reasonable in dismissing both possibilities.

(Obviously, God is different since He is not any one thing in the universe like a unicorn or a piece of china.)
 
Actually, TS, I began a thread, at your explicit suggestion, some time ago. You seemed to have quickly disappeared. I even tried to give it a second boost. Perhaps if you had stayed a while longer, you wouldn’t have been so prone to making such an absurd iteration of his First Way, as you’ve done above! 🤷

But, this is someone else’s thread.

God bless,
jd
OK, fair enough. I didn’t cite the FIrst Way as a whole, of course, though, just a premise I recalled from it (and you had me thinking I had my Five Ways confused for a moment, and I was recalling a premise from the Fourth way or something.

Googling a little, I don’t find:

“Sequences of motion cannot extend ad infinitum”

Phrased exactly thus, but, for instance here (St. Thomas Aquinas:
The Existence of God can be proved in five ways
):

“7. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.”

There’s a singular/plural difference there, but I say that’s the same premise (true for one or any or all sequences).

I see that Prof. of Philosophy Echelbarger of SUNY-Oswego relies on the same account of Aquinas above:

oswego.edu/~echel/

From here at Yale.edu:

The First Way:
  1. Some things are in motion.
  1. Whatever is in motion is moved by something else.
3. An infinite series of movers, each moved by another is impossible.
  1. Therefore, there is a first cause that is not moved by anything. (1,2,3)
(my emphasis)

Or see this from Notre Dame (that hotbed of anti-Catholic disinformatoion):
  1. The chain connecting things which change and things which ini-
    tiate the changes cannot be infinite.
I don’t need to point out more – this is a premise from Aquinas’ First Way that exemplifies “not even wrong” as a way of thinking without putting one’s thoughts at risk of being discredited, practically or even in principle.

As for the previous thread, it’s unfortunately necessary to just lie low and go elsewhere on forums like this at times. The tolerance for free speech is better here than many other religious forums (and kudos for that), but that tolerance runs really thin sometimes, unfortunately. Being banned isn’t the end of the world (it’s humdrum for me, by now), but the operating conditions seem a bit better now, so it’s not such a clear risk of wasting my time as it was previously.

Do you have a thread link or keyword to search for on the old thread you are referring to?

And would you name, even if you refuse to expand, the one Way you find Aquinas to be most liable to falsification, to rising above “not even wrong”? I’d like to know which one you think that is, even if I can’t get you to go into why that would be.

-TS
 
Reasonably, per your view here, unicorns are just as real as God, as well as teapots in orbit around Saturn. Those propositions are also at least possible, are you eminently more reasonable in moving toward belief in unicorns and celestial teapots???
But the practical implications in believing in unicorns or tea-pots orbiting Saturn and believing in God are infinitely different, my friend.
 
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