The Essence-Energies Distinction

[Ghosty]

I finished the Triads. A few initial reactions:

1. There is a discrepancy between the Triads and the statements in my original post from the 14th century Councils of Constantinople. The main discrepancy is that Palamas posits the existence of multiple energies, whereas the councils spoke of only a single energy. I am guessing the councils read in Saint John of Damascus that there is “one simple energy”, so they departed from the Triads. newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm
2. Palamas spends most of his time arguing against what appear to be straw-men that he attributes to Barlaam, mainly that every grace, power and energy of God is something created. Palamas does not, as far as I can tell, more than fleetingly acknowledge the argument that the grace, power and energy of God are the divine essence itself.
3. Palamas relies overwhelmingly on Pseudo-Dionysius. But the influence of Neoplatonism on Pseudo-Dionysius is beyond dispute:

“Finally, in 1895 there appeared almost simultaneously two independent researches, by Hugo Koch and by Joseph Stiglmayr, both of whom started from the same point and arrived at the same goal. The conclusion reached was that extracts from the treatise of the neo-Platonist Proclus, “De malorum subsistentia” (handed down in the Latin translation of Morbeka, Cousin ed., Paris, 1864), had been used by Dionysius in the treatise “De div. nom.” (c. iv, sections 19-35) A careful analysis brought to light an astonishing agreement of both works in arrangement, sequence of thought, examples, figures, and expressions. It is easy to point out many parallelisms from other and later writings of Proclus, e.g. from his “Institutio theologica”, “theologia Platonica”, and his commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides”, “Alcibiades I”, and “Timaeus” (these five having been written after 462).” newadvent.org/cathen/05013a.htm

1. The only real patristic support that Palamas gives (other than Pseudo-Dionysius) is Saint Maximus the Confessor, who at one point expresses what appears to be a belief in the reality of Platonic forms. But Maximus never refers to these forms as “energies” of God. In fact, he even says they have their own essence. And Maximus multiple times expresses what can only be described as a belief in the Beatific Vision:

“He who has made his heart pure will not only know the inner essences of what is sequent to God and dependent on Him but, after passing through all of them, he will in some measure see God Himself, which is the supreme consummation of all blessings.”

Maximus, Saint. The Writings of Maximus the Confessor (Kindle Locations 2126-2128). Lulu.com. Kindle Edition. amazon.com/gp/product/B0124VDHD4/ref=oh_aui_d_detailpage_o00_?ie=UTF8&psc=1

It appears Saint Gregory Nazianzen also believed in the Beatific Vision:

“What God is in nature and essence, no man ever yet has discovered or can discover. Whether it will ever be discovered is a question which he who will may examine and decide. In my opinion it will be discovered when that within us which is godlike and divine, I mean our mind and reason, shall have mingled with its Like, and the image shall have ascended to the Archetype, of which it has now the desire. And this I think is the solution of that vexed problem as to “We shall know even as we are known”. But in our present life all that comes to us is but a little effluence, and as it were a small effulgence from a great Light.” newadvent.org/fathers/310228.htm

Palamas certainly has his limitations, which you point out. As you can see it was much more like a discussion forum debate than an academic or spiritual treatise. I hope you find that he isn’t heretical, however, and have a better sense of what the argument was about and what the Council was attempting to address.

As for not acknowledging that grace and such is the Divine Essence, remember that it is impossible for Essence to be communicated in this system, so grace can not be the Divine Essence.

Unfortunately I have never found any of Barlaam’s writings to compare, so I don’t know if PLamas accurately portrayed his position.

 

[Ghosty]

You’re welcome. But I didn’t say it was more clear or correct, I believe it provides context.

That it does. Thanks again for the link!

 

[PluniaZ]

Palamas certainly has his limitations, which you point out. As you can see it was much more like a discussion forum debate than an academic or spiritual treatise. I hope you find that he isn’t heretical, however, and have a better sense of what the argument was about and what the Council was attempting to address.

As for not acknowledging that grace and such is the Divine Essence, remember that it is impossible for Essence to be communicated in this system, so grace can not be the Divine Essence.

Unfortunately I have never found any of Barlaam’s writings to compare, so I don’t know if PLamas accurately portrayed his position.

Well, systems aren’t God. God is God. Men don’t have the right to invent “systems” that make up whatever they want about God.

But that the righteous will see the Divine Essence was established by Saint Gregory of Nazianzus a thousand years before Gregory Palamas:

“What God is in nature and essence, no man ever yet has discovered or can discover. Whether it will ever be discovered is a question which he who will may examine and decide. In my opinion it will be discovered when that within us which is godlike and divine, I mean our mind and reason, shall have mingled with its Like, and the image shall have ascended to the Archetype, of which it has now the desire. And this I think is the solution of that vexed problem as to “We shall know even as we are known”. But in our present life all that comes to us is but a little effluence, and as it were a small effulgence from a great Light.” newadvent.org/fathers/310228.htm

 

[Expatreprocedit]

But that the righteous will see the Divine Essence was established by Saint Gregory of Nazianzus a thousand years before Gregory Palamas:

“What God is in nature and essence, no man ever yet has discovered or can discover. Whether it will ever be discovered is a question which he who will may examine and decide. In my opinion it will be discovered when that within us which is godlike and divine, I mean our mind and reason, shall have mingled with its Like, and the image shall have ascended to the Archetype, of which it has now the desire. And this I think is the solution of that vexed problem as to “We shall know even as we are known”. But in our present life all that comes to us is but a little effluence, and as it were a small effulgence from a great Light.” newadvent.org/fathers/310228.htm

How do you get from “whether it will ever be discovered is a question which he who will may examine and decide. In my opinion…” to “was established”?

 

[Ghosty]

Well, systems aren’t God. God is God. Men don’t have the right to invent “systems” that make up whatever they want about God.

But that the righteous will see the Divine Essence was established by Saint Gregory of Nazianzus a thousand years before Gregory Palamas:

“What God is in nature and essence, no man ever yet has discovered or can discover. Whether it will ever be discovered is a question which he who will may examine and decide. In my opinion it will be discovered when that within us which is godlike and divine, I mean our mind and reason, shall have mingled with its Like, and the image shall have ascended to the Archetype, of which it has now the desire. And this I think is the solution of that vexed problem as to “We shall know even as we are known”. But in our present life all that comes to us is but a little effluence, and as it were a small effulgence from a great Light.” newadvent.org/fathers/310228.htm

Ok, but be careful because you are continuing to apply your own definitions and systems to the topic rather than understanding what is actually being said and engaging Palamism as Palamism.

Forget about “seeing the Divine Essence” as terms for a moment and think about what you are trying to convey with such an expression. Understand that St. Gregory is conveying the exact same thing with a different linguistic and theological approach. When he says “we will not see the Divine Essence” he is expressing precisely the same thing as Aquinas when he says “we can see but not comprehend the Divine Essence”, because they are using “Divine Essence” equivocally (albeit with some overlap). When you say in your language “we will see the Divine Essence”, you are really saying “we will see the Divine Energy”, because the Divine Energy is the Divine Nature that is participated in and seen with the Divine Light of Grace. You are not contradicting Palamas at all, you are agreeing with him, you are just defining your terms differently.

 

[PluniaZ]

Ok, but be careful because you are continuing to apply your own definitions and systems to the topic rather than understanding what is actually being said and engaging Palamism as Palamism.

Forget about “seeing the Divine Essence” as terms for a moment and think about what you are trying to convey with such an expression. Understand that St. Gregory is conveying the exact same thing with a different linguistic and theological approach. When he says “we will not see the Divine Essence” he is expressing precisely the same thing as Aquinas when he says “we can see but not comprehend the Divine Essence”, because they are using “Divine Essence” equivocally (albeit with some overlap). When you say in your language “we will see the Divine Essence”, you are really saying “we will see the Divine Energy”, because the Divine Energy is the Divine Nature that is participated in and seen with the Divine Light of Grace. You are not contradicting Palamas at all, you are agreeing with him, you are just defining your terms differently.

No. This is not an issue of semantics. There is a real difference between Palamas and everyone else in the church before him.

Palamas explicitly says there are multiple energies that are “all around God” and that these will “enhypostasize” in the righteous. Palamas believes that God in His entirety will indwell the believer through these energies. This is where that crucial word inseparable keeps coming up. Palamites play a game where a human only participates in an energy, but this counts as the indwelling of God in His entirety because the essence is not separable from the energy. But Palamas still believes the human will never see the divine essence.

It’s like if I touch you with the tip of my finger. A Palamite would say that all of me is touching you because all of me is inseparable from my finger. The rest of the Church never drew such crude analogies between the absolutely simple God and the composite nature of created beings.

That is not the teaching of Saint Gregory Nazianzus. Nor is it the teaching of Saint Maximus the Confessor. Nor of Saint Cyril of Alexandria. Nor Saint John of Damascus. Maybe it’s inferred from the Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Dionysius. Othwerwise, Palamas simply made it up out of whatever Neoplatonic tradition had infiltrated the church in Constantinople.

 

[Ghosty]

No. This is not an issue of semantics. There is a real difference between Palamas and everyone else in the church before him.

Palamas explicitly says there are multiple energies that are “all around God” and that these will “enhypostasize” in the righteous. Palamas believes that God in His entirety will indwell the believer through these energies. This is where that crucial word inseparable keeps coming up. Palamites play a game where a human only participates in an energy, but this counts as the indwelling of God in His entirety because the essence is not separable from the energy. But Palamas still believes the human will never see the divine essence.

It’s like if I touch you with the tip of my finger. A Palamite would say that all of me is touching you because all of me is inseparable from my finger. The rest of the Church never drew such crude analogies between the absolutely simple God and the composite nature of created beings.

That is not the teaching of Saint Gregory Nazianzus. Nor is it the teaching of Saint Maximus the Confessor. Nor of Saint Cyril of Alexandria. Nor Saint John of Damascus. Maybe it’s inferred from the Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Dionysius. Othwerwise, Palamas simply made it up out of whatever Neoplatonic tradition had infiltrated the church in Constantinople.

I’m sorry, but you seem to be passing over everything I just said. Essence means something different in Palamite theology than in your usage. If you are reading it as if he is using the term essence in the same sense that Latin theology uses it, then you are misreading him.

Even if we grant that Palamas’ perspective is overly reliant on Neoplatonism, his conclusions are not. First we must understand terms as he did, then we can judge them. If we insist on saying that when he says Essence he means precisely the same thing that Aquinas does, then we are not reading appropriately.

 

[PluniaZ]

I’m sorry, but you seem to be passing over everything I just said. Essence means something different in Palamite theology than in your usage. If you are reading it as if he is using the term essence in the same sense that Latin theology uses it, then you are misreading him.

Even if we grant that Palamas’ perspective is overly reliant on Neoplatonism, his conclusions are not. First we must understand terms as he did, then we can judge them. If we insist on saying that when he says Essence he means precisely the same thing that Aquinas does, then we are not reading appropriately.

Can you show where he says, “I am defining essence differently than Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, Saint Maximus the Confessor and Saint John of Damascus”?

 

[Phillip_Rolfes]

Can you show where he says, “I am defining essence differently than Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, Saint Maximus the Confessor and Saint John of Damascus”?

Can you show us where Thomas Aquinas says as much? Given that all of the writers you mention each wrote in Greek from a Greek perspective, I think that the burden of proof is on demonstrating that Aquinas and the Latin tradition actually understand “essence” in the same way that the early Greek Fathers did.

So my question becomes (and admittedly I should do more research on this): How did Gregory, Cyril, Maximus, and John of Damascus understand “essence?”

 

[Wesrock]

I’ve been turning these comments over in my head. I am thinking this statement might be the point at which our ways of thinking diverge:

“No compounding occurs in a nature from its natural properties.”

I am used to considering that God IS his attributes. We have divine simplicity because His Intellect is His will is His goodness. They are one. And not in the way the Trinity is said to be one. In God, our words for Intellect, Will, Goodness, Being, are literally analgous terms that all refer to the same exact thing (if you’ll permit me to call it a “thing”). They don’t flow from the essence. They are (or “it is”) Him. So the idea, from this perspective, that you can then speak of essence and energy as being distinct, even if we aren’t using the normal Latin understanding of essence, becomes contradictory.

Whereas, if I’m reading Constantinople correctly, it isn’t acknowledging them (intellect, will, goodness, essence, energies) as the same thing. They are (or could be) truly different attributes, natural properties of the divine nature. The Intellect isn’t his Will and isn’t his goodness, but they are not seen compounding. It can be said that one is in the other, and the other in some way accompanies the energy (if I continue to understand right), in a similar way to how a Latin speaks of the persons of the Trinity or concomitance in the Eucharist, but they aren’t just analogous terms for the same thing.

So I don’t believe it’s only a semantic issue over the word essence.

I might have gotten this wrong in parts, or been sloppy, but perhaps someone understands what I’m saying?

And if I’m correct, then has the Latin Church defined Divine Simplicity in a way that excludes this? Not just used or favored certain definitions, but defined.

 

[Ghosty]

I’ve been turning these comments over in my head. I am thinking this statement might be the point at which our ways of thinking diverge:

“No compounding occurs in a nature from its natural properties.”

I am used to considering that God IS his attributes. We have divine simplicity because His Intellect is His will is His goodness. They are one. And not in the way the Trinity is said to be one. In God, our words for Intellect, Will, Goodness, Being, are literally analgous terms that all refer to the same exact thing (if you’ll permit me to call it a “thing”). They don’t flow from the essence. They are (or “it is”) Him.

Whereas, if I’m reading Constantinople correctly, it isn’t acknowledging them as the same thing. They are (or could be) truly different attributes, natural properties of the divine nature. The Intellect isn’t his Will and isn’t his goodness, but they are not seen compounding.

I might have gotten this wrong in parts, or been sloppy, but perhaps someone understands what I’m saying?

And if I’m correct, then has the Latin Church defined Divine Simplicity in a way that excludes this? Not just used or favored certain definitions, but defined.

Those attributes are still one, they are just one in the Divine Energy. I believe that what the council is saying is akin to saying that a fire isn’t compound just because we distinguish the natural property of heat (Energy) from the essense of fire. Again this is an imperfect analogy as it involves a creature, but I hope it serves to illustrate what is meant.

In God the natural energy isn’t something added on, nor is it something that can be excised from the essence. Since God is simple the Divine Energy is God Himself, albeit God in a communicable, out-going aspect.

 

[PluniaZ]

Can you show us where Thomas Aquinas says as much? Given that all of the writers you mention each wrote in Greek from a Greek perspective, I think that the burden of proof is on demonstrating that Aquinas and the Latin tradition actually understand “essence” in the same way that the early Greek Fathers did.

So my question becomes (and admittedly I should do more research on this): How did Gregory, Cyril, Maximus, and John of Damascus understand “essence?”

I never mentioned Thomas Aquinas. You keep mentioning in him in an attempt to derail the thread. This isn’t an East vs West issue. It’s an Old vs New issue. The essence-energies distinction was invented in the 14th century. The pre-14th century church universally taught the absolute simplicity of God.

Saint Gregory Nazianzen defines God’s essence very simply: “what He is.” newadvent.org/fathers/310228.htm

Saint Cyril of Alexandria says, “For if one is not too poorly endowed with the decency which befits wise men, one will say that the divine being is properly and primarily simple and incomposite; one will not, dear friend, venture to think that it is composed out of nature and energy, as though, in the case of the divine, these are naturally other; one will believe that it exists as entirely one thing with all that it substantially possesses. Thus, if anyone says that his energy, that is, his Spirit, is something created and made, even while it belongs to him in a proper sense, then the Deity, surely, will be a creature, given that his operation is no other thing than he himself.” bekkos.wordpress.com/2009/06/22/st-cyril-on-divine-simplicity/

Saint Maximus the Confessor repeatedly calls the essence “uknowable”, but also says, “God has knowledge only of what is good, because He is in essence the nature and the knowledge of what is good.” Maximus, Saint. The Writings of Maximus the Confessor (Kindle Locations 2886-2887). Lulu.com. Kindle Edition. And I have already quoted Maximus as saying the righteous will ascend beyond the “energies” that Palamas refers to, and see God Himself.

Saint John of Damascus says, “In the case of God, however, it is impossible to explain what He is in His essence, and it befits us the rather to hold discourse about His absolute separation from all things. For He does not belong to the class of existing things: not that He has no existence , but that He is above all existing things, nay even above existence itself. For if all forms of knowledge have to do with what exists, assuredly that which is above knowledge must certainly be also above essence : and, conversely, that which is above essence will also be above knowledge.” newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm

 

[PluniaZ]

Those attributes are still one, they are just one in the Divine Energy. I believe that what the council is saying is akin to saying that a fire isn’t compound just because we distinguish the natural property of heat (Energy) from the essense of fire. Again this is an imperfect analogy as it involves a creature, but I hope it serves to illustrate what is meant.

In God the natural energy isn’t something added on, nor is it something that can be excised from the essence. Since God is simple the Divine Energy is God Himself, albeit God in a communicable, out-going aspect.

Yes, the councils of Constantinople changed what Palamas taught in the Triads, where he referred to a multitude of divine attributes. Constantinople instead merged all these attributes into the “one simple energy” that was taught by Saint John of Damascus.

The difference between Consantinople and Rome is that Constantinople asserts that this energy has a cause, which Constantinople refers to as “essence”. Rome maintains that the energy (which is all the divine attributes) has no cause - the energy is the essence.

 

[Ghosty]

Can you show where he says, “I am defining essence differently than Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, Saint Maximus the Confessor and Saint John of Damascus”?

If these writers are saying that essence is communicable, as you must be assuming, then the mere fact that Palamas says that it is not and yet we participate in Divinity proves that he is using it differently.

Reading the Triads should make it patently obvious that he’s using the term differently from the Latin usage, and that is sufficient for this discussion. We haven’t established that the Latin usage is the same as that of those Father’s at any rate.

Is this about understanding what was written, or about accusing a Saint of the Catholic Church of heresy?

 

[Wesrock]

Those attributes are still one, they are just one in the Divine Energy. I believe that what the council is saying is akin to saying that a fire isn’t compound just because we distinguish the natural property of heat (Energy) from the essense of fire. Again this is an imperfect analogy as it involves a creature, but I hope it serves to illustrate what is meant.

The analogy isn’t helping me. You admitted the analogy is imperfect, I would see it as compounding, with heat being a necessary accident of fire (edit: I’m not a fan of the fire analogy, as it seems to have a medieval view of fire).

But I may not be helping the topic, as I seem to be brining western thoughts into this in my own attempt to understand it philosophically when PluniaZ wishes (as I understand him) to focus more on whether this pronouncement at Constantinople is truly a development of doctrine demonstrated in the ECF/Patristic period or an invention.

 

[Ghosty]

The analogy isn’t helping me. You admitted the analogy is imperfect, I would see it as compounding, with heat being a necessary accident of fire (edit: I’m not a fan of the fire analogy, as it seems to have a medieval view of fire.

The problem we run into with this kind of discussion is that the human mind can’t work with truly simple ideas anyway. Everything of, including God, is compound in our minds when using our natural reason.

As Aquinas said (and forgive me as I’m writing on a phone and can’t provide a link) what is compound and accidental in creatures is simple and essential in God, so while we speak of things like God’s Life, God’s Knowledge, and God’s Love we make clear distinctions based on our limitations while understanding that in God these things are one. The Essence/Energy distinction is the same type of difficulty, but what is important to understand is that with an infinite, simple essence that is real and active (as opposed to being merely a static idea) the operation and activity of this essence is not something that can be removed from the definition of the essence, any more than heat can be removed from the definition of fire. Saying that God is alive and active (Energy) isn’t adding on to the definition of God, it is describing the very definition of God.

This is why I say that Divine Energy is incorporated into the definition of Divine Essence in the West, because it is truly “essential” and can’t be excised from any definition of God. The mystery in the West is placed in the question “how can the Essence be both communicable and incommunicable at the same time”, and we ultimately have to shrug our shoulders and accept the limitations of our mind. In the Palamite framework the Divine Energy is spoken of as distinct from the Divine Essence (but is always referred to as “essential energy” to emphasize that it is not some outside addition), and the mystery is placed in the question “how is the Divine Energy simple and truly Divinity Itself”, and we ultimately have to shrug our shoulders and accept the limitations of our mind.

In both cases it is affirmed that the Divine Nature is infinite, living, simple, active, and communicable. What is different is simply what we call the communicable and incommunicable aspects.

A very simple way to break it down would be to say that if it would be an accident in us, it is Divine Energy when refering to God, and it IS God and not some addition that can be removed. The Essence refers to “God as God, within God”, that which is shared Personally by the Divine Trinity.

 

[Wesrock]

Thanks, Ghosty.

At this point, I’ll stop diverting the topic to philosophy and away from the Fathers and councils.

 

[Ghosty]

Thanks, Ghosty.

At this point, I’ll stop diverting the topic to philosophy and away from the Fathers and councils.

I don’t think you’re diverting at all. In order to understand the Council we have to understand the underlying philosophy.

 

[PluniaZ]

The problem we run into with this kind of discussion is that the human mind can’t work with truly simple ideas anyway. Everything of, including God, is compound in our minds when using our natural reason.

As Aquinas said (and forgive me as I’m writing on a phone and can’t provide a link) what is compound and accidental in creatures is simple and essential in God, so while we speak of things like God’s Life, God’s Knowledge, and God’s Love we make clear distinctions based on our limitations while understanding that in God these things are one. The Essence/Energy distinction is the same type of difficulty, but what is important to understand is that with an infinite, simple essence that is real and active (as opposed to being merely a static idea) the operation and activity of this essence is not something that can be removed from the definition of the essence, any more than heat can be removed from the definition of fire. Saying that God is alive and active (Energy) isn’t adding on to the definition of God, it is describing the very definition of God.

This is why I say that Divine Energy is incorporated into the definition of Divine Essence in the West, because it is truly “essential” and can’t be excised from any definition of God. The mystery in the West is placed in the question “how can the Essence be both communicable and incommunicable at the same time”, and we ultimately have to shrug our shoulders and accept the limitations of our mind. In the Palamite framework the Divine Energy is spoken of as distinct from the Divine Essence (but is always referred to as “essential energy” to emphasize that it is not some outside addition), and the mystery is placed in the question “how is the Divine Energy simple and truly Divinity Itself”, and we ultimately have to shrug our shoulders and accept the limitations of our mind.

In both cases it is affirmed that the Divine Nature is infinite, living, simple, active, and communicable. What is different is simply what we call the communicable and incommunicable aspects.

A very simple way to break it down would be to say that if it would be an accident in us, it is Divine Energy when refering to God, and it IS God and not some addition that can be removed. The Essence refers to “God as God, within God”, that which is shared Personally by the Divine Trinity.

Yes, and this was a 14th century innovation. No one prior to the 14th century created a distinction in God, said that there is energy that proceeds from God’s essence, said that God is a union of essence and energy, and then shrugged their shoulders and said, “But it’s a mystery how God is still simple.” 14th century Constantinople didn’t even do that. They explained the simplicity by saying there is no composition between a nature and its attributes. But the Synod of Rheims had already defined 200 years earlier that God is His attributes. Constantinople simply added an apophatic cause, which is again a 14th century innovation.

 

[Ghosty]

Yes, and this was a 14th century innovation. No one prior to the 14th century created a distinction in God, said that there is energy that proceeds from God’s essence, said that God is a union of essence and energy, and then shrugged their shoulders and said, “But it’s a mystery how God is still simple.” 14th century Constantinople didn’t even do that. They explained the simplicity by saying there is no composition between a nature and its attributes. But the Synod of Rheims had already defined 200 years earlier that God is His attributes. Constantinople simply added an apophatic cause, which is again a 14th century innovation.

The Byzantine East wasn’t a party to the Council of Rheims, which itself is merely a local council. Are you here to discuss theology, or merely argue about the appropriateness of the Council of Constantinople?

If the latter then I will just say this: the Council of Rheims settled a local dispute with a local Council using local theology, and the Council of Constantinople did the same. These Councils aren’t opposed; they don’t even intersect. Beyond that I think we should leave the matter aside.