Good is not an evaluative or normative sentence.
Huh? “God is good” is clearly a normative sentence.
First, I am not sure why you claim there is Voluntarism in this view. If there is Voluntarism, then there must be a possible world where God does BAD. But such a world logically impossible. Why?
I think a distinction is in order here, between
logical truth and
necessary truth. It is a necessary (conceptual) truth that all equilateral triangles are equiangular, but this is not a logical truth. If you question this, consider the following argument:
- Triangle A is equilateral.
- Therefore, Triangle A is equiangular.
This argument is invalid: it is *logically *possible that 1 is true while 2 is false. We see this by substituting in some other terms for “equilateral” and “equiangular”.
- Triangle A is blue.
- Therefore, Triangle A is large.
The second sentence clearly does not follow from the first. Logical truth is merely a matter of form, *not *of conceptual definitions.
All this is just to say that God might be necessarily good without being good by definition.
As the maximally great being, Good must be an essential property of God.
This is where I feel that Anselm’s Ontological Argument creeps into our discussion. Here are the problems I see with that argument: (1) It moves from language to reality, instead of the other way round. You cannot simply define a being into existence. (2) Aristotle created the concept of an “essential property” to explain how things change – an essential property is a criterion for that which undergoes change. Since God does not undergo change, there is no problem of identifying the “substance” of God.
Nevertheless, I agree that there is a “fashion” of God’s existence: He is good. We might call this a property, but – since God is timeless – it is not an essential property. It is true that “anything that is not good is therefore not God” but this would be true of non-essential properties too. I have an orange shirt on; therefore, anyone who does not have an orange shirt on is not me.
But if Good is an essential property of God, there is no possible world where God exists and he does something not Good.
Well, this would certainly be true if we just said, “Anything that does bad isn’t God”, thereby rigging the deal by defining our way out of any difficulty. But I think something much more remarkable is at work. I think God and good are conceptually, not linguistically, linked.
We can imagine a way that God would be that is bad, just as we can imagine a staircase that went upward but terminated underground. But, in point of fact, up and down are metaphysically contrary to one another, just as God and evil are metaphysically contrary.
By thing, I do not mean a physical object. If one is to say “Murder is Evil” such a truth must be ontologically grounded. So either you have to say that “Murder is Evil” is just something we arbitrarily decided on or you cannot escape the need to ontologically ground the truth.
Consider the statement “the Pope is Catholic”. This sentence is true, right? When I say that it is true, I am describing something about the sentence – namely, its relationship to the world. Must we say, then, that there is some entity, Truth, without which the sentence would neither be true or false? The claim that truth is some entity – or even that truth has some ontological status – just seems utterly incomprehensible to me. And this is how I feel about goodness, as well.
What I would like to say is that the Good proceeds from the nature of God, but is not defined by God – as you said, God is the paradigm of goodness. But God does not determine what goodness is; otherwise, it would be meaningless to say that God is good.