The demand for evidence for the existence of God

[atheistgirl]

Have any of those untested ideas ever worked out?

Ok, just thought of an example from the past - in short, I heard of an event happening - nothing I’d be interested in, but the person made a throw away remark about the only thing they didnt like was the huge cue for the cloakroom.
Lightbulb goes on. I get some guys from the horse sanctuary to clean up some boxes, fit a temporary shelving system, contact the organises who denied us permission to set up on the grounds - obviously - so we set up across the street. Nothing they could do about that. But bikers do love their horses - after all bikes are just a horse substitute - we charged two bucks to look after their helmets and coats for the day - we were there for the week and made thousands for the sanctuary.
So, idea not tested, no research done before hand, just instinct, but it solved a problem I was told existed, and when word got out on the second day we made a killing thereafter - we were cheaper, we had more volunteers so we could process much quicker, we had several openings not just one so no huge cues, turnaround was a few seconds per person due to the clever little system we set up, and, needless to say, we were friendlier, and much better looking
So, there’s an untested idea, born on the spur of the moment (did ya see what I did there ) that worked out real good.

Sarah x

 

[grannymh]

So I think I can paraphrase your point here as follows (tell me if I’m wrong - I’m not trying to set up a straw man or anything - I’m putting the argument in my own words to make sure I understand it): ‘Loads of cool dudes have believed. They didn’t need evidence. Maybe they were right. By demanding evidence you are (unreasonably?) restricting reality to what you can sense.’ To which I say, 'OK then, I’m open to persuasion. I’d like to believe in the existence of a bigger reality. In fact, as far as I know, there could well be huge areas of reality beyond sensory experience. Hit me with it. But not everything I can imagine corresponds to reality. So, how do I know what’s really out there? Maybe the believer dudes can show me what is real and what is illusion."

Can you?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Can a dudette quietly sneak in a couple of historical ideas? Even a few hysterical ones?

Came across an interesting statement in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Second Edition, Paragraph 28. “These forms of religious expression [referring to that of humans since the dawn of history] despite the ambiguities they often bring with them, are so universal that one may well call man a religious being:” To those expressions, I would add myths and fables describing something that has being but not the same as themselves.

When I think of a person as a religious being, I think of a person extremely curious about life and how all of it began. A person who senses order in the universe and a need for an orderly way of living with others. A person who senses a higher being. Many of the stories handed down from ancient peoples are collections of explanations of that “something higher that has being” but is not the same as a human person. It is that awareness of something immaterial or spiritual which distinguishes a religious being.

The religious sense is when awareness becomes respect. And respect desires communication. Ah, one says. You are talking about pagans inventing all kinds of gods to suit their purposes. True. But one needs to remember that just because some migrating relatives chose to discard teachings passed down from original parents, there were still those who repeated the stories verbatim about One God. Furthermore, my meandering post is not necessarily a proof of God’ existence; rather it is a proof of humans’ innate ability to be aware of the spiritual and to seek its meaning. And yes, this innate ability, inherited in human nature which can go beyond the natural has continued through the centuries so that it is currently found in you and me.

While it is good to be open to persuasion that there does exist a bigger reality, what is basic is that human beings can recognize that the spiritual exists somehow. The fact that people hold different ideas about the source of our ability to know the immaterial or spiritual is not important at the moment. What is important is that the ability exists as part of our human nature.
What good would it be to have the best possible, most realistic, absolutely marvelous proof for God’s existence if human nature had no awareness of the spiritual?

Now there is that pesky ending to your post – “But not everything I can imagine corresponds to reality. So, how do I know what’s really out there? Maybe the believer dudes can show me what is real and what is an illusion.” Well, I am not sure I can meet your requirements for a good answer.

It seems to me that in order to know real from illusion, one has to go beyond awareness and respect for a spiritual being and seek communication with God Himself. I don’t mean to imply that one will get a lightening quick response. I am trying to say that in order to find a real God, one has to put one’s own foot in front of the other and get the old anatomy moving. I wouldn’t go so far as to say get down on your knees, well maybe you could.

What I want to say is that in some way we need to prove to ourselves that we are in earnest about finding God, not proving that He exists, but knowing His reality. It is when we actively seek God, that He finds us.

Blessings,
granny

The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?”
from the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[Betterave]

Good post. Since John hasn’t replied yet, I’ll jump in.

Hi John, I may be missing the point - since you are its author you are in the best position to declare what you meant to convey. But my point is that the analogy is not apposite - in the one case there really is an ice cream truck that anyone can sense who cares to do so and in that case the other kids’ belief in the presence of the truck is absolutely based on sensory evidence - either immediate sensory evidence at the time or an inference from prior and repeatable sensory evidence. To the extent that our anti-hero is missing out, he is doing so because he is rejecting the idea that others can have reliable sensory evidence to which he is not party. So in this case the others are, in effect, saying “we know the truck is there because we have sensory evidence that it is so - come along” and he is saying “naw - I won’t accept your report - I’ll wait till I have direct evidence myself” and in that he is a fool, because sometimes one should accept the well attested sensory evidence of others, assuming that, at least in principle, one could test it for oneself. Either the truck is there or it is not, and there is no ambiguity in determining whether it is or not provided one puts it to the test by seeking evidence for it.

The important point that I think you may have missed in John’s analogy is the fact that if he insists on waiting to get his own sensory evidence, he’s going to miss out. Presumably the bell rings only once; the other kids heard it, but he missed it, so now he’s being pig-headed. Maybe he’ll get lucky and the bell will ring again before the truck leaves, and maybe he’ll be paying attention when it does ring the next time, but maybe not.

Now contrast that with the case for theism, which does not, cannot, depend on sensory evidence as you yourself admit by talking about a reality that transcends evidence. The epistemic warrant for theism is radically different for the epistemic warrant for the ice cream truck. In saying that the demand for evidence is blocking the experience of full reality, you are making a claim for the existence of a reality which is beyond sensory experience, that is manifested - how? - through private revelation and inward contemplation I suppose, that is untested and untestable. Perhaps such a reality does exist but it is beyond knowledge for us; you can only make such a claim on faith, and the essence of your post is to admit that. Our guy knows he’s screwed up when the other kids come back, faces sticky with good eating - he gets the direct sensory evidence that the truck *was *there and surely he’ll go along with the evidence tomorrow (unless he’s even more of a fool than he seems). In the case of the theistic claim, its rejection is not, cannot be refuted by evidence.

This talk of sense-based epistemic warrant seems quite inappropriate here. The analogy seems neutral with respect to the basis for the epistemic warrant for the belief in question. I think John’s point was simply about the reasonableness of this guy (let’s call him Billy) choosing to risk missing out on a good thing, just because Billy didn’t hear the bell (in this case) for himself - even though all the other kids evidently seem to have heard it. It seems that Billy may be unreasonably arrogant in dismissing the relevance of the behavior of the majority of the kids, and so if he misses out on a good thing it will be deservedly so.

So I think I can paraphrase your point here as follows (tell me if I’m wrong - I’m not trying to set up a straw man or anything - I’m putting the argument in my own words to make sure I understand it): ‘Loads of cool dudes have believed. They didn’t need evidence. Maybe they were right. By demanding evidence you are (unreasonably?) restricting reality to what you can sense.’

And hopefully you can see why I would think that indeed is a straw man. There’s no question of not needing evidence. It’s about being reasonable when it comes to recognizing the evidence which is constituted by the behavior of the other kids. Ceteris paribus, their behavior seems to constitute a prima facie theoretical warrant, and certainly a pragmatic warrant, justifying further investigation. I think that was John’s point. He can correct me too if I have that wrong.

 

[LongJohnSilver]

Thanks Betterave, you articulated it very well. I started typing a reply myself, but your answer is better formulated than mine. Maybe Alec can respond to your post.

 

[ambertrevena]

Hello Friends…

Demanding for the evidence for the existence of God is a very silly question i found in my life…I can’t believe that someone asks like this…I simply want to say if you have faith in God then its good otherwise no-one can do something for you…Yeah i admire that sometimes some people ask like this but you have to know that there is a hidden power that empowers us too and that is the God…

Amber Trevena.

---

Want to know your destiny click : Indian astrology and Horoscopes

 

[Curious_Seed]

" Does the boy really need to hear the bell ring before he can trust the existence of the icecream van? "
Yes, and we are all benefactors of the scientists’ measuring sticks.

" There is no scientifically irrefutable proof for the existence of God. "
True, but does the existence of God presuppose the need of science?

" The majority of humans believe in His existence. "
The majority of humans once believed in a geocentric earth.

" The non-believer wants his life and actions to have meaning. "
Wants do not a God make.

No, the evidence of God is not found in the annals of science or philosophy. The evidence is in the revelations presented by Jesus. Jesus showed us God. Without Jesus, there is no evidence of God; with Jesus, all abounds in evidence of God.

 

[hecd2]

Can a dudette quietly sneak in a couple of historical ideas? Even a few hysterical ones?

Sure thing; I’d like to respond to the crux of your post which comes at the end.

But before I do that, I’d just like to make the point that I have no problem with the existence of a spiritual dimension to human life for the simple reason that I have spiritual experiences myself quite regularly. Where, I suppose, we see things from a different angle is that I think that the ultimate foundation for spirituality is material: I don’t see the spiritual and the material domains as somehow mutually exclusive, but that they exist together, one emerging from the other. I am not an extreme reductionist: I don’t think that we can fully explain our spirituality in terms of physics, any more than we can explain all of chemistry or biology or economics in terms of physics - that’s why we have explore the world via a multiplicity of disciplines because the emergent world is resistant to reduction.

The idea that I do oppose to the natural is not spirituality, but the supernatural; a region of reality which, by definition, lies beyond our senses, beyond testing, that can exist only in our minds, that is unknown and unknowable.

Now there is that pesky ending to your post – “But not everything I can imagine corresponds to reality. So, how do I know what’s really out there? Maybe the believer dudes can show me what is real and what is an illusion.” Well, I am not sure I can meet your requirements for a good answer.

It seems to me that in order to know real from illusion, one has to go beyond awareness and respect for a spiritual being and seek communication with God Himself. I don’t mean to imply that one will get a lightening quick response. I am trying to say that in order to find a real God, one has to put one’s own foot in front of the other and get the old anatomy moving. I wouldn’t go so far as to say get down on your knees, well maybe you could.

Well, this might well be true - that there is one transcendent Being who permeates what we call the material world but also exists in a domain beyond that and not subject to it; and that that Being can be known only by assuming His existence and seeking communication with Him. But this doesn’t, as far as I can see, help with the problem of discerning truth from illusion because ultimately one has to rely on some sort of personal revelation or personal experience. And, moreover, one is hoping that one will receive that personal experience and so is specially open to self-delusion. I think you agree with me judging by the way you approached this in your post. Although crystal healing, astrology, Spiritualism (the brand that claims to have mediums that can contact members of your family who have died) and paranormal belief might lack the serious moral framework of the monotheistic religions and so might seem lightweight in comparison, they are not easily distinguished from it on epistemic grounds - they all share the epistemology of personal ineffable experience and a resistance to evidence and testing.

What I want to say is that in some way we need to prove to ourselves that we are in earnest about finding God, not proving that He exists, but knowing His reality. It is when we actively seek God, that He finds us.

I am sure that is the way that many experience it, and who can argue against convictions grounded in personal experience? All I can say is that I actively sought for 25 years and concluded in the end that I was talking to myself. For me, there was no reply that I didn’t construct in my own mind. I never got as far as the awareness, never mind the respect or the knowing stages.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Hi John, hi Bette, it seems that John has delegated his response so I’m responding to you both in this.

The important point that I think you may have missed in John’s analogy is the fact that if he insists on waiting to get his own sensory evidence, he’s going to miss out. Presumably the bell rings only once; the other kids heard it, but he missed it, so now he’s being pig-headed. Maybe he’ll get lucky and the bell will ring again before the truck leaves, and maybe he’ll be paying attention when it does ring the next time, but maybe not.

If you read my objections to the analogy you will find that I concur with the idea that our Billy was, as far as we can tell, wrong to insist on having direct personal evidence for the truck. As I quite clearly stated, there are circumstances in which it is unwise to reject the testimony of others who do have good reason to accede to the proposition. Billy’s is one of those cases. As far as that goes I agree with you and John and I have said so before, so I don’t think it’s right to say that I missed that point.

This talk of sense-based epistemic warrant seems quite inappropriate here. The analogy seems neutral with respect to the basis for the epistemic warrant for the belief in question. I think John’s point was simply about the reasonableness of this guy (let’s call him Billy) choosing to risk missing out on a good thing, just because Billy didn’t hear the bell (in this case) for himself - even though all the other kids evidently seem to have heard it. It seems that Billy may be unreasonably arrogant in dismissing the relevance of the behavior of the majority of the kids, and so if he misses out on a good thing it will be deservedly so.

But this is the crux of the matter. Rather than discussion of the epistemic warrant being inappropriate as you suggest, it is, on the contrary, absolutely critical to the case. We can see that Billy is wrong to miss out by insisting on personal sensory evidence himself, but our judgement of his behaviour depends entirely on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the other kids have for their belief - in this case the epistemic warrant is strongly based in the sensory experience that the other kids share. The appropriateness of the analogy depends entirely on the epistemic warrant of the “other kids”.

If we were to use this analogy as a basis to judge my behaviour in declining the blandishments of a certain West African gentleman that he is holding a million bucks for me that he is desperate to give me, then we’d be wrong. His epistemic warrant for his proposition is non-existent - he does not, in fact, have a million bucks for me or anyone else - this seems like a trivial case, but it establishes the fact that the analogy depends on the strength of the epistemic warrant of the persuaders.

This then is the basis on which I reject the analogy as being apposite to the case of belief in God. In that case, the epistemic warrant is just what is in question - the very basis of the OP is that you don’t need evidence yourself - you can rely on others’ testimony, but the second part of that is valid only if the others themselves have good evidence (at least they do in the analogy, which is why the analogy seems so obviously right to us).

So I think I can paraphrase your point here as follows (tell me if I’m wrong - I’m not trying to set up a straw man or anything - I’m putting the argument in my own words to make sure I understand it): ‘Loads of cool dudes have believed. They didn’t need evidence. Maybe they were right. By demanding evidence you are (unreasonably?) restricting reality to what you can sense.’

And hopefully you can see why I would think that indeed is a straw man. There’s no question of not needing evidence. It’s about being reasonable when it comes to recognizing the evidence which is constituted by the behavior of the other kids. Ceteris paribus, their behavior seems to constitute a prima facie theoretical warrant, and certainly a pragmatic warrant, justifying further investigation. I think that was John’s point. He can correct me too if I have that wrong.

Two points here.

First my paraphrase was in response not to John’s OP or his general point but to this statement that you appear not to have read:

LongJohnSilver:

But I am trying to show that you might want to reconsider the demand for evidence of the existence of God itself. It’s not a unreasonable demand, but considering the billions of believers who have believed without evidence, many of whom very rational, intelligent people, is it not possible that this demand is an obstacle in experiencing full reality rather than a criterion for reality?

My emphasis.

Second, I don’t accept that the behaviour of the others is, de facto, evidence for the proposition. It is only compelling as a case for action *provided *the behaviour of the others is it itself based on sound evidence. In other words, sound evidence enters the analogy via the fact that the other kids have sound sensory evidence that the truck is there and that is what compels one to conclude that Billy is being a bit of a klutz. In order to conclude, based on the analogy, that those who do not accept the God proposition are unwise, one would have to show that the believers themselves have good evidence for the proposition. However, John himself admits that billions of believers believe without evidence.

To summarise: to establish that the analogy is apposite to any case of persuasion by a group who accept a proposition, one would have to show that the acceptance of the proposition by the group is soundly based. But John’s starting position is that such evidence is not available.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

But this is the crux of the matter. Rather than discussion of the epistemic warrant being inappropriate as you suggest, it is, on the contrary, absolutely critical to the case. We can see that Billy is wrong to miss out by insisting on personal sensory evidence himself, but our judgement of his behaviour depends entirely on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the other kids have for their belief - in this case the epistemic warrant is strongly based in the sensory experience that the other kids share. The appropriateness of the analogy depends entirely on the epistemic warrant of the “other kids”.

I agree with you about the crux of the matter because I am using the same approach in evaluating certain scientific research. I would continue by asking how do you know that “in this case the epistemic warrant is strongly based in the sensory experience that the other kids share.”? Going back to the OP, the kids say that the ice cream van is around the corner but they don’t describe their sensory experience. Thus, there is an assumption that there was a sensory experience. This assumption is certainly reasonable. But, there are other assumptions as to how the kids knew that the ice cream van was around the corner.

Now, I don’t want to debate which assumption is the correct one. Rather, I would like to consider other possible assumptions. For example, some ice cream vans have a specific route so that they would show up near the school yard at about the same time each day. One of the kids could have looked at his watch and figured that the van was due. By using his reasoning power, he would know when the van would be coming even when the bell was kaput.

Going back to post 256, the point was made that there was no problem with the existence of a spiritual dimension to human life. Setting aside our different views regarding the source of the spiritual, when one looks at spirituality in general, there can be all kinds of assumptions regarding the kids’ knowledge of the van. For example, there could be a free, yet deliberate, choice as to who would serve as a lookout.

Before I get carried away by my love for ice cream, there is another interesting angle in the analogy. There is a relationship between Billy and the other kids. Maybe these kids have fooled Billy before. What has been Billy’s personal experience? Maybe a new kid has joined the group and Billy is wondering if this kid can be trusted.

The analogy doesn’t say if Billy eventually sought out the ice cream van. It does refer to him as stubbornly. Is that adjective enough to warrant a conclusion that Billy stayed in the school yard? Could Billy override his demand for evidence?

Blessings,
granny

“The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?”
from the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[atheistgirl]

Could Billy override his demand for evidence?

Im sure he could if he chose to. I can be the most stuborn person on the planet. Mention the silent treatment to my husband and watch his face. But even I know when the man has suffered enough Billy could just run with the crowd with a Pascal gait.
I dont know if itñs been mentioned yet, but maybe Billy just doesnt like or want icecream

Sarah x

 

[The_Exodus]

To summarise: to establish that the analogy is apposite to any case of persuasion by a group who accept a proposition, one would have to show that the acceptance of the proposition by the group is soundly based. But John’s starting position is that such evidence is not available.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Hey bud. Good points, all. Here’s my two cents.

How do you formulate a “reasonable” criteria of evidence without smuggling in your own subjective construct? Say I think the existence of a cell is “good” evidence to believe in an intelligent designer. Say you disagree. We can argue about this all we want, but if our ideas of “good evidence” clash, we’ll have to go about arguing what makes “good evidence” good in the first place. But how would we ever arrive at an infallible conclusion in this matter, totally separated from the practical sphere?

What we grant as “good evidence” seems to me just as much a practical as a speculative conclusion. Consider: say I had a vision of an angel telling me I ought to do such and such. Now, even if this really happened, and an angel truly appeared to me, would I not still have to make a conscious decision to take this vision as “real”? Must I not still pass judgment on my experience and authenticate it – not in itself – but insofar as I’m concerned? I will still have to believe, one way or the other. Do I think I’m having an illusion or do I think an angel has really appeared?

So, in a sense, there is no such thing as “infallible proof.” Or at least, there is no such thing as “subjectively compelling proof” of God’s existence (or, for that matter, many other things) which is separated from the practical sphere of the mind. We must still, at some point, self-authenticate our own presuppositions and realize that a good deal of what we consider “good” evidence actually springs from our wills passing judgment on such evidence. No one can do this for us, though we may do it without realizing we are doing it (by appealing to authority, for instance.) In the case of God’s existence, it doesn’t seem to me that evidence is compelling in and of itself in either direction, detached from our perception and will.

 

[grannymh]

Hey bud. Good points, all. Here’s my two cents.

How do you formulate a “reasonable” criteria of evidence without smuggling in your own subjective construct? Say I think the existence of a cell is “good” evidence to believe in an intelligent designer. Say you disagree. We can argue about this all we want, but if our ideas of “good evidence” clash, we’ll have to go about arguing what makes “good evidence” good in the first place. But how would we ever arrive at an infallible conclusion in this matter, totally separated from the practical sphere?

What we grant as “good evidence” seems to me just as much a practical as a speculative conclusion. Consider: say I had a vision of an angel telling me I ought to do such and such. Now, even if this really happened, and an angel truly appeared to me, would I not still have to make a conscious decision to take this vision as “real”? Must I not still pass judgment on my experience and authenticate it – not in itself – but insofar as I’m concerned? I will still have to believe, one way or the other. Do I think I’m having an illusion or do I think an angel has really appeared?

So, in a sense, there is no such thing as “infallible proof.” Or at least, there is no such thing as “subjectively compelling proof” of God’s existence (or, for that matter, many other things) which is separated from the practical sphere of the mind. We must still, at some point, self-authenticate our own presuppositions and realize that a good deal of what we consider “good” evidence actually springs from our wills passing judgment on such evidence. No one can do this for us, though we may do it without realizing we are doing it (by appealing to authority, for instance.) In the case of God’s existence, it doesn’t seem to me that evidence is compelling in and of itself in either direction, detached from our perception and will.

In my humble opinion, what you are referring to is what I would consider the difference between objective reasoning and subjective reasoning when the two are used in tandem which shifts from back to front to back.

Blessings for the week
granny

:twocents:

 

[grannymh]

Im sure he could if he chose to. I can be the most stuborn person on the planet. Mention the silent treatment to my husband and watch his face. But even I know when the man has suffered enough Billy could just run with the crowd with a Pascal gait.
I dont know if itñs been mentioned yet, but maybe Billy just doesnt like or want icecream

Sarah x

Not like ice cream.

Doesn’t Billy want eternal happiness? As mentioned in the OP. Wouldn’t curiosity get Billy running with a Pascal gait?

Blessings,
granny

Ice cream and dark chocolate are two blessings of life.

 

[hecd2]

I agree with you about the crux of the matter because I am using the same approach in evaluating certain scientific research. I would continue by asking how do you know that “in this case the epistemic warrant is strongly based in the sensory experience that the other kids share.”? Going back to the OP, the kids say that the ice cream van is around the corner but they don’t describe their sensory experience. Thus, there is an assumption that there was a sensory experience. This assumption is certainly reasonable. But, there are other assumptions as to how the kids knew that the ice cream van was around the corner.

Good question, but you’ll see if you look back that I dealt with this question in the second of my posts in this thread (the one after my initial two line response). The fact is that the kids could not know, or even predict with confidence that the truck was there, unless they had direct sensory evidence of its presence or they had registered the fact from previous sensory experience that, say, 11 o’clock is the time when the truck turns up on its schedule. There is no question of any sort of supernatural revelation or paranormal phenomenon: the kids could only determine that the truck was there based on either direct or prior external sensory experience. And it is sensory experience, either direct or extrapolated, that gives a warrant to their belief; I don’t see what other assumption there can be.

Now, I don’t want to debate which assumption is the correct one. Rather, I would like to consider other possible assumptions. For example, some ice cream vans have a specific route so that they would show up near the school yard at about the same time each day. One of the kids could have looked at his watch and figured that the van was due. By using his reasoning power, he would know when the van would be coming even when the bell was kaput.

Sure, and I acknowledged that in the post I refer to above. Then you have to ask how did the kids know what the route of the truck is and when it was due at their school, as well as asking how they knew what the time was? None of that knowledge can be acquired without external sensory evidence.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Hey bud. Good points, all. Here’s my two cents.

Hi there buddy.

How do you formulate a “reasonable” criteria of evidence without smuggling in your own subjective construct? Say I think the existence of a cell is “good” evidence to believe in an intelligent designer. Say you disagree. We can argue about this all we want, but if our ideas of “good evidence” clash, we’ll have to go about arguing what makes “good evidence” good in the first place. But how would we ever arrive at an infallible conclusion in this matter, totally separated from the practical sphere?

Well, that’s a good question and one that is certainly worth thinking about - but I think that it isn’t relevant to my take on the alignment between the two propositional processes being compared by analogy. Whatever we think about what constitutes good evidence, my point is that the epistemic warrant in the one case is fundamentally different from the epistemic warrant in the other, and it is this that undermines the value of the analogy (I also note as an aside that we concur with the proposition that Billy is missing out because we all agree that the other kids have a really good reason to believe that there *is *ice cream on offer. John’s point is that we should extend that to the theistic proposition: “If you can see it in Billy’s case, why can’t you see that atheists are missing out.” And my point is that it’s clear in Billy’s case because we all agree that the warrant is there, but the same argument applied to atheists is not cogent because a similarly clear and agreed warrant is lacking.)

What we grant as “good evidence” seems to me just as much a practical as a speculative conclusion. Consider: say I had a vision of an angel telling me I ought to do such and such. Now, even if this really happened, and an angel truly appeared to me, would I not still have to make a conscious decision to take this vision as “real”? Must I not still pass judgment on my experience and authenticate it – not in itself – but insofar as I’m concerned? I will still have to believe, one way or the other. Do I think I’m having an illusion or do I think an angel has really appeared?

Of course, everyone has to make decisions as to whether what they think they sense is a reflection of reality or some sort of illusion - it doesn’t just apply to grand and terrifying visions such as the appearance of angels. You and I and everyone has to discern between experiences that reflect reality and those that are illusion, and doing so is often tricky and difficult.

So, in a sense, there is no such thing as “infallible proof.” Or at least, there is no such thing as “subjectively compelling proof” of God’s existence (or, for that matter, many other things) which is separated from the practical sphere of the mind. We must still, at some point, self-authenticate our own presuppositions and realize that a good deal of what we consider “good” evidence actually springs from our wills passing judgment on such evidence. No one can do this for us, though we may do it without realizing we are doing it (by appealing to authority, for instance.) In the case of God’s existence, it doesn’t seem to me that evidence is compelling in and of itself in either direction, detached from our perception and will.

I agree with all that you have written in this paragraph and would add that the scientific method is a way to validate our beliefs about external reality via a socialised and group-based process. Even that is notoriously fallible, but, as far as I can see, it’s less fallible than all the other fallible methods. A huge number of people still reject the conclusions of that process in preference for their own wills passing judgement positively on some other revelation that they have, but in my view, that represents no cause to descend into epistemic nihilism. We can, together, discern what is likely to be true and what is not, even if we can never be 100% certain. We can, as in my description of my take on the External Wager discussion that I was having with In Spiration, broadly assume alignment between our interpretation of our sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and reality and, indeed, we have to in order to survive. If we hear the ice cream truck bell, well, that’s most likely because the truck is there.

But if someone goes through the self-authentication process and concludes that they can fly, no argument will stop them jumping off a cliff - all that you can do in that case is to lock them up.

By the way, I replied to your last post on the PW thread - you might want to have a look. If you’re not interested in reading it or replying that’s cool.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

Good question, but you’ll see if you look back that I dealt with this question in the second of my posts in this thread (the one after my initial two line response). The fact is that the kids could not know, or even predict with confidence that the truck was there, unless they had direct sensory evidence of its presence or they had registered the fact from previous sensory experience that, say, 11 o’clock is the time when the truck turns up on its schedule. There is no question of any sort of supernatural revelation or paranormal phenomenon: the kids could only determine that the truck was there based on either direct or prior external sensory experience. And it is sensory experience, either direct or extrapolated, that gives a warrant to their belief; I don’t see what other assumption there can be.

Please excuse my briefness. I’m getting ready to leave town for a week. I may find a granny-friendly computer, maybe not.

Non-sensory external experiences are not limited to supernatural revelation or paranormal phenomenon. Nor can sensory experience be extrapolated without limits. Previous sensory experience of a 11 o’clock arrival of an ice-cream truck is not as simple as it sounds especially when it comes to humans.

In my view, assumptions can be based on different ways of learning or different perspectives of the same evidence. Assumptions are not bad. But they can involve a choice which could be wise or not wise.

Sure, and I acknowledged that in the post I refer to above. Then you have to ask how did the kids know what the route of the truck is and when it was due at their school, as well as asking how they knew what the time was? None of that knowledge can be acquired without external sensory evidence.

In a way, I assumed your acknowledgment; but I do need to go back and view how you acknowledged. Thank you for reminding me. Your post 2 is the key to our rational/corporeal nature…

The questions you posed above are part of an old journalism mantra which was drummed into my head when I was working. Who, how, what, when, where, why.
I still use that mantra when reading about simulated populations and data going millions of years backwards.

In order to make use of the knowledge gained by asking those questions, analytical skills have to be applied. This requires the tools of reasoning. This brings up the question-- In a world considered to be only material/physical, what is the external sensory evidence that I see when I am looking at a person who is using reason, logic, subjective experiences, extrapolations. objectivism, and so on?

Blessings,
granny

The quest for truth is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[Betterave]

Another very good post.

If you read my objections to the analogy you will find that I concur with the idea that our Billy was, as far as we can tell, wrong to insist on having direct personal evidence for the truck. As I quite clearly stated, there are circumstances in which it is unwise to reject the testimony of others who do have good reason to accede to the proposition. Billy’s is one of those cases. As far as that goes I agree with you and John and I have said so before, so I don’t think it’s right to say that I missed that point.

Okay…

But this is the crux of the matter. Rather than discussion of the epistemic warrant being inappropriate as you suggest, it is, on the contrary, absolutely critical to the case. We can see that Billy is wrong to miss out by insisting on personal sensory evidence himself, but our judgement of his behaviour depends entirely on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the other kids have for their belief - in this case the epistemic warrant is strongly based in the sensory experience that the other kids share. The appropriateness of the analogy depends entirely on the epistemic warrant of the “other kids”.

So yes, “our judgement of his behaviour depends entirely on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the other kids have for their belief”…

If we were to use this analogy as a basis to judge my behaviour in declining the blandishments of a certain West African gentleman that he is holding a million bucks for me that he is desperate to give me, then we’d be wrong. His epistemic warrant for his proposition is non-existent - he does not, in fact, have a million bucks for me or anyone else - this seems like a trivial case, but it establishes the fact that the analogy depends on the strength of the epistemic warrant of the persuaders.

But that you would be wrong in using this analogy in that case is not a function of the non-sensory nature of the evidence grounding your belief (that this WAG is or is not a crook). So I think my point stands: you *did *miss that point (and still are).

This then is the basis on which I reject the analogy as being apposite to the case of belief in God. In that case, the epistemic warrant is just what is in question - the very basis of the OP is that you don’t need evidence yourself - you can rely on others’ testimony, but the second part of that is valid only if the others themselves have good evidence (at least they do in the analogy, which is why the analogy seems so obviously right to us).

Correct.

Two points here.

First my paraphrase was in response not to John’s OP or his general point but to this statement that you appear not to have read:
My emphasis.

Second, I don’t accept that the behaviour of the others is, de facto, evidence for the proposition. It is only compelling as a case for action *provided *the behaviour of the others is it itself based on sound evidence. In other words, sound evidence enters the analogy via the fact that the other kids have sound sensory evidence that the truck is there and that is what compels one to conclude that Billy is being a bit of a klutz. In order to conclude, based on the analogy, that those who do not accept the God proposition are unwise, one would have to show that the believers themselves have good evidence for the proposition. However, John himself admits that billions of believers believe without evidence.

No, I actually did read that and I don’t think it makes sense: your adherence to the testimony of the others cannot be based on your knowing that “their behaviour is itself based on sound evidence.” It seems that it could only be based on that if you were already privy to the evidence yourself, such that *you yourself *could make an assessment of its soundness - in which case there would be no question of relying on the testimony of others. Thus John contends - and I agree - that a default stance of scepticism towards the testimony of others is unjustified here.

To summarise: to establish that the analogy is apposite to any case of persuasion by a group who accept a proposition, one would have to show that the acceptance of the proposition by the group is soundly based. But John’s starting position is that such evidence is not available.

And to counter-summarize: this demand is analogous to Billy’s: it appears to be inherently unreasonable given the circumstances.

 

[The_Exodus]

I agree with all that you have written in this paragraph and would add that the scientific method is a way to validate our beliefs about external reality via a socialised and group-based process. Even that is notoriously fallible, but, as far as I can see, it’s less fallible than all the other fallible methods. A huge number of people still reject the conclusions of that process in preference for their own wills passing judgement positively on some other revelation that they have, but in my view, that represents no cause to descend into epistemic nihilism. We can, together, discern what is likely to be true and what is not, even if we can never be 100% certain. We can, as in **my description of my take **on the External Wager discussion that I was having with In Spiration, broadly assume alignment between our interpretation of our sensory (name removed by moderator)ut and reality and, indeed, we have to in order to survive. If we hear the ice cream truck bell, well, that’s most likely because the truck is there.

I’ve bolded the above to bring out my point. What you consider “good epistemic warrant” is only good – indeed can only be good – to you and you alone. Your criteria can never be validated in the mind of another individual without that individual making his or her own decision and judgment. Evaluating the evidence is a necessarily personal affair, because it is always up to your mind, whenever the evidence comes in, to decide. Now, sometimes the evidence may be compelling, other times not so much. We seem to have less say so in the former case than in the latter.

Your stance on the ability of science to answer certain questions correctly is really a reflection of what your will has given authority to as “good epistemic warrant” in your mind. Many people, as you note, do not share the same conviction because they have interpreted various evidences differently (perhaps they’ve had – or thought they had – revelations.) To a large extent we authenticate the evidence, particularly in “Big Questions.”

I’ll check out your wager post.

 

[hecd2]

Non-sensory external experiences are not limited to supernatural revelation or paranormal phenomenon.

Well, perhaps. So could you give me an example of a non-supernatural revelatory, non-paranormal non-sensory external experience?
Nor can sensory experience be extrapolated without limits. Previous sensory experience of a 11 o’clock arrival of an ice-cream truck is not as simple as it sounds especially when it comes to humans.
I’m not sure what you mean here. I don’t see how taking what is already a strained analogy, even in its simple straightforward version where there really is a truck and the majority of the kids really know it’s there, and complicating it by various speculations about deceit and so forth, helps to rescue it. Let me turn this on its head - can you suggest a way that the kids could know that the truck was there without the (name removed by moderator)ut of some direct or prior external sensory evidence?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Thanks for this. This is interesting because there are some subtle points here and because behind the analogy there is a very important question - are atheists unwise to refuse to act on the testimony of the very many believers?

hecd2:

If we were to use this analogy as a basis to judge my behaviour in declining the blandishments of a certain West African gentleman that he is holding a million bucks for me that he is desperate to give me, then we’d be wrong. His epistemic warrant for his proposition is non-existent - he does not, in fact, have a million bucks for me or anyone else - this seems like a trivial case, but it establishes the fact that the analogy depends on the strength of the epistemic warrant of the persuaders.

But that you would be wrong in using this analogy in that case is not a function of the non-sensory nature of the evidence grounding your belief (that this WAG is or is not a crook). So I think my point stands: you *did *miss that point (and still are).

My position in all cases, ice cream, million bucks and theistic belief are, within the terms of the analogies, grounded in the testimony of others and not in any evidence that I have myself. When it comes to the warrants that the others have for their propositions the case is not so uniform.

I was using the example to establish the fact, which I now believe you accept, that the reasonableness of rejection of such a proposition depends on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the persuaders have for the proposition, regardless of whether the warrant is sensory evidence or not. In the case of the ice cream kids we all agree that their warrant, based on sensory experience, is sound. In the case of Professor Abayomi, we all agree that his warrant for his proposition is, to put it kindly, a tad flaky in that he is deliberately ignoring the external sensory evidence provided by his bank statement which is composed chiefly of red numbers. His warrant is fundamentally opposed to that of the kids in that they are acting on their sense of external reality and he is deliberately distorting and falsifying his. In the case of the theistic proposition, the warrant, such as it is, is also of an entirely different kind from that of the kids (and also from that of the professor’s in that there is no question of deliberate deceit in their case), and it is this fact that renders John’s analogy impertinent, because for it to be valid, we would have to accept that the warrants for belief in the ice cream case and the theistic case are equivalent, but John has already conceded in the OP that they are not. My point is that the reasonableness of the ice cream case (which is based on a prima facie good warrant) does not in itself establish the theistic case absent independent assessment of the evidence for the theistic case and the strength of the warrant there.

No, I actually did read that

I’m sorry - do you mean you read John’s statement and you now accept that my paraphrase of that particular paragraph was fair; and if that’s not what you mean, I’d appreciate knowing just how my paraphrase and John specific statement diverge.

and I don’t think it makes sense: your adherence to the testimony of the others cannot be based on your knowing that “their behaviour is itself based on sound evidence.” It seems that it could only be based on that if you were already privy to the evidence yourself, such that *you yourself *could make an assessment of its soundness - in which case there would be no question of relying on the testimony of others. Thus John contends - and I agree - that a default stance of scepticism towards the testimony of others is unjustified here.

So, if your adherence to the testimony of others is not based on a belief that “their behaviour is itself based on sound evidence” what is it based on? It clearly cannot, as you point out, be based on a knowledge of the evidence itself, because then there would be no need for testimony. But neither is it reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is generally unjustified. If reason compelled one to take every proposition seriously without any consideration of the likely strength of the evidence underlying the proposition, life would be impossible and the Professor would be a rich man. If one is to act on testimony alone, without the evidence oneself, then one needs to understand at least that the warrant for belief for those providing the testimony is likely to be strong - that is the prima facie case for the kids and is not, by the statement of the problem in the first place, the case for theism.

Alec
evolutionpages.com