"The end justifies the means"

[fredystairs]

And I see that you still did not answer my question.

 

[kapp19]

You confuse the God of the Philosophers with the Biblical God of Christianity. They have nothing to do with each other.

Dude. I am sorry. If you think that this claim is at all justified, we are not communicating very well.

From the existence of causal chains (which we observe) it does not follow that there is only one causal chain. . .

Ughhhhh… Yes. It does, in fact. As long as anything is contingent, it is in the same ultimate causal chain with that which is not contingent. There cannot be multiple first causes - or else they would have to be unique. What would specify them other than parts?

And from the existence of causal chains it does not follow that the beginning needs to be created. The view that it simply exists as a brute fact is an equally valid approach.

You are correct. Duh. And that’s my point too. But you miss it. Think harder.

You cannot substantiate the existence of brute fact “first cause”

The “brute fact” is indeed a “first cause.”

Also from the hypothetical “first cause” it does not follow that it needs to have consciousness and volition, it could be just a deistic force of nature.

On a certain understanding, yes, of course. But you already assumed that I have not bothered to distinguish between Athens and Jerusalem. So. I am stoopid. Got it.

Aquinas simply concludes: “And that is what we call God”. I have never seen a less convincing conclusion.

Your “brute fact” is the thing which we give the name “God” to. For the record, after Question 2, it is still “up in the air” if God is a body, contains parts, is good, etc… Have you even read these things that you are critiquing?

And you still have not responded to Quine. What counts as “evidence” and why?

-K

 

[Gorgias]

Although the object, torture itself is morally wrong, the intent and circumstances can make the whole act to be moral.

No, that’s not true.

One cannot do a bad thing for a good reason, not even in a trying circumstance.

Again, your argument would need to be one of ‘culpability’. Are the actors in the Inquisition culpable, based on their knowledge and the culture of the times?

Abrosz:

You confuse the God of the Philosophers with the Biblical God of Christianity. They have nothing to do with each other.

Dude. I am sorry. If you think that this claim is at all justified, we are not communicating very well.

Yeah… “God of the Philosophers” is a catch-phrase poorly understood by those who attempt to use it as a bludgeon!

 

[Rau]

it’s not going to convince you of anything without accepting that there is indeed a rational first cause of all other things.

If a person is committed to an atheistic position, then I don’t foresee he can be persuaded to accept catholic moral principles.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

It obviously can. Would it make you happy that the family in the basement survives? Naturally. So you lie to save them.

I see no problem there.

It would not really be a lie if you used mental reservation.

Back to the most asked question on lying. Its WWII and you have Jews hiding in your house. Would it be a lie and immoral if a nazi comes to your door and asks if there are any Jews in your house. If you answer out loud “there are no Jews here” and then finish the sentence silently in your head “that you should know about”.
I would contend that it is not a lie.

A lie is a statement that is meant to deceive. If I tell my wife: ‘I have never slept with our neighbour (sotto vocce…) fully clothed’, then I am lying. I am intentionally deceiving her.

 

[Freddy]

I do not think so either. Again, I understand your position just fine. I think the burden is on you to get a grasp on what sense virtue ethics and natural law make. I offered the order of inquiry. Thomas follows that order for a reason (and Aristotle presumes it in the Ethics).

I fully grasp the problem. I understand completely the order of inquiry. I’m simply saying that it doesn’t apply in all cases. I know this is horrifying to some but it depends on tbe circumstances. And who makes the call? Again, horrifying to some but we do as individuals.

I’m not prepared to absolve myself from the responsibility of acting correctly by claiming that there are black and white rules which I am obliged to obey. Shrugging one’s shoulders as the Jewish family is marched out of your house is not an option.

 

[Rau]

You confuse the God of the Philosophers with the Biblical God of Christianity. They have nothing to do with each other.

Is it possible, or likely, that the God of the philosophers is in fact the God of one of the great religions?

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

So the good Samaritan can be used as an example.

Well, yes… and no.

And if ‘our understanding of what’s going on must be in the context of the time and place, and not merely from our 21st-century western perspective’ then that is exactly a definition of relative thinking.

Not what I’m trying to get at. We could debate what actually happened – whether God commanded it in a literal way, or whether it was merely their understanding that this was the will of God…

You skipped answering the question about the Samaritan. Could he be described as acting correctly if he didn’t help the traveller for some greater good?

And as for the question as to whether God commanded the killing or not, we are judging the matter on the basis that He did: ‘how in the Bible God commands the killing of innocent people’.

And now you say the acts are objectively wrong. Period. So whatever ends they achieved, the means did not justify them.

 

[Montrose]

A lie is a statement that is meant to deceive. If I tell my wife: ‘I have never slept with our neighbour (sotto vocce…) fully clothed’, then I am lying. I am intentionally deceiving her.

Read up on mental reservation!

 

[Montrose]

So whatever ends they achieved, the means did not justify them.

An evil means never justifies the end even if the end achieved is good.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

So whatever ends they achieved, the means did not justify them.

An evil means never justifies the end even if the end achieved is good.

So slaughtering women and children are presumably out. Whatever the end result. We’ll let Gorgias comment on that.

And mental reservation is an attempt to deceive. I’ve given an example already - is the husband being honest to his wife? Obviously not.

 

[Montrose]

And mental reservation is an attempt to deceive. I’ve given an example already - is the husband being honest to his wife? Obviously not.

I told you to read up on mental reservation.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

And mental reservation is an attempt to deceive. I’ve given an example already - is the husband being honest to his wife? Obviously not.

I told you to read up on mental reservation.

Hey, lighten up on the commands if you could. I am fully aware of what constitutes mental reservation and I reject it for the reasons I gave.

 

[Abrosz]

An evil means never justifies the end even if the end achieved is good.

And this flatly contradicts one of the defenses in the problem of evil, namely that God permits evil so he can bring forth something good from it!

 

[Abrosz]

Is it possible, or likely, that the God of the philosophers is in fact the God of one of the great religions?

Since the God of the philosophers “suffers” from internal contradictions and loosely defined attributes, this is a problem.

 

[Montrose]

Hey, lighten up on the commands if you could. I am fully aware of what constitutes mental reservation and I reject it for the reasons I gave.

Just because you reject it does not make it wrong. Same applies to your rejection of God.

 

[Rau]

Since the God of the philosophers “suffers” from internal contradictions

Perhaps that is a problem of the philosophers?

 

[Rau]

And this flatly contradicts one of the defenses in the problem of evil, namely that God permits evil so he can bring forth something good from it!

A world in which Gob intervened to prevent bad things happening strikes me as an absurd kind of world. It might however provide the scientific kind of proof of God that you have called for. But it would be a world we would struggle to make sense of.

 

[Abrosz]

Perhaps that is a problem of the philosophers?

And everyone else who takes religion seriously.

A world in which Gob intervened to prevent bad things happening strikes me as an absurd kind of world.

A really well designed world would not need any intervention, because it would work exactly as intended. Of course it might have some freedom of action, but only curtailed one, so the action could never “threaten” the intended work of the creator.

 

[Rau]

Of course it might have some freedom of action,

Not much I suspect!